Erik M. Holst, Appellant,v.Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 26, 1999
01983411 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 26, 1999)

01983411

08-26-1999

Erik M. Holst, Appellant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency


Erik M. Holst v. Department of Agriculture

01983411

August 26. 1999

Erik M. Holst, )

Appellant, )

) Appeal No. 01983411

v. ) Agency No. UG9801

)

Daniel R. Glickman, )

Secretary, )

Department of Agriculture, )

Agency )

)

DECISION

INTRODUCTION

Appellant timely filed an appeal with the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (Commission) from a final agency decision concerning his

grievance against the agency alleging retaliation for his exercise of

protected activity under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as

amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. Accordingly, the appeal is accepted

in accordance with EEOC Order No. 960.001.

ISSUE PRESENTED

The issue on appeal is whether the agency properly found that appellant

failed to establish that the agency's actions were motivated by

reprisal.

BACKGROUND

Appellant filed a grievance on October 14, 1997, alleging retaliation

for his participation in EEO and union activities<1> when in February

1997, management intentionally set him up to fail by re-assigning him to

a Resource Assistant position for which he believed he was not trained;

when the supervisor failed to provide him training for this position;

and the supervisor failed to assign a co-worker to cover his assignments

while he was on leave for three weeks in September, 1997.<2>

Appellant learned in February 1997, that the Resource Assistant

position he was being transferred to included switchboard duties.

He threatened to file an EEO complaint alleging discrimination based

on physical disability (hearing impairment) if not granted reasonable

accommodation.<3> Appellant was relieved of switchboard duties but

states his threat resulted in the alleged retaliation.<4>

In a Step 3 grievance decision, the agency found that appellant failed

to establish a prima facie case of reprisal. The agency stated that

appellant's re-assignment was the result of a Memorandum of Understanding

(MOU) Placement Plan negotiated by the agency and the union; that union

representatives were present during implementation of the plan; and that

two funded vacancies at appellant's grade level existed for his directed

re-assignment: Personnel Assistant, for which he was not qualified,

and the Resource Assistant position.

The agency stated that appellant's new supervisor made reasonable

efforts to provide training. The agency stated that the supervisor

developed an Individual Development Plan with appellant, placed him

in one formal training session, and informed appellant of experienced

members of his team who were willing and able to assist him. The agency

stated that the supervisor's failure to arrange for back-up does not

violate the Master Agreement or any law, rule or regulation, and that for

anyone going on vacation, their workload awaits them on their return.

The agency further stated that the supervisor managed twenty employees

located in multiple sites<5> as well as an additional twenty employees

whose supervisor had recently left, and that under these circumstances

it is not surprising that she could not supervise employees as closely

as she might have liked.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.401(c) provides that a grievant may appeal

to the Commission from a final decision of the agency, the arbitrator

or the Federal Labor Relations Authority on a grievance when an issue of

employment discrimination was raised in a negotiated grievance procedure

that permits such issues to be raised.

In order to establish a prima facie case of discrimination for an

allegation of reprisal, appellant must show: 1) that he engaged in

protected activity, e.g., participated in a Title VII proceeding; 2)

that the alleged discriminating official was aware of the protected

activity; 3) that he was disadvantaged by an action of the agency

contemporaneously with or subsequent to such participation; and 4)

that there is a causal connection between the protected activity and

the adverse employment action. Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation for

Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass), affirmed,

545 F. 2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976); see also Mitchell v. Baldridge, 759 F. 2d

80, 86 (D.C. Cir. 1985); Burrus v. United telephone Co. of Kansas, Inc.,

683 F.2d 339, 343 (10th Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1071 (1982).

We find that appellant fails to establish a prima facie case for his

claims that management set him up for failure by re-assigning him to the

Resource Assistant position and that the supervisor failed to assign

a co-worker to cover for him during his vacation. Appellant engaged

in protected activity in 1994 and 1997 when he requested reasonable

accommodation for his physical disability. The agency was aware of that

activity, having granted appellant's reasonable accommodation requests.

However, because three years lapsed between the time of his first request

and his re-assignment, and seven months lapsed between the time of his

second request and the supervisor's failure to provide coverage during

his vacation, appellant fails to show a casual connection between the

protected activities and the agency actions which disadvantaged him.

Assuming arguendo, that appellant established a prima facie case, the

record indicates that appellant's re-assignment was part of a union

negotiated MOU, and that all employees were equally situated regarding

work left unattended while on leave.

Appellant's claim that the agency failed to provide him training

and assistance in his new position occurred in the months immediately

following his second request for reasonable accommodation. The Commission

finds a causal connection can be inferred based on the proximity in time

between the protected activity and the adverse action. Thus, appellant

states a prima facie case of reprisal for this claim.

However, appellant fails to demonstrate that the reason articulated

by the agency for its actions were a pretext for discrimination.

See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248,

253-256 (1981). The Commission finds that appellant's assertion of

discrimination based on reprisal is not borne out by the record which

indicate that the agency provided training and assistance. Accordingly,

the decision of the agency was proper and is AFFIRMED.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)

It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file

a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN

NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have

interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that

a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the

date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action

is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)

CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult

an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction

in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS

OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in

the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION

August 26. 1999

________________________ _______________________

DATE Carlton Hadden, Acting Director

Office of Federal Operations

1 Title VII does not cover union activities absent any allegations of

discrimination.

2 Appellant states that on the day before he was to leave his supervisor

told him that he was responsible for arranging for back-up.

3 Appellant requested and was granted reasonable accommodation for his

hearing impairment in 1994.

4 Appellant does not allege discrimination based on physical disability

in his grievance.

5 Appellant and his supervisor worked in different locations.