Ex Parte 6345323 et al

Board of Patent Appeals and Interferences

May 7, 2012

90010626 (B.P.A.I. May. 7, 2012)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARKOFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/010,626 07/29/2009 6345323 2540-1197 4728
42624 7590 05/08/2012
DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP
4300 WILSON BLVD., 7TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203
EXAMINER
CHOI, WOO H
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
05/08/2012 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS
AND INTERFERENCES
____________

Ex parte AVOCENT REDMOND CORP.,
Appellant and Patent Owner
____________

Appeal 2012-000093
Reexamination Control 90/010,626
Patent 6,345,323 B1
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before KEVIN F. TURNER, STEPHEN C. SIU, and THOMAS L.
GIANNETTI, Administrative Patent Judges.

SIU, Administrative Patent Judge

DECISION ON APPEAL
Patent owner appeals under 35 U.S.C. §§ 134(b) and 306 from a final
rejection of claims 1-3 and 5. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C.
§§ 134(b) and 306. This case is related to Appeal 2012-001011
(Reexamination Control 90/010,628).
We heard oral arguments on April 18, 2012.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
This proceeding arose from a request for ex parte reexamination filed
by Tracy W. Druce on September 29, 2009, of United States Patent
6,345,323 B1 (the ‘323 Patent) issued to Danny L. Beasley, Robert V.
Seifert, Jr., Paul Lacrampe, James C. Huffington, Thomas Greene, and
Kevin J. Hafer on February 5, 2002. Presently, claims 1-3 and 5 stand
rejected, with claims 4 and 6-8 confirmed as patentable.
Patentee’s invention relates to a system for interconnecting remotely
located computers (Spec, col. 1, ll. 11-12). Claim 1 reads as follows:
1. A system for connecting a number of workstations
of the type that include a keyboard, mouse and video monitor to
a number of remote computer systems, comprising:
a plurality of first signal conditioning units coupled to the
workstations for receiving electronic signals produced by the
keyboard and mouse and for creating a serial data packet that
includes the electronic signals;
a plurality of first communication links coupled to the
first signal conditioning units for carrying the serial data
packets;
a central crosspoint switch including a number of inputs
and a number of outputs, said central crosspoint switch
receiving the serial data packets from an input and routing the
serial data packet to one or more of said outputs;
a plurality of second communication links coupled to the
outputs of the central crosspoint switch; and
a plurality of second signal conditioning units coupled to
the remote computer systems, for receiving the serial data
packets transmitted on one of the plurality of second
communication links switch and for supplying the data packets
to a keyboard and mouse input of the remote computer.
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(App. Br. 37, Claims Appendix).

The Examiner rejected claims 1-3 and 5 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
unpatentable over the combination of the following references:
Fukada 4,893,175 Jan. 9, 1990
Diefendorff EP 0174099 Mar. 12, 1986
Horiuchi JP 5-27721 Feb. 5, 1993

ISSUE
Did the Examiner err in rejecting claims 1-3 and 5 as obvious over the
combination of Horiuchi, Diefendorff, and Fukada?

PRINCIPLE OF LAW
“Section 103 forbids issuance of a patent when ‘the differences
between the subject matter sought to be patented and the prior art are such
that the subject matter as a whole would have been obvious at the time the
invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in the art to which said
subject matter pertains.’” KSR Int'l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 406
(2007).

