Ex Parte 6088816 et al

Patent Trial and Appeal Board

Jul 15, 2014

90012315 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 15, 2014)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
90/012,315 05/30/2012 6088816 016295.4363 1056
27299 7590 07/15/2014
GAZDZINSKI & ASSOCIATES, PC
16644 WEST BERNARDO DRIVE
SUITE 201
SAN DIEGO, CA 92127
EXAMINER
KE, PENG
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3992
MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/15/2014 PAPER
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte ROUND ROCK RESEARCH, LLC
Appellant
____________

Appeal 2014-005992
Reexamination Control 90/012,315
Patent 6,088,816
Technology Center 3900
____________

Before JEFFREY S. SMITH, BRUCE R. WINSOR,
and MINN CHUNG, Administrative Patent Judges.

WINSOR, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(b) from a final rejection of
claims 1–53, which constitute all the claims pending in this reexamination.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
We refer to the patent that is the subject of the instant reexamination
proceeding (U.S. Patent No. 6,088,816, issued July 11, 2000) (the “’816
Pat.”), the final Office Action from which this appeal is taken (“Final Act.”
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mailed Apr. 9, 2013), Appellant’s Appeal Brief (“Br.” filed Oct. 19, 2013),
the Examiner’s Answer (“Ans.” mailed Nov. 19, 2013), and, where
incorporated by reference in the Answer, the Request for Ex Parte
Reexamination (“Req.” filed May 30, 2012).
Appellant’s disclosure “relates to fault tolerant computer systems.
More specifically, the invention is directed to a system for providing remote
access and control of server environmental management.” (’816 Pat. col. 1,
ll. 59–62.) Claim 1, which is illustrative, reads as follows:
1. A method of retrieving or updating system status
for a computer, the method comprising the acts of:
sending a command for remotely retrieving or updating
system status from a second computer through a remote
interface to a first computer;
executing the command on a microcontroller in the first
computer; and
sending a retrieve or update system status signal from the
microcontroller to the first computer thereby retrieving or
updating the system status.
(See Br. 32.)
The Examiner relies on the following prior art in rejecting the claims:
Carbonneau et al. US 5,586,250 Dec. 17, 1996
(“Carbonneau”)
Lambrecht et al. US 5,754,801 May 19, 1998
(“Lambrecht”)
Tobita et al. US 5,781,434 July 14, 1998
(“Tobita”)
Frederick US 6,052,740 Apr. 18, 2000
Chung et al. US 6,359,871 B1 Mar. 19, 2002
(“Chung”)
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Motoyama US 2003/0172115 A1 Sept. 11, 2003
Intel Corporation, “LANDesk Server Monitor Module
Installation and User’s Guide” (1995) ( “LANDesk”).

The following is an enumerated listing of the grounds of rejection
(GR) on appeal.
GR-1: Claims 1–20, 33–39, 41, 42, 51, and 53 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being anticipated by LANDesk. (Final Act. 4–9.)
GR-2: Claims 21–24, 40, 47, and 52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over LANDesk and Carbonneau. (Final Act.
9–12.)
GR-3: Claims 48–50 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over LANDesk, Carbonneau, and Lambrecht. (Final Act. 12–
13.)
GR-4: Claim 45 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over LANDesk and Motoyama. (Final Act. 14–15.)
GR-5: Claims 25–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over LANDesk and Frederick. (Final Act. 15–18.)
GR-6: Claims 43, 44, and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over LANDesk and Chung. (Final Act. 18–20.)
GR-7: Claims 1, 3, 4, 6–8, 11, 12, 14–19, 22–24, 33, 37–42, 47, 52,
and 53 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by
Carbonneau. (Final Act. 20–26.) The rejection of claims 21 and 35 as
anticipated by Carbonneau is withdrawn. (Ans. 2.)
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GR-8: Claims 2, 5, 9, 10, 20, 36, and 51 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Carbonneau and LANDesk.
(Final Act. 26–28.)
GR-9: Claims 25–32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Carbonneau and Frederick. (Final Act. 28–31.)
GR-10: Claims 48–50 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Carbonneau and Lambrecht. (Final Act. 31–32.)
GR-11: Claim 45 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Carbonneau and Motoyama. (Final Act. 33–34.)
GR-12: Claims 43, 44, and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Carbonneau and Chung. (Final Act. 34–
35.)
GR-13: Claims 1, 2, 4, 6–8, 10–12, 15–19, 23, 24,1 33, 37–42, and 53
stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(e) as being anticipated by Tobita.
(Final Act. 36–40.) The rejection of claims 14 and 35 as anticipated by
Tobita is withdrawn. (Ans. 2.)
GR-14: Claims 25–29, 31, and 32 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tobita and Frederick. (Final Act. 40–
43.)
GR-15: Claim 30 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tobita, Frederick, and LANDesk. (Final Act. 44.)

