Elwha LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 5, 2020

14501343 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 5, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/501,343 09/30/2014 ALISTAIR K. CHAN 0712-035-003-000000 3851
44765 7590 08/05/2020
INTELLECTUAL VENTURES - ISF
ATTN: DOCKETING, ISF
3150 - 139th Ave SE
Bldg. 4
Bellevue, WA 98005
EXAMINER
RUHL, DENNIS WILLIAM
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3689
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/05/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ISFDocketInbox@intven.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte ALISTAIR K. CHAN, JESSE R. CHEATHAM III,
WILLIAM DAVID DUNCAN, EUN YOUNG HWANG,
RODERICK A. HYDE, TONY S. PAN,
CLARENCE T. TEGREENE, and VICTORIA Y. H. WOOD

Appeal 2019-001935
Application 14/501,343
Technology Center 3600

Before JASON V. MORGAN, DAVID J. CUTITTA II and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.

CUTITTA, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 14–19, 26, 27, 29–32, 35, 42–45,
140, 248, and 563, all the claims pending in this application.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Elwha LLC.
Appeal Br. 4.
2 Claims 3–13, 20–25, 28, 33, 34, 36–41, 46–139, 141–247, 249–562, and
564–899 are canceled. Id.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Invention
Appellant’s claimed subject matter relates to “management of an
airspace for unmanned aircraft.” Spec. ¶ 12.3
Exemplary Claim
Independent claim 1 is exemplary of the claims on appeal and is
reproduced below with bracketed lettering added and dispositive limitation
at issue italicized for discussion purposes:
1. An unmanned aircraft configured for operation on
a mission in an airspace comprising flyway segments managed
by a management system of the airspace comprising:
an aircraft system, including one of a fixed wing aircraft
system and a rotary wing aircraft system;
a computing system associated with the aircraft and
having a processor configured to respond to computer-readable
program instructions and storage configured to store the
computer-readable program instructions and data including:
(a)4 a profile for the aircraft used for registration of
the aircraft with the management system before operation
in the airspace;
(b) a mission plan data identifying a route,
including at least one of one or more flyway segments
spanning one or more of a zone and a region to be
travelled by the aircraft throughout the mission;

3 We refer to: (1) the originally filed Specification filed September 30, 2014
(“Spec.”); (2) the Final Office Action mailed March 9, 2018 (“Final Act.”);
(3) the Appeal Brief filed July 20, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); (4) the Examiner’s
Answer mailed November 5, 2018 (“Ans.”); and (3) the Reply Brief filed
January 4, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
4 Reproduced incorrectly in the Appeal Brief as (b). Appeal Br. 57.
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(c) an identifier for the aircraft used for monitoring
of the aircraft by the management system during
operation in the airspace; and
(d) a license for the aircraft used by the
management system to manage the operation of the
aircraft in the airspace; and
[(e)] a communication system operably coupled with the
computing system; and
[(f)] computer-readable program instructions configured
to direct the computing system to [(f1)] automatically
communicate with the management system to execute a
transaction to secure the license for an entirety of the mission
before the mission so that the aircraft can be operated
according to terms of the license during the mission in the
airspace and [(f2)] to automatically register the aircraft with
the management system before the mission;
wherein the aircraft may be automatically monitored by
the management system during the mission.
Appeal Br. 57–58.
REFERENCES AND REJECTIONS
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 14–19, 26, 27, 29–32, 35, 42–45,
140, 248, and 563 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 2–13.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 14–17, 26, 27, 29–32, 35, 42, 44,
45, 140, 248, and 563 under U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over the combined
teachings of Jarrell (US 9,087,451 B1; patented July 21, 2015) and Federal
Aviation Administration, Unmanned Aircraft Operations in the National
Airspace System, 14 C.F.R. Part 91 (2007) (“FAA Article”). Final Act. 14–
18.
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The Examiner rejects claims 18, 19, and 43 under U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over the combined teachings of Jarrell, FAA Article, and
further in view of official notice of the automated toll charging system of EZ
pass. (“EZ Pass”). Final Act. 19–20.

OPINION
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant and in light of Appellant’s arguments and evidence.
Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
Arguments not made are waived. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (2017).
Appellant appeals the Examiner’s rejection of the pending claims as
ineligible subject matter under § 101 and as obvious under § 103. Appeal
Br. 13–42; Reply Br. 3–21. Appellant’s arguments address limitations
recited in claim 1 but do not address any particular limitation recited in any
other claim that is different than the limitations argued for claim 1. As such,
we select independent claim 1 as representative of all rejected claims in this
appeal. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

I. Rejection Under 35 U.S.C. § 101
An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has held that § 101 includes implicit
exceptions—laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas—which
are not patent-eligible. See Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014). In January 2019, the Office issued the 2019 Revised Patent Subject
Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”),
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which addresses the manner in which § 101 case law is to be applied by the
Office. In October 2019, the Office issued an update to explain further the
manner in which the Guidance should be implemented. See October 2019
Patent Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55,942 (Oct. 18, 2019);
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility, available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/ peg_oct_2019_
update.pdf (“October 2019 Update”). The Board is required to adhere to
these guidance documents as a matter of Office policy. Guidance at 51.5
The Guidance sets forth a four-part analysis for determining whether a claim
is eligible subject matter under § 101; the four parts are labeled Step 1, Step
2A Prong 1, Step 2A Prong 2, and Step 2B. Id. 53–56.

Guidance Step 1
First, under “Step 1,” we consider whether the claimed subject matter
falls within the four statutory categories set forth in § 101, namely
“[p]rocess, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” Guidance at
53–54; see 35 U.S.C. § 101. Appellant’s independent claims 1 and 140 each
recite an unmanned aircraft (i.e., a “machine”). Independent claims 248 and
563 each recite a computer-implemented method (i.e., a “process”). As
such, the claims are directed to a statutory class of invention within § 101
and we proceed to the next step.