ANALYSIS
Remote computer system
Claim 1 recites a remote computer system. Appellant argues that
Horiuchi fails to disclose or suggest a remote computer system (see, e.g.,
App. Br. 13). We disagree with Appellant’s contention for at least the
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reasons set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 7-11).
As the Examiner points out, Horiuchi discloses “information terminal
devices [that] are devices that convert stock price information or the like that
is sent in . . . ” (p. 5, ¶ [0010]. In other words, the information terminal
devices of Horiuchi receive data and convert the received data into video
signals (i.e., “video signals converted by the information terminal devices” –
p. 3, ¶ [0002]). We agree with the Examiner that Horiuchi’s “information
terminal devices” are computers since the “information terminal devices”
perform functions of a computer under a broad but reasonable construction.
While Appellant generally argues that Horiuchi’s “information
terminal devices” are not “computers” (see, e.g., App. Br. 12), Appellant has
provided insufficient support for this contention and does not indicate a
specialized definition of the term “computer” in the Specification that differs
from Horiuchi’s disclosure of “information terminal devices.” In the
absence of an explicit definition of the term “computer” in the Specification,
the Examiner defines the term broadly but reasonably to include “[a]ny
device capable of processing information to produce a desired result” (Reply
Br. 2). We find no difference between a device capable of processing
information to produce a desired result (i.e., a “computer”) and Horiuchi’s
“information terminal device” that also processes information (i.e., processes
information in order to convert data to video signals) to produce a desired
result (i.e., output video signals).
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s broad but reasonable definition
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of the term “computer” is improper and proposes a different definition,
namely, “[a]ny machine that . . . accepts structured input, processes it
according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as output” (Reply Br.
2). Even assuming Appellant’s proposed definition of the term “computer”
is correct, we find no difference between Horiuchi’s “information terminal
device” that receives “structured input” (i.e., input data to be converted to
video signals), processes the “structured input” (i.e., converts the input data
to video signals) according to prescribed rules, and produces the results as
output (i.e., produces and outputs the converted video signal).
Appellant argues that Horiuchi’s “information terminal device” is not
a “computer” because, according to Appellant, the “information terminal
device” does not “perform any function besides . . . displaying ‘stock price
information or the like’” (App. Br. 13). Hence, Appellant appears to argue
that one of ordinary skill in the art would have understood a computer as
only performing multiple functions and that any device that processes data
and that performs one function is not a computer. Appellant has not
indicated where in the Specification this specialized quality of a “computer”
(as a device that processes data but performs one function) can be found.
We do not independently find this definition in the Specification. In the
absence of such a disclosed requirement and definition, we disagree with
Appellant’s overly narrow construction of the term “computer.” Using a
broad but reasonable interpretation, one of ordinary skill in the art would
have understood that a computer can either perform one function or multiple
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functions depending on the user’s needs.
Appellant cites the Specification (col. 4, ll. 11-16) and the Declaration
of Joseph C. McAlexander, III (dated April 17, 2010) and argues “keyboard
communication with a computer is bidirectional – not unidirectional” (App.
Br. 15). Based on this assumption, Appellant states that Horiuchi transmits
data from an interface device to the information terminal device
unidirectionally (and not bidirectionally) and therefore supposedly does not
disclose a computer. As support for this contention, Appellant states that the
Specification discloses the following:
As the user is operating the remote server computer, the remote
computer may transmit commands which affect the operation of
the mouse and keyboard. These include the mouse sensitivity,
the keyboard repeat rate, activating one or more LEDs on the
keyboard (such as the number lock, capital letter lock, etc.).
(Col. 4, ll. 11-16).
As an initial matter, we note that, contrary to Appellant’s assertion,
the Specification does not appear to disclose whether keyboard
communication with a computer is bidirectional or unidirectional. Rather,
the Specification merely discloses that a computer may transmit commands
that “affect the operation of the mouse and keyboard” (col. 4, ll. 11-16). Of
note is that the Specification does not disclose to or from where or in which
direction such commands are being transmitted, only that the commands
(wherever they may be going and wherever they may have originated) affect
certain operations of the mouse or keyboard in some way.
Even assuming that the Specification discloses that a computer
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communicates with an attached mouse and keyboard in a bidirectional
manner such that signals are transmitted from the computer to the
mouse/keyboard and from the mouse/keyboard back to the computer
(Appellant has not demonstrated that the Specification does provide such a
disclosure, however), the Specification merely would have provided an
example of such a function and would not have required the computer to
perform in this manner. Rather, the Specification would have merely
disclosed that a computer may function in this manner.
In addition, the alleged unidirectional transmission lines of Horiuchi
(i.e., Fig. 1, 12a-12n) represent a communication between an interface
device (2a-2n) and the “information terminal device” and do not represent a
communication between the “information terminal device” and a
mouse/keyboard according to the Examiner. Therefore, even assuming that
connections between a computer and a mouse/keyboard must be
bidirectional as Appellant asserts, it would be immaterial whether the
connection between the “information terminal device” and the “interface
device” of Horiuchi is unidirectional or bidirectional since the Examiner
does not equate the “interface device” of Horiuchi with a mouse/keyboard of
the information terminal device.

