Ex Parte Abraham et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 11, 2017

12751535 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 11, 2017)

United States Patent and Trademark Office
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O.Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/751,535 03/31/2010 Manoj ABRAHAM T9049-19401US01 1814
74739 7590 07/13/2017
MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C.
Oracle International Corporation
1751 Pinnacle Drive
Suite 1500
Tysons Corner, VA 22102-3833
EXAMINER
CHOY, PAN G
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3624
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/13/2017 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
Ipdocketing @ Miles S tockbridge. com
bgoldsmith @ miles stockbridge .com
smcvean @ milesstockbridge. com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte MANOJ ABRAHAM and QUN CHEN
Appeal 2017-0068231
Application 12/751,53 52
Technology Center 3600
Before HUBERT C. LORIN, NINA L. MEDLOCK, and
BRADLEY B. BAYAT, Administrative Patent Judges.
MEDLOCK, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellants appeal under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1, 3—7, 9—13, and 15—20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We REVERSE.
1 Our decision references Appellants’ Appeal Brief (“App. Br.,” filed
August 15, 2016) and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.,” filed March 20, 2017), and
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.,” mailed January 19, 2017), and Non-Final
Office Action (“Non-Final Act.,” mailed March 15, 2016).
2 Appellants identify Oracle International Corporation as the real party in
interest. App. Br. 2.
Appeal 2017-006823
Application 12/751,535
CLAIMED INVENTION
Appellants’ claimed invention relates to “a supply chain planning
system” (Spec. 11).
Claims 1, 7, and 13 are the independent claims on appeal. Claim 1,
reproduced below with bracketed numerals added, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A non-transitory computer-readable medium having
instructions stored thereon that, when executed by a processor,
cause the processor to perform a method for simulating supply
chain plans, the method comprising:
[1] loading a supply chain plan from a database into a
planning web service executed at a server of a supply chain
planning system by creating an in-memory object residing in a
memory of the planning web service executed at the server,
wherein the supply chain plan comprises supply chain planning
data comprising one or more components for a product;
[2] copying the supply chain plan into a new supply chain plan
by serializing the in-memory object residing in the memory of
the planning web service into a file comprising a sequence of
bytes, copying the file into a new file, and de-serializing the new
file to create a new in-memory object residing in the memory
executed at the server, wherein the new supply chain plan is a
copy of the supply chain plan that is created from the new file;
[3] modifying the new supply chain plan by modifying the
new in-memory object residing in the memory of the planning
web service, wherein the modified new supply chain plan
comprises an alternate scenario for the supply chain plan;
[4] running a planning algorithm on the modified new supply
chain plan to generate a planning solution based on the alternate
scenario;
[5] saving the modified new supply chain plan within the
database as the planning solution; and
[6] unloading the supply chain plan from the planning web
service.
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Application 12/751,535
REJECTIONS
1. Claims 1, 3—7, 9—13, and 15—20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as directed to non-statutory subject matter.
2. Claims 1, 7, and 13 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Riepshoff et al. (US 2011/0173034 Al, pub. July 14,
2011) (hereinafter “Riepshoff’), Bodily et al. (US 2007/0239774 Al, pub.
Oct. 11, 2007) (hereinafter “Bodily”), Bibr et al. (US 2005/0057560 Al,
pub. Mar. 17, 2005) (hereinafter “Bibr”), and Tian (US 2008/0313649 Al,
pub. Dec. 18, 2008).
3. Claims 3, 6, 9, 12, 15, and 18 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Riepshoff, Bodily, Bibr, Tian, and Peterson et
al. (US 2003/0195934 Al, pub. Oct. 16, 2003) (hereinafter “Peterson”).
4. Claims 4, 5, 10, 11, 16, and 17 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Riepshoff, Bodily, Bibr, Tian, and Jackson
(US 2011/0173294 Al, pub. July 14, 2011).
5. Claims 19 and 20 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over Riepshoff, Bodily, Bibr, Tian, and Underwood
(US 6,609,128 Bl, iss. Aug. 19, 2003).
