Ex Parte Atwood

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 13, 2018

13615161 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 13, 2018)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/615,161 09/13/2012 Sherilyn ATWOOD 5059P 2560
29141 7590 03/15/2018
Brundidge & Stanger, P.C./SLG
1925 BAT .TENDER AVENUE, STE. 560
Alexandria, VA 22314
EXAMINER
LUDWIG, PETER L
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3687
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/15/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mail@brundidge-stanger.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SHERILYN ATWOOD
Appeal 2016-008070
Application 13/615,1611
Technology Center 3600
Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, LARRY J. HUME, and
JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges.
CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Final Rejection of claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20, which are all of the claims
pending in this application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.
1 According to Appellant, the real party in interest is Ittavi, Inc. App. Br. 3.
Appeal 2016-008070
Application 13/615,161
INVENTION
Appellant’s application “relates to computer-implemented support
systems, and more particularly, to a child support management system.”
Spec. 12. Claim 1 is representative and reads as follows:
1. A computer-implemented method for facilitating child
support management, the computer-implemented method
comprising:
providing a child support management computer system
that includes a central repository to store joint documents,
wherein the child support management computer system enables
direct communication between two parties via any of a web,
mobile, and tablet based social networking platform;
managing expenses incurred by each of the two parties by
the child support management system, wherein the expenses are
organized by an expenses module into a reoccurring expense
section and an additional expense section, wherein the expenses
module provides a plurality of actions including archiving,
editing, deleting, and disputing, wherein the disputing provides
a dispute form to enable each of the two parties to dispute any of
the expenses by logging and sharing dispute form notes with the
other one of the two parties;
facilitating payments made by each of the two parties
directly to any of the other one of the two parties and a third party
by the child support management computer system, wherein the
payments are organized by a history module into a past due
payment section, a pending payment section, and a historical
payment section, wherein the historical payment section is
sortable by payment date, payee name, payee type, merchant
name, merchant type, and category, wherein the other one of the
two parties is notified of the payments made directly to the third
party; and
automatically calculating, by the child support
management computer system, an amount owed by each of the
two parties based on the payments made, wherein the amount
owed is communicated by the child support management
computer system to each of the two parties.
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REJECTIONS
Claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the claimed invention is directed to subject matter that is judicially-
excepted from patent eligibility. Final Act. 2.
Claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over the combination of Wilkins at al. (US 2010/0318450
Al; published Dec. 16, 2010) (“Wilkins”) and Carolan et al. (US
2004/0172279 Al; Sept. 2, 2004) (“Carolan”). Final Act. 3.
ANALYSIS
Rejection of Claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101
Under 35 U.S.C. § 101, an invention is patent-eligible if it claims a
“new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.”
35 U.S.C. § 101. The Supreme Court, however, has long interpreted § 101
to include an implicit exception: “[ljaws of nature, natural phenomena, and
abstract ideas” are not patentable. See, e.g., Alice Corp. Pty Ltd. v. CLS
Bank Inti 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2354 (2014).
The Supreme Court in Alice reiterated the two-step framework
previously set forth in Mayo Collaborative Services v. Prometheus
Laboratories, Inc., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1300 (2012), “for distinguishing patents
that claim laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas from those
that claim patent-eligible applications of these concepts.” Alice, 134 S. Ct.
at 2355. The first step in that analysis is to “determine whether the claims at
issue are directed to one of those patent-ineligible concepts,” e.g., to an
abstract idea. Id. If the claims are not directed to an abstract idea, the
inquiry ends. Otherwise, the inquiry proceeds to the second step where the
elements of the claims are considered “individually and ‘as an ordered
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Application 13/615,161
combination’” to determine whether there are additional elements that
‘“transform the nature of the claim’ into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2355 (quoting Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1297).
The Court acknowledged in Mayo that “all inventions at some level
embody, use, reflect, rest upon, or apply laws of nature, natural phenomena,
or abstract ideas.” Mayo, 132 S. Ct. at 1293. We, therefore, look to whether
the claims focus on a specific means or method that improves the relevant
technology or are instead directed to a result or effect that itself is the
abstract idea and merely invoke generic processes and machinery. See
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1336 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Here, each of independent claims 1 and 11 requires: 1) managing
expenses incurred by the child support management system; 2) facilitating
payment made by the parties; and 3) automatically calculating an amount
owed by each of the parties. App. Br. 18 (Claim 1). The Examiner
concluded claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 are directed to an abstract idea—
facilitating child support management between parties. Final Act. 2,
Ans. 10. The Examiner also found the claims do not recite limitations that
amount to “significantly more” than the abstract idea because the generically
recited computer elements do not add a meaningful limitation to the abstract
idea, and the functions performed by the computer elements are routine,
conventional, and well-known to an artisan of ordinary skill. Ans. 10.
