Ex Parte Adelman et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardJun 9, 201611306612 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 9, 2016) Copy Citation UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE 111306,612 0110412006 43699 7590 06/13/2016 Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC 14455 NORTH HAYDEN ROAD SUITE 219 SCOTTSDALE, AZ 85260 FIRST NAMED INVENTOR Warren Adelman UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www .uspto.gov ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 0053 1611 EXAMINER NGUYEN, ANGELA ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 2442 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 06/13/2016 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address( es): inventions@godaddy.com pat-dept@quarles.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD Ex parte WARREN ADELMAN and MICHAEL CHADWICK Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 Technology Center 2400 Before ST. JOHN COURTENAY III, KAMRAN JIV ANI, and JOYCE CRAIG, Administrative Patent Judges. JIV ANI, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL Appellants1 seek our review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner's final decisions rejecting claims 1, 3-13, and 29-36, which are all the claims pending in the present patent application. Claims 2 and 14-28 are cancelled. App. Br. 1. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ). We AFFIRM. 1 Appellants identify Go Daddy Operating Company, LLC as the real party in interest. App. Br. 1. Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 STATEMENT OF THE CASE The present application relates to obtaining secure certificates using domain name related reputation. Spec. i-f 3. Claim 1 is illustrative (disputed limitation emphasized): 1. A system, compnsmg: one or more computing devices communicatively coupled to a network and configured to: A) store in association, in a database running on said one or more computing devices: i) a domain name; ii) an identification of a registrant; iii) a reputation score for said domain name; and iv) a reputation score for said registrant; B) receive, from said registrant of said domain name, a request for a secure certificate from a certification authority; C) request, from said certification authority, said secure certificate; D) receive, from said certification authority, a request for said reputation score for said domain name, or for said registrant; and E) transmit, to said certification authority, said reputation score, said certification authority issuing said secure certificate to said registrant responsive to said reputation score exceeding a predetermined value. 2 Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 The Rejections Claims 1, 3-5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 13, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Beattie (US 7,003,661 B2; Feb. 21, 2006) and Shull (US 2006/0212930 Al; Sept. 21, 2006). Claims 6 and 31 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Beattie, Shull, and Dixon (US 2006/0253584 Al; Nov. 9, 2006). Claims 8 and 33 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Beattie, Shull, and Judge (US 2006/0015942 Al; Jan. 19, 2006). Claims 11 and 36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) over Beattie, Shull, and Farmer (VeriSign buys Network Solutions for $21 billion deal, CNET News (Mar. 7, 2000)). ANALYSIS Appellants contend the Examiner fails to establish a prima facie case of obviousness in rejecting claim 1 because "Beattie teaches nothing more than a computer system configured to generate email addresses to be selected by a server certificate 'requestor' (not the CA itself) so that an email (not a secure certificate) may be automatically sent to the 'approver' to approve the installation of the certificate." App. Br. 5-7; Reply Br. 2-3. Thus, Appellants contend, the Examiner's rejection lacks "showing a CA requesting and receiving the reputation score or a CA determining whether the reputation score exceeds a predetermined value." App. Br. 7. Appellants further contend: Simply stated, Shull is absolutely silent regarding a CA, and therefore cannot disclose the claimed limitations of 1) a CA requesting and/or receiving a reputation score from a database; 2) the CA determining whether the reputation score exceeds a 3 Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 predetermined value; and/or 3) issuing a secure certificate if the received. Likewise, Beattie is absolutely silent regarding the claimed limitations. In fact, the words "reputation" and "score" (or any equivalent words) are conspicuously absent from the Beattie reference. App. Br. 5-6; Reply Br. 4. Finally, Appellants contend, "This bind trust score is not a reputation score for a domain name or a registrant, . . . the cited paragraphs only shows that 'such a score might be made available to users' It is not enough to merely be 'available."' App. Br. 6. We have considered Appellants' arguments in the Appeal Brief and Reply Brief, as well as the Examiner's Answer thereto. We are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments for at least the following reasons. First, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that the Examiner fails to set forth prima facie case of obviousness because the Examiner correctly maps each claim limitation to a teaching or suggesting of Beattie or Shull. Final Act. 3-5. A determination of obviousness does not require the claimed invention to be expressly suggested by any one or all of the references. See e.g., In re Keller, 642 F.2d 413, 425 (CCPA 1981). The Examiner was not required to "seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the challenged claim" as argued by Appellants. KSR Int'! Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007). Rather, the Examiner's obviousness analysis could "take account of the inferences and creative steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ" (id.), as well as "include recourse to logic, judgment, and common sense available to the person of ordinary skill that do not necessarily require explication in any reference or expert opinion," Perfect Web Techs., Inc. v. InfoUSA, Inc., 587 F.3d 1324, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2009). 4 Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 Second, we are not persuaded by Appellants' arguments that "Shull is absolutely silent regarding a CA" and "the words 'reputation' and 'score' (or any equivalent words) are conspicuously absent from the Beattie reference" because these arguments are not responsive to the Examiner's findings. Where, as here, a rejection is based on a combination of references, one cannot show non-obviousness by attacking references individually. Keller, 642 F.2d at 426; In re Merck & Co., Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). The Examiner cites Beattie-not Shull-for its teaching of a CA requesting and issuing a secure certificate. Final Act. 4. Similarly, the Examiner cites, Shull-not Beattie -for its teaching of a trust score for an authenticated source name (i.e., a reputation score for a domain name) and a portfolio score (i.e., a reputation score for said registrant). Id. at 5. Third, we are not persuaded by Appellants' argument that Shull merely teaches a trust score "might be made available to users . . . . It is not enough to merely be 'available."' Here too, Appellants' argument is not responsive the Examiner's findings in the combined references. The Examiner finds, and we agree: When combining Beattie and Shull, the system would perform the automated check as described in Beattie (column 6, lines 63 - column 7, line 10.) The combined system would use the system taught in Shull to perform the automated check. The combined system requests and obtains a score for an online entity ([0037], [0089], and [0100]) and then makes the decision on whether or not to perform the action [i.e. issue the certificate] based on that score ([0064]). Ans. 8; Final Act. 5. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner's 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection of claim 1. Appellants advance no further arguments for claims 3-13 and 5 Appeal2014-006774 Application 11/306,612 29-36. App. Br. 8. Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of these claims. DECISION We affirm the Examiner's decisions rejecting claims 1, 3-13, and 29- 36. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l)(iv). AFFIRMED 6 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation