Ex Parte Amann et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Dec 3, 2014

11717401 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 3, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/717,401 03/13/2007 Keith R. Amann SL.021 199-0578US 1674
44200 7590 12/04/2014
HONIGMAN MILLER SCHWARTZ & COHN LLP
350 East Michigan Avenue
Suite 300
Kalamazoo, MI 49007-3800
EXAMINER
PEREZ GUTIERREZ, RAFAEL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2642
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/04/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________
Ex parte KEITH R. AMANN, MARK A. HAMILTON, and
OLIVER J. KRAHN
____________
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401
Technology Center 2600
____________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, MIRIAM L. QUINN, and
ADAM J. PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judges.

PYONIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
Non-Final Rejection of claims 1–17, which are all the claims pending in this
application. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.

Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

2
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The invention relates to methods for coordinating wireless
communication, with wireless communication devices that are configured to
operate in the unscheduled automatic power save delivery mode. Spec. 1, ll.
10–12. Claim 1 is illustrative, reproduced below from the Claims Appendix
of the Appeal Brief1:
1. In a wireless LAN, a plurality of wireless
communication devices are associated with an access point that
buffers at least one frame of information for delivery to one or
more of the wireless communication devices, a method for
synchronizing the transmission of trigger messages between
first and second ones of the plural wireless communications
devices comprising the steps of:
the first wireless communications device transitioning to
a higher powered state and detecting an ending time of a first
unscheduled service period associated with the second wireless
communication device and storing the detected time;
the first wireless communication device determining that
the wireless medium is free for a predetermined minimum
period of time after the detected and stored ending time, waiting
a specified interframe time, transmitting a trigger message to
the access point and then transitioning to a lower powered state;
the first wireless communication device transitioning to a
higher powered state and detecting and storing an ending time
of a next unscheduled service period associated with the second
wireless communications device, comparing the ending time of
the first unscheduled service period to the ending time of the
next unscheduled service period and determining that the
ending time for the second unscheduled service period is the
same as the ending time for the first unscheduled service period

1 References to the Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) are directed to Appellants’
Appeal Brief filed August 25, 2011, and references to the Reply Brief
(“Reply”) are directed to Appellants’ Reply Brief filed May 10, 2012.
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

3
associated with the second wireless communications device,
and;
the first wireless communication device transmitting a
trigger message to the access point, subsequent to the detected
ending time of the next unscheduled service period associated
with the second wireless communications device, after waiting
less than the time interval specified for any other wireless
communications device associated with the access point to
begin arbitrating for the wireless medium.
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal:
Emeott et al.
(“Emeott”)
US 6,917,598 B1 July 12, 2005
Donovan US 7,457,271 B2 Nov. 25, 2008
The Examiner provides the following ground of rejection, of which
Appellants seek review: claims 1–17 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. §
103(a) as being unpatentable over Donovan in view of Emeott. Ans. 4–112.
ISSUES
Appellants argue that the Examiner’s rejection of claims 117 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is in error. In the briefs, Appellants argue a number of
related issues for each independent claim (see, e.g., Reply 4). We discuss
each issue in the following analysis.

2 References to the Answer (“Ans.”) are directed to the Examiner’s Answer
mailed March 14, 2012.
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

4
ANALYSIS
We have considered all of Appellants’ arguments and we have
reviewed the Examiner’s rejections in light of Appellants’ arguments that
the Examiner has erred. Further, we have reviewed the Examiner’s response
to Appellants’ arguments. We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken, and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in
response to Appellants’ Appeal Brief. We concur with the conclusions
reached by the Examiner. We highlight the following arguments for
emphasis.

A. Detecting an Unscheduled Service Period
Appellants argue that neither Donovan nor Emeott recites a first
wireless communication device (e.g., a wireless device or station) detecting
an ending time of an “unscheduled service period associated with the second
wireless communication device,” as recited in claims 1 and 8. App. Br. 13,
15, Reply 8–11. In particular, Appellants argue that Emeott teaches a
wireless device that merely detects the end of one of its own service periods,
not that of another device. Reply 10–11.
We are not persuaded by Appellants’ arguments. First, we agree with
the Examiner’s finding that a wireless device seeking to transmit voice
frames must first sense the channel to determine if the channel has been idle
(i.e., not in use by another device) for a specified period of time. Ans. 12.
Therefore, a wireless device is required to detect an end time of another
device’s service period, in order to determine if the specified period of time
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

5
has been met. We find that Emeott confirms this, describing “channel
carrier sensing” as a means for a wireless device to determine if another
device is transmitting on a given channel, or whether the channel is “carrier
free for a brief, preselected time period.” Emeott, col. 11, ll. 7–29.
Furthermore, we are persuaded that the Examiner has shown Emeott
teaching the required unscheduled service periods. See Ans. 17 (citing the
“unscheduled power save delivery (UPSD) mode of operation” in col. 5, ll.
26–37 of Emeott). Second, although Appellants argue that Emeott discloses
only unscheduled service periods for itself, Appellants do not argue that
Emeott’s disclosure would not suggest detecting an unscheduled service
period of another device. See Reply 9. Thus, we do not agree with
Appellants’ contention that the Examiner erred.

