Ex Parte 7512563 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Mar 31, 2014

95001589 (P.T.A.B. Mar. 31, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
95/001,589 03/30/2011 7512563 9027.138.IP563 1096
7590 04/01/2014
GEORGE LIKOUREZOS, ESQ.
261 WASHINGTON AVE.
ST. JAMES, NY 11780
EXAMINER
DESAI, RACHNA SINGH
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
04/01/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

EBAY, INC.
Requester and Respondent

v.

XPRT VENTURES, LLC.
Patent Owner and Appellant
____________

Appeal 2014-002130
Reexamination Control 95/001,589
Patent 7,512,563
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before KEVIN F. TURNER, WILLIAM V. SAINDON, and
JENNIFER L. McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judges.

McKEOWN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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Patent Owner XPRT Ventures, LLC. (“Patent Owner”) appeals under
35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 315(a) the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1,
7, 10 and 19.1 Third Party Requestor eBay, Inc. responds to the Patent
Owner’s appeal.2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and
315(a).
We AFFIRM.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
United States Patent 7,512,563B2 (hereinafter the “’563 Patent”),
issued to George Likourezos and Michael Anthony Scaturro on March
31, 2009, is the subject of the current inter partes reexamination.
The ’563 Patent along with five other patents are the subject of a civil
action in the United States District Court for the District of Delaware, which
is currently stayed. See App. Br. 1-2.
Additionally, the Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences has
decided appeals from the original prosecution of related patents, US Patent
Nos. 7,483,856 and 7,567,937. See App. Br. 2.

1 See Patent Owner’s Revised Appeal Brief, filed April 10, 2013
(hereinafter “PO App. Br.”), at 2; Examiner’s Answer, mailed July 23, 2013,
incorporating by reference the Examiner’s Right of Appeal Notice, mailed
October 5, 2012 (hereinafter “RAN”). The Patent Owner also filed a reply
brief. See Patent Owner’s Rebuttal Brief, filed August 26, 2013 (hereinafter
“PO Reply Br.”).
2 See Third Party Requestor’s Respondent Brief, filed May 8, 2013
(hereinafter “TPR Resp. Br.”).
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THE INVENTION
The ’563 Patent generally relates to a computerized electronic auction
payment system and method for effecting a real-time payment for an item
sold via an electronic auction web site. ’563 Patent, Abstract and 1:17-23.
Claim 1, which is illustrative of the appealed subject matter, has not
been amended during reexamination and reads as follows:
1. A method for automatically effecting payment for a
user of an electronic auction web site maintained by at least one
computing device to an operator associated with the electronic
auction web site, said method comprising the steps of:
executing by at least one processor a sequence of events,
the sequence of events including the steps of providing the user
with an option prior to the conclusion of an electronic auction
provided by the electronic auction web site, the option enabling
the user to authorize a payment system to execute an automatic
payment method after the conclusion of the electronic auction,
the automatic payment method includes automatically
deducting funds from a payment account storing funds therein
and corresponding to the user;
receiving authorization from the user in response to the
provided option and prior to the beginning of the electronic
auction to execute the automatic payment method after the
conclusion of the electronic auction; and
determining whether to execute the automatic payment
method for the user after the conclusion of the electronic
auction based on whether the user has provided authorization to
execute the automatic payment method in response to the
provided option; and
executing by the at least one processor the automatic
payment method after the conclusion of the electronic auction,
if it is determined by the at least one processor to execute the
automatic payment method and the user has provided
authorization for executing the automatic payment method in
response to the provided option, the executing step comprising
the steps of:
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automatically deducting funds from the funds stored in
the payment account corresponding to the user of the electronic
auction web site; and
automatically transferring at least a portion of the
deducted funds into an account corresponding to the operator
associated with the electronic auction web site.
App. Br., Claims App’x.