1 The Examiner lists claims 25–29 for both GR-13 and GR-14 (see Final
Act. 36, 40), but discusses claims 25–29 under GR 14 (see Final Act. 41–
43), but not under GR-3. We conclude that the inclusion of claims 25–29 in
GR 13 was a typographical error.
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GR-16: Claims 3, 5, 9, 13, 20, 21, and 34 stand rejected under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tobita and LANDesk. (Final
Act. 45–46.)
GR-17: Claims 22, 47, and 52 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tobita and Carbonneau. (Final Act. 46–
48)
GR-18: Claims 48–50 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Tobita, Carbonneau, and Lambrecht. (Final Act.
49–50.)
GR-19: Claim 45 stands rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being
unpatentable over Tobita and Motoyama. (Final Act. 50–51.)
GR-20: Claims 43, 44, and 46 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as being unpatentable over Tobita and Chung. (Final Act. 51–53.)

ISSUES
The dispositive issues presented by Appellant’s contentions are as
follows2:
Does LANDesk disclose “executing the command on a
microcontroller in the first computer” (emphasis added), as recited in claim
1?
Does LANDesk disclose that “the act of transmitting the encapsulated
command comprises transmitting the encapsulated command specifically

2 Appellant’s contentions raise additional issues. However, because the
identified issues are dispositive of the appeal, we do not reach the additional
issues.
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addressed to a processing entity of the first computer to [a] remote
interface,” as recited in claim 12?
Does LANDesk disclose that “the act of performing the command
includes the act of sending data to a component of the first computer,” as
recited in claim 14?
Is Frederick combinable with LANDesk to teach or suggest
“communicating the selected operation to the selected component at the first
computer according to a communication protocol, the communication
protocol comprising a serialized bus protocol” (emphasis added), as recited
in claim 25?
Does LANDesk disclose “sending a retrieve or update system status
signal from the microcontroller to a component of the first computer thereby
retrieving or updating the system status,” as recited in claim 33?
Does LANDesk disclose “the command executed on the control entity
is configured to retrieve data from a component of the first computer,” as
recited in claim 41?

ANALYSIS
Claim 1
Claim 1 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1), as anticipated
by Carbonneau (GR-7), and as anticipated by Tobita (GR-13).
With regard to the rejection over LANDesk (GR-1), the Examiner
maps the recited microcontroller to LANDesk’s Sever Monitor Module
(“SMM”) card having an on-board 8086-compatible processor. (Final Act.
4; Req. 46; Req. App’x C2 4–6.) The Examiner explains that “Merriam-
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Webster defines Microcontroller as: A microprocessor that controls some or
all of the functions of an electronic device (as a home appliance) or system.”
(Ans. 3 (citing http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/
microcontroller).) The Examiner takes the position that the dictionary
definition represents the broadest reasonable interpretation of
“microcontroller” as it would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the
art, and that LANDesk’s disclosed 8086-compatible processor meets
definition. (Ans. 3–4.)
Appellant contends that that LANDesk’s disclosed 8086-compatible
processor is not a “microcontroller” as recited in claim 1. (Br. 6.) Appellant
points to examples from the ’816 Patent of a processor or microprocessor
(’816 Pat. col. 8, ll. 46–55) and a microcontroller (id. at col. 9, ll. 19–20) and
asserts these examples “clearly delineate[] the two types of devices (the
exemplary construction details of one type being generally inconsistent with
the other type), and is precise in its selection of the term ‘microcontroller’ in
Claim 1.” (Br. 6.)
We are unpersuaded of error. The passages cited by Appellant are
examples, and do not amount to definitions of the terms “processor” and
“microcontroller.” As pointed out by the Examiner, Appellant offers no
definition of the recited term “microcontroller” that would exclude either
LANDesk’s SMM or the 8086-compatible processor included in the SMM
card. (See Ans. 2.)
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1), and the rejection of claims 2–11, which depend from
claim 1 and were not separately argued with particularity, as anticipated by
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LANDesk (GR-1). Consequently, we need not address the cumulative
rejections of claims 1–11 as anticipated by, or unpatentable over,
Carbonneau (GR-7, 8) and Tobita (GR-13, 16) individually or in
combination with LANDesk. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a) (2011) (“The
affirmance of the rejection of a claim on any of the grounds specified
constitutes a general affirmance of the decision of the examiner on that
claim, except as to any ground specifically reversed.”); see also In re
Gleave, 560 F.3d 1331, 1338 (Fed. Cir. 2009).
Claim 12
Claim 12 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1), as
anticipated by Carbonneau (GR-7), and as anticipated by Tobita (GR-13).
With regard to the rejection over LANDesk (GR-1), the Examiner
finds that LANDesk discloses that “[an] act of transmitting [an]
encapsulated command comprises transmitting the encapsulated command
specifically addressed to a processing entity of the first computer to [a]
remote interface,” as recited in claim 12. (Final Act. 4 (citing LANDesk 7).)
The Examiner explains that LANDesk discloses updating the basic
input/output system (BIOS) and software of the SMM, and that since BIOS
is specific to a processor and motherboard, the BIOS update specifically
addresses those processing entities. (Ans. 4–5 (citing LANDesk 55).) The
Examiner further explains that LANDesk discloses cancelling commands
that are being executed by a processor, which requires addressing the
processor executing the commands. (Ans. 5 (citing LANDesk 56).)
Appellant argues that LANDesk does not disclose that “the act of
transmitting the encapsulated command comprises transmitting the
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encapsulated command specifically addressed to a processing entity of the
first computer to the remote interface.” (See Br. 7.) Appellant argues
it is entirely possible that the only knowledge necessary to
cancel this command is knowledge of the command itself, and
not necessarily of the processing entity. Therefore, LANDesk
does not inherently (i.e., necessarily) describe transmitting the
encapsulated command specifically addressed to a processing
entity of the first computer, as set forth in Claim 12.
(Br. 7 (emphases in original).)
We agree with the Examiner. We find the Examiner’s explanation
regarding the updating of the SMM BIOS to be reasonable. Appellant does
not address the Examiner’s explanations regarding the SMM BIOS.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 12 as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1); the rejection of claims 15–20, which depend from claim
12 and were not separately argued with particularity, as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1); and the rejection of claims 21–24, which depend from
claim 12, and were not separately argued with particularity, as unpatentable
over LANDesk and Carbonneau (GR-2). Consequently, we need not
address the cumulative rejections of claims 15–24 as anticipated by, or
unpatentable over, Carbonneau (GR-7, 8) or Tobita (GR-13, 16, 17),
individually or in various combinations with each other and LANDesk. See
37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a); see also Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1338.
Claim 13
Claim 13 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1) and as
unpatentable over Tobita and LANDesk (GR-16). Appellant submits no
arguments or evidence contesting the aforementioned rejections. Therefore,
Appellant has waived appeal as to claim 13. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv)
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(2013); see also Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010)
(precedential). Accordingly, we summarily sustain the rejection of claim 13.
Claim 14
Claim 14 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1) and as
anticipated by Carbonneau (GR-7).
With regard to the rejection over LANDesk (GR-1), the Examiner
finds LANDesk discloses that “the act of performing [a] command includes
the act of sending data to a component of the first computer,” as recited in
claim 14. (Final Act. 4; Req. 53; Req. App’x C2 23–24 (citing LANDesk
41–42, 44).) The Examiner explains that LANDesk discloses that the
module shutdown temperature, inter alia, is set by an operator using the
monitoring software at the monitoring console (i.e., the “second computer”)
and is sent to, and stored in, memory at the SMM installed in the server (i.e.,
“a component of the first computer”). (See Ans. 5–6 (citing LANDesk 13–
20, 40, 42, 66).)
Appellant contends that the LANDesk does not expressly or
inherently disclose that performing a command includes sending data to a
component of the first computer. (See Br. 8.) Appellant argues that setting
of temperature and voltage limits and actuation of alarms could just as easily
be performed by the monitoring software at the second computer, i.e.,
LANDesk’s monitoring console, without sending data to the SMM, i.e., to a
“component of the first computer.” (See id.)
We agree with the Examiner. We note for emphasis that LANDesk
discloses that the user “can set the Module’s shutdown temperature
threshold so that the Module shuts down both the server and itself before
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damage occurs.” (LANDesk 42.) In order for the shutdown temperature
threshold to cause the module (the SMM) to shut down the server and itself,
data representing the threshold set by the user must be sent to the SMM as a
part of the setting process (i.e., “performing a command”). We note for
further emphasis that the Module can deliver a page in the event a
monitoring console cannot be contacted (see LANDesk 30), which further
discloses that the settings for the actuation of alarms are sent to the SMM as
a part of the setting process.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 14 as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1). Consequently, we need not address the cumulative
rejection of claim 14 as anticipated by Carbonneau (GR-7). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.77(a); see also Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1338.
Claim 25
Claim 25 is rejected as unpatentable over LANDesk and Frederick
(GR-5), as unpatentable over Carbonneau and Frederick (GR-9), and as
unpatentable over Tobita and Frederick (GR-14).
Regarding the rejection over LANDesk and Frederick (GR-5), the
Examiner finds that LANDesk teaches all of the limitations of claim 25,
except that LANDesk does not teach that “the communication protocol
compris[es] a serialized bus protocol.” (Final Act. 15–17 (citing LANDesk
7, 28, 31, 41, 42, 44, 55, 67).) The Examiner finds that Frederick’s
disclosure of an Inter Integrated Circuit (“I2C”) bus protocol and a Universal
Serial Bus (“USB”) protocol teaches a communication protocol that
comprises a serialized bus protocol. (Final Act. 16 (citing Frederick col. 4,
ll. 55–65).) The Examiner concludes that “[i]t would have been obvious to
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an artisan at the time of the invention to include Frederick’s teaching with
method of LANDesk in order to allow device to operate at different speed.”
(Final Act. 16–17.)
Appellant contends that combination of Frederick with LANDesk is
improper because (1) the proffered motivation is not taught or suggested by
the prior art (Br. 10–11); and (2) the prior art does not recognize the problem
addressed by the invention of claim 25 (Br. 11 (citing ’816 Pat. col. 9,
l. 59—col. 10, l. 2)).
We are unpersuaded of error. In KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550
U.S. 398 (2007), the Court instructs that “[[r]]ejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there
must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” Id. at 418 (quoting In re
Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006)). “[H]owever, the analysis need
not seek out precise teachings directed to the specific subject matter of the
challenged claim, for a court can take account of the inferences and creative
steps that a person of ordinary skill in the art would employ.” Id. “The
obviousness analysis cannot be confined by a formalistic conception of the
words teaching, suggestion, and motivation, or by overemphasis on the
importance of published articles and the explicit content of issued patents.”
Id. at 419. Furthermore, “[o]ften it will be necessary for a court to look to
. . . the background knowledge possessed by a person having ordinary skill
in the art, all in order to determine whether there was an apparent reason to
combine the known elements in a the fashion claimed by the patent at issue.”
Id. at 418.
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The Examiner has articulated a reason with rational underpinning for
combining Frederick’s bus communication protocols with LANDesks
system (see Final Act. 15–17). Such rational underpinning is disputed by
Appellant only on the basis that it is not explicitly taught by Frederick or
LANDesk. We are, therefore, unpersuaded that the Examiner erred in
relying on the background knowledge of the skilled artisan. See KSR, 550
U.S. at 418.
As to Appellant’s argument that neither Frederick nor LANDesk
recognizes the problem solved by the invention of claim 25 (see Br. 11), the
argument is unpersuasive because
the problem motivating the patentee may be only one of many
addressed by the patent’s subject matter. The question is not
whether the combination was obvious to the patentee but
whether the combination was obvious to a person with ordinary
skill in the art. Under the correct analysis, any need or problem
known in the field of endeavor at the time of invention and
addressed by the patent can provide a reason for combining the
elements in the manner claimed.
KSR, 550 U.S. at 420.
Finally, we conclude, as does the Examiner (Ans. 10), that the
substitution of the I2C or USB protocol taught by Frederick for LANDesk’s
ISA bus protocol is no more than the combination of familiar elements
according to known methods that does no more than yield predictable
results, see KSR, 550 U.S. at 416, in other words, a predictable variation that
can be implemented by a person of ordinary skill, see id. at 417.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 25 as unpatentable over
LANDesk and Frederick (GR-5) and the rejection of claims 26–32, which
depend from claim 25 and were not separately argued with particularity, as
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unpatentable over LANDesk and Frederick (GR-5). Consequently, we need
not address the cumulative rejections of claims 25–32 as unpatentable over
Carbonneau (GR-9) or Tobita (GR-14, 15), in various combinations with
Frederick and LANDesk. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a); see also Gleave, 560
F.3d at 1338.
Claim 33
Claim 33 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1), as
anticipated by Carbonneau (GR-7), and as anticipated by Tobita (GR-13).
With regard to the rejection over LANDesk (GR-1), the Examiner
finds LANDesk discloses “sending a retrieve or update system status signal
from the microcontroller to a component of the first computer thereby
retrieving or updating the system status,” as recited in claim 33. (Final Act.
5 (citing LANDesk 31, 41, 42, 49).) The Examiner explains, inter alia,
LANDesk anticipates claim 33 because it retrieves remote
server’s statues [sic] upon user command. (see LANDesk page
47) LANDesk allows user to changes State Table’s polling
time interval from the remote server between 0 to 100 seconds.
(see LANDesk pages 46-47) By polling State Table from the
remote server, LANDesk’s server monitor module is retrieving
system status from remote server. (see LANDesk pages 46-
47)[.]
(Ans. 7–8; see also LANDesk 49.)
Appellant contends that LANDesk does not expressly or inherently
disclose “sending a retrieve or update system status signal from the
microcontroller to a component of the first computer thereby retrieving or
updating the system status” (Br. 8–9), because the cited passages of
LANDesk “LANDesk merely describe[] setting high and low temperature
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thresholds, setting the range of thresholds, setting a shutdown temperature,
configuring module options and changing the amount of data stored in the
log, without regard to how this is actually accomplished” (Br. 8).
We agree with the Examiner for the reasons quoted supra. As
discussed supra with regard to claim 1, the LANDesk’s SMM includes the
microcontroller. We find that LANDesk’s disclosure of retrieving server
(“first computer”) status (LANDesk 47) in response to a command from a
user sent from the monitoring console (“second computer”) (LANDesk 46-
47) to the SMM processor (“microcontroller”) discloses “sending a retrieve
or update system status signal from the microcontroller to a component of
the first computer thereby retrieving or updating the system status,” as
recited in claim 33.
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 33 as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1); the rejection of claims 34–39, which depend from claim
33 and were not separately argued with particularity, as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1); and the rejection of claim 40, which depends from claim
33, and was not separately argued with particularity, as unpatentable over
LANDesk and Carbonneau (GR-2). Consequently, we need not address the
cumulative rejections of claims 33, 34, and 36–40 as anticipated by, or
unpatentable over, Carbonneau (GR-7, 8) or Tobita (GR-13, 16),
individually or in combination with LANDesk. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a);
see also Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1338.
Claim 41
Claim 41 is rejected as anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1), as
anticipated by Carbonneau (GR-7), and as anticipated by Tobita (GR-13).
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With regard to the rejection over LANDesk (GR-1), the Examiner
finds LANDesk discloses that “the command executed on the control entity
is configured to retrieve data from a component of the first computer,” as
recited in claim 41. (Final Act. 8 (citing LANDesk 31, 46, 47, 49).) The
Examiner explains, inter alia,
LANDesk anticipates claim 41 because it retrieves remote
server’s statues [sic] upon user command. (see LANDesk
page 47) LANDesk allows user to changes State Table’s
polling time interval from the remote server between 0 to 100
seconds. (see LANDesk pages 46-47) By allowing user to set
the time interval, LANDesk’s server monitor module is
retrieving system status from remote server upon user
command. (see LANDesk pages 46-47)[.]
(Ans. 8–9.)
Appellant contends that LANDesk does not expressly or inherently
disclose that that “the command executed on the control entity is configured
to retrieve data from a component of the first computer.” (Br. 9–10.)
Appellant argues that
LANDesk merely describes the storing of predefined
parameters in a state table, changing the amount of data stored
in the log and configuring module options, without regard to
how this is actually accomplished. LANDesk does not
expressly describe, for example, how the storing of predefined
parameters in a state table is accomplished . . . .
(Br. 9.)
We agree with the Examiner. Appellant’s argument does not address
the rejection actually made. The Examiner does not assert that storing
predefined parameters in LANDesk’s server state table discloses the
disputed limitation. Rather the Examiner asserts that retrieving information
from the state table upon user command discloses the limitation. We find
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that LANDesk discloses a user request (i.e., “command”) to view the server
state table (i.e., “retrieve data”) (LANDesk 47) initiated at a monitoring
console (LANDesk 46–47) that causes the 8086-compatible processor (i.e.,
“control entity”) of the SMM the read (i.e., “execute the command to
retrieve data”) a memory at the server that contains the status table (i.e., “a
component of the first computer”).
Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 41 as anticipated by
LANDesk (GR-1); the rejection of claims 42, 51, and 53, which depend
from claim 41 and were not separately argued with particularity, as
anticipated by LANDesk (GR-1); the rejection of claims 47 and 52, which
depend from claim 41, and were not separately argued with particularity, as
unpatentable over LANDesk and Carbonneau (GR-2); the rejection of claims
48, 49, and 50, which depend from claim 41, and were not separately argued
with particularity, as unpatentable over LANDesk, Carbonneau, and
Lambrecht (GR-3); claim 45, which depends from claim 41, and was not
separately argued with particularity, as unpatentable over LANDesk and
Motoyama (GR-4); and claims 43, 44, and 46, which depend from claim 41,
and were not separately argued with particularity, as unpatentable over
LANDesk and Chung (GR-6). Consequently, we need not address the
cumulative rejections of claims 41–53 as anticipated by, or unpatentable
over Carbonneau (GR-7, 8, 10, 11, 12) or Tobita (GR-13, 17, 18, 19, 20),
individually or in various combinations with each other and LANDesk,
Lambrecht, Motoyama, and Chung. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.77(a); see also
Gleave, 560 F.3d at 1338.
Appeal 2014-005992
Reexamination Control 90/012,315
Patent 6,088,816

18
DECISION
The decision of the Examiner to reject claims 1–53 is affirmed.
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1). See 37 C.F.R.
§§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv) and 1.550(c) (2010).

AFFIRMED

msc

Patent Owner:

GAZDZINSKI & ASSOCIATES, PC
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