Ex Parte 8275845 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2015

90012771 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2015)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/012,771 01/23/2013 8275845 101921.0003PRX 8355
34284 7590 03/27/2015
Rutan & Tucker, LLP.
611 ANTON BLVD
SUITE 1400
COSTA MESA, CA 92626
EXAMINER
DESAI, RACHNA SINGH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/27/2015 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte RPOST INTERNATIONAL LIMITED
____________

Appeal 2015-001525
Reexamination Control 90/012,771
Patent 8,275,845 B2
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before JAMES R. HUGHES, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
LINZY T. McCARTNEY, Administrative Patent Judges.

HUGHES, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Appellant seeks our review under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 306 of the
Examiner’s final decision rejecting claims 1–27. (App. Br. 6.)
1
We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 6(b), 134(b), and 306. An oral hearing was
held on March 11, 2015.
We affirm.
This proceeding arose from a request for ex parte reexamination filed
on January 23, 2013 of the’845 patent, issued to Tomkow on September 25,
2012. The ’845 patent describes systems and methods for verifying the
content of a response to an offer (to enter an agreement) transmitted over a
network. The method includes receiving a message (including the offer)
from a sender, registering the message by a server, transmitting the
registered message from the server to a recipient, the recipient generating a
reply to the received registered message, transmitting the reply to the server,
registering the reply by the server, and transmitting the registered reply to
the sender. (’845 patent, col. 1, ll. 19–23; col. 3, l. 6 – col. 5, l. 25;
Abstract.)

1
We refer to Appellant’s issued patent US 8,275,845 B2 (’845 patent)
issued Sept. 25, 2012 (filed May 13, 2011 claiming benefit of US
09/626,577, filed July 27, 2000; US 60/146,074, filed July 28, 1999; and US
60/172,479, filed Dec. 17, 1999); Appeal Brief (“App. Br.”) filed June 20,
2014; and Reply Brief (“Reply Br.”) filed October 8, 2014. We also refer to
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.”) mailed August 8, 2014, and Final Office
Action (Final Rejection) (“Final Act.”) mailed August 30, 2013.
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Representative Claim
Independent claim 1, reproduced below with the key disputed
limitations emphasized, further illustrates the invention:
1. A method for verifying the content of a reply manually
initiated by a recipient to an offer to enter an agreement, the
offer transmitted over a network and through a server displaced
from the recipient, comprising:
receiving a message from a sender, the message
containing an offer by the sender to enter an agreement with the
sender;
registering the message by the server;
transmitting the registered message from the server to the
recipient;
generating a manually initiated digital signature-free
reply to the registered message at the recipient, the manually
initiated digital signature-free reply including an indication of
acceptance or rejection of the offer contained in the registered
message;
transmitting the manually initiated digital signature-free
reply to the server;
registering, by the server, the manually initiated digital
signature-free reply received by the server from the recipient;
transmitting the registered manually initiated digital
signature-free reply received from the recipient to the sender by
the server.
Rejections on Appeal
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
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2. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6–11, 15–20, and 24–27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bisbee (US 6,237,096
B1, issued May 22, 2001 (filed May 4, 1998)).
3. The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bisbee and Mitty (US 6,199,052
B1, issued Mar. 6, 2001 (filed Mar. 6 1998)).
4. The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bisbee and Grasso (US
5,892,909, issued Apr. 6, 1999).
5. The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6–11, 15–20, and 24–27
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuroda (US 6,470,448
B1, issued Oct. 22, 2002 (filed Mar. 31, 1997)) and Bisbee.
6. The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 11–14, and 21–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuroda, Bisbee, and Mitty.
7. The Examiner rejects claims 3–5, 11–14, and 21–23 under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kuroda, Bisbee, and Grasso.

ISSUES
Based upon our review of the administrative record, Appellant’s
contentions, and the Examiner’s findings and conclusions, the pivotal issues
before us follow:
1. Does the Examiner err in finding that Appellant’s claims 1–27
fail to comply with the written description requirement?
2. Does the Examiner err in finding that Bisbee would have taught
or suggested “generating a manually initiated digital signature-free reply to
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the registered message at the recipient, the manually initiated digital
signature-free reply including an indication of acceptance or rejection of the
offer contained in the registered message” within the meaning of Appellant’s
claim 1 and the commensurate limitations of claims 10 and 19?
3. Does the Examiner err in finding that the combination of
Kuroda and Bisbee collectively would have taught or suggested “generating
a manually initiated digital signature-free reply to the registered message at
the recipient, the manually initiated digital signature-free reply including an
indication of acceptance or rejection of the offer contained in the registered
message” within the meaning of Appellant’s claim 1 and the commensurate
limitations of claims 10 and 19?

