11437016 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2014)

Ex Parte Anschutz

Patent Trials and Appeals BoardDec 23, 2014

11437016 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 23, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 11/437,016 05/18/2006 Thomas Anschutz 050298 8214 38516 7590 12/23/2014 AT&T Legal Department - SZ Attn: Patent Docketing Room 2A-207 One AT&T Way Bedminster, NJ 07921 EXAMINER ABEDIN, NORMIN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2449 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 12/23/2014 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte THOMAS ANSCHUTZ ____________ Appeal 2012-007920 Application 11/437,016 Technology Center 2400 ____________ Before CARLA M. KRIVAK, JEFFREY S. SMITH, and CHARLES J. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judges. BOUDREAU, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellant Thomas Anschutz 1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s Final Rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, and 15–20. 2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We affirm. 1 Appellant identifies AT&T Intellectual Property I, L.P. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. 2 Claims 3, 10, 13, and 14 have been canceled. App. Br. 1. Appeal 2012-007920 Application 11/437,016 2 STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant’s claimed invention “generally relates to interactive video distribution systems and to computers and, more particularly, to synchronized media experiences.” Spec. ¶ 2. Independent claim 1, reproduced below, is representative of the subject matter on appeal. 1. A method for synchronizing a media experience, comprising: receiving a request at a server sent from a host device, the request identifying an invitee device for a shared video-on- demand collaborative session; sending a session invitation from the server to the invitee device, the session invitation identifying content to be collaboratively shared during the video-on-demand collaborative session, a name of the host device, a start time of the video-on-demand collaborative session, and a stop time of the video-on-demand collaborative session; receiving a session confirmation at the server sent from the invitee device; sending a session acknowledgment from the server to the host device to confirm the video-on-demand collaborative session; streaming a content stream from a media content server to the host device and to the invitee device; establishing a common control between the host device and the invitee device; receiving the common control at the server; and sending an instruction from the server to the media content server to synchronously control the content stream to the host device and to the invitee device. Appeal 2012-007920 Application 11/437,016 3 Claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, and 15–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schneider (US 2006/0053195 A1; published Mar. 9, 2006) and Kinney (US 5,808,662; issued Sept. 15, 1998). Ans. 4–14. ANALYSIS The Examiner finds Schneider discloses all elements of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, with the exception of explicit disclosure that the collaborative session is a video-on-demand collaborative session and that the shared content is streamed from a media content server, as recited in claim 1, and similar limitations recited in claims 8 and 15. Ans. 5–6, 10–14. The Examiner finds those remaining elements are nonetheless taught by Kinney. Id. at 6–7, 12–13. Appellant argues “[t]he proposed combination of Schneider with Kinney fails to teach or suggest all the features recited by independent claim 1.” App. Br. 7. Specifically, Appellant contends: Independent claim 1, for example, recites “streaming a content stream from a media content server to the host device and to the invitee device.” The Examiner contends that Schneider with Kinney teaches these features, and the Examiner specifically cites to portions of Schneider. The Examiner is mistaken. . . . Schneider expressly states that only “miniature screen shots” are sent from a server to different client devices. These “miniature screen shots” are static and are not logically or reasonably equivalent to “a content stream,” as independent claim 1 recites. When Schneider is correctly interpreted, independent claim 1 cannot be obvious over Schneider with Kinney. The Examiner has thus erred in finding independent claim 1 is obvious over Schneider with Kinney. Appeal 2012-007920 Application 11/437,016 4 Id. at 7–8. Throughout the remainder of the discussion of claim 1 in the Appeal Brief, Appellant addresses specific portions of Schneider but does not specifically address the portions of Kinney upon which the Examiner relies. See id. at 8–12. With respect to independent claim 8, Appellant asserts, again without any discussion of the cited portions of Kinney, that “the proposed combination of Schneider with Kinney expressly states that only a static ‘miniature screen shot’ is shared with client devices,” and that “[b]ecause this ‘miniature screen shot’ is static and NOT equivalent to ‘stream[ing] content,’ the Examiner has erred in finding independent claim 8 is obvious over Schneider with Kinney.” Id. at 12. Appellant’s argument with respect to independent claim 15 is similar. See id. at 12–13. Appellant’s arguments are not persuasive of Examiner error. As stated above, each of the claims is rejected over the combination of Schneider and Kinney. The Examiner expressly finds that “Schneider . . . did not explicitly disclose . . . that the shared content is streamed form [sic] a media content server,” whereas “Kenney [sic] . . . in the same field of endeavor teaches a video-on-demand collaborative session wherein the shared content is streamed form [sic] a media content server . . . .” Final Rejection 7, 12, and 14. Accordingly, Appellant’s arguments regarding the teachings of Schneider alone are unpersuasive. See In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 426 (CCPA 1981) (“One cannot show non-obviousness by attacking Appeal 2012-007920 Application 11/437,016 5 references individually where . . . the rejections are based on combinations of references.”). 3 Accordingly, we affirm the rejection of independent claims 1, 8, and 15, as well as the rejection of dependent claims 2, 4–7, 9, 11, 12, and 16–20, argued to be patentable on the same grounds as independent claims 1, 8, and 15 (see App. Br. 13–15), under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Schneider and Kinney. DECISION We affirm the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 4–9, 11, 12, and 15–20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Schneider and Kinney. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). AFFIRMED lv 3 We note Appellant presents an argument directed to Kinney in the Reply Brief. See Reply Br. 2–3. Because Appellant has not shown good cause explaining why that argument could not have been presented in the opening Appeal Brief, that argument is deemed waived and will not be considered. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) (2011) (second sentence); Ex parte Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834, 1837 (BPAI 2010) (explaining that any argument not timely presented in the principal brief on appeal will not be considered when filed in a reply brief, absent a showing of good cause explaining why the argument could not have been presented in the principal brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473, 1474 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (“[T]he reply brief [is not] an opportunity to make arguments that could have been made in the principal brief on appeal to rebut the Examiner’s rejections, but were not.”).