Applying the first step of the Alice analysis, we agree with the
Examiner that claim 1 is directed to an abstract idea. See Ans. 10—11.
Managing expenses, facilitating payments, and calculating amounts owed
are longstanding practices that existed well before the advent of computers
and the Internet, and could be carried out by a human as mental steps, with
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the aid of pen and paper. See CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc.,
654 F.3d 1366, 1375 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (“That purely mental processes can be
unpatentable, even when performed by a computer, was precisely the
holding of the Supreme Court in Gottschalk v. Benson.'''’).
Courts have held other patent claims ineligible for reciting similar
abstract concepts. For example, although the Supreme Court has altered the
§101 analysis since CyberSource in cases like Mayo and Alice, they
continue to “treat[ ] analyzing information by steps people go through in
their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without more, as essentially
mental processes within the abstract-idea category.” Synopsys, Inc. v.
Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138, 1146-47 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (alteration
in original) (quoting Elec. Power Grp., LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1354 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). The claims here are similar to those found patent
ineligible in Electric Power, which “treated analyzing information by steps
people go through in their minds, or by mathematical algorithms, without
more, as essentially mental processes within the abstract-idea category.”
Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1354.
We also refer to Content Extraction, where the Federal Circuit
provided additional guidance on the issue of statutory subject matter by
holding claims to collecting data, recognizing certain data within the
collected data set, and storing that recognized data in memory were directed
to an abstract idea and therefore unpatentable under § 101. Content
Extraction & Transmission LLC v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., 116 F.3d 1343
(Fed. Cir. 2014). Similarly, here we find claim 1 involves nothing more than
managing and organizing parties’ expenses, organizing payments, and
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calculating amounts owed by the parties —fundamental activities squarely
within the realm of abstract ideas.
For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 is directed
to an abstract idea.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claims 1 and 11
are not directed to a fundamental economic practice, a method of organizing
human activities, an idea of itself, or a mathematical relationship or formula,
and instead describe detailed method steps for managing child support
payments and incurred expenses online between the two parents and a
variety of third parties. See App. Br. 9. The category of abstract ideas is not
limited to economic or commercial practices or methods of organizing
human activity. Intellectual Ventures ILLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d
1307, 1313 (Fed. Cir. 2016). The Supreme Court has not delimited the
precise contours of the “abstract ideas” category. Content Extraction, 116
F.3d at 1346 (quoting Alice Corp., 134 S. Ct. at 2357). Courts have treated
collecting information, including when limited to particular content (which
does not change its character as information), as within the realm of abstract
ideas. Elec. Power, 830 F.3d at 1353.
Turning to the second step of the Alice analysis, we find nothing
sufficient to remove the claims from the class of subject matter ineligible for
patenting. There is no indication in the record that any specialized computer
hardware or other “inventive” computer components are required in claim 1.
Claim 1 merely employs generic computer components to perform generic
computer functions, i.e., collecting, storing, and processing information,
which is not enough to transform an abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.
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We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 recites
significantly more than the abstract idea because it discloses a computer
system, central repository, and network center (App. Br. 7), and also
improves management of online child support payments {id. at 8). The
Examiner found the generically-recited computer elements (i.e., the elements
that purportedly include “significantly more” than the underlying abstract
idea, according to Appellant) perform functions that are routine,
conventional, and well-understood to one of ordinary skill in the computer
art. Ans. 13. Appellant has not persuasively rebutted those findings.
Moreover, claim 1 does not purport to improve the functioning of the
computer system itself. Nor does it effect an improvement in any other
technology or technical field.
For these reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 101 rejection
of claim 1, as well as claims 2—6, 8—16, and 18—20, not argued separately.
Rejection of Claims 1—6, 8—16, and 18—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
In rejecting claim 1 for obviousness, the Examiner found Wilkins
teaches or suggests all of the recited limitations, except “wherein the child
support management computer system enables direct communication
between two parties via any of a web, mobile, and tablet based social
networking platform,” “facilitating payments made by each of the two
parties directly to any of the other one of the two parties and a third party by
the child support management computer system, wherein the other one of
the two parties is notified of the payments made directly to the third party,”
and “disputes include logging and sharing dispute form notes with the other
one of the two parties.” Final Act. 3—5 (emphasis omitted). The Examiner
relied on Carolan as teaching or suggesting those limitations. Id. at 5—7.