FINDINGS OF FACT
We adopt the Examiner’s findings in the Answer and the Final Office
Action mailed August 30, 2013, as our own, except as to those findings that
we expressly overturn or set aside in the Analysis that follows.

ANALYSIS
Based on Appellant’s arguments, we find Appellant argues, with
respect to the § 112, first paragraph, rejection (App. Br. 6–17), claims 1–27
together as a group. We also find Appellant argues, with respect to the
§ 103 rejection over Bisbee (App. Br. 17–30) and the § 103 rejection over
Kuroda and Bisbee (App. Br. 32–40), claims 1, 2, 6–11, 15–20, and 24–27
together as a group. Although Appellant provides nominal separate
arguments for independent claims 10 and 19, these arguments merely
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reiterate the arguments made with respect to claim 1. (App. Br. 26–30; 37–
40).
Additionally, we find Appellant provides nominal separate arguments,
with respect to the § 103 rejection over Bisbee and Mitty (App. Br. 30–31)
and the § 103 rejection over Kuroda, Bisbee, and Mitty (App. Br. 40–41),
for claims 4, 13, and 22 as a group. (App. Br. 30, 40.) Appellant, however,
merely reiterates the arguments made with respect to claim 1 and quotes the
language of claim 4 (id.) without sufficiently explaining why the limitation
is not met by Bisbee and Mitty (and Kuroda). Thus, we find Appellant does
not separately argue the § 103 rejection over Bisbee and Mitty and
dependent claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23. Similarly, with respect to the
§ 103 rejection over Bisbee and Grasso (App. Br. 31–32) and the § 103
rejection over Kuroda, Bisbee, and Grasso (App. Br. 41–42), Appellant
again merely reiterates the arguments made with respect to claim 1 and
states that “[n]owhere is there any mention in Grasso of a process allowing a
recipient to reply to the message. Grasso only teaches a recipient being able
select how to receive a message.” (App. Br. 31 (see App. Br. 41).)
Appellant does not sufficiently explain how this statement traverses the
Examiner’s rejection. Thus, Appellant has not separately argued with
particularity the § 103 rejection over Bisbee and Grasso and dependent
claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23.
Accordingly, we select independent claim 1 as representative of
Appellant’s arguments and grouping with respect to claims 1–27 and each of
the (i) the § 112, first paragraph, rejection; (ii) the § 103 rejection over
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Bisbee; and (iii) the § 103 rejection over Kuroda and Bisbee. 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2012).
We adopt as our own (1) the findings and reasons set forth by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken (Final Act. 3–39;
Ans. 3), and (2) the reasons set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s
Answer (Ans. 4–17) in response to Appellant’s Appeal Brief. We concur
with the findings and conclusions reached by the Examiner, and we provide
the following for emphasis.
The Written Description Rejection of Claims 1–27
The Examiner rejected claims 1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first
paragraph, as failing to comply with the written description requirement.
Claim 1 is representative and was amended to recite a “digital signature-free
reply.” (Final Act. 3; Ans. 3–6.) Appellant contends that the Examiner
improperly rejected the claims as failing to comply with the written
description requirement and that support exists in the ’845 patent for the
added limitation of a “digital signature-free reply.” (App. Br. 7–17; Reply
Br. 2–4.) There is no dispute that the Specification and original claims are
silent as to the digital signature-free reply limitation that was added by
amendment during reexamination. (Final Act. 3.) The amended
limitation—“digital signature-free reply”—is also a “negative limitation” in
that it excludes from the scope of the recited invention features taught by the
prior art, rather than describes subject matter which defines the invention
recited by the claims.
Neither Appellant’s Appeal Brief, nor the Specification of the ’845
patent provides a definition for “digital signature.” Accordingly, we broadly
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but reasonably construe the term to mean “[a] unique value associated with a
transaction that verifies the originator.” Dictionary of Communications
Technology: Terms, Definitions and Abbreviations, Wiley (1998) available
at http://search.credoreference.com/content/entry/wileycommtech/
digital_signature/0).
Appellant cites several portions of the ’845 patent Specification for
support of the general concept of “providing for verification of the content
of an email message without the need for a sender to utilize special software,
or to encrypt the message” (App. Br. 7). (App. Br. 7–16 (citing Spec., col.
2, l. 63–col. 3, l. 2; col. 3, ll. 15–24, 36–67; col. 4, ll. 17–20; col. 5, ll. 21–
25; col. 6, l. 44–col. 7, l. 35; col. 8, ll. 14–25; col. 17, ll. 32–61; col. 17, l.
