Ex Parte Ballard et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 26, 2017

14556668 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/556,668 12/01/2014 Brian Adams Ballard 12151.0010-00000 4198
22852 7590 07/28/2017
FINNEGAN, HENDERSON, FARABOW, GARRETT & DUNNER
LLP
901 NEW YORK AVENUE, NW
WASHINGTON, DC 20001-4413
EXAMINER
LIAO, HSINCHUN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
regional-desk @ finnegan. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte BRIAN ADAMS BALLARD, JAMES LEIGHTON ATHEY,
EDWARD ROBERT ENGLISH, TODD RICHARD REILY,
HAROLD RONALD VILLANUEVA TAGUNICAR,
and
MICHAEL ANTHONY SCISCENTI
Appeal 2017-004707
Application 14/556,668
Technology Center 2600
Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, HUNG H. BUI, and JON M. JURGOVAN,
Administrative Patent Judges.
KRIVAK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—20, which are all the claims pending in the
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
Appeal 2017-004707
Application 14/556,668
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants’ invention is directed to “systems and methods for look-
initiated communication” (Title (capitalization altered)) by “establish[ing] a
communication path [with a] user [of a wearable device and] at least one
individual” (Abstract).
Independent claim 1 and dependent claim 20, reproduced below, are
exemplary of the subject matter on appeal.
1. A wearable device for establishing a
communication path with a user of the wearable device and at
least one individual, the wearable device comprising:
a display;
at least one sensor configured to provide an output
indicative of a viewing direction of the user; and
at least one processing device configured to:
monitor the viewing direction of the user based on
the output of the at least one sensor;
determine, based on the monitored viewing
direction, whether the user is looking in the direction of the at
least one individual; and
establish the communication path between the user
and the at least one individual if the user is determined to be
looking in the direction of the at least one individual.
20. The wearable device of claim 1, wherein
determining, based on the monitored viewing direction, whether
the user is looking in the direction of the at least one individual
includes:
tracking a time duration during which the gaze of the
user’s eyes is in the direction of the at least one individual; and
determining that the time duration is greater than a
predetermined dwell threshold.
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REFERENCES and REJECTIONS
(1) The Examiner rejected claims 1—8, 10—17, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Ratcliff (US 2014/0368538 Al;
published Dec. 18, 2014) (Final Act. 3).
(2) The Examiner rejected claims 9 and 18 under 35 U.S.C. § 103
based upon the teachings of Ratcliff and Bar-Zeev (US 2012/0068913 Al;
published Mar. 22, 2012) (Final Act. 6).
(3) The Examiner rejected claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 based
upon the teachings of Ratcliff and Ma (US 2011/0201295 Al; published
Aug. 18, 2011) (Final Act. 7).
ANALYSIS
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 of claims 1—8, 10—17, and 19
Appellants contend the Examiner erred in finding Ratcliff discloses all
the limitations of independent claims 1, 10, and 19 (App. Br. 6, 8).
Particularly, Appellants assert the Examiner erred in finding Ratcliff
discloses a processing device configured to “establish the communication
path between the user and the at least one individual if the user is determined
to be looking in the direction of the at least one individual” as recited in
claim 1, because Ratcliff does not teach “that a look-initiated
communication is established if a user looks in the direction of another
person;” rather, Ratcliff merely presents to the user “‘association
information’ (e.g., a[nother] person’s name, age, birthday, marital status,
and/or profession) ‘proximate to the [another] person in an augmented
reality view using . . . location information’” (App. Br. 7 (citing Ratcliff
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1112, 17, 43, and Abstract)). Appellants further contend “although Ratcliff
discloses . . . ‘determining] a person’s identity and/or determining]
association information for a person based on . . . radio-frequency
identification chip in . . . other device[s],”’ Ratcliff does not establish “a
communication path between at least two persons” or a “communication
through the radio-frequency identification chip . . . based on a determination
that the viewer is looking in the direction of another person” (Reply Br. 3
(citing Ratcliff 144); see also App. Br. 7). We do not agree.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings as our own.
Particularly, we agree with the Examiner that Ratcliff discloses a user’s
computing device (302, see Ratcliff Fig. 3) establishes a communication
path between the user and another person’s RF-enabled computing device
(311, 312) if the user is determined to be looking in the direction of that
person (Ans. 3^4 (citing Ratcliff H 43 44, 57, 69, 71, Fig. 7, items 705 and
720); see also Final Act. 4 (citing Ratcliff Fig. 3)). In particular, Ratcliff
discloses the viewer’s (user’s) computing device—worn as a pair of
glasses—“may track one or more people in the viewer’s field of view” and
“may use the radio-frequency identification chip from the [tracked] person’s
device to determine the association information for the [tracked] person” in
“direct sensing” (Ans. 2-A (citing Ratcliff H 43, 44, 57, 69)). Thus, “use of
a radio-frequency identification chip is initiated [in Ratcliff’s direct sensing
mode] if a user is looking in the direction of the person using the device
containing the radio-frequency identification chip,” and the “person’s radio­
frequency identification chip [then] transmits ‘the association information’
to the viewer who is looking in the direction of the person” (Ans. 4 (citing
Ratcliff 1144, 69, 71, Fig. 7, items 705, 720)).
