Ethel M. Carter, Complainant,v.Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionSep 19, 2001
01991494 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 19, 2001)

01991494

09-19-2001

Ethel M. Carter, Complainant, v. Donald H. Rumsfeld, Secretary, Department of Defense, (Defense Logistics Agency), Agency.


Ethel M. Carter v. Defense Logistics Agency

01991494

September 19, 2001

.

Ethel M. Carter,

Complainant,

v.

Donald H. Rumsfeld,

Secretary,

Department of Defense,

(Defense Logistics Agency),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01991494

Agency No. JH-98-010

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as

amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act

of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The appeal

is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. Complainant alleged that

she was discriminated against in the form of on-going harassment on the

bases of her sex, her age (DOB 8/10/45) and in reprisal for previous

EEO activity protected under Title VII when:

on October 8, 1997, complainant's supervisor duties were reduced to

half days;

her subordinates were encouraged to bypass her in the chain of command;

she was repeatedly asked to consider retirement;

in September of 1997, complainant's individual development plan (IDP) was

refused because complainant had requested more than 40 hours of training;

in September 1997, complainant's supervisor (RMO) informed her that

the IDPs for her branch were overdue even though they had been timely

submitted, while her male counterpart in Operations West received no

direction or deadline regarding the IDPs for his branch, despite his

not being timely submitted;

in September and October of 1997, RMO set or changed the release dates

for three of complainant's subordinates without consulting her; and

RMO made critical remarks during complainant's mid-year evaluation

regarding keeping her office door closed too much, not sharing a local

newspaper with her staff, and not answering her phone in a timely manner.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Supervisory Contract Specialist at the agency's East

Columbus, Ohio, facility. Believing she was a victim of discrimination,

complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently filed a formal

complaint on February 6, 1998. At the conclusion of the investigation,

complainant was informed of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final decision by

the agency. Complainant requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant established a prima

facie case of reprisal and disparate treatment based on reprisal,

sex and age. The agency went on to conclude that legitimate,

non-discriminatory reasons were articulated by RMO, which were not

discredited by complainant. Specifically, RMO stated that supervisor

duties were reduced because the staff complainant supervised was reduced

from fifteen to three. Regarding the chain of command issue, RMO states

that he made himself available after several subordinates complained about

access to complainant. RMO denies ever pressing complainant to retire.

With respect to the IDP, RMO stated that the IDP request was unreasonable.

Regarding release dates, RMO stated that the personnel specialist

in charge of handling the releases had problems getting in touch with

complainant and thus contacted him. Further, RMO states that complainant

asked him to work with the personnel specialist to determine a release

date, and advised the personnel specialist of the same, since it would

directly impact his work load. Finally, RMO states that he felt it was

important to bring to complainant's attention the need to be accessible

to her staff and her customers, by keeping her door open, circulating

the local newspaper and answering the phone promtly. RMO nonetheless

rated complainant �fully successful� for the rating period. The agency

requests that we affirm its FAD.

Harassment of an employee that would not occur but for the employee's

race, color, sex, national origin, age, disability, or religion is

unlawful, if it is sufficiently patterned or pervasive to alter the

conditions of the complainant's employment. Wibstad v. United States

Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01972699 (Aug. 14, 1998) (citing McKinney

v. Dole, 765 F.2d 1129, 1138-39 (D.C. Cir. 1985)). Applying the standards

set forth in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973);

Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003 (1st Cir. 1979) (requiring a showing

that age was a determinative factor, in the sense that "but for" age,

complainant would not have been subject to the adverse action at issue);

and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for Experimental Biology, Inc.,

425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd, 545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976)

(applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal cases), the Commission agrees

with the agency that complainant failed to rebut the reasons proffered

as being a pretext for discrimination.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that complainant presents no evidence

that the reasons proffered by the agency are pretextual. Further, we

find the reasons legitimate and non-discriminatory. We further find

that under a theory of hostile work environment, complainant fails to

establish a prima facie case of harassment since there is no evidence

that management's action was based on complainant's membership in a

protected class. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17

(1993); EEOC Notice No. 915.002 (March 8, 1994), Enforcement Guidance on

Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc. at 3, 6. Therefore, after a careful

review of the record, including complainant's contentions on appeal,

the agency's response, and arguments and evidence not specifically

addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

September 19, 2001

__________________

Date