Ex Parte 7,366,919 et alDownload PDFPatent Trial and Appeal BoardNov 14, 201395000603 (P.T.A.B. Nov. 14, 2013) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 95/000,603 01/27/2011 7,366,919 1762030.00123US1 4276 69417 7590 11/14/2013 WILMERHALE/SYMANTEC CORPORATION Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW WASHINGTON, DC 20006 EXAMINER SAGER, MARK ALAN ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3992 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 11/14/2013 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ M86 SECURITY, INC. Requester v. SYMANTEC, CORPORATION Patent Owner ____________ Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 Technology Center 3900 ____________ Before RICHARD M. LEBOVITZ, DAVID M. KOHUT, and ERIC B. CHEN Administrative Patent Judges. KOHUT, Administrative Patent Judge DECISION ON APPEAL Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 2 Requester M86 Security, Inc. appeals under U.S.C. §§ 134 and 315 (2002) the Examiner’s decision not to adopt rejections of claims 1-3, 5-7, 15, 17-24, and 26-37 that had been proposed by the Requester. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134 and 315 (2002). An oral hearing was conducted with the Requester and Patent Owner on October 30, 2013. STATEMENT OF THE CASE This proceeding arose from a request by M86 Security, Inc. for an inter partes reexamination of U.S. Patent 7,366,919 B1, titled “Use of Geo- Location Data for Spam Detection,” and issued to Sobel et al. on April 29, 2008 (the ’919 patent). The ’919 patent describes a system for determining when e-mail contains spam. Claim 1 on appeal reads as follows: 1. A computer implemented method for detecting suspected spam in e-mail originating from a sending computer, said method comprising the steps of: determining an actual IP address of the sending computer; converting the actual IP address into actual geo- location data; and using the actual geo-location data, ascertaining whether the e-mail contains suspected spam. Appellant, who is the Third Party Requester, proposes rejections of the claims over the following prior art references: Donaldson WO 01/38999 A1 May 31, 2001 Voticky WO 01/80535 A1 Oct. 25, 2001 Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 3 Sam Costello, EmailTrackerPro tries to find spammers, March 5, 2002, CNN.com/SCI-TECH, available at http://archives.cnn.com/2002/TECH/ptech/03/05/email.tracker.pro.idg/index .html. Bill Barnes, E-Mail Impersonators: How to identify “spoofed” e-mail, March 12, 2002, The Slate Group, available at http://www.slate.com/articles/technology/webhead/2002/03/email_imperson ators.html. Huang U.S. 2003/0231207 A1 Dec. 18, 2003 McElligott U.S. 2004/0093566 A1 May 13, 2004 Requester appeals the Examiner’s refusal to adopt the following rejections: Claims 1, 2, 22, and 24 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Voticky. Claims 1, 15, 22, 24, 27, and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott. Claims 3, 6, 7, 17-21, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Donaldson. Claims 1 and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Barnes, Voticky, Costello, and McElligott. Claims 29, 32, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Donaldson. Claims 30 and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Huang. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 4 Claims 31, 33, 36, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Costello. ISSUE Did the Examiner err in finding that Costello does not teach “ascertaining whether the e-mail contains suspected spam,” as required by each of the independent claims? ANALYSIS Issue 4: Claims 1, 15, 22, 24, 27, and 28 as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott Independent claim 1 is drawn to a “computer implemented method for detecting suspected spam in e-mail originating from a sending computer” that comprises three recited steps, including a step of using actual geo- location data, obtained from the actual IP address, to “ascertain [ ] whether the e-mail contains suspected spam.” First, we note that the Examiner finds (RAN 12) and Requester agrees (3PR App. Br. 8) that the claim term “actual IP address” does not exclude a “claimed IP address” since Patent Owner does not limit the term in the claims. Patent Owner uses an exemplary embodiment of the ’919 patent to show a difference between an actual IP address and a claimed IP address. PO Resp. Br. 3. However, we agree with Examiner and Requester that neither Patent Owner’s claims nor Specification requires the terms to have a different definition. As such, we find Examiner’s interpretation of “actual IP address” to include “claimed IP address” to be reasonable. RAN 12. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 5 In the Original Inter Partes Reexamination Request on page 13 and as explained in Exhibit D-2,1 Requester proposed an obviousness rejection of claims 1, 15, 22, 24, 27, and 28 based on the combination of Costello and McElligott. The Examiner did not adopt the Requester’s rejection, because the Examiner determined there was insufficient evidence to support a finding that Costello teaches ascertaining whether an email contains spam using geo-location data. RAN 5, 17, and 20-21. Patent Owner further adds that Costello teaches that the system can track the message based upon its geographic info, but only when the e-mail is a “known spam e-mail.” PO Resp. Br. 9-10. Thus, Patent Owner argues (PO Resp. Br. 9-10), and the Examiner finds (RAN 5), that Costello does not make any spam determination, as required by the claims. Requester argues that the Examiner’s determination is in error, since Costello is used to determine “the hallmark of spammers” using the IP address and geographic information. 