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Appellants argue “Ratcliff’s radio-frequency identification chip is a
passive device, and it is always available for reading[, t]hus Ratcliffs radio­
frequency identification chip is not activated based on a looking direction of
a user” in contrast to Appellants’ device “establishing a communication path
between at least two persons” (App. Br. 7—8). We are not persuaded by
Appellants’ argument because claim 1 does not exclude a communication
path to an individual’s passive device that is always available for reading.
Additionally, Ratcliffs one-way information sharing (i.e., between the
user’s computing device and the tracked individual’s radio-frequency
identification chip) is commensurate with the broad description of
“communication path” established between individuals in Appellants’
Specification (see Ratcliff | 69; see also Spec. Tflf 198, 215).1 Further, the
Examiner relies on Ratcliff’s direct sensing mode (see Ans. 2, 4; see also
Ratcliff 57, 69), which Appellants do not address. Rather, Appellants’
arguments only address Ratcliff’s indirect sensing mode that tracks a first
person via communication with a second person (Reply Br. 2—3 (citing
Ratcliff 1 59)).
1 Appellants’ Specification describes “a wearable AR device . . . configured
to initiate and maintain a communication link with another device, such as
another AR device, a smartphone, a tablet, or other computing device,”
where “[t]he communication link may include any electronic pathway
through which two or more individuals may communicate (e.g., by speaking,
sharing information, etc.) with each other;” for example, “[t]he established
communication link may be a pathway through with[sic] user 1201 may
communicate (e.g., speaking, sharing information, etc.) with user 1202” and
“the communication link may be two-way (e.g., user 1202 can reciprocally
communicate with user 1201), although not necessarily’'’ (Spec. 198, 215
(emphasis added)).
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Thus, for the above reasons, we sustain the Examiner’s anticipation
rejection of independent claim 1, and independent claims 10 and 19 argued
for substantially the same reasons (App. Br. 8). We also sustain the
Examiner’s anticipation rejection of dependent claims 2—8 and 11—17,
argued for their dependency on claims 1 and 10 (App. Br. 8).
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claims 9 and 18
With respect to dependent claims 9 and 18, Appellants contend Bar-
Zeev fails to disclose, alone or in combination with Ratcliff, “establish[ing]
the communication path between the user and the at least one individual if
the user is determined to be looking in the direction of the at least one
individual” (App. Br. 10). However, Ratcliff was used in rejecting these
claim 1 limitations. As we agree with the Examiner that Ratcliff discloses
these limitations, and no substantive arguments were provided rebutting the
Examiner’s findings with respect to Bar-Zeev, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 9 and 18 as obvious over the combination of
Ratcliff and Bar-Zeev (Final Act. 6—7; see also Ans. 4).
Rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 of claim 20
With respect to dependent claim 20, the Examiner finds (1) Ratcliffs
monitoring a “length of time of the electronic communication” tracks a time
duration during which the gaze of the user’s eyes is in the direction of an
individual, and (2) Ma’s monitoring a timer threshold “uses time duration to
verify data call just like appellant using time duration to verily gazing
direction” (Ans. 5 (citing Ratcliff | 68, Ma, Abstract, || 9, 48, 51); see also
Final Act. 7).
Appellants argue “Ratcliff’s length of time of electronic
communication is not ‘a time duration during which the gaze of the user’s
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eyes is in the direction of the at least one individual’” as recited in claim 20;
rather, Ratcliff merely characterizes electronic communication “based on . . .
length of time of the electronic communication, such as how long the
electronic communication has been in place” (App. Br. 11 (citing Ratcliff
1 68)). Appellants also argue Ma does not remedy this deficiency of Ratcliff
because “Ma’s predetermined time period is not ‘a time duration during
which the gaze of the user’s eyes is in the direction of the at least one
individual’” (Reply Br. 4).
We agree with Appellants neither Ratcliff nor Ma discloses “tracking
a time duration during which the gaze of the user’s eyes is in the direction of
the at least one individual,” as recited in claim 20. Particularly, Ratcliff’s
characterizing electronic communication based on the length of time of the
electronic communication, such as how long the electronic communication
has been in place, cannot be reasonably construed as teaching tracking a
time duration during which the gaze of the user’s eyes is in a direction of an
individual (App. Br. 11). Further, “Ma’s ‘predetermined time duration
threshold’ ... is [merely] related to a duration in which the data call is
maintained as active” (Reply Br. 4 (citing Ma ^fl[ 48, 51)).
As the Examiner has not identified sufficient evidence to support the
rejection of dependent claim 20, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of this claim.
DECISION
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1—8, 10-17, and 19 under
35 U.S.C. § 102 is affirmed.
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The Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 9 and 18 under
35 U.S.C. § 103 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s decision rejecting claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is
reversed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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