Ex Parte 5913180 et alDownload PDFBoard of Patent Appeals and InterferencesSep 1, 201090007920 (B.P.A.I. Sep. 1, 2010) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 90/007,920 02/08/2006 5913180 7026320/25500 5033 26386 7590 09/01/2010 DAVIS, BROWN, KOEHN, SHORS & ROBERTS, P.C. THE DAVIS BROWN TOWER 215 10TH STREET SUITE 1300 DES MOINES, IA 50309 EXAMINER LEWIS, AARON J ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3993 MAIL DATE DELIVERY MODE 09/01/2010 PAPER Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE BOARD OF PATENT APPEALS AND INTERFERENCES ____________ Ex parte MICHAEL C. RYAN, Appellant ____________ Appeal 2010-006577 Reexamination Control 90/007,920 Patent 5,913,180 Technology Center 3900 ____________ Before RICHARD TORCZON, ROMULO H. DELMENDO, and JEFFREY B. ROBERTSON, Administrative Patent Judges. DELMENDO, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON REQUEST FOR REHEARING1 1 The two-month time period for filing an appeal or commencing a civil action, as recited in 37 C.F.R. § 1.304, begins to run from the “MAIL DATE” shown on the PTOL-90A cover letter attached to this decision. Appeal 2010-006577 Reexamination Control 90/007,920 Patent 5,913,180 2 Appellant requests rehearing of our June 17, 2010 Decision (hereinafter “original Decision”), in which we affirmed the Examiner’s final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) of claims 1-3, 7, 18, 21, and 22 as anticipated by United States Patent 5,184,309 to Simpson (Request for Rehearing filed August 13, 2010, hereinafter “Req. Reh’g”).2 We DENY Appellant’s request to modify our original Decision. Appellant contends that “had the Board not misapprehended and/or overlooked [certain] points, the Board would not have affirmed the Examiner’s rejection of claim 22” (Req. Reh’g at 1). While not disputing our finding that Appellant had argued claims 1-3, 7, 18, 21, and 22 together, Appellant now contends that “the explanatory logic of the Board’s Decision is inherently inconsistent and flawed as it rejects claim 22 for lacking a limitation which claim 22 clearly contains” (Req. Reh’g at 3; original Decision at 4). Specifically, Appellant states that “claim 1 was rejected because it failed to bring itself outside Simpson by limiting the receipt of information to the receipt of information from a remote location” but that “claim 22 contains this limitation and therefore does not fall within the Board’s asserted explanation for affirming the Examiner’s rejection” (Req. Reh’g at 3). Appellant then asserts that we invoked 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(c) and therefore the amendment attached to the Request should be entered (Req. Reh’g at 4-6). 2 We also reversed a final rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) of claims 4, 5, 8, 10, 19, 20, 23, and 25-27 as unpatentable over Simpson in view of United States Patent 4,263,945 to Van Ness. Appellant does not contest that part of our decision. Appeal 2010-006577 Reexamination Control 90/007,920 Patent 5,913,180 3 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(vii) states in relevant part (emphasis added): [T]he failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately. Any claim argued separately should be placed under a subheading identifying the claim by number. In this case, it is undisputed that Appellant argued claims 1-3, 7, 18, 21, and 22 together as a single group and that the Appeal Brief did not include a separate subheading, let alone separate arguments, focusing on claim 22 (App. Br. 8; Reply Br. at 4). Under these circumstances, it was appropriate to confine our discussion to claim 1, which we selected as representative, and to address Appellant’s arguments as they relate to selected claim 1. As our discussion of the anticipation rejection was limited to claim 1, we did not misapprehend or overlook any fact. Appellant’s belated attempt to argue claim 22 separately is not well taken. Even if Appellant had argued claim 22 separately, Appellant failed to address our findings in the paragraph bridging pages 13-14 of our original Decision, where we discussed the remote aspect of transactions involving credit card information disclosed by Simpson. Accordingly, Appellant’s belated attempt would have been futile in any event. Finally, Appellant’s proposed amendment pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(c) is also inappropriate because our original Decision did not invoke the rule or “include an explicit statement of how a claim on appeal may be amended to overcome a specific rejection,” as provided by the rule. Indeed, such an explicit statement would have been inconsistent with our analysis in the paragraph bridging pages 13-14 of our original Decision. Appeal 2010-006577 Reexamination Control 90/007,920 Patent 5,913,180 4 DECISION While we have reconsidered certain aspects of our original Decision in light of Appellant’s arguments, we decline to modify our original Decision in any respect. DENIED saw FOR PATENT OWNER: DAVIS, BROWN, KOEHN, SHORS & ROBERTS, P.C. THE DAVIS BROWN TOWER 215 10TH STREET, SUITE 1300 DES MOINES, IA 50309 Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation