Ex Parte Alperin

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Sep 26, 2017

13011134 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 26, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/011,134 01/21/2011 Jonathan Alperin 4366-535 4060
48500 7590 09/28/2017
SHERIDAN ROSS P.C.
1560 BROADWAY, SUITE 1200
DENVER, CO 80202
EXAMINER
BORISSOV, IGORN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3649
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/28/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
cjacquet@ sheridanross.com
pair_Avay a @ firsttofile. com
edocket @ sheridanross .com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JONATHAN ALPERIN
Appeal 2015-0082011
Application 13/011,13 42
Technology Center 3600
Before MICHAEL R. ZECHER, TARA L. HUTCHINGS, and
MATTHEW S. METERS, Administrative Patent Judges.
HUTCHINGS, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s final
rejection of claims 1—11, 14, 15, and 17—23. App. Br. 2. Claims 12, 13, and
16 were cancelled. Final Act. 2. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§ 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
Mar. 2, 2015) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed Sept. 10, 2015), the
Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed July 10, 2015), and Final Office Action
(“Final Act.,” mailed Nov. 28, 2014).
2 Appellant identifies Avaya Inc. as the real party in interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2015-008201
Application 13/011,134
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellant’s claimed invention “relates to emergency notification
systems and[,] more specifically[,] to notification systems that notify visitors
at a site.” Spec. 11.
Claims 1 and 11 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below, is illustrative of the subject matter on appeal:
1. A method comprising:
registering at a visitor register, contact information
and location information about a previously unregistered
visitor to a site, wherein the contact information comprises
contact information associated with the visitor and/or
another contact and the location information comprises
location information associated with the visitor;
storing the contact information and the location
information in an emergency database, each of the contact
information and the location information being
represented in the emergency database as a data structure
stored in a tangible, non-transitory computer readable
medium;
detecting by an emergency detector, an emergency
at the site; and
notifying by a notification system and via a
tangible, non-transitory notification, the visitor and/or the
other contact of the emergency based on the location
information,
wherein the visitor register, the emergency
database, the emergency detector, and the notification
system, are elements of the emergency system and the
emergency system manages emergency services using the
visitor register, the emergency database, the emergency
detector, and the notification system, and
wherein the emergency detector is in
communication with the visitor register.
App. Br. 23 (Claims Appendix).
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REJECTIONS3
Claims 3,11, 14, 15, and 17—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112,
second paragraph, as indefinite for failing to particularly point out and
distinctly claim the subject matter that Appellant regards as the invention.
Claims 1—11, 14, 15, and 17—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as
directed to non-statutory subject matter.
Claims 1—11, 14, 15, and 17—23 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as unpatentable over Halbritter (US 2007/0038570 Al, pub. Feb. 15, 2007)
and Onishi (US 2007/0049259 Al, pub. Mar. 1, 2007).
ANALYSIS
Indefiniteness
Appellant does not present arguments in response to the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 3,11, 14, 15, and 17—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second
paragraph, as being indefinite. Therefore, we summarily sustain the
Examiner’s rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph of claims 3,
11, 14, 15, and 17—20. See Manual of Patent Examining Procedure
§ 1205.02 (Rev. 9, Aug. 2012) (“If a ground of rejection stated by the
examiner is not addressed in the appellant’s brief, that ground of rejection
will be summarily sustained by the Board.”).
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
For the first time in the Reply Brief, Appellant presents arguments in
response to the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—11, 14, 15, and 17—23
under 35 U.S.C. § 101. See Reply Br. 3—7. But Appellant’s arguments are
3 The Examiner has withdrawn the rejection of claim 3 under 35 U.S.C.
§112, first paragraph. Ans. 3
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untimely, and will not be considered in the absence of any good faith
showing why it could not have been timely presented in Appellant’s Appeal
Brief. In re Hyatt, 211 F.3d 1367, 1373 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (noting that an
argument not first raised in the brief to the Board is waived on appeal);
Ex parte Atsuhisa Nakashima, 93 USPQ2d 1834, 1840-41 (BPAI2010)
(informative) (explaining that arguments and evidence not timely presented
in the Principal Brief will not be considered when filed in a Reply Brief,
absent a showing of good cause explaining why the argument could not have
been presented in the Principal Brief); Ex parte Borden, 93 USPQ2d 1473,
1477 (BPAI 2010) (informative) (“Properly interpreted, the Rules do not
require the Board to take up a belated argument that has not been addressed
by the Examiner, absent a showing of good cause.”).
Therefore, we summarily sustain the Examiner’s rejection under 35
U.S.C. § 101 of claims 1-11, 14, 15, and 17-23.
Obviousness
Independent Claims 1 and 11 and Dependent Claim 14
Appellant argues claims 1 and 11 as a group. App. Br. 5—10. We
select claim 1 as representative. Claim 11 stands or falls with claim 1. See
37C.F.R. §41.37(c)(l)(iv).
In rejecting claim 1, the Examiner finds that Halbritter discloses most
of the claim limitations. See Final Act. 5—6 (citing Halbritter || 27—31,35—
36, 126). The Examiner finds that Halbritter does not disclose that the
“emergency is detected by an emergency detector at the site,” or that the
“emergency detector is in communication with said visitor register.” Id. at
6. The Examiner relies on Onishi to teach these limitations. Id. (citing
Onishi, Abstract, || 5, 15, 40). In this regard, the Examiner determines, in
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part, that it would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art at the
time of the invention to modify Halbritter to include communicating with an
emergency detecting device, as described in Onishi, because it would
provide patrons with a safest path for escaping a dangerous situation. Id. at
7 (citing Onishi 146). The Examiner also determines that the proposed
combination is obvious because it is nothing more than a combination of
prior art elements according to their established functions, and yields a
predictable result. Id.
Appellant argues that the Examiner erred in rejecting independent
claim 1 under § 103(a) because the Examiner failed to provide adequate
reasoning for combining Halbritter and Onishi. See App. Br. 6—7.
Specifically, Appellant contends that the Examiner reasons that the
combination would have been obvious to one of ordinary skill because “both
references disclose an ability of communicating with additional devices over
a public network.” Id. at 6 (citing Final Act. 5); see also id. (“[j]ust because
something can happen does not suggest that it does.”). Appellant contends
that a person of ordinary skill “would not think to combine the emergency
detector of Onishi with various elements of Halbritter because such a
combination of elements having no change in their respective function
would not yield predictable results.” App. Br. 7. Appellant charges that the
Examiner’s obviousness rejection is based on impermissible hindsight
reconstruction, using the present application as a guide. Id.
But Appellant does not address the Examiner’s stated reasons for
combining the teachings of the various references, particularly the
Examiner’s reliance on Onishi of providing patrons with a safest path for
escaping a dangerous situation. Onishi 146. Apart from mere attorney
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argument, Appellant does not provide any persuasive evidence or technical
reasoning to explain why the modification by the Examiner is nothing more
than the predictable use of prior art elements according to their established
functions.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because the combination
of Halbritter and Onishi does not disclose or suggest the “emergency
detector is in communication with the visitor register,” as recited in claim 1.
App. Br. 8—9. Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive because it hinges on a
false premise — namely, that the Examiner’s analysis fails to provide
adequate reasoning to support the obviousness determination.
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the alleged
deficiencies of Connor and Uchida, because these references are not applied
by the Examiner to reject claim 1. See id. at 8—9. Instead, these references
are cited by the Examiner to support taking Official Notice that “access[ing]
a database with pre-stored telephone number to execute [an emergency]
call” is “old and well known.” See Final Act. 6—7. In addition, the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit has recognized that evidence
submitted in support of an obviousness rejection (e.g., additional references
to demonstrate that storing and accessing telephone number is a database is
old and well known) may be considered to demonstrate the state of the art.
See Randall Mfg. v. Rea, 733 F.3d 1355, 1362-63 (Fed. Cir. 2013)
(emphasizing that additional prior art references or evidence are not for the
purpose of changing the prior art combination that forms the basis of the
ground of rejection, but rather are merely for the purpose of providing
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evidence of the state of the art, including the background knowledge of one
of ordinary skill in this art).
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting independent claim 1 under § 103(a) because Halbritter fails
to show “notifying . . . the visitor ... of the emergency based on the location
information [registered at a visitor register],” as recited in claim 1. App.
Br. 9—10. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that Halbritter describes this
claim limitation. See Final Act. 6 (citing Halbritter H 27—31, 125).
By way of background, Halbritter relates to a system for use in a
hospitality facility that enables communication among patrons. Halbritter
12. A patron establishes a patron account on a server by providing
identifier information, such as name and address. Id. ]Hf 43, 64—65. The
server issues the patron a unique patron identifier, and the patron receives a
sending device, such as a magnetic card, with the unique patron identifier
stored thereon. Id. H 21, 26, 43. Each location of the hospital facility
includes a receiving device, such as a patron client terminal, service client
terminal, or broadcast client terminal, having a terminal location identifier.
Id. 21, 29, 31, 33. When a patron enters or exists a location, the receiving
device, such as patron client terminal, receives the unique patron identifier
from the patron’s sending device, and sends the unique patron identifier
along with the terminal location identifier to the server. Id. 130. The server
updates the patron account associated with the unique patron identifier with
the terminal location identifier. Id. 135.
Halbritter’s hospitality facility enables various messages to be sent to
the patrons. For example, a service client terminal (i.e., a receiving device
used only by personnel at the hospital facility) sends messages
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(e.g., promotions, advertisements, missing patron notices, or emergency
information) to all or a subset of the patrons. Id. H 33, 125. The messages
may be based on location information stored in the patron’s account. Id.
1 80. For example, textual directions may be provided to the user based on
the location of the user and the internal mapping of the hospitality facility.
Id. 178.
Appellant argues that Halbritter does not teach the claimed
“notifying” step because Halbritter uses devices and terminals to track a
patron, and, thus, does not describe using registered location information for
the notification of the visitor, as required by the claim. App. Br. 9—10.
Appellant contends that the claimed invention requires no device to be
carried by the visitor and requires no tracking of the visitor due to the use of
the registered location information at the visitor register. Id. at 10. Yet, we
see nothing in Appellant’s claim language or Specification that precludes
using registered location that tracks the visitor. Contrary to this suggestion,
Appellant’s Specification describes that location information registered and
stored in an emergency database may include, amongst other things, a
Global Positioning System location of a person at a site, a check-in by the
visitor at a tertiary location at the site, and a wi-fi triangulation of where the
visitor or person is at the site. See Spec. 113.
Claim 1 requires notifying based on the location information
associated with the visitor that is registered at a visitor register. Appellant
argues that Halbritter’s “client terminal is not equivalent to [the claimed]
visitor register.” Id. at 10. Yet, the Examiner mapped Halbritter’s server to
the claimed “visitor register,” not Halbritter’s client terminal. See Final Act.
5. In our view, one of ordinary skill in the art would understand, in light of
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the Specification, that storing a patron identifier and client terminal location
identifier at a server, as described by Halbritter, meets the claim language
for registering location information and client information at a visitor
register, under a broad, but reasonable, interpretation of the claim language.
As such, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in finding that
Halbritter’s messages to patrons based on location information stored at a
server meets the claimed step of “notifying.”
To the extent Appellant also contends that Halbritter’s server does not
register contact information (see App. Br. 10 (Halbritter “is silent regarding
registering information (including location information and contact
information) at a visitor register”), we also find that providing identifier
information to establish a patron account file for storage in the server
describes registering at a visitor register contact information, as required by
claim 1. See, e.g., Halbritter 143.