63–col. 18, l. 3; col. 18, ll. 37–51; col. 22, ll. 55–66; col. 23, ll. 1–8, 17–28,
37–49; col. 24, ll. 22–27; col. 25, ll. 9–14; col. 26, ll. 6–17; col. 26, l. 45–
col. 27, l. 3; Figs. 1–5, 8–10.) Appellant asserts this general concept would
convey possession to one of ordinary skill in the art “the concept that
eliminating the use of encryption technology to verify the contents of a
message included eliminating the need to apply a digital signature to the
message to verify its contents” (App. Br. 8) and, in particular, the amended
negative limitation. (App. Br. 7–16.) We disagree.
Nothing in Appellants’ Specification requires a digital signature be
encrypted (utilize encryption). Nor, does Appellants’ Specification describe
eliminating unique values associated with a transaction that verify an
originator. Appellant provides ample support for the general concepts of:
(1) a user/recipient sending an unencrypted message and (2) that digital
signatures may involve encryption. (App. Br. 7–16 (e.g., Spec. col. 2, l. 63–
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col. 3, l. 67; col. 17, l. 63–col. 18, l. 3; col. 24, ll. 22–27).) These general
concepts and Appellant’s cited support in the Specification, however, do not
describe or necessarily suggest the more specific idea of proscribing a digital
signature. The Specification merely describes a system transparent to a
message sender’s software and hardware—allowing the system to verify a
message (its content and sender) without the sender (and receiver) using
special software or equipment, which was a disadvantage of prior art
systems (see App. Br. 15–16 (citing Spec. col. 17, ll. 32–61)).
Given Appellant’s arguments based on the broad descriptions in the
’845 patent Specification, we note, “it is ‘not a question of whether one
skilled in the art might be able to construct the patentee’s device from the
teachings of the disclosure . . . . Rather, it is a question whether the
application necessarily discloses that particular device’ . . . . A description
which renders obvious the invention for which an earlier filing date is sought
is not sufficient.” Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572
(Fed. Cir. 1997) (quoting Jepson v. Coleman, 314 F.2d 533,536 (CCPA
1963)). See also Ariad Pharm., Inc. v. Eli Lilly & Co., 598 F.3d 1336, 1352
(Fed. Cir. 2010) (“[W]e have repeatedly stated that actual ‘possession’ or
reduction to practice outside of the specification is not enough. Rather, . . .
it is the specification itself that must demonstrate possession.”). This
reasoning is applicable here. Broad descriptions in the Specification
considered alone, or when combined with the knowledge of one skilled in
the art, which merely render obvious the contested negative limitation are
insufficient to satisfy the written description requirement. See e.g.,
Lockwood, 107 F.3d at 1572.
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Further, regarding the negative limitation at issue, we find Appellant’s
cited support in the Specification (supra), does not identify any “descri[ption
of] a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.” Santarus, Inc. v. Par
Pharmaceutical, Inc., 694 F.3d 1344, 1351 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (“Negative
claim limitations are adequately supported when the specification describes
a reason to exclude the relevant limitation.”). See also MPEP § 2173.05(i)
(“Any negative limitation or exclusionary proviso must have basis in the
original disclosure . . . . The mere absence of a positive recitation is not basis
for an exclusion.”).
Even assuming, arguendo, that a digital signature may utilize
encryption (App. Br. 7–8 (citing Spec. col. 3, ll. 53–62)) and the
Specification describes a message sender not utilizing special software (App.
Br. 8–16 (citing, e.g., Spec., col. 2, l. 63–col. 3, l. 67; col. 17, l. 63–col. 18, l.
3; col. 24, ll. 22–27)) or avoiding the disadvantages of encryption (App. Br.
15–16 (citing Spec. col. 17, ll. 32–61)), we find the cited support does not
affirmatively provide a “reason to exclude the relevant limitation”—to
exclude any use of digital signatures (unique values associated with
transactions that verify the message senders) by message senders, i.e., a
“digital signature-free reply” under the controlling Santarus test. See
Santarus, 694 F.3d at 1351.
This is not a case where, as in Santarus, skilled artisans would
understand from the Specification the disadvantages of a particular
alternative excluded by the negative limitation. See Santarus, 694 F.3d at
1351 (where the specification expressly listed the disadvantages of using
sucralfate and the claim excluded sucralfate). Here the ’845 patent describes
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the disadvantage of using proprietary software (and avoiding encryption).
(App. Br. 15–16 (citing Spec. col. 17, ll. 55–61).) Appellant does not
explain—and the ’845 patent does not describe a sufficient nexus between
using proprietary software and utilizing a digital signature—justifying
exclusion of a digital signature. Rather, in the instant case, contrary to
