Ex Parte Anderson et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 11, 2016

11371133 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 11, 2016)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
111371,133 0310712006 Gary F. Anderson
45092 7590 07113/2016
HOFFMAN WARNICK LLC
540 Broadway
4th Floor
ALBANY, NY 12207
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
END920050l68US1 2839
EXAMINER
PEACHER, LORENA R
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3623
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/13/2016 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address( es):
PTOCommunications@hoffmanwarnick.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte GARY F. ANDERSON, MARKS. RAMSEY,
CHARLES J. SCHOTT, and DAVID A. SELBY
Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133 1
Technology Center 3600
Before NINA L. MEDLOCK, CYNTHIA L. MURPHY, and
BRUCE T. WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judges.
WIEDER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is a decision on appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the
Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, and 17-20. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Appellants do not identify a real party in interest. Therefore, the named
inventors are considered to be the real parties in interest. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(l)(i).
Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellants' claimed invention relates to "[a] method, system and
computer program product for verifying a usage of a transportation resource
by an object user of the transportation resource." (Spec. i-f 6.)
Claims 1, 8, 14, and 20 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1
is representative and is reproduced below:
1. A method for verifying a usage of a transportation
resource by an object user of the transportation resource, the
method comprising steps of:
selecting a peer group of transportation users that are
expected to have similar behavior as the object user using a
computer;
identifying a set of behavioral attributes of the peer group
comprising mileage, fuel consumption, routes taken, times of
use, and taxes paid using the computer;
determining a mean behavior of the peer group regarding
the identified set of behavioral attributes using the computer;
determining a fraudulent behavior of the object user if a
behavior of the object user is outside a threshold of the mean
behavior of the peer group plus or minus a standard deviation
regarding the identified set of behavior attributes using the
computer; and
investigating the object user in response to determination
of the fraudulent behavior.
REJECTION
Claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, and 17-20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Lowrey (US 6,988,033 Bl, iss. Jan. 17, 2006),
Kargupta (US 7,715,961 Bl, iss. May 11, 2010), Ross
(US 2006/0004589 Al, pub. Jan. 5, 2006), and Keith (US 6, 115,655, iss.
Sept. 5, 2000).
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Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
ANALYSIS
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding that Kargupta
discloses "the element of 'if a behavior of the object user is outside a
threshold of the mean ... behavior of the peer group."' (Appeal Br. 5.)
Specifically, Appellants argue that in Kargupta, "each vehicle and driver has
a signature profile and the specific vehicle data stream is compared with
such driver signature profile and vehicle signature profile (col. 8, lines 49-
51 ). Kargupta never compares the object user with a mean behavior of the
peer group." (Appeal Br. 5; see also Reply Br. 2-3.)
The Examiner answers that Kargupta discloses "determin[ing]
behavior patterns to construct behavioral signatures (e.g. signature profile)
of a driver, a vehicle and/or a fleet (e.g. peer group) (see column 2, lines 63-
67, column 3, lines 25-67---column 4, lines 1---67 and column 7, lines 19---67-
column 8, lines 1-67)." (Answer 15.) The Examiner explains that "the fleet
of vehicles [in Kargupta] represents a peer group and the signature profile of
a fleet represents the mean behavior of the fleet." (Id.)
Kargupta discloses "constructing the behavioral signature of the
driver, vehicle and the fleet." (Kargupta, col. 3, 11. 66---67.) Kargupta further
discloses using analytic "techniques for vehicle, driver, and fleet behavior
tracing and comparison with typical behavior signatures." (Id., col. 4, 11. 1-
3.) Kargupta also discloses "[i]dentify[ing] fleet-level (multi-vehicle)
behavior patterns," "[ c ]omparing the performance of one vehicle with that of
another," and "[d]etect[ing] unusually behaving vehicles in a fleet." (Id.,
col. 4, 11. 22-28; Answer 15.)
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Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
Appellants do not persuasively argue why the above-cited disclosures
from Kargupta do not disclose comparing the object user (driver or vehicle)
with a mean behavior of the peer group (fleet).
Appellants next argue that the Examiner erred in finding that Ross
discloses "if a behavior of the object user is outside a threshold ... plus or
minus a standard deviation." (Appeal Br. 6.) Specifically, Appellants argue
that in Ross,
[t]here is no comparison of the object user's behavior with a
mean behavior of a peer group. In fact, a comparison to a mean
group in Ross would be of no use in projecting whether the object
user is on track to exceed the lease mileage limit. Thus, Ross
teaches away from comparing an object user's behavior with "the
mean behavior of a peer group."