ANALYSIS
Non-Statutory Subject Matter
In rejecting the pending claims under § 101, the Examiner finds that
the claims are directed to “supply chain planning,” and that the concept of
comparing a particular plan to a scenario, analyzing whether the particular
plan achieves a specified outcome, and identifying the particular plan
records is similar to the concept of comparing new and stored information
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Application 12/751,535
and using rules to identify options, which the Federal Circuit concluded, in
SmartGene, Inc. v. Advanced Biological Labs., SA, 555 F. App’x 950, 955
(Fed. Cir. 2014), is an abstract idea (Non-Final Act. 10; see also id. at 3—6;
Ans. 6). The Examiner further finds that the claims do not include
additional elements or a combination of elements that amount to
significantly more than the judicial exception because the additional
elements are merely directed to instructions to implement the idea on a
computer and/or computer implemented functions that are well-understood,
routine, and conventional activities previously known to the art (Non-Final
Act. 11: see also Ans. 5 (“the claimed computer based implementation ... is
routine and conventional, therefore, the invention is not necessarily rooted in
the computer technology field”)).
Appellants argue, inter alia, that “the recited claims provide
improvements to the functioning of the computer” (App. Br. 21 (citing
Spec. 1103)). In this regard, Appellants maintain that “[t]he lack of a need
to have to recreate an in-memory object clearly leads to a better result” {id.).
Responding to Appellants’ arguments, the Examiner asserts that “the
features upon which appellants relied (i.e., does not have to reload the
planning data and recreate the in-memory object) are not recited in the
rejected claim(s)” (Ans. 13—14). However, we agree with Appellants that a
claim need not expressly recite the “improvement itself (e.g., the computer
runs faster)” if “the structure and functionality that leads to the
improvement” is recited in the claim (Reply Br. 3). As Appellants explain,
“a supply chain planning system that can propagate user changes to planning
data in a database to a planning web service to directly modify the in­
memory object in the planning web service [. . .] is recited in the claims,
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Application 12/751,535
[i.e., independent claim 1 recites “modifying the new supply chain plan by
modifying the new in-memory object residing in the memory of the planning
web service” and independent claims 7 and 13 each includes a similar
limitation], and [this] is what provides the improvement” {id. at 3—4).
As disclosed in the Specification, “in a conventional supply chain
planning system, the system must reload the database and convert the
changed planning data into an updated in-memory object” (Spec. 1102) and
“loading the planning data from the database to create an in-memory object
can be a time-consuming step” {id. 1 51). The Specification, thus, discloses
that modifying a new supply chain plan by modifying a new in-memory
object, rather than re-loading the data from the database into memory,
provides a more efficient solution that saves time and computing resources
and thereby effects an improvement in the functioning of the computer
itself.3
The present record fails to adequately support a determination that the
claimed invention does not improve the functioning of the computer itself.
Therefore, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—7, 9—
13, and 15—20 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
3 That the Specification describes implementation of the invention using a
general purpose processor (Spec. 132) does not imply that the claims are
necessarily ineligible. See Enflsh, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327,
1338 (Fed. Cir. 2016). 1338 (“we are not persuaded that the invention’s
ability to run on a general-purpose computer dooms the claims.”); id.
at 1335 (“Software can make non-abstract improvements to computer
technology just as hardware improvements can . . .”).
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Claim Construction
We begin our obviousness analysis by first considering the scope and
meaning of the term “in-memory object,” as used in independent claims 1, 7,
and 13.
There is a heavy presumption that claim terms take on their “plain,
ordinary, and accustomed meaning to one of ordinary skill in the relevant
art.” See Prima Tekll, L.L.Cv. Polypap, S.A.R.L., 318 F.3d 1143, 1148
(Fed. Cir. 2003). Appellants may overcome that presumption by acting as
their own lexicographer to assign a special definition to each claim term.
But any such definition must be “clearly set forth” and “explicit.” Id.
Here, we find that Appellants acted as their own lexicographer by
providing a clear and explicit definition in the Specification for the term “in­
memory object:” “An object is a programming data structure which includes
data values and procedures that can manipulate the data values” (Spec. 140).