Appellant’s contentions (App. Br. 16–17), Appellant’s negative limitation
(excluding a digital signature) effectively introduces a new concept that is
not reasonably supported by the original disclosure. See Omega Eng’g, Inc.
v. Raytek Corp., 334 F.3d 1314, 1323 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (finding no express
disclaimer or independent lexicography in the written description to justify
adding negative limitation); Ex parte Grasselli, 231 USPQ 393, 394 (BPAI
1983) (aff’d mem., 738 F.2d 453 (Fed. Cir. 1984)) (“[T]he express exclusion
of certain elements implies the permissible inclusion of all other elements
not so expressly excluded. This clearly illustrates that such negative
limitations do, in fact, introduce new concepts.”)
In view of the above discussion, we are not persuaded the Examiner
erred by finding the Specification of the ’845 patent fails to provide support
for the disputed limitation of claim 1 sufficient to comply with the written
description requirement of 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph. Independent
claims 10 and 19 include the same negative limitation and are argued
together with claim 1 (supra). Dependent claims 2–9, 11–18, and 20–27
incorporate the same negative limitation and are, therefore, subject to the
same rejection under § 112, first paragraph.
Therefore, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–27 under
§ 112, first paragraph.
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The § 103 Rejection Over Bisbee
Appellant contends Bisbee does not teach the disputed features of
claim 1. (App. Br. 17–30; Reply Br. 5–8.) Specifically, Appellant contends
that Bisbee does not teach generating and registering a “digital signature-
free reply,” as recited in claim 1 (App. Br. 17–26; Reply Br. 5–8) — “Bisbee
only teaches a system whose integrity requires a digital signature or seal to
be applied to a reply.” (App. Br. 18.) In particular, Appellant contends the
Examiner has misconstrued the claim and/or Bisbee in that Bisbee’s Title
Co./Agent is not a recipient. (App. Br. 25.) Appellant further contends
claim 1 requires registering an email and Bisbee, instead, merely describes
an audit or evidence trail, which is not equivalent to the required
“registering.” (App. Br. 19–20.) Appellant also explains that Bisbee teaches
unencrypted and/or digital signature-free messages are “unreliable” and
“cannot be authenticated or verified” (App. Br. 21). (See App. Br. 21–23.)
Additionally, Appellant asserts factors why claim 1 would not have been
obvious in view of Bisbee, in particular commercial success satisfying a
long-felt but unresolved need. (App. Br. 23–24.) We disagree with each of
Appellant’s contentions.
As explained by the Examiner, Bisbee describes sending messages
without a digital signature, which was well-known (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 6–
10 (citing Bisbee col. 1, ll. 39–44; col. 1, l. 62–col. 2, l. 1).) Bisbee explains
that no distributed verification system exists (at the time of Bisbee’s filing)
that cannot be repudiated, i.e., has the reliability of a signed paper document.
(Bisbee col. 1, ll. 39–44; col. 1, l. 62–col. 2, l. 1.) Bisbee also describes a
Title Co./Closing Agent (recipient) generating a reply message that is not
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necessarily encrypted and lacks a digital signature, and registering the reply
message in the Authentication Center (registering the reply by the server).
(Final Act. 7–9; Ans. 6–10 (citing Bisbee col. 9, ll. 26–53; Fig. 6a (steps 4
and 5)).) Bisbee describes that the Title Co./Closing Agent has the
documents executed electronically (has the Homeowner execute the
documents as if they were paper) (see Bisbee col. 9, ll. 42–44; col. 10, ll. 5–
8, 13–20.) Further, Bisbee explains that the reply message, including the
signed documents, is time-stamped, date-stamped, digitally signed,
journaled, and then stored by the Authentication Center. (Bisbee col. 9, ll.
47–48; col. 10, ll. 31–34.) We broadly but reasonably construe “registering”
to mean “to enter in or as in a record or list; enroll or record officially” or “to
transcribe permanently, as if in a register” Webster’s New World College
Dictionary, 4th Ed. (1999), available at http://www.yourdictionary.com/).
Therefore, we find “registering” broadly reads on appending data to a
message (e.g., time-stamping) and storing the appended message.
Further, Bisbee’s reply message (from the Title Co./Closing Agent to
the Authentication Center) is not necessarily signed or encrypted. While
Bisbee certainly contemplates a signatory and or agent providing private
keys for digitally signing and encrypting documents and messages (see
Bisbee col. 10, l. 5–col. 11, l. 5), nothing in Bisbee describes requiring such
a digital signature for the reply message. Bisbee describes a signatory
required to provide an electronic autograph on the documents (Bisbee col. 9,
ll. 42–44; col. 10, ll. 5–8, 13–20), and that the documents are included in the