5 Although the Office Action at issue was mailed on March 9, 2018, before
the 2019 Guidance was issued, the 2019 Guidance “applies to all
applications . . . filed before, on, or after January 7, 2019.” Guidance 50.
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Guidance Step 2A Prong 1 (Alice/Mayo–Step 1) (Judicial Exceptions)
Second, under “Step 2A Prong 1,” we evaluate “whether the claim
recites a judicial exception, i.e., an abstract idea, a law of nature, or a natural
phenomenon.” Guidance 54; see Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S.
208, 216–17 (2014).
The Examiner determines that claim 1 recites an abstract idea “of
managing airspace for unmanned aircraft, such as drones and UAVs” which
is (i) a certain method of organizing human activities” and (ii) a mental
process that “can be practiced by people with pen and paper.” Final Act. 6–
7.
Appellant argues the Examiner failed to establish a prima facie case
of patent ineligibility against the pending claims under 35 U.S.C. § 101
because the Examiner “conclud[ed] that Claim 248 was not directed to
patentable subject matter . . . without ever expressly referencing Independent
Claims 1, 140 (both of which are directed to unmanned aircraft), and 563.”
Appeal Br. 17. Appellant argues that claims 1 and 140 “are not directed to
abstract ideas” (id. at 29) because they “recite an unmanned aircraft with an
associated computing and communications systems” and “further recite that
the computing system executes ‘computer-readable program instructions
configured to direct the computing system to automatically communicate
with the management system to execute a transaction to secure the license
for an entirety of the mission before the mission.”’ Id. at 27. Similarly,
Appellant argues claims 248 and 563 are not directed to abstract ideas
because they “are directed to a computer-implemented method, each
performed ‘on a computing system associated with an unmanned aircraft.’”
Id. (emphasis omitted).
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We are not persuaded of Examiner error. Rather, we agree with the
Examiner’s determination that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. Apart from
additional elements discussed separately below, claim 1, under a broadest
reasonable interpretation, recites “acts taken to manage airspace for
unmanned aircraft, similar to how manned aircraft are managed by the FAA
and air traffic controllers.” Final Act. 6–7; see Guidance 52 (indicated as
abstract “[c]ertain methods of organizing human activity” including
“managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people
(including social activities, teaching, and following rules or instructions).”
In particular, limitation (f1) involves “communicat[ing] with the
management system to execute a transaction to secure the license for an
entirety of the mission before the mission so that the aircraft can be operated
according to terms of the license during the mission in the airspace.”
Limitation (f2) involves “register[ing] the aircraft with the management
system before the mission.” As the Examiner notes, these types of activities
fall “clearly within the scope of being a method of organizing human
activities” because “the FAA requires aircraft (manned and unmanned) to be
registered and obtain FAA certification for flight worthiness that gives the
aircraft and the operator the ‘license’ or ‘right’ to fly” and these limitations
recite “the acts taken to manage airspace for unmanned aircraft, similar to
how manned aircraft are managed by the FAA and air traffic controllers.”
Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner further determines, and we agree, that “the
claimed steps can also be viewed as being steps taken to comply with FAA
regulations and the law, which is the satisfying of a legal obligation.” Id. at
7. Moreover, Appellant’s Specification supports the determination that these
have long been common steps in ensuring air safety. For example,
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Appellant’s Background section states that under “FAA policy, operators
who wish to fly an unmanned aircraft for civil use must obtain an FAA
airworthiness certificate the same as any other type aircraft.” Spec. 4:8–9.
Moreover, as the Examiner notes, the Specification further discloses that:
It is well-known to provide a system and method for
administration and management of manned aircraft (e.g. with
on-board pilot) in an airspace. Systems and methods for air
traffic control of manned aircraft such as for (piloted)
commercial flights are very well established in use. Employment
of staff such as air traffic controllers to facilitate management of
commercial/military flights of manned aircraft operating in and
across airspaces in larger urban areas is well known . . . .
A well-established system of governmental regulation and
oversight (e.g. through the U.S. Federal Aviation Administration
(FAA)) is in operation.
Final Act. 8 (citing Spec. ¶¶ 4, 5).
Accordingly, securing a license for a mission, such as one indicating
airworthiness, so that the aircraft can be operated according to terms of the
license during the mission in the airspace have long been common steps
performed by people to ensure air safety. We agree, therefore that the steps
identified by the Examiner recite a certain method of organizing human
activities because they merely seek to automate human-performed tasks.
In addition, we agree with the Examiner’s determination that claim 1
recites an idea of itself, i.e., a mental process. Final Act. 7. Although the
previously recognized category of an idea of itself is not one of the currently
recognized categories in the Guidance, it is sufficient for the purposes of the
present appeal that the claimed concept reasonably can be characterized as
falling within the still-recognized category of mental processes. See, e.g.,
MPEP § 2106.04(a)(2)(III):
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The courts have used the phrase “an idea ‘of itself’” to describe
an idea standing alone such as an uninstantiated concept, plan or
scheme, as well as a mental process (thinking) that “can be
performed in the human mind, or by a human using a pen and
paper.” CyberSource Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d
1366, 1372 . . . (Fed. Cir. 2011).
Characterizing the abstract idea as a mental process instead of an idea
of itself does not constitute a change in the thrust in the Examiner’s rejection
because the Examiner recognizes that the “phrase ‘an idea of itself,’ is used
to describe an idea standing alone such as an un-instantiated concept, plan or
scheme, as well as a mental process (thinking) that ‘can be performed in the
human mind, or by a human using a pen and paper.’” Final Act. 5–6. We
agree with the Examiner that limitations (f1) and (f2) “can be practiced by
people with pen and paper” because “[b]efore the invention of computers,
aviators and aircraft owners had to manually register their aircraft with the
FAA.” Id. at 7. In addition, executing a transaction to secure the license for
an entirety of the mission before the mission could be performed manually
such as with pen and paper by drafting the license on paper and handing the
license to the pilot before takeoff. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s
determination that claim 1 recites a mental process because nothing in the
claim elements precludes the steps from practically being performed in the
mind. Final Act. 7; see October 2019 Update 7 (“Under the 2019 PEG, the
‘mental processes’ grouping is defined as concepts performed in the human
mind, and examples of mental processes include observations, evaluations,
judgments, and opinions.”).
Appellant argues “the pending claims are not directed to purely
mental processes” because they recite “specific apparatuses, including a
computing system, a communications system coupled with the computing
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system, and other elements.” Reply Br. 13. This argument is unpersuasive
because it does not specifically address the Examiner’s determination that
limitations (f1) and (f2) recite an abstract idea, but instead addresses
additional limitations discussed separately in Step 2A Prong 2 and Step 2B,
below.
Consequently, we agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an
abstract idea in the form of a “certain method of organizing human activity”
and a “mental process,” as provided in the Guidance. We discern no error in
that part of the Examiner’s rejection.