The Examiner maintains that “[ujnder a broadest reasonable
interpretation in light of the specification, ‘in-memory object’ is interpreted
as being an object ‘stored in a memory’” (Ans. 18) (citing paragraph 53 of
Appellants’ Specification)). We agree. Thus, an “in-memory object” is “a
programming data structure which includes data values and procedures that
can manipulate the data values” that is stored in a memory.
We further note, regarding the claimed “memory,” that paragraph 32
of Appellants’ Specification provides that “[mjemory 14 can be comprised
of any combination of random access memory (‘RAM’), read only memory
(‘ROM’), static storage such as a magnetic or optical disk, or any other type
of machine or computer-readable medium.”
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With this understanding in mind, we turn to the merits of the
Examiner’s obviousness rejections.
Obviousness
We are persuaded by Appellants’ argument that the Examiner erred in
rejecting independent claims 1,7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) because
Riepshoff, on which the Examiner relies, does not disclose or suggest
“loading a supply chain plan from a database into a planning web service
executed at a server of a supply chain planning system by creating an in­
memory object residing in a memory of the planning web service” i.e.,
limitation [1], as recited in claim 1, and similarly recited in claims 7 and 13
(App. Br. 23—25).
Riepshoff is directed to optimizing supply plans based on changing
operational demands using genetic algorithms (Riepshoff 17), and discloses
a supply plan evaluation and optimization system 250 that stores supply
chain data in a supply plan database 302 {id. 134). Riepshoff also discloses
storing supply plan data in data storage 522 {id. 145; Figures 5—7).
In rejecting independent claims 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a),
the Examiner cites Figure 5 (steps 502 and 510-518) and paragraphs 36-40
and 44—51 of Riepshoff as disclosing “creating an in-memory object residing
in a memory of the planning web service” (Non-Final Act. 14—15).4
According to the Examiner, “Riepshoff discloses storing data in a memory”
in Figure 5, steps 502—504 and paragraph 46, and more particularly discloses
that “the requirement 520 module then writes (storing) the new data to data
storage 522” {id.).
4 In the Answer, the Examiner cites several additional portions of Riepshoff
as disclosing an “in-memory object” (Ans. 18—19).
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Steps 502—506 of Figure 5 are described in paragraph 46 of Riepshoff
as follows:
At step 502, middleware 420 “write[s] raw supply plan data to
data manager” of web service client 424 (Riepshoff 1 46). At
step 504, “web service client 424 then abstracts and consolidates
the received supply data” {id.) At step 506, “[Requirements
module 520 then writes the new data to data storage 522.”
We fail to see how, and the Examiner has not explained how, writing raw
supply plan data at step 502 is equivalent to “creating an in-memory object
residing in a memory of the planning web service,” as the term “in-memory
object” is defined in the Specification. The Examiner also has not
adequately explained how writing abstracted and consolidated data at
step 504 or writing new data at step 506 amounts to creating an object, i.e.,
creating “a programming data structure which includes data values and
procedures that can manipulate the data values.”
The Examiner further asserts in the Answer that Riepshoff discloses
the “in-memory object” at Figure 7, steps 702—704, at paragraphs 50-51,
and in the supply plan optimizing instructions recited in claim 8 (Ans. 18—
19). According to the Examiner, “Riepshoff teaches at least storing the
supply plan optimizing instructions (objects) in a memory for generating an
optimized (new) supply plan” {id. at 19).
We have reviewed the cited portions of Riepshoff and we find nothing
there that discloses or suggests creating an “object.” Steps 702—704 describe
writing supply plan data similar to steps 502—506 discussed above. The
supply plan optimizing instructions recited in claim 8 are just that:
instructions, not objects.
In view of the foregoing, we do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). For the same reasons, we
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also do not sustain the Examiner’s rejection of dependent claims 3—6, 9—12,
and 15-20. Cf. In re Fritch, 972 F.2d 1260, 1266 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(“dependent claims are nonobvious if the independent claims from which
they depend are nonobvious”).
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—7, 9—13, and 15—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101 is reversed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1, 3—7, 9—13, and 15—20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) is reversed.
REVERSED
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