Ex Parte 7857600 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jun 30, 2016

95002005 (P.T.A.B. Jun. 30, 2016)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
95/002,005 06/01/2012 7857600 96964-01285 7743
26710 7590 07/01/2016
QUARLES & BRADY LLP
Attn: IP Docket
411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE
SUITE 2350
MILWAUKEE, WI 53202-4426
EXAMINER
DOERRLER, WILLIAM CHARLES
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3993
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2016 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________________
HAYWARD INDUSTRIES, INC.
Requester/Cross-Appellant

v.

PENTAIR LTD, et al.
Patent Owner/Appellant
____________________

Appeal 2016-002726
Reexamination Control 95/002,005
Patent U.S. 7,857,600 B21
Technology Center 3900
____________________

Before JOHN C. KERINS, DANIEL S. SONG, and BRETT C. MARTIN,
Administrative Patent Judges.

MARTIN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

1 Issued on December 28, 2010 to Robert M. Koehl (hereinafter the ’600
patent).
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
The Patent Owner appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315(a) from
the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36. The Requester cross-appeals from
the non-adoption of certain proposed rejections. See Req. Br. 3. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(c) and 315(b). Oral arguments were
presented in this case on May 17, 2016, a transcript of which will be entered
into the record in due course.
We are informed that the ’600 patent is the subject of litigation in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of North Carolina (Case
No. 5: 11-CV-459, Pentair Water Pool and Spa, Inc. and Danfoss Drives
A/S v. Hayward Industries, Inc. and Hayward Pool Products, Inc.), and also
is a continuation of United States Patent Application No. 10/730,747, now
U.S. Patent No. 8,540,493, which is related to (A) U.S. Patent Nos.
8,641,385; 8,444,394; 7,990,091; 7,983,877; 7,976,284; 7,821,215;
7,815,420; 7,751,159; 7,704,051; 7,686,587; 7,612,510; and 7,572,108, (B)
U.S. Application Nos. 11/980,096; 12/973,778; 14/322,744; 14/338,939;
14/444,782; 14/446,018; and 14/444,812, (C) Reexamination Control Nos.
95/002,007 and 95/002,008, and (D) Case IPR2013-00287. PO App. Br. 1–
2.
We AFFIRM.

CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed “generally to pumps and pumping methods
and more particularly to pump motor controllers and control methods.”
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Spec., col. 1, ll. 12-14. Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the
claimed subject matter:
1. A method of detecting a foreign object obstruction in a
pool or spa, the pool or spa being coupled to a pump and a motor,
the method comprising:
measuring a voltage and a current being provided to the
motor;
determining a power factor based on the voltage and the
current;
determining whether a fault condition has occurred due to
the presence of a foreign object obstruction in the pool or spa
based on the voltage, the current, and the power factor;
shutting down the motor when the fault condition has
occurred; and
indicating to a user that the fault condition has occurred.

REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Tibbits
Miller
Marshall
Kierstead
Nielsen
Wagoner
McDonough
Møller
Johnson
Koehl (“’408 PGP”2)
McKain
Moeller
Keown
US 4,420,787
US 4,703,387
US 4,841,404
US 4,864,287
US 5,577,890
US 5,614,812
US 6,227,808
US 6,354,805
US 2002/0093306 A1
US 2002/0123408 A1
US 6,468,052
US 2002/0176783 A1
US 6,842,117
Dec. 13, 1983
Oct. 27, 1987
June 20, 1989
Sept. 5, 1989
Nov. 26, 1996
Mar. 25, 1997
May 8, 2001
Mar. 12, 2002
July 18, 2002
Sept. 5, 2002
Oct. 22, 2002
Nov. 28, 2002
Jan. 11, 2005
Mehlhorn US 2005/0226731 A1 Oct. 13, 2005

2 Pre-Grant Publication
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Robert S. Carrow, Electrician’s Technical Reference, Variable Frequency
Drives, Delmar (2001) (hereinafter “Carrow”).

