Ex Parte 7,974,912 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 27, 2014

95001863 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 27, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
95/001,863 12/28/2011 7,974,912 106186.00003 1617
26875 7590 03/28/2014
WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP
2700 CAREW TOWER
441 VINE STREET
CINCINNATI, OH 45202
EXAMINER
WORJLOH, JALATEE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
03/28/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________

GOOGLE, INC. and MICROSOFT CORP.
Requesters and Respondents,

v.

PAID SEARCH ENGINE TOOLS, LLC
Patent Owner and Appellant.
____________________

Appeal 2014-002495
Reexamination Control 95/001,863
Patent No. US 7,974,912 B2
Technology Center 3900
____________________

Before HUBERT C. LORIN, MARC S. HOFF, and DENISE M. POTHIER,
Administrative Patent Judges.

HOFF, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Patent Owner, Paid Search Engine Tools, LLC, appeals under 35
U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315(a) (2002) from the rejection of claims 1-62 as set
forth in the Right of Appeal Notice (RAN) mailed February 27, 2013.
Requesters, Google, Inc. and Microsoft Corp., filed a respondent brief on
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July 1, 2013. The Examiner mailed an Examiner’s answer on October 17,
2013 which incorporated the RAN by reference. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 315.
We affirm.
The ‘912 patent issued to patentee July 5, 2011, and is assigned to
Paid Search Engine Tools, LLC. The ‘450 patent concerns providing search
engine keyword bidders with information they need to optimize their use of
paid search engines. The system accumulates bid amounts for a plurality of
target keywords at one or more paid Internet search engines and presents the
bid amounts to a user. The system also presents bid amounts for a keyword
at one or more paid Internet search engines, in a manner highlighting one or
more selected bid amounts of interest to a potential bidder. This permits a
bidder to identify a differential in bid amounts that indicates an opportunity
for bid optimization (Abstract).
Claim 1 is exemplary of the claims on appeal:
A method that manages pay-per-click advertising, by
determining an amount to be charged in response to a click of a
hyperlink associated with a target keyword, comprising
accessing with a computer processor, a particular
amount a first advertiser is willing to be charged in response to
a click of a hyperlink associated with said first advertiser,
accessing with a computer processor, a statistic of
relevance to said first advertiser and a statistic of relevance to a
second advertiser, said statistics being related to one or more of
rate of use by users, number of times a hyperlink was viewed,
data that relates to an increase or decrease in the use of a
keyword by users, demographics of users associated with a
keyword, or demographics of advertisers associated with a
keyword,
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and without human intervention, determining with a
computer processor, an amount to be charged to said second
advertiser in response to a click of a hyperlink associated with
said target keyword and said second advertiser,
wherein said amount to be charged to said second advertiser is
determined using said particular amount, and is also determined using
said statistic of relevance to said first advertiser and said statistic of
relevance to said second advertiser.

The Examiner relies upon the following prior art in rejecting the
claims on appeal:
Bollay WO 2000/057333 September 28, 2000
Shi WO 2001/01217 January 4, 2001
Davis US 6,269,361 July 31, 2001
Ryan US 6,421,675 July 16, 2002
Kravets US 6,704,727 March 9, 2004
Beriker US Patent Pub. 2006/0253434 November 9, 2006
Konia US 7,225,151 May 29, 2007