We also are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that Onishi fails
to disclose the “notifying” step, at least because the Examiner relies on
Halbritter for disclosing this limitation. See App. Br. 10.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 1, and claim
11, which falls with claim 1, under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). We also sustain the
rejection of dependent claim 14, which is not argued separately.
Dependent Claim 2
Claim 2 depends from claim 1, and further limits the type of contact
information provided. Appellant advances the same arguments for claim 2
as Appellant advances for claim 1. See App. Br. 11. We find these
arguments unpersuasive for the same reasons described above with respect
to claim 1.
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Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 2 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 3
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 3 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because Halbritter and Onishi do
not disclose or suggest the following limitation:
the contact information is a name of a person at the site that is
not the visitor, the notifying step comprises calling a phone
number of a mobile device associated with the person at the site,
and the notifying step uses a communication from a device that
is not part of the emergency system and is not located at the site.
App. Br. 11—13. The Examiner cites paragraphs 21, 28, 54, 59, 64, and 80
of Halbritter, and paragraphs 10 and 38 of Onishi as disclosing the argued
limitation. Final Act. 8—9; Ans. 12. In the Answer, the Examiner elaborates
that Onishi teaches calling a phone number associated with a person at the
site, and Halbritter’s hospitality facility enables a user to search the name of
a patron to retrieve the patron’s last known location. Ans. 12.
Yet, Halbritter’s name search and Onishi’s phone call involve devices
that are part of the emergency system and located on-site. We fail to see
how or why, and the Examiner does not adequately explain how or why, the
combined teachings of Halbritter and Onishi somehow discloses or suggests
“the notifying step uses a communication from a device that is not part of an
emergency system and is not located at the site,” as recited in claim 3.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 3
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 4
Claim 4 depends from claim 1, and further recites:
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wherein the contact information is a name of a person at the site
that is not the visitor; the location information is a calendar event
of the person at the site that identifies: (1) a location at the site of
the calendar event that occurs during a time that the visitor is at
the site, and (2) the visitor as an attendee of the calendar event;
and the notifying step comprises calling a phone number
associated with the location at the site.
The Examiner relies on Halbritter at paragraph 63 and Onishi’s
disclosure at Figure 6 of “calling a phone number (communicating with the
portable phone) associated with the location at the site,” as disclosing the
argued limitation. Final Act. 9. In the Answer, the Examiner additionally
relies on paragraph 122 of Halbritter. Ans. 13.
Paragraph 63 of Halbritter describes establishing address books on the
server of other patrons at the facility with whom the user may wish to
communicate or locate at the facility, and paragraph 122 of Halbritter
describes providing notification of resort events based on preferences stored
in the patron’s account. For example, a patron who indicated an interest in
musical performances may receive messages about musical performance
start times. Halbritter 1122. Figure 6 of Onishi shows terminals 2
communicating with an emergency alert broadcasting device 6 within an
interior of a facility. See Onishi 140. We find nothing in these paragraphs
that discloses or suggests the specific features called for in claim 4. App. Br.
13-14.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 4
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claims 5 and 15
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claims 5 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 14.
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Dependent claims 5 and 15 include language similar to claim 4. The
Examiner rejects claims 5 and 15 based on the same erroneous findings and
rationale as applied by the Examiner in the rejection of claim 4. See Final
Act. 9.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 5 and
15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 6
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 6 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 15. The Examiner
bases the rejection of claim 6 on the same findings and rationale applied in
rejecting claims 1 and 4. Final Act. 9. We found the Examiner’s findings
and reasoning lacking with respect to claim 4, and we find them equally
lacking with respect to claim 6.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 6
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claims 7 and 17
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 7 and 17 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 15-
lb. Claim 7 depends from claim 1, and further recites that “the registering
step is accomplished based on a notification from a social network.” Claim
17 recites similar language. The Examiner cites paragraphs 43, 44, and 48
of Halbritter as disclosing the argued limitation. Appellant argues that the
cited portions of Halbritter are silent regarding notification from a social
network. Yet, Halbritter’s hospitality facility is a social network, under a
broad, but reasonable interpretation, as it enables communication among
patrons. See, e.g., Halbritter 12, 4, 21; see also id. ]Hf 68—70 (when a user
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attempts to add a patron to his or her address book, and the patron does not
have an account, the patron is sent a request to establish an account).
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 7 and 17
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 8
Claim 8 depends from claim 1, and further recites “a first emergency
existed prior to the emergency system, and wherein the first emergency
system is in communication with the emergency system.”
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s finding that Halbritter discloses
an existing or previous server/emergency system “ignores the fact that the
claim requires two emergency systems.” App. Br. 16—17. And Appellant
asserts that the prior art “is silent” regarding two emergency systems. Id. at
17.
Yet the Examiner does not ignore that the claim requires two
emergency systems. Instead, the Examiner correctly concludes that it would
have been obvious to have a plurality of emergency systems to improve
communication services with the guest, drawing support from precedent
recognizing that a mere duplication of parts involves only routine skill in the
art. Final Act. 11 (citing St. Regis Paper Co. v. Bemis Co., Inc., 549 F.2d
833 (7th Cir. 1977). “It is well settled that the mere duplication of parts has
no patentable significance unless a new and unexpected result is produced.”
In re Harza, 274 F.2d 671 (CCPA 1960). Here, no evidence has been
provided by Appellant as to any new or unexpected results flowing from the
two claimed emergency systems in communication.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 8 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
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Dependent Claim 9
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 9 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 17. The Examiner
cites paragraphs 59, 61, and 122 of Halbritter as disclosing that, “prior to
notifying, determining, by the visitor register, if any of the visitors are still at
the site based on a set of calendar events associated with the visitor,” as
recited in claim 9. Final Act. 11; Ans. 14. Paragraphs 59 and 61 describe
tracking when a patron enters and leaves a particular location, and paragraph
122 describes providing targeted content based on preferences stored in the
patron’s account.
Yet, we fail to see how or why, and the Examiner does not adequately
explain how or why, Halbritter’s description of tracking a patron’s location
at the hospitality facility and storing the patron’s preferences somehow
discloses or suggests “determining ... if any of the visitors are still at the
site based on a set of calendar events associated with the visitor,” as recited
in claim 9.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 9
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 10
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 10 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 17—18.
Claim 10 depends from claim 1, and further recites “the emergency detector
is in communication with the notification system.” The Examiner cites
paragraphs 27—31 and 125 of Halbritter, and paragraphs 20-43 of Onishi, as
describing the argued limitation. In particular, the Examiner explains that
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Halbritter notifies the visitor based on location information, thereby showing
the emergency detector is in communication with the notification system.
Appellant argues that Halbritter and Onishi are silent regarding an
emergency detector in communication with the notification system. App.
Br. 17—18. In this regard, Appellant maintains that Halbritter’s disclosure of
notifying in case of an emergency “is silent regarding any emergency
detector that is in communication with the notification system, as claimed.”
Reply Br. 12. Appellant’s argument is not persuasive, at least because
Halbritter describes a server that pushes messages, including information
regarding emergencies, to patrons via receiving devices that provide
messages to patrons. Thus, meeting the claim limitation that the emergency
detector is in communication with the notification system. See Spec. 113
(“Emergency detector 112 can be any hardware/software that can detect
and/or be notified of an emergency, such as ... an email system, a telephone
system.); id. (“Notification system 113 can be any hardware/software that
can provide notifications, such as a telephone system, a Private Branch
Exchange (PBX), an email system, and Instant Messaging (IM) system, a
pager system, and the like.”)
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 10 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claims 18 and 19
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claims 18 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 18.