3PR App. Br. 15. Requester contends that Costello uses the IP address an email was sent from and a geographical location where the email originated to determine whether the email is spam. 3PR App. Br. 14. To support this position, Requester cited a published case study2 which was said to show an actual use of the eMailTrackerPro program from Costello. Comments from 3PR, dated August 28, 2012, p. 4. 1 The Examiner indicates that claims 5 and 26 were added based upon their dependency on independent claims 1 and 24 (respectively). RAN 21. However, we address each of these claims individually below. 2 “eMailTrackerPro and VisualRoute nab the bad guy,” 1997-2002, Visualware Inc., available at http://www.visualware.com/resources/casestudies/emt1.html. (Hereinafter referred to as “Case Study”). Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 6 This case study describes how an email was received with an email address that indicates it was from the Netherlands, because it ends in NL. Case Study, pg. 2. The program used the IP address to determine that the email was actually sent from Kansas. Case Study, pg. 2. Thus, the email was determined to be misdirected based upon the geo-location data, and the program therefore, was able to ascertain the email as spam. Based on Costello’s explicit disclosure and the evidence provided by Requester as discussed on pages 4-5 of their Comments dated August 28, 2012, and considered by the Examiner (RAN 4), we find that a preponderance of the evidence supports Requester’s contention that Costello teaches ascertaining whether an email is spam based upon the geo-location data.3 Independent claims 24 and 27 contain similar limitations to claim 1. Claims 15, 22, and 28 are dependent upon claim 1. We find that the undisputed limitations of claims 15, 22, and 28 are taught by Costello as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-2. For the reasons discussed supra, we conclude that the Examiner erred in not adopting the rejection of claims 1, 15, 22, 24, 27, and 28 as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a). A reversal of an Examiner’s decision not to adopt a rejection is a new grounds of rejection. 3 The Examiner found that the declaration by Dr. Markus Jakobsson, PhD, dated May 17, 2011, was “sufficient to overcome the rejection of claims 1, 3, 5-7, 15, 17-24, and 26-28 based upon Costello, McElligott (and Donaldson.)” RAN 4. However, we do not find the declaration to be persuasive since it does not take into consideration the evidence discussed above. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 7 New Ground: Dependent Claim 26 as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott Claim 26 is dependent upon claim 24 and contains similar limitations to claim 15. We reject claim 26 for the same reasons as claim 24 and for the same reasons as provided in the Requester’s rejection of claim 15 as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-2, as the latter contains similar limitations. As our analysis deviates from Requester’s, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claim 26 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott. New Ground of Rejection: Dependent Claim 2 as obvious over Voticky, Costello, and McElligott Requester proposed a rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as anticipated by Voticky. Claim 2 is dependent upon claim 1. The evidence supports the Examiner’s (RAN 14) and Patent Owner’s (PO Resp. Br. 8) positions that Voticky fails to anticipate claim 1 since Voticky does not convert an IP address into geo-location data.4 However, as indicated supra, we find that the evidence provided by Requester regarding Case Study supports that Costello teaches converting an IP address into geo-location data. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claim 2 are taught by Voticky as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-1. Since we have 4 Examiner (RAN 12) and Patent Owner (PO Resp. Br. 5-7) address the validity of Requester’s expert testimony regarding the claimed IP address and Voticky’s machine number. This issue is moot since the evidence supports that one of Voticky’s personalized identifiers is an IP address (Req. Reb. Br. 5) and since Costello uses an IP address to determine geo-location data (see discussion with respect to Issue 4). Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 8 changed Requester’s rejection in regard to this claim, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and McElligott. Issue 5: Claims 3, 17-21, and 23 as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Donaldson5 Requester proposed a rejection of claims 3, 17-21, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Donaldson. The Examiner refused to adopt the rejection of these claims because Donaldson does not make up for the deficiencies of Costello and McElligott argued above with respect to Issue 4 and claim 1. RAN 21. Patent Owner agrees with the Examiner. PO Resp. Br. 12. However, as indicated above, we find that the evidence supports a finding that Costello and McElligott teach all of the limitations of claim 1. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claims 3, 17-21, and 23 are taught by Donaldson as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-2. Since we have changed Requester’s rejection in regard to these claims, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claims 3, 17-21, and 23 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Donaldson. New Ground: Claim 5 as obvious over Costello, McElligott, and Barnes or Costello, McElligott, and Huang 5 Claims 6 and 7 are dependent upon claim 5 and are addressed separately below. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 9 Claim 5 is dependent upon claim 1. We find that the Examiner erred in not adopting the rejection of claim 1 as obvious over Costello and McElligott. Claim 5 additionally recites “wherein the actual IP address is determined from a return path header associated with the e-mail.” The Examiner finds (RAN 21-22) and Patent Owner agrees (PO Resp. Br. 13) that Requester has not indicated what Barnes teaches that the other references lack nor does Requester provide a rationale for the combination. However, Requester has provided a detailed explanation of what Barnes teaches on pages 38-39 of Requester’s comments submitted June 16, 2011. 3PR App. Br. 19-21. Specifically, Requester indicates that Barnes teaches a header that details an e-mail’s transmission history which is used to determine an actual IP address. 3PR App. Br. 20. Additionally, Requester indicates that Huang teaches using an e-mail return path header to determine an IP address. Exhibit D-8 (Corrected Version).6 The evidence, therefore, supports a finding that both Barnes and Huang teach the limitation of claim 5. Additionally, Requester presents a rationale for the combinations that we find reasonable. Comments from 3PR dated June 16, 2011, pg. 39; Exhibit D-8 (Corrected Version). Since we have changed Requester’s rejection in regard to this claim, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claim 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Barnes or in the alternative over Costello, McElligott, and Huang. 6 The disputed limitation is found and addressed with respect to claim 30. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 10 New Ground: Claims 6 and 7 as obvious over Costello, McElligott, Barnes, and Donaldson or Costello, McElligott, Huang, and Donaldson Claims 6 and 7 are dependent upon claim 5. Requester’s proposed rejections did not include all of the references for the rejection of claim 5 in the statement of rejection for claims 6 and 7. As indicated above, we find that Costello, McElligott, and Barnes or Costello, McElligott, and Huang teach all of the limitations of claim 5. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claims 6 and 7 are taught by Donaldson as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-2. As our analysis deviates from Requester’s, we designate our analysis as a new ground of rejection of claims 6 and 7 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, Barnes, and Donaldson or Costello, McElligott, Huang, and Donaldson. Issue 10: Independent claims 31, 33, 36, and 37 as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Costello The Examiner finds that Costello does not make up for the deficiencies of Voticky with regard to claims 31, 33, 36, and 37. RAN 23. Specifically, the Examiner finds that Voticky fails to teach an IP address and fails to teach converting an actual IP address into actual geo-location data. RAN 12 and 14. We disagree with the Examiner that Voticky fails to teach an IP address. Voticky, on page 15, specifically indicates that its personalized identifier can be an IP address. See 3PR App. Br. 8. However, the evidence supports the Examiner’s (RAN 14) and Patent Owner’s (PO Resp. Br. 8) positions that Voticky fails to teach converting an IP address Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 11 into actual geo-location data, because the reference fails to indicate the conversion step. Instead, Voticky teaches a priority code is determined based upon a personalized identifier compared to a database, where the personalized identifier includes an IP address or a geographic path. See Voticky, pgs. 5, 9, and 15. However, as indicated supra, we find that evidence provided by the Requester regarding the Case Study provides adequate evidence that Costello teaches converting an IP address into geo- location data. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claims 31, 33, 36, and 37 are taught by Voticky and/or Costello as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-8 (Corrected Version). As our analysis deviates from Requester’s, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claims 31, 33, 36, and 37 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Costello. New Ground: Independent claims 29, 32, and 34 as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Donaldson Requester proposed a rejection of claims 29, 32, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Donaldson. The Examiner finds (RAN 22) and Patent Owner agrees (PO Resp. Br. 13) that Donaldson does not make up for the deficiencies with Voticky. However, as indicated above, we find that Costello makes up for the deficiencies in Voticky. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claims 29, 32, and 34 are taught by Donaldson as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-8 (Corrected Version). Since we have changed Requester’s rejection in regard to these claims, we designate our analysis to Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 12 be a new ground of rejection of claims 29, 32, and 34 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Donaldson. New Ground: Independent claims 30 and 35 as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Huang Requester proposed a rejection of claims 30 and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Huang. The Examiner finds (RAN 23) and Patent Owner agrees (PO Resp. Br. 14) that Huang does not make up for the deficiencies with Voticky. However, as indicated above, we find that Costello makes up for the deficiencies in Voticky. Additionally, we find that the undisputed limitations of claims 30 and 35 are taught by Donaldson as indicated in Requester’s Exhibit D-8 (Corrected Version). Since we have changed Requester’s rejection in regard to these claims, we designate our analysis to be a new ground of rejection of claims 30 and 35 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Huang. CONCLUSION The Examiner erred in finding that Costello does not teach “ascertaining whether the e-mail contains suspected spam,” as required by each of the independent claims. Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 13 DECISION We reverse the Examiner’s decision not to adopt the rejection of claims 1, 15, 22, 24, 27 and 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello and McElligott. Claim 2 is newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and McElligott. Claims 3, 17-21, and 23 are newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Donaldson. Claim 5 is newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, and Barnes or in the alternative over Costello, McElligott, and Huang. Claims 6 and 7 are newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Costello, McElligott, Barnes, and Donaldson or in the alternative over Costello, McElligott, Huang, and Donaldson. Claims 31, 33, 36, and 37 are newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky and Costello. Claims 29, 32, and 32 are newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Donaldson. Claims 30 and 35 are newly rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as obvious over the combination of Voticky, Costello, and Huang. The decision contains new grounds of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b). Section 41.77(b) provides that “a new ground of rejection . . . shall not be considered final for judicial review.” That section also provides that Patent Owner, WITHIN ONE MONTH FROM THE DATE OF THE Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 14 DECISION, must exercise one of the following two options with respect to the new grounds of rejection to avoid termination of the appeal proceeding as to the rejected claims: (1) Reopen prosecution. The owner may file a response requesting reopening of prosecution before the examiner. Such a response must be either an amendment of the claims so rejected or new evidence relating to the claims so rejected, or both. (2) Request rehearing. The owner may request that the proceeding be reheard under § 41.79 by the Board upon the same record. The request for rehearing must address any new ground of rejection and state with particularity the points believed to have been misapprehended or overlooked in entering the new ground of rejection and also state all other grounds upon which rehearing is sought. In accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(a)(1), the “[p]arties to the appeal may file a request for rehearing of the decision within one month of the date of: . . . [t]he original decision of the Board under § 41.77(a).” A request for rehearing must be in compliance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(b). Comments in opposition to the request and additional requests for rehearing must be in accordance with 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(c), respectively. Under 37 C.F.R. § 41.79(e), the times for requesting rehearing under paragraph (a) of this section, for requesting further rehearing under paragraph (c) of this section, and for submitting comments under paragraph (b) of this section may not be extended. An appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit under 35 U.S.C. §§ 141-144 and 315 and 37 C.F.R. § 1.983 for an inter partes reexamination proceeding “commenced” on or after November Appeal 2013-008705 Reexamination Control No. 95/000,603 Patent 7,366,919 B1 15 2, 2002 may not be taken “until all parties' rights to request rehearing have been exhausted, at which time the decision of the Board is final and appealable by any party to the appeal to the Board.” 37 C.F.R. § 41.81. See also MPEP § 2682 (8th ed., Rev. 7, July 2008). Requests for extensions of time in this inter partes reexamination proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.956. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.79. REVERSED 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(b) Wilmerhale/Symantec Corporation Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale and Dorr LLP 1875 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW Washington, DC 20006 Third Party Requester: M86 Security, Inc. 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