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–3, 5, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by Miller. RAN 11.
Claims 4, 5, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Miller. RAN 12.
Claims 4, 5, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Miller and Kierstead. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and McDonough.
RAN 13.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Miller. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain, McDonough, and
Miller. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Kierstead. RAN
14.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Johnson. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Marshall. RAN
15.
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Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Tibbits. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Nielsen. RAN
16.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McKain and Keown. Id.
Claims 1–6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough and McKain. Id.
Claims 1–6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough and Miller.
RAN 17.
Claims 1–6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough, McKain, and
Miller. Id.
Claims 1–6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough and Johnson.
RAN 18.
Claims 1–6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over McDonough, McKain, and
Johnson. Id.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Mehlhorn. RAN 19.
Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Mehlhorn. Id.
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Claims 1–5, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 33–36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Kierstead. Id.
Claims 1–5, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 33–36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kierstead. RAN 20.
Claims 1–5, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 33–36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kierstead and Miller. Id.
Claims 1–5, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 33–36 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Kierstead, Miller, and
McDonough. RAN 21.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the ’408 PGP and Mehlhorn. Id.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the ’408 PGP, Mehlhorn, and Moeller. RAN 22.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over the ’408 PGP, Mehlhorn, Moeller, and Møller. RAN 23.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wagoner and Moeller. Id.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wagoner, Moeller, and Carrow. RAN 24.
Claims 33 and 35 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Wagoner, Moeller, and Kierstead. Id.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Moeller and Wagoner. Id.
Claims 5–36 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Moeller, Wagoner, and Carrow. RAN 25.
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Claims 33 and 35 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Moeller, Wagoner, and Kierstead. Id.