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Appellant first contends the Examiner erred because the cited portions
of Wilkens do not teach the limitation “managing expenses incurred by each
of the two parties by the child support management system.” App. Br. 10—
11. In particular, Appellant argues that in Figure 16 of Wilkens, such
expenses are merely presented to help calculate the child support payment
owed by the non-custodial parent to the custodial parent and are not
representative of distinct expenses that have been “incurred by each of the
two parties,” as recited in claim 1. App. Br. 11.
Appellant’s arguments do not persuade us of error. The Examiner
found Figures 15 and 16 teach receiving data relating to at least one of a
non-custodial patent and a custodial parent using a network. Ans. 15. The
Examiner found that, when the system receives data relating to at least one
of noncustodial parent and custodial parent, the system manages expenses of
both parents. Id. Appellant has not filed a Reply Brief to rebut the
Examiner’s responsive clarifications and findings in the Answer.
Appellant further contends Carolan does not teach the limitation
“wherein the disputing provides a dispute form to enable each of the two
parties to dispute any of the expenses by logging and sharing dispute form
notes with the other one of the two parties,” recited in claim 1. App. Br. 13.
Appellant argues the pre-expense incurring parenting plan feature of Carolan
does not teach or suggest the post-expense incurring dispute form feature of
claim 1. Id.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because Appellant
argues the references separately. The Examiner relied on both Carolan and
Wilkins to teach the disputed “wherein” clause. Ans. 16. The test for
obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly suggested in
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any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject matter
would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light of the
combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425
(CCPA 1981). We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments because
Appellant argues limitations not recited in claim 1, i.e. pre-expense and post­
expense.
Appellant also contends Wilkins does not teach or suggest a “history
module” that organizes payments into specific sections that comprise each of
a past due payment section, a pending payment section, and a historical
payment section that is sortable by payment date, payee name, payee type,
merchant name, merchant type, and category, as claim 1 requires. App.
Br. 13—14. Appellant argues Wilkins Figure 14 “merely discloses when the
payment has been received, the payment amount, the amount retained, and
the amount disbursed to the custodial parent.” Id. at 14.
We are not persuaded of error. The Examiner relied on teachings in
Figures 10-13 and paragraphs 99 and 314 of Wilkins as teaching or
suggesting the disputed limitation. Ans. 18—19. We find Appellant’s single
statement about Figure 14 is insufficient to rebut the Examiner’s findings
with regard to the disputed limitation. Moreover, Appellant’s argument is
conclusory, merely reciting the claim limitation, the alleged teachings of
Wilkins, and stating that the two are not the same. See App. Br. 13—14.
Rule 41.37 “require [s] more substantive arguments in an appeal brief than a
mere recitation of the claim elements and a naked assertion that the
corresponding elements were not found in the prior art.” In re Lovin, 652
F.3d 1349, 1357 (Fed. Cir. 2011).
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Finally, Appellant contends Wilkins does not teach or suggest “an
expenses module” that organizes expenses into specific sections that
comprise each of a reoccurring expense section and an additional expense
section and that enables a plurality of specific actions that can be taken
regarding each of the expenses including archiving, editing, deleting, and
disputing actions. App. Br. 15. Appellant argues “Wilkins merely discloses
a way to calculate the amount owed related to certain expenses.” Id. at 15—
16 (citing Wilkins Fig. 16).
Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive because they do not address
all of the Examiner’s findings related to the disputed limitation. For
example, in the Final Action, the Examiner found Wilkins Figure 23 teaches
or suggests the “disputing” limitations, and Figure 14 teaches or suggests the
“archiving” limitation. Final Act. 4. Moreover, Appellant has not
persuasively explained why Wilkins Figure 16 does not teach or suggest the
“editing” and “deleting” limitations, or that expenses are organized by an
expense module into a recurring expense section, as the Examiner found.
See id.
For these reasons, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in finding
the combination of Wilkins and Carolan teaches or suggests the disputed
limitations of claim 1.
Accordingly, we sustain the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 1, as well as the 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of
independent claim 11, which Appellant argues is patentable for similar
reasons. App. Br. 16. We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claims 2—6, 8—10, 12—16, and 18—20, for which Appellant makes
no separate arguments for patentability. Id.
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DECISION
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1—6, 8—16,
and 18—20 as directed to judicially-excepted subject matter under § 101.
We affirm the decision of the Examiner rejecting claims 1—6, 8—16,
and 18—20 for obviousness under § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See
37 C.F.R. §41.50(f).
AFFIRMED
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