(Id. at 7.)
Ross relates to operating a vehicle lease program, monitoring vehicle
mileage, and determining if "the mileage value corresponds to a leasing
event trigger." (Ross, 1A .. bstract; see Final Action 7.) Appellants are correct
that Ross does not compare the lessee's mileage to a peer group. However,
the Examiner does not cite Ross for that proposition. The Examiner's
"citation of Ross was specifically used to demonstrate a breach of a
threshold defined as being outside of a standard deviation for a monitored
driving attribute/parameter (e.g. mileage) and that a driver's behavior could
be outside of the threshold (see i-f0062-i-f0066)." (Answer 16.) Moreover,
Appellants' argument that Ross teaches away from comparing "an object
user's behavior with 'the mean behavior of a peer group,"' does not indicate
where Ross "criticize[s], discredit[s], or otherwise discourage[s] the solution
claimed." See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). For the
above reasons, Appellants' argument is not persuasive.
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Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
Appellants next argue that the Examiner erred in finding that Keith
discloses "determining a fraudulent behavior of the object user if a behavior
of the object user is outside a threshold of the mean behavior of the peer
group." (Appeal Br. 8.) Specifically, Appellants argue that "[i]n Keith, the
determination is whether the object user followed the proscribed route and
whether off-route stops were made (col. 7, lines 8-16). Thus, Keith teaches
away from comparing an object user's behavior with 'the mean behavior of
a peer group."' (Id.)
Keith discloses a system for "recording the distance traveled by a
vehicle for tax-reporting purposes." (Keith, col. 5, 11. 55-57.) Keith further
discloses that
[i]n another important use of the invention, either or both of a
time-clock function and out-of-route stop monitoring can be
performed .... [B]ecause the system informs the administrator
of all stopping periods regardless of whether they have been
labeled or not, the administrator can discover and investigate out-
of=route stops made by the monitored vehicle.
(Id., col. 6, 11. 33-35, 48-51.) Keith also discloses that vehicle use can be
monitored by "elect[ing] to display the standard route in one color (e.g.,
blue) and display a locus of points that are off the route 106 in another color
(e.g., red), to flag all the off-route points." (Id., col. 7, 11. 10-13; see Final
Action 8.)
The Examiner finds that
[a]lthough Keith does not explicitly state comparing an object
user's behavior to a peer group, it does have the elements of
determining abnormal or out of bounds data and performing an
investigation based on the determination, which is consistent
with the claim limitation. Based on the above it is evident Keith
does not teach away from the limitation.
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Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
(Answer 18-19.) Appellants do not indicate where Keith "criticize[s],
discredit[s], or otherwise discourage[s] the solution claimed." See In re
Fulton, 391 F.3d at 1201. Indeed, Keith's teaching of comparing the
standard route to the user's actual route parallels comparing peer group
behavior to an object user's behavior. (See Keith, col. 7, 11. 10-13.)
Appellants' teaching away argument is not persuasive.
Appellants further argue that
contrary to the Examiners [sic] assertion "Keith may be used to
monitor truck usage when a driver is making service stops by
monitoring stops made, time at stops and mileage which
indicates out of the way stops have been made["] (page 3 of OA
citing col. 6, lines 33---67 of Keith, emphasis added), mileage is
never mentioned in the passage cited."
(Appeal Br. 8.) Appellants' reference to page 3 of the Final Action is a
reference to the Examiner's response to an argument previously made by
Appellants. But the Examiner's explanation of where Keith discloses
"determining a fraudulent behavior of the object user" is found on page 8 of
the Final Action where the Examiner additionally cites to Keith at column 7,
lines 1-1 7, which, as discussed above, teaches monitoring the actual route
travelled by the user and comparing the standard route to it. This data can
"be used by an administrator to discover and investigate out of route (e.g.
abnormal behavior)." (Final Action 8.) In view of the above, Appellants
have not persuaded us that the Examiner's reference to monitoring actual
"mileage" driven rather than the actual route driven, in responding to an
earlier argument made by Appellants, constitutes reversible error.
In view of the above, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 1. The other claims on appeal are not separately argued and,
therefore, fall with claim 1. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(l)(iv).
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Appeal2014-000222
Application 11/371,133
DECISION
The Examiner's rejection of claims 1-3, 5-9, 11-15, and 17-20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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