OPINION
Priority
We first deal with the issue of priority, as the Examiner determined
that the ’600 patent was not entitled to the priority of its parent application,
and thus cited an intervening reference, Mehlhorn, as well as the published
version of the parent application itself (’408 PGP) in a number of the
rejections. See, e.g., RAN 33–34. The main basis for the Examiner’s
finding is that because the claims recite, e.g., “determining whether a fault
condition has occurred due to the presence of a foreign object obstruction in
the pool or spa based on the voltage, the current, and the power factor”
(emphasis added), where the voltage and the power factor are constants, “it
is unclear how a determination of a blockage can be based on a constant.”
Id.
We disagree with the Examiner because even if something is a
constant, a determination can still be made while taking that constant into
account. As the Patent Owner states, “the decision on what level of current
to use as a fault trigger must take the operating conditions into account, and
critical to those operating conditions are the DC bus voltage and the power
factor correction that maintains that DC bus voltage.” PO App. Br. 7–8.
Accordingly, we agree that the ’600 patent sufficiently provides written
descriptive support for the claim language at issue, thus disqualifying
Mehlhorn and the parent application as prior art against the ’600 patent. As
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such, we reverse all rejections based upon either the ’408 PGP and/or
Mehlhorn.
Claim Construction
The majority of the rest of the arguments regarding the remaining
rejections rely upon claim construction arguments, with the Patent Owner
arguing for a considerable number of narrowing claim constructions that
would limit the claims essentially to what is disclosed in the ’600 patent.
See, e.g., PO App. Br. 12–23, and 25–27. The Patent Owner’s claim
construction positions are, however, of dubious merit for at least the
following reasons.
During examination of a patent application, a claim is given its
broadest reasonable construction and read “in light of the specification as it
would be interpreted by one of ordinary skill in the art.” In re Am. Acad. of
Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (citations and internal
quotation marks omitted). Claim terms are generally given their ordinary
and customary meaning. See In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249,
1257 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (“The ordinary and customary meaning ‘is the
meaning that the term would have to a person of ordinary skill in the art in
question.’”) (internal citations omitted).
Reading a claim in light of the Specification, to thereby interpret
limitations explicitly recited in the claim, however, is a quite different thing
from reading limitations of the Specification into a claim, to thereby narrow
the scope of the claim by implicitly adding disclosed limitations having no
express basis in the claim. In re Prater, 415 F.2d 1393, 1404–05 (CCPA
1969). Although the claims are interpreted in light of the Specification,
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limitations from the Specification are not read into the claims. In re Van
Geuns, 988 F.2d 1181 (Fed. Cir. 1993).
As stated by the Requester, the Patent Owner “seeks to impermissibly
incorporate limitations into the [original] claims that are nowhere recited
(‘variable speed,’ ‘regulating,’ ‘correction,’ ‘constant,’ ‘fixed,’ ‘set voltage,’
and/or ‘PFC rectifier,’ etc.)” and then argues that the cited references fail to
teach these narrower limitations. Req. Resp. Br. 10–11. Regarding these
limitations, for example, the Patent Owner argues that “the claimed method
involves fixing the voltage and correcting the power factor such that the
current is reliably indicative of a foreign object detection.” PO App. Br. 12.
We do not disagree that the ’600 patent Specification discloses these
features, nor even that the claims may be read to encompass these features,
but nowhere in the original claims is there mention of fixing voltage or
correcting the power factor such that the claims are properly interpreted to
require such features.
Claim 1 recites only “determining a power factor based on the voltage
and the current.” The Specification goes into lengthy detail describing the
function of the power factor correction and converter/rectifier module (PFC)
34 (see, e.g., col. 7, l. 34–col. 8, l. 3), but curiously, the Patent Owner never
originally claimed a PFC, nor any power factor correction. The only such
step recited in claim 1 is determining the power factor and then assessing
whether a fault has occurred based on the power factor, current, and voltage.
While it may be a fair reading of the original claims that such power factor
correction is within the scope of the claims, we disagree that the broad
language used in the claims requires power factor correction.
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Specifically regarding the term “determining,” the Patent Owner
concedes that “figuring out” is one customary meaning of the term
“determine.” See PO App. Br. 9. The Patent Owner goes onto assert that
another possible meaning of “determining” is “regulate”, and argues that,
given the context of the ’600 patent, we should limit the term to this
regulating construction. Id. While we do not disagree that the one skilled in
the art reading the disclosure of the ’600 patent would understand that
“determine” could include “regulate” in relation to power factor, we also
cannot ignore that, as the Requester states, the ’600 patent uses some form of
the term “determine” 67 times and “[e]ach and every time the word is used it
means ascertaining or ‘figuring out.’” Req. Resp. Br. 3 (emphasis omitted).
From this usage in the Specification, it is clear to us that the Patent Owner
knew how to differentiate “determining” from something akin to
“regulating” in the disclosure, but when choosing terms for the claims,
elected to use the word “determining,” which is broader than “setting” or
“regulating.” Accordingly, we decline to narrow this term to exclude the
definition as used throughout the Specification of “figuring out.”
Additionally, the Patent Owner’s expert, Dr. Collins, further explains
numerous differences between the prior art and the subject matter of the
’600 patent, but again, such differences are not reflected in the original claim
language. For example, Dr. Collins explains at length the differences
between fixed versus variable speed motor operation, but nowhere in claim 1
is there mention of a variable speed motor. Relatedly, the discussion of how
power factor differs between line-connected and variable speed drives is
essentially irrelevant because the original claims are not limited to variable
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speed motors. Similarly, while we appreciate Dr. Collins’ explanation of
how a PFC rectifier works, the Patent Owner has not limited the original
claims to a method involving a PFC rectifier because no such rectifier is
actually claimed.
In summation, we do not necessarily disagree with the Patent Owner
that the ’600 patent discloses and describes various things Dr. Collins
discusses (and that the Patent Owner would like to limit the claims as to
defining), but in order for these differences to have meaning in relation to
the rejections at issue, they must clearly be reflected in the original claim
language, which they are not. The simple recitation of “determining” cannot
be so limited in relation to the power factor to a method involving only
power factor correction. Similarly, nothing in the language of “based on”
limits the claims only to variable speed motors or fixed voltage situations.
We agree with the Requester that the Patent Owner’s attempts to narrow the
claim language at issue amounts to impermissibly reading limitations from