Guidance Step 2A Prong 2 (Practical Application)
Third, having determined that claim 1 recites an abstract idea, we
proceed to “Step 2A Prong 2” of the Guidance, which requires that we
evaluate whether “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial
exception into a practical application of the exception.” Guidance 54. “A
claim that integrates a judicial exception into a practical application will
apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a
meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a
drafting effort designed to monopolize the judicial exception.” Id.; see
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 78
(2012). The Guidance specifies that this evaluation is conducted by first
“[i]dentifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s),” and then “evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application” such as by reciting an
improvement to technology. Guidance 54–55.
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The Examiner determines claim 1’s additional elements include an
aircraft system, including one of a fixed wing aircraft system and a rotary
wing aircraft system, a computing system associated with the aircraft and
having a processor, and storage, and a communication system. Final Act. 9–
10. The Examiner determines the “additional element(s) when considered
individually or in combination with the recited elements in the claim(s) do
not provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a
patent eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts
to significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final Act. 10.
Appellant argues that “the pending claims include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than any such abstract
idea.” Appeal Br. 30. Specifically, Appellant argues that claim 1 is
integrated into a practical application and thus patent eligible. Id.
This argument is unpersuasive because the benefit Appellant asserts,
of “configuring the computing system associated with an unmanned aircraft
to secure rights to operate the aircraft within an airspace and then to operate
the aircraft within the airspace” (Appeal Br. 29), is achieved through the
abstract idea identified above by automatically securing the license for the
mission. Such an improvement to the recited abstract idea does not confer
patent-eligibility. See Customedia Techs., LLC v. Dish Network Corp., 951
F.3d 1359, 1362–65 (Fed. Cir. 2020) (“The claims at issue here are directed
to the abstract idea of using a computer to deliver targeted advertising to a
user, not to an improvement in the functioning of a computer.”).

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Furthermore, the Specification indicates the claimed aircraft system is
generic by disclosing that the aircraft:
may be “a UAV/drone craft [that] may be provided in any of a
variety of forms, shapes, sizes, capabilities, etc. according to
exemplary embodiments, including a fixed wing configuration
(such as commonly referred to as an airplane) (see FIGURES
2A–2C) or rotating blade configuration (such as commonly
referred to as a helicopter) (see FIGURES 3A–3F) or any other
form that presently exists or may exist as technology for
UAV/drone craft evolves in the future.”
Spec. ¶ 153. We, therefore, agree with the Examiner that the “claim
recitations to the aircraft system that includes a fixed or rotary wing aircraft
system is reciting a generic and conventional aircraft system.” Final Act. 10.
Thus, this additional element merely generally links the claimed abstract
idea to a particular technological environment rather than apply or use the
abstract idea in some other meaningful way. Guidance 55.
We also agree with the Examiner that there is no indication that the
computer components recited in claim 1 are anything other than general
purpose computer components. See Final Act. 10 (“This type of structure is
what one would expect to find on an unmanned aircraft (processor,
communication system, storage/memory).”). The Specification does not
provide additional details that would distinguish the claimed additional
elements from a generic implementation. See Spec. ¶ 154 (“[T]he
UAV/drone craft may comprise an on-board computing system with a
control module that can be accessed by a remote operator and/or by network
to direct the UAV/craft on a route/mission and to track location, speed,
etc.”). The Specification also states that the system and subsystems are
“implemented using conventional computing and network technology” and
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that “the UAV/drone craft may comprise a wireless communication device
(e.g.[,] employing conventional wireless/radio/cellular/other technology).”
Id. ¶¶ 248, 155. Thus, rather than improving computer technology, claim 1
uses generic computer components as tools to implement the improved
abstract idea of automatically securing the license for the mission. Using
generic computer components as tools to perform an abstract idea does not
integrate the judicial exception into a practical application or otherwise
confer patent-eligibility. Guidance 55.
Additionally, none of the remaining indicia of integration identified
by the Guidance are present in the claim. Guidance 55; see MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). For example, the claim does not recite a particular
machine and, instead, generically recites generic computer components such
as a “processor, communication system, [and] storage/memory”. Final
Act. 10. Nor does the claim recite the “[t]ransformation and reduction of an
article ‘to a different state or thing.’” Bilski, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010);
MPEP § 2106.05(c). The claimed additional elements do not transform an
article, i.e., some type of tangible or physical object, but instead transform
an intangible concept, i.e., information, from one form to another. That is,
the claim simply collects, manipulates, and communicates data, thereby
executing a transaction to attempt to secure a license. See MPEP
§ 2106.05(c); see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 71–72 (1972)
(holding that a computer based algorithm that merely transforms data from
one form to another is not patent-eligible). As such, claim 1 has no other
meaningful limitations (see MPEP § 2106.05(e)), and merely recites
instructions to execute an abstract idea on generic computer hardware (see
MPEP § 2106.05(f)).
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In summary, the additional elements of claim 1 are not applied in any
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial exception to
a particular technological environment, i.e., generic aircraft and computer
components, such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception. We, therefore, determine claim 1 is
not directed to a specific asserted improvement in computer-related
technology or otherwise integrated into a practical application and thus is
directed to a judicial exception.