First signal communication units
Appellant argues that Horiuchi fails to disclose or suggest a first
signal conditioning unit as recited in claim 1 because, according to
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Appellant, Horiuchi discloses control units that “are not coupled to
Horiuchi’s displays (i.e., the monitors)” (App. Br. 18). Thus, Appellant
disagrees with the Examiner that Horiuchi’s “control units” constitute the
claimed “first signal conditioning units” because claim 1 allegedly requires
the “first signal conditioning units” to be coupled to displays and Horiuchi’s
control units are supposedly not coupled to displays.
While claim 1 recites first signal conditioning units coupled to the
workstations, Appellant has not adequately demonstrated that claim 1 also
recites first signal conditioning units coupled to monitors or displays of a
workstation. Since claim 1 does not require the first signal conditioning unit
to be coupled to a monitor, we do not find Appellant’s contention that
Horiuchi supposedly fails to disclose or suggest this feature to be relevant as
to whether Horiuchi discloses or suggests a first signal conditioning unit.
In any event, we note that both the control unit and the display of
Horiuchi are coupled to each other to the extent that both components are
located within the same “operating terminal” (Fig. 1). Thus, even assuming
that claim 1 actually required the first signal conditioning unit to be coupled
to a monitor, Horiuchi would disclose or suggest this feature.

Second signal communication units
Claim 1 recites a second signal conditioning unit for supplying data
packets to a keyboard and mouse of a computer. Appellant argues that while
Horiuchi discloses “interface devices 2a-2n” (App. Br. 20), the interface
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devices of Horiuchi supposedly are not the same as the “second signal
conditioning units” as recited in claim 1 (see, e.g., App. Br. 20-23). We
disagree with Appellant for at least the reasons set forth by the Examiner
(see, e.g., Ans. 12-15). For example, Horiuchi discloses that the “interface
devices” (Fig. 1) receive data (see, e.g., Fig. 1, 13a-13n) and supply data
(see, e.g., Fig. 1, 12a-12n), 1 which Appellant has not adequately
demonstrated to be different from the claimed “second signal conditioning
units” that also receive and supply data.
Appellant argues that claim 1 requires “that the keyboard and mouse
signals be ‘supplied . . . to a keyboard and mouse input of the remote
computer’ rather than to a computer generally” and that “Horiuchi does not
disclose where the connection is made” (App. Br. 20). However, the
Examiner relies on the combination of Horiuchi and Diefendorff for
supplying this feature as opposed to Horiuchi in isolation. Even assuming
to be true Appellant’s contention that Horiuchi fails to disclose or suggest
supplying data to a keyboard and mouse, Appellant does not provide a
sufficient showing that the combination of Horiuchi and Diefendorff also
fails to disclose or suggest supplying data packets to a keyboard and mouse
input of a computer.
Appellant also argues that while Horiuchi discloses “transmission of

1 Horiuchi discloses that the interface devices “convert video signals to a
range that can be displayed” and “convert information input by the
keyboards . . . to information that can be understood by the information
terminal devices” (¶ [0011]).
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information . . . to the information terminal devices” (App. Br. 21), Horiuchi
supposedly “does not disclose the format of that information” (App. Br. 21).
Claim 1 recites supplying data packets to the remote computer and does not
appear to recite any specific format of the data being supplied to the remote
computer. In the absence of such a recitation in claim 1, we are not
persuaded by Appellant’s argument that claim 1 supposedly requires some
specific format of data to be supplied that is different from the data of
Horiuchi.

Combination of Horiuchi and Diefendorff
Appellant also argues that it would not have been obvious for one of
ordinary skill in the art to have combined the Horiuchi and Diefendorff
references. We disagree with Appellant at least for the reasons set forth by
the Examiner (Ans. 5 and 19-20).
As described above and as indicated by the Examiner, Horiuchi
discloses a data processing device (i.e., “computer” or “information terminal
device”). Diefendorff further discloses that data processing devices include
a keyboard and a mouse (Ans. 5; Diefendorff, Fig. 2). Given the high level
of skill in the art as well as the explicit disclosure of Diefendorff, one of
ordinary skill in the art would have known that data processing devices, such
as the “information terminal device” of Horiuchi (i.e., “computers”), contain
a mouse and keyboard and were utilized as such to achieve a predictable
result of, for example, inputting data into the computer (as disclosed by
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Diefendorff). Since the use of known components of a system in known
ways to achieve a predictable result would have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art (KSR Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 406), we agree with the
Examiner that combining Horiuchi and Diefendorff would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art.
Appellant argues that “one of skill in the art . . . would [not] have
looked to Diefendorff to supplement or modify the teachings of Horiuchi”
(App. Br. 30). We disagree with Appellant. We agree with the Examiner
that the level of skill in the art is high such that one of ordinary skill in the
art would have known, based on Diefendorff, that a data processing device
has a keyboard and mouse and that a similar data processing device (e.g., the
data processing device of Horiuchi) would have included a keyboard and
mouse since both devices are data processing devices. Appellant has not
adequately demonstrated why it would not have been obvious to one of
ordinary skill in the art to have combined the known features of a data
processing device (Diefendorff) with another (similar) data processing
device (Horiuchi).
Even assuming that the data processing device of Horiuchi did not
include a keyboard and mouse as Appellant appears to contend, one of
ordinary skill in the art would have recognized that a similar data processing
device (Diefendorff) would have included a keyboard and mouse and that
including a keyboard and mouse on a similar data processing device (of
Horiuchi) would have improved the data processing device of Horiuchi in
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the same way. “[I]f a technique has been used to improve one device, and a
person of ordinary skill in the art would recognize that it would improve
similar devices in the same way, using the technique is obvious . . .” KSR
Int'l Co., 550 U.S. at 417.
Appellant argues that “Diefendorff is directed to solving problems
that are not contemplated or addressed in Horiuchi” (App. Br. 31) but does
not provide a sufficient showing that, even if Diefendorff is, in fact, directed
to solving problems not contemplated by Horiuchi, it would not have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have applied known features of
a data processing device (Diefendorff) to another (similar) data processing
device performing the same function of data processing. For reasons set
forth above and provided by the Examiner, we agree it would have been
obvious to one of ordinary skill in the art to have combined Horiuchi and
Diefendorff.

Combination of Fukada, Horiuchi and Diefendorff
Appellant also argues that it would not have been obvious for one of
ordinary skill in the art to have combined the Fukada reference with the
Horiuchi and Diefendorff references. We disagree with Appellant at least
for the reasons set forth by the Examiner (Ans. 7 and 20-22).
As described above and as indicated by the Examiner, Horiuchi
discloses conversion of data into video signals but does not appear to
provide specific information about known features of the technical aspects
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of the video signals themselves. As the Examiner points out, Fukada
discloses that color video signals include red, green, and blue video signals
(Ans. 6). We agree with the Examiner that it would have been obvious to
one of ordinary skill in the art to have utilized video signals in Horiuchi that
include, for example, red, green, and blue video signals because, as
disclosed by Fukada, color video would have been known and had been used
by those of skill in the art and such video signals would have been known to
contain such colored signals (e.g., red, green, and blue video signals).
Appellant argues that Horiuchi “could very well be using a
monochrome monitor” and that Fukada’s “complicated transmission system
. . . is not necessary to [implement] a color video system” (App. Br. 34).
However, we agree with the Examiner that even assuming that
Horiuchi is utilizing monochrome video signals (which Appellant has not
sufficiently demonstrated), it would at least have been obvious to utilize
color video signals since color video signals were well known and widely
used (as disclosed by Fukada) and Appellant has provided insufficient
evidence to show that effecting such a combination (i.e., utilizing color
video signals) was “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of ordinary skill
in the art.” See Leapfrog Enters., Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157,
1162 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR, 550 U.S. at 418).
We are also not persuaded by Appellant’s arguments regarding the
level of complexity of the Fukada system at least because the Appellant has
not sufficiently demonstrated that an alleged high level of complexity of
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Fukada’s system indicates whether one of ordinary skill in the art would
have known that color video signals contain color video signal components.
Based on Fukada’s disclosure of color video signals known in the art, one of
ordinary skill in the art would have understood the use and constitution of
color video signals and that color video signals would contain, for example,
red, green, and blue video signals (as recited in claim 3).

CONCLUSION
We conclude that the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1-3 and
5 as obvious over the combination of Horiuchi, Diefendorff, and Fukada.

DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1-3 and 5 is affirmed.
Requests for extensions of time in this ex parte reexamination
proceeding are governed by 37 C.F.R. § 1.550(c). See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED

rvb

Patent Owner

DAVIDSON BERQUIST JACKSON & GOWDEY LLP
4300 WILSON BLVD., 7TH FLOOR
ARLINGTON, VA 22203

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Third Party Requester

TRACY W. DRUCE
NOVAK DRUCE & QUIGG, LLP
(NDQ Reexamination Group)
1000 Louisiana Street, 53rd Floor
Houston, TX 77002