B. Comparing the End Times of Two USPs
Appellants contend that they “see no evidence” that the cited
references inherently show a device comparing the end times of two
unscheduled service periods to determine each end time is the same, as
recited in claim 1. App. Br. 13, Reply 9. We are not persuaded that the
Examiner erred in finding an inherent disclosure of a comparison of times in
Emeott.
Appellants argue that the references are silent as to any time
determinations or calculations, and cite cols. 5–6 of Emeott to show a lack of
such disclosure. Reply 9. However, Appellants have merely made
conclusory arguments that the prior art does not disclose the claimed
features, and do not explain why the system of Emeott does not inherently
perform the comparison and determination as recited in claim 1.
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

6
The Examiner finds that the wireless device of Emeott inherently
determines and compares the ending time of two service periods, using the
device’s polling window timer. Ans. 17–18. We find reasonable the
Examiner’s finding that because the “mobile can calculate the time between
service interval periods . . . it will be able to compare the ending times of
two unscheduled service periods as well as determine [that] the ending time
of the second period is the same as the first period.” Id. The Examiner’s
finding of inherency shifts the burden to Appellants to provide evidence that
the wireless devices disclosed by Emeott, do not, in fact, perform a
comparison of unscheduled service period end times. See In re Best, 562
F.2d 1252, 1254–55 (CCPA 1977) (quoting In re Swinehart, 439 F.2d 210
(CCPA 1971). Appellants have not offered any such evidence, and,
therefore, we are not persuaded by the arguments that the Examiner erred.

C. Decrementing a Start Time
Appellants argue that Donovan does not teach a wireless device
“decrementing the stored first transition time by a preselected period of
time,” and then “transitioning to a higher powered state at the stored next
higher powered state transition time,” as recited in claim 8. App. Br. 15–16.
We are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that Donovan
teaches or suggests the claimed decrementing step. We agree with the
Examiner’s findings that the subtraction of a “fixed delay” from the network
time in Donovan (see Donovan, col. 3, ll. 23–26) teaches or suggests
“decrementing the updated first transition time by a pre-selected period of
time and updating this time as the next transition time,” and that the “time
slots” (see Donovan, col. 4, ll. 35–44) teach or suggest “transitioning to a
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

7
higher powered state at the updating next higher powered state transition
time.” Ans. 6–7.
Appellants point out that the Examiner does not respond to
Appellants’ argument in this regard. Reply 14. We note, however, that the
Answer maintains the rejection. See Ans. 6. Appellants’ central argument is
that the “time slots described in Donovan” are not the same as the claimed
“next higher powered state transition time,” because the claimed transition
time “is arrived at by decrementing the stored first transition time, and the
time slots in Donovan are assigned and only used as a time during which
data is transmitted.” App. Br. 16. Appellants’ arguments do not persuade us
that the Examiner erred in finding that the decremented network time of
Donovan leads to decremented start times for the time slots, because the
time slots of Donovan are set by the updated network time and are used as a
time for the device to enter a high powered state in order to transmit data.
Ans. 6–7 (citing Donovan col. 3, ll. 23–37 and col. 4, ll. 35–44). Therefore,
we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Donovan teaches or suggests
decrementing a transition time for the time slots.

D. Waiting Less Than the Time Specified
Appellants further state that there is no evidence in the cited
references teaching the limitation of transmitting a trigger message after
“waiting less than the time interval specified for any other wireless
communications device associated with the access point to begin
arbitrating . . . ,” as recited in claims 1 and 8. App. Br. 14, 16.
We agree with the Examiner that Emeott teaches or suggests waiting
less than the time interval specified for any other device. Ans. 5–6. Emeott
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