Guidance Step 2B (Alice/Mayo, Step 2) (Inventive Concept)
Having concluded that claim 1 is “directed to” an abstract idea, we
turn to whether the claim provides an “inventive concept,” i.e., whether the
additional elements, individually and as an ordered combination, amount to
“significantly more” than the exception itself. Guidance 56. To determine
whether the claim provides an inventive concept, the additional elements are
considered—individually and in combination—to determine whether they
(1) add a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-
understood, routine, conventional” in the field or (2) simply append well-
understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the
industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
Guidance 56.
The Examiner determines that the claimed additional elements “do not
provide meaningful limitation(s) to transform the abstract idea into a patent
eligible application of the abstract idea such that the claim(s) amounts to
significantly more than the abstract idea itself.” Final Act. 10. Specifically,
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the Examiner finds that the additional limitations are well-understood,
routine, and conventional:
The claim recitations to the aircraft system that includes a fixed
or rotary wing aircraft system is reciting a generic and
conventional aircraft system and amounts to reciting structure
that is well understood, routine, and conventional any type of
fixed wing or rotary aircraft. It is well understood in the field that
unmanned aircraft are operated by computers that have a
processor and a communication system as claimed. This
structure that has been added to the claim via amendment is
reciting that which is well understood, routine, and conventional
in the aviation field and does not represent significantly more.
This type of structure is what one would expect to find on an
unmanned aircraft (processor, communication system, storage/
memory). The claimed “management system” amounts to
reciting that the method is to be applied by a generic system that
can be nothing more than a convention and generic computing
system. The scope of the claimed management system is broad
and could arguably be just people, but even when assuming that
the management system is electronic in nature and is comprised
of a computer/server, it is noted that this is just instructing a
practitioner to implement the abstract idea on a generic
computer.
Id.
Appellant argues that “the pending claims include additional elements
that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than any such abstract
idea.” Appeal Br. 30 (emphasis omitted).
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive. As discussed above, the
additional computer elements in claim 1 beyond the recited abstract idea are
a computing system having a processor configured to respond to computer-
readable program instructions and storage, and these elements are merely
used for performing steps of the claimed abstract process for securing a
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license for a mission. We agree with the Examiner that, the claimed
computer elements are “well understood, routine, and conventional in the
aviation field” and “[t]his type of structure is what one would expect to find
on an unmanned aircraft (processor, communication system,
storage/memory).” Final Act. 10. Although claim 1 recites storing
particular data in memory including the data recited in limitations (a), (b),
(c), and (d), the claim does not recite any specific technical features of
memory or database technology or use the memory in an unconventional
way. In this regard, the claim uses the memory generically for data storage
and retrieval. Consistent with the Guidance, the additional elements of a
memory, used generically, are not practical applications of a judicial
exception as they are included among additional elements that merely recite
“apply it” or similar language, that merely include instructions to implement
an abstract idea on a computer, or that merely use a computer as a tool to
perform an abstract idea. Guidance 54. Also, our reviewing court has
recognized that generic computer components are not enough to satisfy the
inventive-concept requirement. See Mortg. Grader, Inc. v. First Choice
Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Thus generic
use of memory is not enough to supply the requisite inventive concept.
Rather, the use of memory, when read as an ordered combination, must
improve a technological process rather than merely serve as a drafting effort
to monopolize the underlying abstract idea. See BASCOM Global Internet
Servs. v. AT&T Mobility, LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
We further agree with the Examiner that the “claim recitations to the
aircraft system that includes a fixed or rotary wing aircraft system is reciting
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a generic and conventional aircraft system.” Final Act. 10 (citing Spec.
¶ 153).
For these reasons, the recited hardware adds nothing more than well-
understood, routine, conventional activities, specified at a high level of
generality, to the abstract mental process. See MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II)(ii).
We, therefore, agree with the Examiner’s determination that the additional
elements do not amount to significantly more than the above-identified
judicial exception.
Appellant argues that claim 1 recites significantly more than the
alleged abstract idea because similar to BASCOM, claim 1 has an inventive
concept that can be found in the “‘ordered combination of claim limitations
that transforms the abstract idea . . . into a particular, practical application of
that abstract idea.’” Appeal Br. 30.
We disagree. Appellant provides no evidence from the Specification
to support any assertion that the claimed combination of additional elements
is non-conventional. Nor does Appellant, other than listing the additional
limitations, identify any particular combination of claim limitations that
transforms the abstract idea into something more. See Appeal Br. 30 (Claim
1 recites, among other elements . . .”). Mere attorney arguments and
conclusory statements unsupported by factual evidence are entitled to little
probative value. In re Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997). Thus,
there is no evidence in the record to support the argument that Appellant’s
claimed method is provided with any non-conventional and non-generic
arrangement of known, conventional components similar to BASCOM.
Analyzing the additional elements as an ordered combination, we agree with
the Examiner that the additional elements as an ordered combination do not
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amount to significantly more than the abstract idea. See Ans. 9 (“Other than
citing to Bascom and arguing that the examiner is wrong, the appellant does
nothing more than to allege that the claimed limitations are sufficient to
transform the abstract idea into an eligible invention.”).
We, therefore, conclude that claim 1 does not provide an inventive
concept because the additional elements recited in the claim, considered
individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide significantly
more than the recited judicial exception. Accordingly, we are not persuaded
claim 1 recites patent-eligible subject matter. Further, Appellant has not
proffered sufficient evidence or argument to persuade us that any of the
limitations in the remaining claims provide a meaningful limitation that
transform the claims into a patent-eligible application. Therefore, we sustain
the rejection of claims 1–20 under U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-
ineligible subject matter.