PRIOR ART REJECTIONS
The Examiner relies on the following references:
Woolston 5,845,265 Dec. 1, 1998
Churchill 7,461,022 B1 Dec. 2, 2008
Marks 7,720,743 B1 May 18, 2010
Hutchison 7,761,385 B2 Jul. 20, 2010
Gold’s Auction, “Sellers FAQ’s”, Goldsauction.com, October 13,
1999, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/19991013094816/http://
goldsauction.com/html/sellerFAQ.html;
Gold’s Auction, “Gold’s Auction User Agreement”,
Goldsauction.com, October13, 1999, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/
19991013094816/http://goldsauction.com/html/-agreement.html;
Gold’s Auction, “Gold’s Auction Billing”, Goldsauction.com, January
19, 2000, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20000119135639//http://
goldsauction.com/html/auctionbilling.html; and
Gold’s Auction, “Gold’s Auction Privacy Policy”, Goldsauction.com,
March 5, 2000, http://replay.waybackmachine.org/20000305125201//http://
goldsauction.com/html/privacyPolicy.html (collectively hereinafter “Gold”).

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The Examiner adopts, or adopts with modification, the following
rejections proposed by the Requester:
1. The rejection of Claims 1, 7, 10 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §102(e) as
being anticipated Hutchison.
2. The rejection of Claims 1, 7, 10 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Hutchison and Churchill.
3. The rejection of Claims 1, 7, 10 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. 102(b) and
102(e) as anticipated by Woolston.
4. The rejection of Claims 1, 7, 10 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Woolston and Marks.
5. The rejection of Claims 1, 7, 10 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. §103(a) as
being unpatentable over Gold.

ISSUES
1. Did the Examiner err by failing to consider the evidence submitted
after the Action Closing Prosecution?
2. Can the Patent Owner change the scope of claim terms by
disavowing certain features rather than by amending the claim?
3. Did the Examiner incorrectly rely on separate and distinct
embodiments of each prior art reference for the anticipation rejections?
4. Did the Examiner err by rejecting the instant claims as anticipated
by each of Hutchison and Woolston?
5. Did the Examiner err by rejecting the instant claims as obvious
under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) in view of the cited prior art combinations?

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PRINCIPLES OF LAW
“To anticipate a claim, a prior art reference must disclose every
limitation of the claimed invention, either explicitly or inherently.” In re
Schreiber, 128 F.3d 1473, 1477 (Fed. Cir. 1997). “But disclosure of each
element is not quite enough—[the Federal Circuit] has long held that
‘[a]nticipation requires the presence in a single prior art disclosure of all
elements of a claimed invention arranged as in the claim.’” Net MoneyIN,
Inc. v. VeriSign, Inc., 545 F.3d 1359, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2008)(citations
omitted). The Federal Circuit has also explained that the inquiry is “not
constrained to proceed example-by-example when reviewing an allegedly
anticipating prior art reference. Rather, the [reviewer] must, while looking at
the reference as a whole, conclude whether or not that reference discloses all
elements of the claimed invention arranged as in the claim.” Net MoneyIN,
545 F.3d at 1369 n. 5.

ANALYSIS
EVIDENCE OF SECONDARY CONSIDERATIONS
The Patent Owner contends that the Examiner erred in failing to
consider evidence of secondary considerations submitted after the Action
Closing Prosecution. See App. Br. 8-10; PO Reply Br. 1. As the Patent
Owner is aware, though, the Examiner’s refusal to enter the evidence into
the record is a petitionable matter. See 37 C.F.R. §1.181; see also Petition
Under 37 C.F.R. §1.181 For the United States Patent and Trademark Office
to Reconsider Evidence of Secondary Considerations, dated November 26,
2012. Because the Examiner did not enter the evidence, and because the
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Central Reexamination Unit denied the Patent Owner’s petition to enter the
evidence, the evidence is not of record and not properly before the Board.
See RAN 9-11; Decision on Petition For Entry of Affidavit After ACP, dated
Apr. 22, 2013 (denying entry of the evidence for failing to comply with 37
C.F.R. 1.116). Therefore, we will not consider this evidence submitted by
the Patent Owner after the Action Closing Prosecution.3

DISAVOWAL OF CLAIM SCOPE
The Patent Owner allegedly disavows “the claim scope of certain
claim terms” to distinguish over the cited prior art. See PO App. Br. 13-14;
PO Reply Br. 2-4, 6-7. For example, the Patent Owner
herein clearly and unambiguously disavows the full scope of its
claim term ‘payment account’ in each of Claims 1, 7, 10, and
19 from including payment accounts which can be used to earn
reward points and where the earned points can also be applied
to the buyer's payment account to pay for products; and from
including payment accounts which can keep track of points,
money and/or alternative forms of currency earned via an
incentive system and can be redeemed via online auctions. PO
Reply Br. 6.

3 The Patent Owner also acknowledges that the rules require establishing
good and sufficient reasons as to why the evidence was not presented prior
to the Action Closing Prosecution, but “disagrees with the Office’s rules”
and asserts that the Patent Owner “should not have to establish good and
sufficient reasons why the evidence was not submitted earlier.” PO Reply
Br. 1. Mere disagreement with the Patent Office’s rules does not permit the
Patent Owner to disregard them. The Patent Owner here, like all other
Patent Owners, is bound by the case law and rules governing reexamination
practice before the Patent Office.
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Underlying these arguments though, is the erroneous premise that claim
scope can be altered during prosecution, such as in a reexamination, by
“clearly and unambiguously” disavowing particular features, instead of
amending the claim.
To the contrary, it is well established that the appropriate method for
changing the scope of a claim during prosecution is claim amendment. For
example, while rejecting the contention that a loophole would be created by
limiting intervening rights only to claim amendments, not disavowals, the
Federal Circuit noted
…If, in reexamination, an examiner determines that particular
claims are invalid and need amendment to be allowable, one
would expect an examiner to require amendment rather than
accept argument alone. Indeed, Congress may well have
expected that changes in claim scope during reexamination
would ordinarily be made by amendment, which would avoid
the risk of creating a loophole in the intervening rights defense.
Moreover, if an argument does suffice to overcome a rejection,
it is probably because the claims at issue are not unallowable.
Marine Polymer Technologies, Inc. v. Hemcon, Inc., 672 F.3d
1350 (CAFC 2012).

Where, as here, the Examiner has rejected the claims as unpatentable
over the cited prior art, amendment may be needed to distinguish the claims.
The Patent Owner cannot circumvent this method by affirmatively stating “a
clear and unambiguous” disavowal. Accordingly, we agree with the
Requestor’s position that the Patent Owner cannot change the scope of the
claim terms through disavowal and find each of the arguments presented
based on disavowal of claim scope (e.g., PO App. Br. 26-28 and PO Reply
Br. 2-13) unpersuasive.
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Accordingly, we agree with the Requestor’s position that the Patent
Owner cannot limit the scope of the claim terms through disavowal and find
each of the arguments presented based on disavowal of claim scope (e.g., PO
App. Br. 26-28; PO Reply Br. 2-13) unpersuasive.4

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER HUTCHISON
Claims 1, 7, 10, and 19
The Patent Owner maintains that the Examiner improperly relied on
separate and distinct embodiments of Hutchinson to reject the instant claims
as anticipated. PO App. Br. 11-17. We disagree.
According to the Patent Owner, Hutchison includes, and the Examiner
relies on, at least, (1) the “automatically deducted” embodiments of Figs. 8A
and 9C, (2) a “buyer indicates a desire to purchase” embodiment (Figs. 11A-
11E), (3) an “order[ing] products via the Internet” embodiment, (4) a “seller
is an auction Web site” embodiment, and (5) and “alternate embodiment”
described at col. 14, l. 60 to col. 15, l. 2. PO App. Br. 13-17. Notably
absent in the Patent Owner’s argument though is any explanation of how
Hutchison’s elements are arranged in a different way from the claim or why
each alleged embodiment is “separate and distinct.” The Patent Owner
merely cites the Examiner’s identification of more than one embodiment and
different portions of the Specification using language such as “[i]n one

