Ex Parte Abraham et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Nov 7, 2018

14492704 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 7, 2018)

UNITED STA TES p A TENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR
14/492,704 09/22/2014 Subil M. Abraham
73109 7590 11/09/2018
Cuenot, Forsythe & Kim, LLC
20283 State Road 7
Ste. 300
Boca Raton, FL 33498
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www .uspto.gov
ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
END920140l 10US1_8134-0083 8438
EXAMINER
RAMESH, KRISHNAN
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3668
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
11/09/2018 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ibmptomail@iplawpro.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte SUBIL M. ABRAHAM, VINOD A. BIJLANI,
MATHEWS THOMAS, and SUYESH R. TIWARI
Appeal2018-001427 1
Application 14/492,7042
Technology Center 3600
Before BIBHU R. MOHANTY, KENNETH G. SCHOPPER, and
BRADLEY B. BAY AT, Administrative Patent Judges.
SCHOPPER, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
This is an appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134 from the rejection of claims
1-20. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b ).
We AFFIRM.
1 Our decision references the Appeal Brief ("Appeal Br.," filed June 8,
2017), the Reply Brief ("Reply Br.," filed Nov. 24, 2017), the Examiner's
Answer ("Ans.," mailed Sept. 26, 2017), and the Final Office Action ("Final
Act.," mailed Jan. 10, 2017).
2 According to Appellants, the real party in interest is IBM Corporation.
Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal2018-001427
Application 14/492,704
BACKGROUND
The Specification describes "[ a ]rrangements [for] providing
personalized speed limit information to a current driver of a vehicle." Spec.
CLAIMS
Claims 1, 9, and 16 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1 is
illustrative of the appealed claims and recites:
1. A method of determining personalized speed limit
information, comprising:
receiving a plurality of inputs related to vehicle safe speed
data for a first vehicle, the plurality of inputs including vehicle
data received from one or more other vehicles proximate the first
vehicle and communicatively linked to the first vehicle;
determining, using a processor, a recommended safe speed
limit for a current driver of the first vehicle based on the plurality
of inputs; and
presenting the determined recommended safe speed limit
to the current driver of the first vehicle, wherein
the recommended safe speed limit is a calculated
maximum speed, in real time, that the current driver should be
driving, and
the recommended safe speed limit is based upon reaction
time of the current driver, driving characteristics of the driver,
and vehicle condition.
Appeal Br. 22.
REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as indefinite.
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Application 14/492,704
2. The Examiner rejects claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over T'Siobbel3 in view of Morita. 4
DISCUSSION
Indefiniteness
With respect to the independent claims, the Examiner determines that
"[t]he term/phrases 'safe' and 'speed .... should be driving' render the claims
indefinite. The terms are subjective in nature, and one of ordinary skill in
the art would not be able to determine the metes and bounds of the claims,
thus rendering the claimed invention vague and indefinite." Final Act. 6.
The Examiner also determines that "[ a ]lthough there is a general sense of
what is meant by 'safe speed limit' and 'speed ... driver should be driving,'
both phrases have no fixed, clear, definite, meaning in the art." Ans. 3. The
Examiner concludes that the scope of the claim is unclear to the reader
because the safe speed is dependent on variable conditions and that "those of
ordinary skill in the art, or potential infringers, would not have a reasonable
determination of the phrases." Id. at 3--4.
"[A] claim is indefinite when it contains words or phrases whose
meaning is unclear." In re Packard, 751 F.3d 1307, 1332 (Fed. Cir. 2014);
Ex Parte McAward, No. 2015-006416, 11 (PTAB Aug. 25, 2017)
(precedential) (quoting In re Packard, 751 F.3d at 1314). The USPTO
"determines the scope of claims ... not solely on the basis of the claim
language, but upon giving claims their broadest reasonable construction 'in
light of the specification as it would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in
3 T'Siobbel et al., US 2012/0283942 Al, pub. Nov. 8, 2012.
4 Morita et al., US 2013/0245945 Al, pub. Sept. 19, 2013.
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Application 14/492,704
the art."' Phillips v. A WHCorp., 415 F.3d 1303, 1316 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (en
bane) (quoting In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed.