II. Rejections Under 35 U.S.C. § 103
Claim 1
The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Jarrell and FAA
Article to teach or suggest:
[C]omputer-readable program instructions configured to direct
the computing system to automatically communicate with the
management system to execute a transaction to secure the license
for an entirety of the mission before the mission so that the
aircraft can be operated according to terms of the license during
the mission in the airspace and to automatically register the
aircraft with the management system before the mission,
as recited in claim 1. Final Act. 14–18. Of particular relevance, the
Examiner finds that Jarrell teaches or suggests the entirety of the disputed
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limitation except “the communication system of the aircraft is configured to
secure a license for a mission before the mission so that the aircraft can
operate according to terms of the license during the mission in the airspace.”
Id. at 16. But, the Examiner finds that FAA Article teaches or suggests this
limitation. Id. The Examiner determines that sufficient motivation existed
to combine the teachings of the references. Id. at 17–18.
Appellant first argues that “Jarrell does not disclose or suggest
‘computer-readable program instructions configured to direct the computing
system to automatically communicate with the management system to
execute a transaction to secure the license for an entirety of the mission
before the mission’” because “Jarrell describes ad hoc toll collections or
assessment of fines as a UAV passes individual communications stations
within ‘a particular air corridor.’” Appeal Br. 40 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner responds by noting that Appellant’s argument does not
sufficiently address the reasoning of the rejection:
Appellant’s argument seems to be somewhat premised on the
assumption that a given mission is traversing more than one toll
area of the airspace such that more than one toll has to be paid.
The claim scope is such that the UAV may only need to traverse
one toll area to fly a mission and would not require a plurality of
licenses/transactions as argued. Regardless, Jarrell teaches
having a license to operate in airspace and discloses that failure
to have the proper license results in a fine. A mission may only
require traversal of one airspace and only requires one toll,
thereby mooting the argument from the appellant that Jarrell
teaches more than one toll for a given flight. All of that depends
on the flight and where it is doing and how far it is (the mission).
The claims do not specify any particular mission as far as length
or time, etc. Rather than address the actual reasoning set forth by
the examiner, the appellant simply argues that Jarrell does not
teach or suggest what is claimed.
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Ans. 12.
Appellant’s argument is unpersuasive for the reasons identified by the
Examiner. Appellant’s argument that Jarrell teaches more than one toll for a
given flight is not responsive to the rejection because Appellant fails to
persuasively address the Examiner’s determination that claim 1 does “not
specify any particular mission as far as length or time” and thus “[a] mission
may only require traversal of one airspace and only requires one toll.”
Appellant also fails to persuasively address the Examiner’s finding that
Jarrell’s tolling within a particular airspace teaches securing a license to
operate in the airspace therefore Jarrell’s tolling teaches securing the license
for an entirety of the mission. Ans. 12; Final Act. 16.
Appellant next argues that Jarrell discloses that a license may be
obtained but does not indicate that this occurs prior to the mission. Appeal
Br. 41 (emphasis omitted).
The Examiner determines that although this limitation is not expressly
disclosed in Jarrell, that it would have been obvious in view of Jarrell’s
disclosure:
Jarrell discloses that a license may be obtained but does not
indicate that this occurs prior to the mission and by using the
communication system of the aircraft. The examiner notes that
Jarrell discloses that prior to a flight being taken by an aircraft,
communication between the aircraft and a communication
station may occur via the communication system of the aircraft.
See column 19, lines 48-65. This disclosure agrees with the
disclosure by Jarrell that the expected route (the planned
mission) is received from the stored data on the aircraft and is
used during the flight to validate the expected route. This
requires that the route be received prior to the mission beginning.
Knowing that Jarrell teaches that one can obtain a license to use
an express corridor, and knowing that if you do not have the
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license you can be fined or ticketed for using the express
corridor, one of ordinary skill in the art before the effective filing
date of the claimed invention would have found it obvious to