Claim 18 depends from claim 1, and further specifies receipt of the contact
information. Appellant argues that Halbritter and Onishi “are silent
regarding contact information in a visitor registry,” and, thus, necessarily fail
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to describe the features recited in claims 18 and 19. Id. However, as
described above with respect to claim 1, we are not persuaded that Halbritter
and Onishi do not describe registering contact information in a visitor
register.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 18 and 19
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) for the same reasons described above with
reference to claim 1.
Dependent Claim 20
We are not persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner
erred in rejecting claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 19.
Appellant argues that Halbritter and Onishi “are silent regarding location for
a visitor registry,” and, thus, necessarily fail to describe receiving features
regarding any such location information, as required by claim 20. Id.
However, we are not persuaded that Halbritter and Onishi do not describe
registering location information in a visitor register for the same reasons set
forth above with respect to claim 1.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 20 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 21
We are persuaded by Appellant’s argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). App. Br. 19—20. Claim 21
depends from claim 1, and further recites that “the contact information is a
set of names of people at the site and the notifying step comprises
determining an association between a name of a person at the site and a
location of the visitor, and calling a phone number associated with the
person at the site.” In the Final Office Action, the Examiner sites paragraphs
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21, 54, 59, 64, 80 of Halbritter, and paragraphs 10 and 38 of Onishi, as
describing the argued limitation. Final Act. 8—9. In the Answer the
Examiner additionally relies on paragraph 73 as describing the argued
limitation. Ans. 17. Halbritter describes determining a location of the
patron and allowing a user to locate or message the patron. Yet we find
nothing that discloses or suggests calling another person determined to be
associated with a location of the patron, as called for in claim 21.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 21
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 22
Claim 22 depends from claim 1, and further recites “after the storing,
re-registering visitor information, wherein the re-registering is based on a set
of updated contact information from a social network status posted after the
storing.” The Examiner cites paragraphs 59—61 of Halbritter as disclosing
the argued limitation. Final Act. 12. In the Answer, the Examiner
additionally cites paragraphs 23, 43, 44, and 48. Ans. 18. We are not
persuaded that the Examiner erred in determining that it would have been
obvious to re-register based on a set of updated contact information from a
social network status after the storing.
In this regard, we note that Halbritter’s hospitality facility is a social
network under a broad, but reasonable, interpretation of that claim language.
For example, patrons elect to socially network with each other at the
hospitality facility by establishing patron accounts by adding each other to
their respective address books. See, e.g., Halbritter || 35, 43, 63, 65, 68—73.
Halbritter also describes that the patron registers at a service client terminal
at service client terminal of the hospitality facility, such as a hotel front desk.
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Id. 143. In our view, it would have been obvious for Halbritter’s service
client terminal to update a patron’s contact information (such as an updated
address) upon a notification from the patron that his or her contact
information has changed, thereby meeting the argued claim limitation under
a broad, but reasonable, interpretation.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a).
Dependent Claim 23
Claim 23 depends from claim 1, and further recites, “if the
notification system cannot successfully transmit the initial notification to the
visitor then the notification system notifies, via a secondary notification, the
visitor using the contact information associated with the other contact, and
wherein the secondary notification is configured by the emergency system
separately from the notification at a time after the notification is not
successfully transmitted to the visitor.” The Examiner determines that “it is
old and well known to try to repeat notification if a first attempt to contact a
person failed.” Final Act. 12; see also Ans. 18. Yet, this explanation fails to
account for notifying “the other contact,” if a first attempt to contact a
particular person failed, as required by claim 23.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claim 23
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).
18
Appeal 2015-008201
Application 13/011,134
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3,11, 14, 15, and 17—20 under 35
U.S.C. § 112, second paragraph is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1—11, 14, 15, and 17—23 under 35
U.S.C. § 101 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 2, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 17—20, and
22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 3—6, 9, 15, 21, and 23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, the Examiner’s decision is affirmed.
See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED
19