Ex Parte Afriat

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 21, 2016

11964057 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 21, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
11/964,057 12/26/2007 Itshak Afriat SANDP046 1192
77215 7590 07/22/2016
MPG, LLP AND SANDISK
710 LAKEWAY DRIVE SUITE 200
SUNNYVALE, CA 94085
EXAMINER
PARIKH, KALPIT
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2137
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/22/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

Ex parte ITSHAK AFRIAT
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Appeal 2014-005080
Application 11/964,057
Technology Center 2100
____________________

Before ALLEN R. MacDONALD, HUNG H. BUI, and
JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.

MACDONALD, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING

This is a decision on Appellant’s Request for Rehearing.1 Appellant’s
Request for Rehearing is filed under § 41.52(a)(1) requesting that we
reconsider our Decision of April 25, 2016, wherein we affirmed the
Examiner’s rejection of claims 41–44, 46–54, 56–62, 64–72, and 74–76,

1 “The request for rehearing must state with particularity the points
believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked by the Board.”
37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1).
Appeal 2014-005080
Application 11/964,057

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which constitute all the claims pending in this application. We have
reconsidered our Decision in light of Appellant’s comments in the request,
and have found no errors. We, therefore, decline to change the Decision.
Appellant’s request is denied.
Appellant’s Contentions
1. Appellant contends, as to independent claims 41, 50, 59 and 68,
the Board erred because:
[T]he PTAB failed to consider all of the claim limitations in
constructing its analysis. In so doing, the PTAB did not
consider that Yamamoto failed to teach or suggest servicing a
command for initializing a host device. Independent claims
41, 50, 59 and 68 recite a controller of the storage device that is
operative to service an access command to initialize a host
before completion of the initialization of the storage device.
In Yamamoto, a command from the host device is
serviced after completion of initialization of the nonvolatile
semiconductor memory and after the address translation tables
for the PSA and DSA are generated (see paragraphs [0160],
[0161]).
In Yamamoto, the command that is received from a host
device for servicing is for generating an address translation
table for the data storage area (see paragraph [0161] above) and
is not an access command used for initializing a host device.
Rehearing Request 4.
2. Also, Appellant contends that as to independent claims 41, 50,
59 and 68, the Board erred because:
The PTAB did not provide sufficient reasons nor logic
showing that Yamamoto nor the other cited reference to Wilson
teach or suggest that the access command being serviced, when
a logical address satisfying a predefined condition, is within a
predefined range, as claimed.
Rehearing Request 5.
Appeal 2014-005080
Application 11/964,057

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ANALYSIS
As to Appellant’s above contention 1, we disagree. Contrary to
Appellant’s argument, Yamamoto explicitly suggests servicing a command
for initializing a host device. Yamamoto states:
When the usage of this memory device of the invention is
the boot device for the host device, it is possible that the boot
process of the host device is made faster. When the host device
issues the address for reading out the boot program thereof
from the memory device, the memory device . . . can promptly
provide the boot program to the host device by reading out the
boot program from the program storage area PSA thereof.
Yamamoto ¶ 189 (cited by the Examiner (Final Act. 2.)). Yamamoto further
teaches the command for reading out the boot program from the PSA can be
processed in parallel with the command to generate the address translation
table for the DSA. Id. ¶ 187. We conclude that an artisan would
immediately recognize that booting the host device as stated at paragraph
189 includes servicing a command for initializing the host device.
As to Appellant’s above contention 2, we disagree with Appellant’s
conclusory assertion that the “PTAB did not provide sufficient reasons nor
logic showing that [the references] teach or suggest that the access command
being serviced, when a logical address satisfying a predefined condition, is
within a predefined range, as claimed.” Such unsupported attorney
argument, is entitled to little probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465,
1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997); In re De Blauwe, 736 F.2d 699, 705 (Fed. Cir. 1984).
Beyond asserted a conclusion as to this point, Appellant fails to explain
“with particularity the point believed to have been misapprehended or
overlooked by the Board” as required by 37 C.F.R. § 41.52(a)(1).
Again, as we stated in our Decision of April 25, 2016:
Appeal 2014-005080
Application 11/964,057

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[W]e adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by
the Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and
(2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner.
Decision 6. Particularly, “we disagree for the reasons set forth by the
Examiner at page 25 of the Answer.” Decision 7. As the Examiner correctly
found, “Yamamoto necessarily determines if the command is addressing
locations within the PSA or the DSA (i.e., verifying if the command satisfies
a predefined condition) because Yamamoto discloses PSA is accessible
while the DSA remains inaccessible.” Ans. 25.

DECISION
In view of the foregoing discussion, we grant Appellant’s Request for
Rehearing to the extent of reconsidering our decision, but we otherwise deny
Appellant’s Request.

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv).

REQUEST FOR REHEARING DENIED