K. Gallagher and J. Parson, "A Framework of Targeting Banner Advertising
on the Internet"4 Proceedings of the Thirtieth Hawaii Int’l Conference on
System Sciences 265-274 (March 1997) ("Gallagher").
I. Claims 1-4, 8-20, 24-35, 39-51, and 55-62 stand rejected under 35
U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Konia in view of Ryan.
II. Claims 17-23, 25-29, 31, 48-51, 56-60, and 62 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Konia in view of Kravets.
III. Claims 1-4, 8-15, 17-20, 24-30, 32-46, 48-51, and 55-61 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Beriker in
view of Ryan.
IV. Claims 2, 3, 15, 18, 19, 33, 34, 46, 49, and 50 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Bollay, either alone or in
view of Ryan.
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V. Claims 1-3, 5-13, 15, 17-29, 32-34, 36-44, 46, and 48-60 stand
rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by Shi.
VI. Claims 1, 5-13, 16, 17, 20-29, 31, 32, 36-44, 47, 48, and 51-62
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a) as being anticipated by Bollay.
ISSUES
Patent Owner argues that the Examiner failed to properly consider the
declaration evidence of nonobviousness submitted in November 2010 and
May 2012. Patent Owner contends that these declarations establish a date of
invention no later than May 28, 2000 (App. Br. 26-28). Patent Owner
further asserts that the May 2012 declaration establishes the commercial
success of Patent Owner’s invention, when practiced either by Patent Owner
or their competitors (App. Br. 16-18).
Patent Owner further argues that Konia does not lead to the claimed
invention because Konia’s method is only concerned with bid position and
does not involve the user of the amounts of bids of others (App. Br. 8).
Patent Owner thus contends that Konia does not teach the claimed “without
human intervention, determining with a computer processor, an amount to
be charged to said second advertiser in response to a click of a hyperlink . . .
wherein said amount to be charged to said second advertiser is determined
using said particular amount [i.e., that a first advertiser is willing to be
charged]” (App. Br. 7).
Patent Owner contends that it would not have been obvious to
combine Konia and Ryan (App. Br. 12-13). Patent Owner argues that Ryan
is inapplicable to pay-per-click advertising because in Ryan, “the underlying
principle is payment for presentation of content rather than payment for
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‘clicks’” (App. Br. 12).
Patent Owner argues that it would not have been obvious to combine
Konia and Kravets (App. Br. 13-14). Patent Owner suggests that the “value
scoring” presented by Kravets is not disclosed for the purpose of modifying
the amounts advertisers bid for keywords (App. Br. 14). Patent Owner
further contends that it is illogical to assert that GoTo, the “creator of the
Kravets filing,” would have suggested bid optimization or bid management
functions GoTo itself opposed (App. Br. 14).
Patent Owner further asserts that the rejections involving Beriker, Shi,
or Bollay are erroneous because the November 2010 declaration establishes
a date of invention that disqualifies these references as prior art (App. Br.
26-28).
Patent Owner’s contentions present us with the following issues:
1. Does Patent Owner’s Provisional Application disclose “without
human intervention, determining with a computer processor, an amount to
be charged to said second advertiser in response to a click . . . using said
particular amount [a first advertiser is willing to be charged],” as recited in
independent claim 1?
2. Does the November 2010 Declaration of Juan C. Velez and Darren
Murrer establish a date of invention prior to July 5, 2001?
3. Is the May 2012 Declaration of Juan C. Velez and Darren Murrer
persuasive to establish the commercial success of the claimed invention so
as to overcome the obviousness rejections?
4. Does Konia teach accessing with a computer processor a particular
amount a first advertiser is willing to be charged in response to a click of a
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hyperlink, and without human intervention, determining with a computer
processor, an amount to be charged to a second advertiser in response to a
click of a hyperlink, said amount to be charged to said second advertiser
being determined using said particular amount?
5. Would it have been obvious to combine Konia in view of Ryan to
achieve the claimed invention?
6. Would it have been obvious to combine Konia in view of Kravets
to achieve the claimed invention?

PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“A rejection for anticipation under section 102 requires that each and
every limitation of the claimed invention be disclosed in a single prior art
reference.” See In re Buszard, 504 F.3d 1364, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2007)
(quoting In re Paulsen, 30 F.3d 1475, 1478-79 (Fed. Cir. 1994)).
Section 103(a) forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are
such that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at
the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains.’

KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex, Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406 (2007). The question of
obviousness is resolved on the basis of underlying factual determinations
including (1) the scope and content of the prior art, (2) any differences
between the claimed subject matter and the prior art, (3) the level of skill in
the art, and (4) where in evidence, so-called secondary considerations.
Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 17-18 (1966). See also KSR, 550
U.S. at 407, (“While the sequence of these questions might be reordered in
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any particular case, the [Graham] factors continue to define the inquiry that
controls.”)
Our reviewing court has noted in the past that evidence related solely
to the number of units sold provides a very weak showing of commercial
success, if any. See In re Huang, 100 F.3d 135, 137 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Cable
Elec. Prods., Inc. v. Genmark, Inc., 770 F.2d 1015, 1026-27 (Fed. Cir. 1985)
(finding that sales of 5 million units represents a minimal showing of
commercial success because “[w]ithout further economic evidence . . . it
would be improper to infer that the reported sales represent a substantial
share of any definable market”); see also In re Baxter Travenol Lab., 952
F.2d 388, 392 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
ANALYSIS
PATENT OWNER’S DECLARATION EVIDENCE OF NONOBVIOUSNESS
We are not persuaded that Patent Owner has established a date of
invention earlier than July 5, 2001.
1