8
states that the wireless device “will immediately begin contending for the
WLAN channel to transmit a polling frame.” Ans. 6 (citing Emeott, col. 10,
ll. 55–60). As further explained by Emeott, the wireless device will send
that polling frame only when the channel is free, before any other device has
started transmitting or otherwise contending for the channel. Emeott, col.
11, ll. 1–30. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner that Emeott shows a
wireless device waiting less than any other device on the network to send a
trigger message.
Appellants refer to the claimed “time interval” as being related to the
interframe times defined by the IEEE 802.11 standard, and argue that the
cited art does not disclose a shorter time. Reply 12–13. This argument is
not commensurate with the scope of the claims. Claims 1 and 8 require that
one device within the network send a trigger message before any other
device begins the arbitration process. Claims 1 and 8, however, are silent
regarding any specific interframe time. “[L]imitations are not to be read into
the claims from the specification.” In re Van Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181, 1184,
(Fed. Cir. 1993) (citing In re Zletz, 893 F.2d 319, 321(Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Appellants further argue that Emeott does not show the claimed
timing, by stating that Emeott discloses winning an arbitration, and “winning
an arbitration only happens after beginning an arbitration.” Reply 13. This
argument, however, appears to confuse the arbitration period for the first
device with an arbitration period for another device on the network. We
agree, instead, with the Examiner’s findings, that Emeott teaches that a first
device can win an arbitration by sending a trigger before any other device.
Ans. 7 (citing Emeott col. 3, lines 4–25). Appellants have not persuaded us
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

9
that the Examiner has erred in finding Emeott teaches the trigger message
timing recited in claims 1 and 8.

E. Access Points and Synchronized Trigger Messages
Appellants’ final contentions are that Donovan in view of Emeott does
not render obvious the claim 1 and 14 limitations of access points and
synchronizing the transmission—or storing the timing—of trigger messages.
App. Br. 12, 17–18, Reply 5–7. We do not find these arguments persuasive
for the following reasons.
First, Appellants do not provide any evidence the Examiner
incorrectly finds that the mobile devices of Donovan act as access points
while communicating with each other. Reply 5; see Ans. 15 (finding that the
Donovan mobile stations communicating with each other act as access
points). Although Appellants disagree with the Examiner’s characterization
of the Donovan mobile stations as “access points,” the argument presented
does not show persuasively that, under the broadest reasonable interpretation
in light of the specification, a recited “access point” cannot encompass a
mobile station that communicates directly with another.
Second, we agree with the Examiner’s finding that Donovan discloses
a “trigger message,” as recited in claims 1 and 14. Ans. 15–16. As found by
the Examiner, the “data” transmitted by a first mobile device of Donovan
lets another device know it is going into low power mode, resulting in the
other device acting as an access point and transmitting its own data. Ans. 15
(citing Donovan, col. 6, ll. 1–8). Further, the Examiner finds that the
“beacon” transmitted by a first mobile device of Donovan results in another
device obtaining a time slot to transmit its own data. Ans. 16 (citing
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

10
Donovan, col. 9, ll. 25–31). Both the data and beacon transmissions of
Donovan are sent from one device and result in a second device transmitting
data Therefore we agree with the Examiner’s finding of both transmissions
teaching or suggesting “trigger messages,” as recited in claims 1 and 14.
Ans. 15–16.
Appellants argue “that the Answer has not been consistent in its use of
the trigger message.” Reply 7. We are not persuaded that the Examiner’s
findings are in error merely because of citing to multiple teachings of
“trigger message” in the same document. As discussed above, we agree
with the Examiner’s finding that both transmissions, disclosed by Donovan,
teach “trigger messages,” as claimed.
Third, Appellants argue that the cited references do not teach a device
that synchronizes trigger message as required by claims 1 and 14, or
“identify and store a time at which it can transmit a trigger frame, and then
in a next service period use this stored time as the time to transmit a trigger
frame,” per claim 14. App. Br. 18, Reply 7–8. We note that the term
“synchronizing” only appears in the preamble of claims 1 and 14. In any
event, we see no error in the Examiner’s finding that the beacons of
Donovan in view of Emeott act as trigger messages that are synchronized by
a common network time and stored in a memory. We note also the
Examiner finding that Donovan discloses beacons being coordinated, or
“synchronized,” by the network time when scheduling time slots. Ans. 16
(citing Donovan, col. 9, ll. 25–31). Further, we agree with the Examiner that
Emeott combines with Donovan to disclose the storing of these scheduled
slots (and the associated trigger message transmission times), to enable this
synchronization. Ans. 8, 16.
Appeal 2012-008580
Application 11/717,401

11
Appellants argue that the Examiner erred in finding synchronization is
taught by Donovan in view of Emeott, because “[t]he beacon may allow for
synchronization but that does not teach transmitting the trigger messages
synchronized as claimed.” Reply 8. As discussed above, however, the
Examiner finds, and we agree, that the beacon itself is a trigger message.
Ans. 16. Accordingly, having considered all of Appellants’ arguments
regarding the synchronizing and storing of trigger messages, we are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we conclude that the Examiner did not err
in rejecting independent claims 1, 8, and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over
Donovan in view of Emeott. Consequently, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection thereto. Because Appellants do not argue separately the
patentability of dependent claims (App. Br. 18), we also sustain the rejection
of claims 2–7, 9–13, and 15–17.
DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

AFFIRMED

kme