Ex Parte Angle et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 20, 2017

14039256 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 20, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/039,256 09/27/2013 Colin Angle 09945-0121002/CC-03B
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108858 7590 06/22/2017
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EXAMINER
P.O. Box 1022
Minneapolis, MN 55440-1022
KONG, SZE-HON
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/22/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
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PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte COLIN ANGLE, CLARA VU, MATTHEW CROSS, and
TONY L. CAMPBELL
(Applicant: iRobot Corporation)
Appeal 2016-007752
Application 14/039,25 61
Technology Center 3600
Before JOHN A. EVANS, LARRY J. HUME, and SCOTT B. HOWARD,
Administrative Patent Judges.
HOWARD, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Final Rejection
of claims 10—23, which constitute all of the claims pending in this
application. Claims 1—9 have been cancelled. App. Br. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm-in-part.
1 Appellant identifies iRobot Corporation as the real party in interest. App.
Br. 1.
Appeal 2016-007752
Application 14/039,256
THE INVENTION
The disclosed and claimed inventions are directed to a companion
robot for personal interaction. Claim 10, reproduced below, is illustrative of
the claimed subject matter:
10. A method performed by a robotic system including a
mobile robot comprising a camera, the method comprising:
segmenting a map of a household into a plurality of areas
each having a room identity;
causing a display device to display, to a user, a plurality of
room identity markers; and
for at least two of the room identities:
causing the display device to display, to the user, an
image taken by the robot with the camera in the area of the
household corresponding to the room identity;
receiving, using at least one processor remote from
the mobile robot, a selection from the user of a room
identity marker from the displayed plurality of room
identity markers; and
assigning the selected room identity marker to the
room identity; and
causing a drive system of the mobile robot to follow a
planned path in a privacy mode, avoiding obstacles unanticipated
in the planned path while image data from the camera is
inaccessible to the user on the display device, to at least one
position within the household corresponding to a designation of
a destination room identity marker; and
enabling image display on the display device in response
to the robot reaching a position within the household
corresponding to a designation of a destination identity marker.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner as evidence in rejecting the
claims on appeal is:
REFERENCES
Suzuki
Kanayama
US 2003/0229474 A1 Dec. 11, 2003
US 2005/0231357 A1 Oct. 20, 2005
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Application 14/039,256
REJECTION
Claims 10-23 stand rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Suzuki and Kanayama. Final Act. 3—9.
ANALYSIS
We have reviewed the Examiner’s rejection in light of Appellant’s
arguments that the Examiner erred. In reaching this decision, we have
considered all evidence presented and all arguments made by Appellant. We
are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding claims 10—22.
However, we are persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that, on the current
record, the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 23.
Claims 10—22
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in finding the combination of
Suzuki and Kanayama teaches or suggests the “causing a drive system” step
recited in claim 1. App. Br. 3—6; Reply Br. 1—3. More specifically,
Appellant argues Suzuki does not describe: (1) “a privacy mode in which
image data from a camera is inaccessible to a user on a display device”; (2)
movement “of the robot 11 as being in a privacy mode while image data
from the camera is inaccessible to a user on a display Device”; and (3)
“avoiding unanticipated obstacles while image data from the camera is
inaccessible.” App. Br. 4. Appellant further argues Kanayama does not
describe: (1) “any planned path followed by such a robot or the camera
1 a/lb”; (2) “a mobile robot following a planned path in a privacy mode
while image data is inaccessible to a user on a display device”; and
(3) “obstacle avoidance along a planned path, let alone obstacle avoidance
while image data is inaccessible.” App. Br. 5.
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Application 14/039,256
Moreover, Appellant argues that, absent any hindsight, the
combination of Suzuki and Kanayama “would not move to the monitoring
position in a privacy mode while restricting image data from a display
device, as suggested in the rejection.” App. Br. 5. And, according to
Appellant, in the proposed combination, “Suzuki’s robot 11 would not avoid
unanticipated obstacles while the image data from the camera is inaccessible
to the user on the display device.” Id. at 6. That is, because, according to
Appellant, “Suzuki’s robot 11 avoids obstacles during its movement to the
monitoring position” and, with the image pickup turned off, “would not
account for unanticipated deviations in a planned path due to obstacle
avoidance.” Id. (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner finds Suzuki teaches all of the limitations of the claims
except for those related to the privacy mode. Final Act. 3. The Examiner
further finds Kanayama teaches a privacy mode for a mobile unit during
which mode “image pickup unit is restricted to pickup images based on the
designated area.” Id. at 4. The Examiner further finds it would have been
obvious to a person of ordinary skill in the art to modify “Suzuki to restrict
recording and/or displaying any image data outside predetermined area and
allow recoding of image data within predetermined area or when the robot
reach the position with designated permission, taught by Kanayama to
address privacy concerns with images pickup by the robot at user designed
positions.” Id. The Examiner further finds that during the period the camera
is not picking up images, the modified robot would continue to use its
“obstacle avoidance function.” Ans. 4.
Nonobviousness cannot be established by attacking the references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon a combination of prior art
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Application 14/039,256
disclosures. In re Merck & Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The
test for obviousness is not whether the claimed invention is expressly
suggested in any one or all of the references, but whether the claimed subject
matter would have been obvious to those of ordinary skill in the art in light
of the combined teachings of those references. In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413,
425 (CCPA 1981). Accordingly, to the extent Appellant’s arguments focus
on the reference individually and not the combined teachings, we are not
persuaded the Examiner erred.
