Ex Parte Attwood et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Apr 26, 2017

10742876 (P.T.A.B. Apr. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
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APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
P150273 6830
EXAMINER
TANG, KAREN C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2447
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
10/742,876 12/23/2003
71949 7590 04
CROSE LAW LLC
112 NORTHBROOKE TRACE
WOODSTOCK, GA 30188
Daren William Attwood
04/27/2017 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DAREN WILLIAM ATTWOOD and
TIMOTHY EDMUND HASTINGS
Appeal 2017-000337
Application 10/742,876
Technology Center 2400
Before CAROLYN D. THOMAS, BRADLEY W. BAUMEISTER, and
SHARON FENICK, Administrative Patent Judges.
THOMAS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellants seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the
Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4—9, and 11—16, all the pending
claims in the present application. Claims 3 and 10 are canceled. See Claims
Appendix. We have jurisdiction over the appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
The present invention relates generally to allowing distributed
software applications to remain in synchronization with the current state of a
system of data objects. See Spec. 1:6—8.
Appeal 2017-000337
Application 10/742,876
Claim 1 is illustrative:
1. A distributed event notification system,
comprising:
a server comprising a data synchronization server
component;
a plurality of objects stored in a server database at
the server;
a plurality of client machines, each client machine
comprising:
a data synchronization client component, and
an application located on the client machine,
wherein the application on any of the plurality of client
machines can perform an action on any object in the plurality of
objects; and
a network through which the server and the
plurality of client machines may communicate,
wherein each data synchronization client
component and the data synchronization server component
perform[s] data synchronization over the network so that, when
the action has been taken by the application at one of the
plurality of client machines, a notification of the action is sent
to the data synchronization server component, after which the
data synchronization server component notifies each data
synchronization client component having a registered interest in
the object that the action has been performed, and
wherein the application or the component of the
client machine dynamically registers or removes an interest in
an object type, a specific object, or an action performed on an
object by using the system.
Appellants appeal the following rejections:
Rl. Claims 1, 2, 4—9, 11, and 13—15 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Robertson (US 6,269,369 Bl, July 31,
2001), Mellen-Gamett (US 7,020,880 B2, Mar. 28, 2006), and Stoodley
(US 2004/0078236 Al, Apr. 22, 2004); and
R2. Claims 12 and 16 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
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Application 10/742,876
unpatentable over Robertson, Nixon (US 2003/0004952 Al, Jan. 2, 2003)
and Jay (US 2003/0050802 Al, Mar. 13, 2003).
ANALYSIS
Issue: Did the Examiner err in finding that Robertson teaches or
suggests an application on any of the plurality of client machines can
perform an action on any object in the plurality of objects, as set forth in
claim 1?
Appellants contend that “[tjhere is no disclosure, teaching or
suggestion in Robertson . . . that would indicate that these systems are
capable of allowing any client machine to perform an action on any object.
. . . all of the systems described in Robertson require user-restrictions (App.
Br. 5). Appellants further contend that Robertson “in fact teach[es] away
from the instant claims since [it is] directed to systems which restrict user
access to information and changing of information” {id. at 6) and because
the “[t]he client machines in Robertson are thus user-restricted machines
which only permit the user of the machine to modify the user’s own
information” {id. at 7).
In response, the Examiner explains that Robertson discloses “where
any clients machines [sic] ‘view/download/access’ the information from the
server . . . (clients can view any of the objects information in the categories
tables/plurality of objects . . .) (Ans. 13) and the “user ‘can’ elect[] to
receive notifications on all the objects that is changed in the system” {id.
at 14). We agree with the Examiner.
As an initial matter, the Examiner highlights, and we agree, that “the
limitations at issue[] only [recite] that the client machines ‘can’ perform an
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Application 10/742,876
action on any object. . . but the client machines do[] not ‘actually’ perform
action on any object” (Ans. 16) (see claim 1). In other words, claim 1
merely recites that the application can perform an action. We have
previously held that findings made by an Examiner’s need not show a prior
art relied upon teaches or suggests a conditional/optional step (e.g., “can
be”) recited in a claim. See Ex parte Katz, 2011 WL 514314, *4 (BPAI
2011) (non-precedential) (citing In re Am. Acad. ofSci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004)). See also MPEP § 2111.04 (claim scope is not
limited by claim language that suggests or makes optional, yet does not
require steps to be performed). For example, claim 1 merely recites “the
application on any of the plurality of client machines can perform an action
on any object in the plurality of objects” (see claim 1) (emphasis added), not
that the application is actually performing an action on any object.
As a result, the Examiner merely needs to show that in Robertson’s
system an application on any of the client machines is capable of performing
an action on any object stored in a server database. To illustrate this, the
Examiner points out, and we agree, that when there are no restrictions
provided, “Robertson’s system application has the ability to conduct ‘an
action’ on any object in the plurality of objects” since the restriction features
is only dependent on user preferences (see Final Act. 2; see also Ans. 14).
In other words, the user’s preference in Robertson can allow all other
users to perform an action (i.e., view/access the user’s information on a
server) on any object (“The personal contact manager system allows each
user to specify on an individual basis which of their contacts are permitted to
access respective datums of their user information” (Robertson, Abstract)).
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Application 10/742,876
The mere fact that some users can be restricted does not dismiss the
possibility that none of the users are restricted.
Thus, we find unavailing Appellants’ contention that Robertson is
“directed to systems which restrict user access to information and changing
of information” {see App. Br. 6), given the aforementioned preference
driven disclosure in Robertson. We further note that claim 1 does not
require modifying of information as argued by Appellants (App. Br. 7), but
merely requires that the application “perform an action,” which we find
reasonably includes merely accessing/viewing an object.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1.
Appellants’ arguments regarding the Examiner’s rejection of independent
claims 8 and 12 rely on the same arguments as for claim 1, and Appellants
do not argue separate patentability for the dependent claims. See App. Br.
4—9. We therefore also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 2, 4—9,
and 11—16.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s § 103(a) rejections R1 and R2.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
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