Cir. 2004). We agree with Appellants that the relevant issue here is
"whether one skilled in the art would recognize whether someone was
determining a safe speed limit versus determining some other type of speed
limit." Reply Br. 4. We also agree that the claim terms are not indefinite
simply because the safe speed limit may vary depending on different
parameters. Id. at 5. Thus, given the "general sense of what is meant by"
the claim terms at issue and the specific variable parameters required by the
claim, we conclude that one of ordinary skill would be reasonably be
apprised of the scope of the claim such that the claims are not indefinite.
Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection.
Obviousness
Appellants acknowledge that claims 2-20 will stand or fall with claim
1. Appeal Br. 11.
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds that T'Siobbel teaches a
method as claimed except that T'Siobbel does not teach providing a
recommended safe speed limit based on driver reaction time, driving
characteristics of the driver, and vehicle condition. Final Act. 7-8.
However, the Examiner finds that the use of these parameters would have
been obvious in view of the teachings of Morita. Id. at 8-9.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner's findings and conclusions
regarding claim 1 as they pertain to this rejection. See Final Act. 7-9; see
also Ans. 5-8. As discussed below, we are not persuaded of error by
Appellants' arguments.
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Application 14/492,704
First, Appellants argue that T'Siobbel does not disclose a
determination of a safe speed and only discloses the determination of an
average speed, which is not inherently equal to the safe speed limit. Appeal
Br. 12. Appellants assert that the average speed disclosed in T'Siobbel is
not a speed limit as required by the claim because a limit provides the bound
of a particular range and an average speed is not a bound. Id. We disagree.
T'Siobbel teaches the "need for a navigation system and method that
is capable of providing a driver with a merging speed behavior
recommendation, allowing the driver to focus on safely merging with
another traffic flow at the safest possible speed or acceleration." T'Siobbel
,r 8. T'Siobbel meets this need by providing methods for determining the
average speed of traffic and conveying "a recommended merging speed."
See id. at 9, 37, 38, 48. Thus, when considering T'Siobbel as a whole, one
of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that the average speed calculated
is determined to be a speed at which it is safe to merge, i.e. a safe speed.
Further, T'Siobbel teaches that the system and methods can recommend a
change in speed if the monitored speed of the vehicle is not equal to the
average speed of vehicles on a second road segment, and thus, T'Siobbel
teaches that the average speed is intended to be the safe speed limit for the
vehicle as it approaches a merging point with the second roadway. This
speed limit may either be a maximum or minimum safe speed limit
depending upon whether the vehicle is travelling above or below the average
speed on the second road segment. Therefore, we agree with the Examiner
that T'Siobbel does disclose the determination and presentation of a safe
speed limit. See, e.g., Ans. 5---6.
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Application 14/492,704
Second, Appellants argue that Morita does not teach determining a
safe speed limit based on the "driving characteristics of the driver," as
required by claim 1. See Appeal Br. 16. We are not persuaded for the
reasons provided by the Examiner. See Ans. 6-7. Specifically, Morita
discloses that the safe, recommended speed may be derived from a variety of
parameters including "[t]he driver's reaction time, the reaction time of the
vehicle ... , etc." Morita ,r 89. We agree with the Examiner that because the
driver's reaction time is a driving characteristic of the driver and because
Morita contemplates using other parameters, Morita would have at least
suggested the use of other driving characteristics to one of ordinary skill in
the art such that the claimed limitation requiring the use of reaction time,
vehicle condition, and other driving characteristics of the driver would have
been obvious.
Third, Appellants argue that the proposed combination would change
the principle of operation of T' Siobbel because T' Siobbel involves only
determining and presenting the average speed of merging traffic. Appeal Br.
18-19. We disagree for the reasons provided by the Examiner. See Ans. 7-
8. Specifically, we agree with the Examiner that using additional parameters
to calculate a safe merging speed would enhance, rather than destroy,
T'Siobbel's principle of operation, as T'Siobbel is primarily concerned with
providing a safe merging speed for the driver.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of reversible error in the
rejection of claim 1. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1, and
we also sustain the rejection of claims 2-20, which fall with claim 1.
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CONCLUSION
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b ).
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 1-20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(l )(iv).
AFFIRMED
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