Furthermore, “[t]he test for obviousness is not whether the features of
a secondary reference may be bodily incorporated into the structure of the
primary reference.” Id. Instead, the relevant issue is “what the combined
teachings of the references would have suggested to those of ordinary skill
in the art.” Id. “Combining the teachings of references does not involve an
ability to combine their specific structures.” In re Nievelt, 482 F.2d 965, 968
(CCPA 1973); see also In reMouttet, 686 F.3d 1322, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2012)
(“It is well-established that a determination of obviousness based on
teachings from multiple references does not require an actual, physical
substitution of elements.”). Accordingly, to the extent Appellant’s
arguments are directed to the bodily incorporation of the references, we are
not persuaded the Examiner erred.
Finally, we are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments that turning
off the image pickup in Suzuki’s robot would result in a robot that is unable
to avoid unanticipated obstacles. Specifically, Suzuki does not rely
exclusively on the images from the camera to avoid obstacles. Instead,
Suzuki also teaches using an ultrasonic sensor to monitor its position and
avoid obstacles. Suzuki 1194. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s arguments,
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Application 14/039,256
even if the camera no longer picks up an image, the ultrasonic sensor will
still allow the robot to avoid obstacles. Therefore, we are not persuaded by
Appellant’s arguments that the Examiner erred. Instead, we agree with and
adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10, along
with the rejections of claims 11—22, which are not argued separately.
Claim 23
Appellant argues neither of the cited references teach “disabling
image availability by moving the camera to an image-disabling position
under certain conditions, and moving the camera to an image-enabling
position under other conditions, as required by claim 23.” App. Br. 6—7; see
also Reply Br. 4—5. According to Appellant, although “Kanayama describes
a number of ways to disable a camera, such as simply turning the power off
(see, e.g., Tflf [0022] and [0062]), there is no suggestion of moving the
camera to image-disabling and image-enabling positions.” App. Br. 7.
Appellant also argues because the Examiner’s analysis does not consider
whether there is a “a finite number of known, predictable solutions to this
problem” or sufficiently explain why “one of ordinary skill in the art would
have had any reason to incorporate all of the mechanisms required to move
the camera between different positions instead of simply turning the camera
power off as suggested,” the Examiner failed to establish the elements
required for an obvious to try analysis. Id. (citing MPEP 2143(I)(E)).
The Examiner finds that Kanayama teaches “various methods for
restricting the image pickup operation can be performed including causing
the image not viewable, locking power to the image pickup unit.” Final
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Application 14/039,256
Act. 8 (citing Kanayama 12, 13, 18, 22, 23, 46—50). The Examiner
further finds, in light of those teachings, that it would have been obvious to
try modifying “Suzuki to move the camera to an image-disabling position
when the robot is located outside the predetermined area and moving the
camera to an image-enabling position when the robot is located inside the
predetermined area using the concept of ways to restrict image pickup
operation.” Final Act. 9. The Examiner also finds that modification “would
provide with the same predictable result of restricting the image pickup
operation for address privacy concerns with images pickup by the robot at
user designed positions.” Id. (citing Kanayama 5, 14).
“When there is a design need or market pressure to solve a problem
and there are a finite number of identified, predictable solutions, a person of
ordinary skill has good reason to pursue the known options within his or her
technical grasp.” KSRInt’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 421 (2007).
“In that instance the fact that a combination was obvious to try might show
that it was obvious under § 103.” Id.
As Appellant argues, Kanayama teaches several different ways for
preventing image-pickup:
In the step (iii), when it is determined in the step (ii) that the self-
location is outside of the predetermined area, the image pickup
operation of the image pickup section is restricted by supplying
an electrical signal and the like. The restriction of the image
pickup operation can be performed in various ways. For
instance, the image being picked up is caused not to be
viewable, by not accepting the input from an image pickup
button, locking the power supply to the image pickup
equipment to the off state, performing a mosaic process,
deleting (discarding) image data, and converting the image
data to solid-black or solid-white image.
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Application 14/039,256
Kanayama 122 (emphasis added). Although Kanayama teaches a finite
number of solutions with predictable results, none of those solutions teach or
suggest moving the camera between an image-enabling position and an
image-disabling position as recited in claim 23. See id. Accordingly, based
on the current record, the Examiner has not provided sufficient “articulated
reasoning with some rational underpinning” to support the finding that the
person of ordinary skill in the art would select one of the methods not taught
by Kanayama. See Kahn, 441 F.3dat988.
Accordingly, we agree with Appellant that the Examiner’s finding that
it would have been obvious to try moving the camera between an image­
enabling position and an image-disabling position is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. See In re Caveney, 761 F.2d 671, 674 (Fed.
Cir. 1985) (Examiner’s burden of proving non-patentability is by a
preponderance of the evidence); see also In re Warner, 379 F.2d 1011, 1017
(CCPA 1967) (“The Patent Office has the initial duty of supplying the
factual basis for its rejection. It may not, because it may doubt that the
invention is patentable, resort to speculation, unfounded assumptions or
hindsight reconstruction to supply deficiencies in its factual basis.”).
Accordingly, we are constrained on this record to reverse the
Examiner’s rejection of claim 23.
DECISION
For the above reasons, we affirm the Examiner’s decisions rejecting
claims 10—22.
For the above reasons, we reverse the Examiner’s decisions rejecting
claims 23.
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Application 14/039,256
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART
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