the Specification into the claims when the Specification does not require
such narrowed construction. As much as some of the prior art may fail to
disclose variable speed motors, fixed voltage, and power factor correction,
among other things, the original claims likewise fail to claim these features
by way of the use of the broad language contained therein.
Rejections of Claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, and 33–36
We agree with the Requester that the Patent Owner relies solely on its
claim construction arguments, which we decline to adopt for the reasons
stated supra. Req. Resp. Br. 11. Accordingly, the rejections involving
claims 1–5, 16, 17, 25, 26, 34, and 36 as anticipated by or unpatentable over
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Miller alone or unpatentable over Miller and Kierstead are affirmed.
Likewise the Patent Owner relies solely on its claim construction arguments
for the rejections of claims 1–5, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36 involving McKain
as the primary reference in combination with various secondary references
(Req. Resp. Br. 11–12) and these rejections are affirmed as well. We
similarly affirm the rejections of claims 1–5, 6, 15–18, 25, 26, 34, and 36
based upon McDonough (Req. Resp. Br. 12) and the rejections of claims 1–
5, 16, 17, 25, 26, and 33–36 based upon Kierstead (Id.).
Rejection of Claims 5–36 Based upon Wagoner
Other than arguing that Moeller fails to teach the specific recitation of
the application of the method to a spa or pool pump, the Patent Owner does
not argue that specific limitations from dependent claims 5–36 are absent
from the proposed combination. See PO App. Br. 28–29; PO Reb. Br. 8–9.
The Patent Owner argues only that the combination is improper. Id.
We first agree with the Requester that the Patent Owner fails to
address the basis for the rejection by arguing that “Moeller does not base its
fault detection on power factor, because its power factor is not regulated.”
Req. Resp. Br. 14; see also PO App. Br. 29. The rejection does not rely
upon Moeller, but instead uses Wagoner for this feature. See, e.g., Req.
Resp. Br. 14.
Next, we also agree that, while different from the Patent Owner’s
motivation for using power factor correction, the Requester has proffered a
rational basis upon which a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
found it obvious to combine Wagoner and Moeller, namely that “the use of
power factor correction provides energy savings and incentives.” Req. Resp.
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Br. 13 (citing Emadi Dec. ¶ 64). As stated by the Requester, we are
persuaded that “[a] person of ordinary skill in the art would provide a
variable speed motor circuit with power factor correction (as in Wagoner)
together with power-based evaluations for determining the presence of a
foreign object obstruction leading to the pump (as in Moeller).” Req. Resp.
Br. 13.
In response, the Patent Owner refers to purported limitations from
claim 1 that are allegedly missing in the references (PO App. Br. 29), but as
discussed supra, these limitations are actually impermissible attempts to
read limitations from the Specification into the claims. Furthermore, given
the broad language contained in claim 1 and the fact that the combination of
Wagoner and Moeller teaches obstruction detection and power factor
correction, we are not persuaded that the combination fails to teach these
limitations. The Patent Owner’s arguments amount to attacking the
references individually rather than the combination as a whole. See PO App.
Br. 29, PO Reb. Br. 8–9. In summation, we are not persuaded by the Patent
Owner’s arguments against the combination of Moeller and Wagoner and
agree that the Requester has demonstrated that there would have been
sufficient reason for combining the two references, and that all of the
limitations of the claims as interpreted supra are present in the proposed
combination.
As to the limitation regarding a spa or pool pump, we agree that
Moeller’s description of a reservoir with piping in paragraph 4 generically
describes the same general environment of a spa or pool. Even if this were
insufficient to describe a spa or pool as claimed, however, we also agree that
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Carrow, which the Patent Owner does not argue other than to say it does not
cure the deficiencies of Wagoner and Moeller, is properly combinable with
Wagoner and Moeller and does specifically teach a spa or pool pump. See
Carrow pp. 159–160.
Secondary Considerations of Nonobviousness
Although the Patent Owner alleges that the secondary considerations
of nonobviousness should establish that the claimed method was not
obvious, we agree with the Requester that it is the Patent Owner’s burden to
satisfy the nexus requirement. Req. Resp. Br. 15. First, we note that, to the
extent any claims are anticipated, secondary considerations are inapposite
and cannot overcome such rejections. Furthermore, as the Examiner states,
the conclusion that the Intelliflo and Intellipro VS+SVRS pumps utilize the
claimed invention “is a conclusion, without supporting facts.” RAN 36.
We see no persuasive analysis of how the alleged commercial
embodiment encompasses each and every limitation of any of the claims
thus rendering it impossible to determine the existence, or lack thereof,
between the claimed invention and the evidence purported to establish
commercial success. Also, as the Examiner states, “[t]he [Pickard]
declaration does not establish the premium is based solely on the SVRS
functionality.” Id.; see also Req. Resp. Br. 15. Thus, it would appear that
there may be other factors unrelated to the claims, which the Patent Owner
has not addressed, that could account for the alleged commercial success.
When evidence is presented, it is our duty to consider all evidence
anew. See, e.g., In re Eli Lilly and Co., 902 F.2d 943, 945 (Fed. Cir. 1990).
We are also mindful that objective evidence of non-obviousness in any given
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case may be entitled to more or less weight depending on its nature and its
relationship with the merits of the invention. See Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip
Corp., 713 F.2d 1530, 1538˗39 (Fed. Cir. 1983). Accordingly, we consider
anew the issue of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103, carefully evaluating
and weighing both the evidence relied upon by the Examiner and the
objective evidence of non-obviousness provided by the Appellants. Having
considered all of the evidence submitted, we do not find the Patent Owner’s
secondary considerations evidence sufficient to overcome the prima facie
case of obviousness set forth by the Examiner.
Remaining Rejections and Requester’s Appeal
Having sustained rejections of all pending claims, we decline to reach
the remaining rejections as cumulative of those already considered.
Likewise, the Requester’s Appeal is moot in that it adds only cumulative
rejections to those already sustained. Thus, we decline to reach the
Requester’s appeal.
DECISION
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–36 is AFFIRMED.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). In the event
neither party files a request for rehearing within the time provided in
37 C.F.R. § 41.79, and this decision becomes final and appealable under
37 C.F.R. § 41.81, a party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice
on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See
37 C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983.
AFFIRMED
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Patent Owner:

QUARLES & BRADY LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKET
411 E. WISCONSIN AVENUE
SUITE 2350
MILWAUKEE, WI, 53202-4426

Third Party Requester:

STEVEN E. HALPERN
MCCARTER & ENGLISH, LLP(NEWARK)
100 MULBERRY STREET, FOUR GATEWAY CENTER
NEWARK, NJ 07102