have the communication system secure the license to use an
express corridor when the mission plan data indicates that this is
the desired route to be taken by the aircraft, which would occur
prior to the flight occurring as is disclosed by Jarrell. One of
ordinary skill in the art who desires to have a mission plan (a
flight plan) that utilizes the express corridor would have found it
obvious to secure the license for the express corridor prior to the
mission so that the operator will not risk getting a fine or ticket
for using the express corridor without the required license.
Final Act. 17–18.
Appellant’s argument that Jarrell does not expressly disclose securing
the license before the mission is unpersuasive. Appeal Br. 41–42. “The
question under [35 U.S.C. § 103] is not merely what the references expressly
teach but what they would have suggested to one of ordinary skill in the art
at the time the invention was made.” Merck & Co. v. Biocraft Laboratories,
Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 807 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (emphasis added) (quoting In re
Lamberti, 545 F.2d 747, 750 (Fed. Cir. 1976); see also MPEP § 2123. We
agree with the Examiner’s finding that Jarrell’s “verification of the license to
operate in the airspace . . . strongly implies that one would want to have the
license before the mission.” Ans. 13. Because “Jarrell teaches having a
license and teaches that a UAV can be fined if it does not have the proper
license” this “leads to the obviousness of securing the license before the
mission as claimed.” Id; see also Final Act. 17–18.
For the reasons discussed, Appellant has not persuaded us of error in
the Examiner’s obviousness rejection of independent claim 1. Accordingly,
we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of that claim, as well as the rejection of
independent claims 140, 248, and 563, and dependent claims 2, 14–17, 26,
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27, 29–32, 35, 42, 45, which Appellant does not argue separately with
particularity. Appeal Br. 43–55.
Claim 18
The Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Jarrell, FAA
Article, and further in view of official notice of the automated toll charging
system of EZ pass (“EZ Pass”) to teach or suggest “[t]he aircraft of Claim 1
wherein the license is automatically secured at a rate of payment
automatically for which the computing system is configured to automatically
approve,” as recited in claim 18. Final Act. 19. We adopt the Examiner’s
findings and conclusions as our own and add the following for emphasis.
Appellant points out that claim 18 recites “‘a computing system
associated with the aircraft.’” Appeal Br. 53. Appellant argues “[t]he
Examiner acknowledges that EZ Pass describes a vehicle carrying a
transponder to facilitate paying the toll. Id. However, the Examiner does
not even suggest that there is a computing system associated with the
aircraft.” Id.
Appellant’s argument based on EZ Pass alone is unpersuasive because
the Examiner relies on the combined teachings of Jarrell, FAA Article, and
EZ Pass (Final Act. 19), rather than EZ Pass alone, to teach or suggest the
disputed limitation. See Nat’l Steel Car, Ltd. v. Canadian Pac. Ry., Ltd.,
357 F.3d 1319, 1336–37 (Fed. Cir. 2004) (rejecting argument directed at the
wrong reference). Of particular relevance, the Examiner relies on Jarrell,
rather than EZ Pass, to teach or suggest “‘a computing system associated
with the aircraft.” See Final Act. 14 (“The aircraft has a computer/processor
512, communication system, and data storage as claimed.”). The Examiner
finds EZ Pass teaches “the license is automatically secured at a rate of
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payment automatically,” as recited in claim 18, in view of “official notice of
the fact that road toll systems such as EZ pass exist that allow drivers to be
charged a toll to use a roadway in an automated manner such that the
payment is automatically approved.” Final Act. 20.
Appellant, therefore, has not persuaded us of error in the Examiner’s
obviousness rejection of dependent claim 18 because Appellant’s arguments
are not responsive to the rejection. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claim 18, as well as the rejection of claims 19 and 44, which Appellant does
not argue separately with particularity. Appeal Br. 54–55.

CONCLUSION
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § References/
Basis
Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 14–19,
26, 27, 29–32,
35, 42–45,
140, 248, 563
101

1, 2, 14–19, 26,
27, 29–32, 35,
42–45, 140,
248, 563

1, 2, 14–17,
26, 27, 29–32,
35, 42, 44, 45,
140, 248, 563
103 Jarrell, FAA
Article
1, 2, 14–17, 26,
27, 29–32, 35,
42, 44, 45, 140,
248, 563

18, 19, 43 103 Jarrell, FAA
Article, EZ
Pass
18, 19, 43
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 14–19, 26,
27, 29–32, 35,
42–45, 140,
248, 563

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED