Ernest N. Bellantoni, Complainant,v.Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 3, 2002
01A12988 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 3, 2002)

01A12988

10-03-2002

Ernest N. Bellantoni, Complainant, v. Gordon R. England, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.


Ernest N. Bellantoni v. Department of the Navy

01A12988

October 3, 2002

.

Ernest N. Bellantoni,

Complainant,

v.

Gordon R. England,

Secretary,

Department of the Navy,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A12988

Agency Nos. 95-68944-004; 95-68944-009

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq., and the Age Discrimination

in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq.

The appeal is accepted pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the

following reasons, the Commission affirms the agency's final decision.

Complainant filed formal complaints on October 3, 1994, and December 21,

1994. In his first complaint, complainant alleges he was discriminated

against on the bases of his disability (limited pulmonary capacity with

associated respiratory illness), age (DOB 12/24/33), and in reprisal

for prior protected activity when letters to his Commanding Officer

(CO) requesting a reasonable accommodation were ignored. In his second

complaint, complainant alleges he was discriminated against on the bases

of his disabilities (generalized anxiety disorder and limited pulmonary

capacity with associated respiratory illness), age, and in reprisal

for his prior complaint when he was rated as Successful for the rating

period of July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1994. The agency consolidated

these complaints in its FAD.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was employed

as a Electronics Engineer at the agency's Space and Naval Warfare

Systems Center in San Diego, California. From February 1992 through

February 1993, complainant was home on extended sick leave because of his

generalized anxiety disorder. Complainant returned to work on February

22, 1993, but was only cleared to work 4 hours a day by his physician.

When he returned to work, complainant was placed under the supervision of

the same individual (S1) whom complainant believed had previously caused

him problems and added to his anxiety. Additionally, complainant states

that the position he returned to was not fully defined, as his duties

were not the same supervisory duties they had been before his absence.

Complainant's physician sent letters to complainant's Commanding Officer

(CO) criticizing complainant's working conditions, given his generalized

anxiety disorder. The physician stated that the placement of complainant

back under S1's supervision would inhibit complainant's recovery.

The physician requested that complainant be provided with a position

description and performance plan so as to map out complainant's career

development.

In January 1994, midway through the rating period in question,

complainant was provided a mid-year review to sign. Complainant did so,

but maintained that he should be provided with a clear performance plan

and career objectives. On April 2, 1994, complainant went back out on

extended sick leave. He was rated by S1 as being successful for the

rating period of July 1, 1993, through June 30, 1994. Formal complaints

followed, as noted above.

At the conclusion of the investigations, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.<1>

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant failed to establish a

prima facie case of discrimination based on his disability in either

complaint. Specifically, the agency found that complainant did not

produce evidence to demonstrate he had an impairment which substantially

limited him in a major life activity. The agency concluded that

complainant's medical documentation did not support the conclusion

that he was substantially limited by his pulmonary condition or his

generalized anxiety disorder because it did not substantiate the effects

these conditions had on complainant's life.

With respect to his reprisal claim, the agency concluded that complainant

established a prima facie case in that, he engaged in protected activity,

his managers were aware of such activity, and he received a Successful

rating and not a higher rating as complainant argues he deserved within

such a period of time after the protected activity that a retaliatory

motive could be inferred. This conclusion notwithstanding, the agency

found that it had articulated a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason

for its actions. Regarding the assertion that complainant's letters

to the CO were ignored, the agency stated that complainant's letters

were not ignored. The agency states that the letters were routed to and

addressed by the appropriate officials, and complainant was provided with

accommodations to make his work environment more suitable.<2> The agency

noted that this routing procedure was standard, as the CO delegates duties

and therefore is not the appropriate person to answer every letter that

comes to him personally. As to the rating, the agency stated that

the Successful performance rating was an accurate reflection of his

work during the rating period. Complainant argues that he should have

been rated Superior, as that was the average rating of his work group.

The agency noted that in fact only two of six individuals received a

higher rating than complainant. The underlying argument complainant

appears to be making is that had he received the reasonable accommodation

he and his doctor requested, that of a clear position description and

performance plan, he would have been able to perform in a superior manner.

Stated more succinctly, complainant claims that the lack of superior

performance on his part was due to the agency's failure to provide him

with a reasonable accommodation.

Finally, with respect to complainant's age claim, the agency did not

draw a conclusion as to whether complainant established a prima facie

case. Rather, the agency concluded that legitimate, non-discriminatory

reasons were articulated as to both complaints, and that complainant

failed to rebut these reasons as being a pretext masking discrimination.

Complainant is silent on appeal and the agency requests that we affirm

its FAD.

The Commission concurs with the agency's determination that complainant

failed to establish a prima facie case of disability discrimination.

Specifically, we find that complainant is not an individual with a

disability, in that he has not produced evidence to demonstrate that he

is substantially limited in a major life activity. First, complainant's

physician stated that complainant's generalized anxiety disorder was

a temporary condition. The medical evidence relating to complainant's

generalized anxiety disorder indicates that it only precluded him from

working full-time in the particular job he held or under the particular

supervisor he had. The Commission has repeatedly held that being unable

to work in one particular job or with a particular supervisor does not

render one substantially limited in working. See Groshans v. Department

of the Navy, EEOC Appeal No. 03950109 (February 1, 1996) (individual with

severe allergy that had anaphylactic reactions who could work anywhere

but one office building was not substantially limited in the ability to

work). Cf. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. Pt. 1630.2(j), App. (an individual

is not substantially limited in working when she is unable to perform

one particular job for one employer). Regarding his pulmonary condition,

there is no evidence detailing its effect on complainant's life beyond

complainant himself stating that walking distances of 200 feet or more

cause him shortness of breath. Complainant's ability to perform a major

life activity must be restricted as compared to the ability of the average

person in the general population to perform the activity. 29 C.F.R. �

1630.2(j). The evidence of record is limited and does not demonstrate

that complainant is substantially limited in a major life activity.

Thus, complainant is not entitled to a reasonable accommodation under

the Rehabilitation Act.

The Commission further finds that complainant failed to present evidence

that the agency's articulated reasons for its actions were a pretext

for discrimination on the bases of complainant's age or in reprisal.

In reaching this conclusion, we note that the agency did respond to the

letters complainant's physician sent the CO. The fact that the CO did

not do so directly is immaterial. Further, with regard to the rating,

complainant offers only an unsupported argument that he deserved a higher

rating. There is no evidence to suggest that the reasons proffered by the

agency are a pretext masking discrimination. Therefore, after a careful

review of the record, including the agency's response, and arguments and

evidence not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Frances M. Hart

Executive Officer

Executive Secretariat

October 3, 2002

__________________

Date

1 We note that both of these complaints

have extensive procedural histories. The FAD and investigative record

each contain statements mapping the journey each complaint has taken,

and will therefore not be restated herein.

2 The agency states that complainant was permitted to work a part-time

schedule, was not assigned time sensitive work, so as to avoid causing

him stress, and complainant was placed under the immediate supervision of

another supervisor (S2), in response to his request to not report to S1.

The Commission notes that the agency was under no obligation to change

complainant's supervisor. See EEOC Enforcement Guidance on Reasonable

Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with Disabilities

Act, No. 915-002, Question 32 at 46 (March 1, 1999).