4 Because we find the Patent Owner’s ability to change the claim scope
through disavowals unpersuasive, we need not reach the Patent Owner’s
dependent argument that the Requestor is not permitted to present new
substantial new questions of patentability of the changed claim scope. See,
e.g., Reply Br. 3.
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actual embodiment” and “[i]n an alternate embodiment.” See e.g., PO App.
Br. 13-17; see also PO Reply Br. 13-14. Without more, this is not
persuasive.
Instead, we agree with the Requestor’s position that the Patent Owner
improperly fails to consider the reference as a whole and fails to consider
whether the claims are arranged in the same way as in the claim. TPR Resp.
Br. 5-7. Hutchison’s Brief Description of the Figures describes that Fig. 8C
depicts an exemplary webpage for applying for a virtual payment account
with Hutchison’s system. Hutchison, 4:31-33. Fig. 9C shows an exemplary
webpage for customizing that virtual payment account. Hutchison 4:34-36.
Figs. 11A-11E then outline how to use the created and customized virtual
payment account to purchase goods, services, and/or content. Hutchison,
4:41-43. Given these disclosures, it is readily apparent then that these
alleged embodiments are not separate and distinct, but instead are directly
related.
Similarly, we are also not persuaded by the Patent Owner that the
alleged “order[ing] products via the Internet” embodiments and a “seller is
an auction Web site” embodiments are separate and distinct. PO App. Br.
15-16 (emphasis omitted). Hutchison, to the contrary, describes that the
virtual payment system can be used to purchase products over the Internet,
including for example, an auction website. See TPR Resp. Br. 6-7 (noting
that the “seller is an auction website” embodiment is within the “order[ing]
products” section of the Specification). These disclosures thus do not
warrant the Patent Owner’s characterizations as separate and distinct
embodiments. Moreover, as the Examiner finds, Hutchison combines the
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claim limitations as done in the instant claims. RAN 64-65. Therefore, we
are not persuaded that the Examiner improperly relied upon separate and
distinct embodiments in rejecting the instant claims as anticipated.
The Patent Owner also, in the Reply brief, argues that Hutchison fails
to disclose the claimed option prior to the conclusion of an electronic
auction to enable an automatic payment method (as claimed in claims 1 and
10) and automatically deducting funds without a request from the user
following a termination event (as claimed in claims 7 and 19). PO Reply Br.
7-8. In particular, the Patent Owner maintains that “Hutchison describes a
non-automatic payment method in which ‘the buyer and seller are willing to
‘reserve funds.’” PO Reply Br. 7 (emphasis omitted). The Patent Owner
emphasizes that Hutchison describes having the buyer and seller reserve
funds through use of the commerce gateway, but an additional purchase
authorization is required from the buyer. See PO Reply Br. 7 (citing
Hutchison 24:27-44).
We agree that this later authorization by the buyer is one description
of the payment method through use of the commerce gateway. However, as
cited by the Examiner, immediately following that disclosure, Hutchison
states “[t]his payment method [i.e. using the commerce gateway] supports
buyer-initiated, pre-approved purchases with expiration date/time, such as
auction and gift-certificate purchases.” Hutchison 24:42-44 (emphasis
added); see also RAN 32-33. Pre-approved purchases require prior
approval or authorization. We agree with the Examiner and Requestor, then,
that Hutchison discloses the claimed prior authorization.
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Finally, the Patent Owner also argues that Hutchison fails to
automatically transfer a portion of the funds to an operator associated with
the electronic web site. PO App. Br. 17-21. As discussed in more detail
below, we find this argument unconvincing. Hutchison identifies that the
seller can be an auction website and further discloses that the provider of the
commerce gateway (which is part of the payment system for the Hutchison’s
seller web site) receives a fee. See TPR Resp. Br. 8-9 (citing Hutchison
15:8-11 and 22:3-7). Thus, we agree with the Examiner and Requestor that
Hutchison discloses this claimed feature.
The Patent Owner’s remaining arguments rely on its impermissible
claim scope disavowals. See e.g., PO App. Br. 26-28; PO Reply Br. 2-13.
As discussed above, we disagree that the Patent can change the scope of the
claims through disavowal and therefore find these arguments also
unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we are not apprised of error in the Examiner’s rejection
of claims 1, 7, 10, and 19 are anticipated by Hutchison and affirm the
rejection.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER CHURCHILL AND HUTCHISON
Claims 1, 7, 10, and 19
The Patent Owner argues that Hutchison fails to disclose
“automatically transferring at least a portion of the deducted funds into an
account corresponding to the operator associated with the electronic auction
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web site.”5 PO App. Br. 18 (emphasis omitted). According to the Patent
Owner, neither Hutchison nor Churchill discloses this feature. PO App. Br.
17-20.
First, we note that the Patent Owner fails to consider Hutchison as a
whole, but instead addresses each portion cited by the Examiner separately.
See PO App. Br. 18-20. For example, the Patent Owner asserts that there is
no disclosure of an electronic auction payment system in the embodiments
of Figs 8A and 9C. PO App. Br. 19. However, Hutchison at least discloses
that a portion of the transaction amount will go to the provider of the
commerce gateway. See PO App. Br. 20 (citing Hutchison 21:64-22:12).
According to the Patent Owner, though, the “provider of the commerce
gateway” is distinct from an “operator associated with the electronic auction
web site.” Id. (emphasis omitted.) We disagree. The claims merely require
the operator be “associated with” the electronic web site. Therefore, we
agree with the Examiner that the provider of the commerce gateway would
at least be associated with the auction website.
Moreover, as the Requestor points out, in Hutchison, the auction
website can be the seller. TPR Resp. Br. 8. In other words, by deducting
funds to transfer to pay the seller for the purchased item, the transfer is also
in effect transferring at least a portion of the deducted funds to the operator
of the electronic web site. Further, Churchill also discloses a transaction fee
that is paid to the auction company. TPR Resp. Br. 9 (citing Churchill 1:64-

5 We apply the BPAI’s construction of “automatically,” “funds,” and
“account.” from the appeal of the priority parent patent, US Patent No.
7,483,856. See Decision On Appeal, Appeal No. 2007-002742, dated
August 22, 2007, p. 4-5.
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2:1). Together then, the combination of Hutchison and Churchill teaches
automatically transferring at least a portion of the deducted funds into an
account corresponding to the operator associated with the electronic auction
web site.
The Patent Owner’s remaining arguments rely on its impermissible
claim scope disavowals. See, e.g., PO App. Br. 26-28; PO Reply Br. 2-13.
As discussed above, we disagree that the Patent can change the scope of the
claims through disavowal and therefore find these arguments also
unpersuasive.
As discussed above, we disagree with the Patent Owner and are not
apprised of error in the Examiner’s findings. Accordingly, we affirm the
rejection of claims 1, 7, 10, and 19 as unpatentable over Churchill and
Hutchison.

THE ANTICIPATION REJECTION OVER WOOLSTON
Claims 7 and 19
The Patent Owner again presents arguments that the Examiner
improperly relied on at least two separate and distinct embodiments to
support the Woolston anticipation rejection. See PO App. Br. 22-24.
As discussed above with respect to the same arguments applied to
Hutchison, the Patent Owner fails to explain why these alleged embodiments
are “separate and distinct” or how Woolston’s elements are not arranged in
the same way as in the claims. See PO App. Br. 22-24.
We agree with the Requestor’s position. TPR Resp. Br. 9-11.
Woolston describes two embodiments, one relating to posting items for sale
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at a consignment node and another relating to posting items to a market
maker computer through a remote terminal. TPR Resp. Br. 10 (citing
Woolston Figs. 1 and 12; 9:66-10:32; 14:51-53). The Patent Owner’s
assertion that the market maker computer includes additional devices and
perform additional functions does not render it separate and distinct. See PO
App. Br. 22-23 and PO Reply Br. 10-11.
To the contrary, as the Requestor points out, Woolston directly relates
the embodiments. TPR Resp. Br. 9-10. “Much of the market maker
computers 800 functionality is disclosed above in the consignment node
functionality.” TPR Resp. Br. 10 (quoting Woolston 19:34-36); see also
Woolston 14:57-63. We therefore agree with the Requestor that Woolston’s
embodiments are not separate and distinct and Woolston’s elements are
arranged in the same way as in the claims.
The Patent Owner’s remaining arguments erroneously rely on the
Patent Owner’s claim disavowals. See, e.g., PO App. Br. 26-28; PO Reply
Br. 2-13. As discussed above, we disagree that the Patent Owner can change
the scope of the claims through disavowal and therefore consider these
arguments also unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting
claims 7 and 19 as anticipated by Woolston and affirm the rejection.

THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER WOOLSTON AND MARKS
Claims 1 and 10
The Patent Owner asserts that Marks fails to disclose “bidders are
provided the option to have funds automatically deducted from their
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accounts at the conclusion of the auction for which the bidder is the winner.”
PO App. Br. 25. In challenging the Requestor’s reliance on Marks, the
Patent Owner alleges that the Requestor mischaracterizes Marks, specifically
pointing to Mark’s failure to recite “the words ‘account’ or ‘accounts.’” PO
App. Br. 25.
We find this argument unavailing. As the Requestor identifies, Marks
discloses an electronic marketplace where customers, such as bidders in an
auction, can be presented with an option to commit to buying before an
auction begins. TPR Resp. Br. 11(citing Marks Abstract); see also Marks
5:21-24. Then, as outlined by the Examiner, it would be obvious to a skilled
artisan to incorporate Mark’s known method of enhancement, committing to
buy option prior to conclusion of the auction, with Woolston’s automatic
payment system to make the auction more efficient and effective. See RAN
8.
The Patent Owner’s remaining arguments rely on its impermissible
claim scope disavowals. See e.g., PO Reply Br. 11-13. As discussed above,
we disagree that the Patent can change the scope of the claims through
disavowal and therefore find these arguments also unpersuasive.
Accordingly, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting
claims 1 and 10 as unpatentable over Woolston and Marks and affirm the
rejection.

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THE OBVIOUSNESS REJECTION OVER GOLD
Claims 1, 7, 10, and 19
With respect to Gold, the Patent Owner first presents arguments based
on claim scope disavowals, which as discussed above, we reject. See PO
App. Br. 26-28. Then, addressing claims 7 and 19, the Patent Owner argues
that Gold fails to disclose said “computing devices being in operative
communication with each other via at least one non-Internet connection.”
PO App. Br. 29. This blanket assertion, however, is not persuasive.
As the Requestor explains, the claims merely require one non-Internet
connection between the computing devices of the computer architecture
which maintains the electronic payment account and electronic commerce
website. TPR Resp. Br. 14. Gold’s system includes servers and databases,
which store information regarding customers. TPR Resp. Br. 14. As such,
we agree that it would be obvious to a skilled artisan that a company’s
servers, including database and web servers, would include at least one non-
Internet connection.
The Patent Owner’s remaining arguments erroneously rely on the
Patent Owner’s claim disavowals. See e.g., PO App. Br. 26-28. As
discussed above, we disagree that the Patent can change the scope of the
claims through disavowal and therefore find these arguments also
unpersuasive.
Accordingly, for at least the reasons discussed above and by the
Examiner, we conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1, 7,
10 and 19 as unpatentable over Gold and affirm the rejection.

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DECISION
The Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 7, 10, and 19 is affirmed.
Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.956. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79.
Pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(d), this decision is final for the purpose
of judicial review. A party seeking judicial review must timely serve notice
on the Director of the United States Patent and Trademark Office. See 37
C.F.R. §§ 90.1 and 1.983.
AFFIRMED

PATENT OWNER:
GEORGE LIKOUREZOS, ESQ.
261 WASHINGTON AVE.
ST. JAMES, NY 11780

THIRD-PARTY REQUESTER:

DENTONS US LLP
1530 PAGE MILL ROAD
SUITE 200
PALO ALTO, CA 94304