reply message (Bisbee col. 10, ll. 21–23), it is the documents that have a
unique value (signature) associated with them that verifies the originator
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(signatory). The reply message is not necessarily required to include any
unique value associated with a transaction/message that verifies the Title
Co./Closing Agent. Instead, it is Bisbee’s Authentication Center that
provides a digital signature and encryption. (Bisbee col. 10, l. 26–col. 11, l.
5.) As Bisbee explains no distributed verification system at the time existed
that could not be repudiated. (Bisbee col. 1, ll. 39–44; col. 1, l. 62–col. 2, l.
1.)
With respect to Appellant’s argument that Bisbee’s Title Co./Closing
Agent is not a recipient (App. Br. 25), the Examiner points out and we agree
that the Agent receives the documents electronically and has the
Homeowner sign them electronically before providing hard (paper) copies to
the Homeowner (Final Act. 7–8; Ans. 11; Bisbee col. 9, ll. 42–46; col. 10, ll.
5–8, 13–20). Thus, we find that the acceptance and the reply are generated
“at the recipient.” as recited in claim 1.
With respect to Appellant’s argument concerning commercial success,
as the Examiner points out, Appellant does not provide any persuasive
evidence in the record of commercial success. (Ans. 10–11.) Appellant’s
statements—“RPost Communications . . . was founded around 1999, at time
when thousands, if not tens of thousands of other companies entered the e-
commerce market. Unlike many of those others, Patent Owner has not only
survived, but has seen its revenues continue to grow” (App. Br. 24)—is
conclusory attorney argument unsupported by any actual evidence (sales
figures, etc.). Market longevity and/or revenues, as purported by Appellant,
are not sufficient to demonstrate commercial success of the claimed systems
and methods (e.g., claim 1), i.e., that Appellant’s digital signature-free reply
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is any more effective, better received, or more “successful” than similar
messaging methods/systems. Appellant provide no nexus between the
merits (claimed features) of their reply message and the commercial success
of the company as a whole.
Thus, for all the reasons supra, Appellant does not persuade us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative independent
claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative claim 1, independent claims 10 and 19, and dependent claims
2, 6–9, 11, 15–18, 20, and 24–27 not separately argued with particularity
(supra).
The § 103 Rejection Over Kuroda and Bisbee
Appellant contends that Kuroda and Bisbee do not teach the disputed
features of claim 1. (App. Br. 32–37; Reply Br. 9.) Specifically, Appellant
contends that neither Kuroda, nor Bisbee teach registering the reply message
(App. Br. 32–34, 36; Reply Br. 9) and Bisbee does not teach a “digital
signature-free reply.” (App. Br. 34–36.)
In our discussion above (supra), we explain why we agree with the
Examiner that Bisbee renders representative claim 1 obvious. We also
disagree with Appellant’s contention that Kuroda does not teach or suggest
registering the reply message. Instead, we agree with the Examiner that
Kuroda’s notarization device assigns a document ID to the document M.
(Ans. 13–14 (citing Kuroda, col. 7, ll. 55–57; col. 12, ll. 37–39; Fig. 6).)
Kuroda’s notarization device receives the transaction document from a
sender (recipient), stores it, and assigns it a document ID. As with the
Bisbee rejection (supra), Appellant does not provide a persuasive
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explanation why the storing and assignment of an ID are not “registering,”
as recited in claim 1.
Thus, for all the reasons supra, Appellant does not persuade us of
error in the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of representative independent
claim 1. Accordingly, we affirm the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of
representative claim 1, independent claims 10 and 19, and dependent claims
2, 6–9, 11, 15–18, 20, and 24–27 not separately argued with particularity
(supra).
The § 103 Rejection of Claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23
As we explain above, Appellant did not provide separate arguments
for the various § 103 rejections of claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23 over the
combinations of Bisbee, Kuroda, Mitty, and Grasso (supra). Accordingly,
for the same reasons as claim 1 (supra), we affirm the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of dependent claims 3–5, 12–14, and 21–23 not
separately argued with particularity.

CONCLUSIONS
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 112, first paragraph.
Appellant has not shown that the Examiner erred in rejecting claims
1–27 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a).

DECISION
We affirm the Examiner’s rejections of claims 1–27.
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Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

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