First, we are not persuaded that the Patent Owner’s Provisional
Application, U.S. App. No. 60/215,976, contains a disclosure of subject
matter corresponding to “without human intervention, determining with a
computer processor, an amount to be charged to said second advertiser in
response to a click of a hyperlink associated with said target keyword and
said second advertiser,” which is recited in independent claim 1. Patent
Owner states that the Provisional Application discloses “[c]ompare the data

1
The ‘912 patent issued from Application No. 11/379,987, filed April 24,
2006, which is a continuation of Application No. 10/324,802, filed on
December 20, 2002, which is a continuation of Application No.
PCT/US01/41263, filed on July 5, 2001.
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looking for changes or opportunities to save money or time, or increase
traffic or sales” and “[m]ake sure the customer is not over paying for the
position they are holding” and states that information on changes or
opportunities is delivered to the “people or computer” that will “make the
decision about how to use the Paid Search Engines” (App. Br. 19-21). We
do not agree with Patent Owner that these disclosures correspond to the
claim language of, “without human intervention, determining with a
computer processor an amount to be charged to said second advertiser . . . .”
Second, we are not persuaded that Velez and Murrer’s Declaration of
November 29, 2010 (“2010 Declaration”) establishes a date of invention
earlier than July 5, 2001. Patent Owner argues that the invention was
conceived of and reduced to practice by May 28, 2000, citing an e-mail
message Jon Keel forwarded to himself on that date (2010 Declaration ¶ 62).
The body of the email states “Jon, We lowered the bid of a word and it
worked!” and is signed “Juan” (presumably co-inventor Juan Velez) (2010
Declaration Appendix E).
We agree with Patent Owner that this email establishes that Mr. Velez
communicated with Mr. Keel on or before May 28, 2000, and reported the
result of lowering a bid on a keyword advertisement at goto.com. The
evidence fails to establish what mechanism was used to lower this bid, or
even whether it was done automatically or manually. We agree with
Requesters that the evidence presented does not establish that the bid-
lowering was done according to the limitation of the claimed invention, i.e.,
“without human intervention, determining with a computer processor, an
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amount to be charged to said second advertiser in response to a click of a
hyperlink” (see Resp. Br. 9-10).
We have also considered Patent Owner’s proffered evidence of
commercial success, but we are not persuaded that the evidence is sufficient
to outweigh the Examiner’s conclusion of obviousness. Velez and Murrer’s
Declaration of May 15, 2012 (“2012 Declaration”) avers that
paidsearchenginetools.com (“PSET”) accumulated “over 200 paying
customers throughout the year 2000 and early 2001” (2012 Declaration
¶ 17). This showing is insufficient to outweigh the Examiner’s conclusion
of obviousness for two reasons. First, the number of customers attracted by
PSET is a very weak showing of commercial success in the absence of
information concerning market share. See Huang, supra. Second, the 2012
Declaration does not establish the required nexus between the limitations of
the claimed invention and the asserted commercial success. Patent Owner’s
allegations that Yahoo! and Google also enjoyed commercial success, as a
result of copying Patent Owner’s invention (2012 Declaration ¶¶ 31-40), are
similarly unpersuasive, as they also lack any showing of a nexus between
those companies’ commercial success and the claim limitations of the ’912
patent.
We conclude that Patent Owner has not persuasively shown
entitlement to a date of invention earlier than July 5, 2001. Accordingly,
Patent Owner’s arguments that Bollay, Beriker and Shi should be
disqualified as prior art, due to Patent Owner’s alleged establishment of a
date of invention antedating these references (App. Br. 26-28), are not
persuasive to show Examiner error.
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We further conclude that Patent Owner’s evidence of commercial
success is not sufficient to outweigh the Examiner’s conclusion of
obviousness.
REJECTION I OVER KONIA IN VIEW OF RYAN
Appellant’s argument that the combination of Konia and Ryan fails to
teach all the limitations of the claims, because Konia’s method uses only the
position of bids of others, not their amounts (App. Br. 8-11), is not
persuasive to show Examiner error.
Requesters point out, and we agree, that Konia discloses the use of bid
amounts. “For example, the system checks for whether the bidder’s bid
exceeds all other bids in the auction for determining continuing priority for
listing the bidder’s web page” (col. 4, ll. 52-55; Resp. Br. 14). Konia further
discloses that once a bidder “has achieved the proper position in the search
engine with respect to the current term being processed, the system may
reduce the bid to a minimum which allows the bidder to keep the position”
(col. 4, ll. 57-60). Reducing a bid to a minimum that still allows the bidder
to stay in its desired position is only possible if one knows the relevant bid
amounts, not merely the bid positions.
Thus, we do not agree with Patent Owner that Konia fails to teach the
features of claim 1 because Konia does not teach “accessing with a computer
processor, a particular amount a first advertiser is willing to be charged in
response to a click,” and “without human intervention, determining with a
computer processor, an amount to be charged to [a] second advertiser in
response to a click of a hyperlink . . . . wherein said amount to be charged to
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said second advertiser is determined using said particular amount” (App. Br.
7).
Patent Owner’s further argument that it would not have been obvious
to combine Konia and Ryan, because they are directed to different bidding
methods (App. Br. 12-13), is not persuasive to establish that the Examiner
erred.
We do not agree with Patent Owner that Ryan is not combinable with
Konia because it is concerned with payment for presentation of content,
rather than payment for clicks (App. Br. 12). Rather, we agree with
Requesters that both references are directed to the field of automatic bidding
systems for advertisements (Resp. Br. 19). We agree with Requesters that
the Examiner has stated a rationale for combining the references that
possesses a rational underpinning. Konia teaches efficient bidding for
keywords, and combination with Ryan would have supplied the advantage of
providing bidders with an indication of the effect of the number of views on
their bids, providing some security against paying too much if the value
changed (Resp. Br. 19-20; RAN 17).
Because we do not agree with Patent Owner that the combined
teachings of the references lack any claim elements, or that one would not
have combined Konia with Ryan, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1-4, 8-20, 24-35, 39-51, and 55-62 under § 103 as being unpatentable
over Konia in view of Ryan.
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REJECTION II OVER KONIA IN VIEW OF KRAVETS
Patent Owner argues that the “value scoring” presented by Kravets is
not disclosed for the purpose of modifying the amounts advertisers bid for
keywords (App. Br. 14). Patent Owner further argues that it is illogical to
assert that GoTo, the “creator of the Kravets filing,” would have suggested
bid optimization or bid management functions GoTo itself opposed (App.
Br. 14).
We are not persuaded by Patent Owner’s argument. We agree with
Requester and the Examiner that Kravets is not relied upon for a disclosure
of bid optimization, but rather for “statistics for valuing a keyword that can
be used with a bidding system” (Ans. 7; RAN p. 59).
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of claims 17-23, 25-
29, 31, 48-51, 56-60, and 62 under § 103 as being unpatentable over Konia
in view of Kravets.
REJECTION III OVER BERIKER IN VIEW OF RYAN
Patent Owner’s only argument with respect to the disclosure of
Beriker is a single sentence that Beriker “lacks any teaching or suggestion of
the use of a ‘particular amount’ of a competitive bid in determining a bid
adjustment” (App. Br. 30). Patent Owner provides no citation or evidentiary
support for this assertion. In any event, we agree with Requesters that
Beriker discloses testing “whether the senior merchant’s proxy bid is greater
than or equal to the junior merchant’s current bid” (Resp. Br. 22, citing
Beriker ¶ [0099]).
Patent Owner also argues that Ryan is not relevant and not
combinable with Beriker (App. Br. 30). As discussed in the analysis of
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rejection I over Konia in view of Ryan supra, we are not persuaded by this
argument. Patent Owner’s position that Beriker should be disqualified as
prior art (App. Br. 26-28) is also unpersuasive, as explained supra.
Patent Owner has not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection. We
sustain the rejection of claims 1-4, 8-15, 17-20, 24-30, 32-46, 48-51, and 55-
61 as being unpatentable over Beriker in view of Ryan.
REJECTIONS IV AND VI, OVER BOLLAY ALONE OR IN COMBINATION WITH
RYAN
Patent Owner’s only argument with respect to the disclosure of Bollay
is a single sentence that Bollay “does not describe a system in which a
statistic of relevant (sic) to a first advertiser and a statistic of relevance to a
second advertiser are used to determine an amount to be charged to a second
advertiser” (App. Br. 30). Patent Owner provides no citation or evidentiary
support for this assertion. Nevertheless, we agree with Requesters that
Bollay discloses automated agents that are sent user information, “which
includes at least viewing habits, buying habits, income, e-mail, Internet
Service Provider (ISP), zip code, and other address information” (Resp. Br.
23; Bollay p. 3). “Agents compare the user’s information with criteria, such
as the advertiser’s target audience . . . . The agent’s bid price is determined
by each agent in accordance with a value placed on a user with this user
information, and any other information pertinent to an advertiser” (Resp. Br.
23-24; Bollay p. 3). We further agree with Requesters that bids are
determined using information relevant to one advertiser (advertiser-specific
information) and information relevant to another (user-specific information)
(Resp. Br. 24).
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Patent Owner also argues that Ryan is not relevant and not
combinable with Bollay (App. Br. 30-31). Similar to the discussion in the
analysis of rejection I over Konia in view of Ryan supra, we are not
persuaded by this argument. Patent Owner’s position that Bollay should be
disqualified as prior art (App. Br. 26-28) is also unpersuasive, as explained
supra.
Patent Owner has not shown error in the Examiner’s rejections. We
sustain the rejection of claims 2, 3, 15, 18, 19, 33, 34, 46, 49, and 50 as
being unpatentable over Bollay either alone or in combination with Ryan.
We also sustain the rejection of claims 1, 5-13, 16, 17, 20-29, 31, 32, 36-44,
47, 48, and 51-62 under § 102 as being anticipated by Bollay.
REJECTION V OVER SHI
Patent Owner’s only argument with respect to the disclosure of Shi is
a single sentence that Shi does not teach a method that would “involve the
use of the ‘particular amount’ of a first bidders (sic) bid, to determine a
second bidders (sic) bid” (App. Br. 31). Patent Owner provides no citation
or evidentiary support for this assertion. Nevertheless, we agree with
Requesters that Shi discloses a database structure having a field to specify
the ‘autobid’ preferences of an advertiser, “in which an advertiser is
permitted to specify autobidding increments to maintain the advertiser’s
relative bid amount to other advertisers. For example, an advertiser can
maintain a specific bid ranking (e.g., as the highest bidder) or a range
ranking (e.g., within the top five bidders) by indicating that its bid amount is
to be substantially incremented, subject to an optional cap amount, to
maintain that specified bid ranking” (Resp. Br. 25; Shi 23:22-28). We
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further agree with Requesters that Shi thus discloses comparing the
advertiser’s bid amount to amounts submitted by other advertisers (Resp. Br.
25).
Patent Owner’s position that Shi should be disqualified as prior art
(App. Br. 26-28) is also unpersuasive, as explained supra.
Patent Owner has not shown error in the Examiner’s rejection. We
sustain the rejection of claims 1-3, 5-13, 15, 17-29, 32-34, 36-44, 46, and
48-60 under § 102 as being anticipated by Shi.

CONCLUSIONS
1. Patent Owner’s Provisional Application does not disclose “without
human intervention, determining with a computer processor, an amount to
be charged to said second advertiser in response to a click . . . using said
particular amount [a first advertiser is willing to be charged],” as recited in
independent claim 1.
2. The November 2010 Declaration of Juan C. Velez and Darren
Murrer does not establish a date of invention prior to July 5, 2001.
3. The May 2012 Declaration of Juan C. Velez and Darren Murrer is
not persuasive to establish the commercial success of the claimed invention
so as to overcome the obviousness rejections.
4. Konia teaches accessing with a computer processor a particular
amount a first advertiser is willing to be charged in response to a click of a
hyperlink, and without human intervention, determining with a computer
processor, an amount to be charged to a second advertiser in response to a
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click of a hyperlink, said amount to be charged to said second advertiser
being determined using said particular amount.
5. It would have been obvious to combine Konia in view of Ryan to
achieve the claimed invention.
6. It would have been obvious to combine Konia in view of Kravets to
achieve the claimed invention.

ORDER
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1-62 is affirmed.
In the event neither party files a request for rehearing within the time
provided in 37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and
appealable under 37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must
timely serve notice on the Director of the United States Patent and
Trademark Office. See 37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983.
Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.956. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79.

AFFIRMED

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ack

Patent Owner:

WOOD, HERRON & EVANS, LLP
2700 CAREW TOWER
441 VINE STREET
CINCINNATI, OH 45202

Third Party Requester:

MILES & STOCKBRIDGE P.C.
GOOGLEINC.
1751 PINNACLE DRIVE, SUITE 500
TYSONS CORNER, VA 22102-3833