01976672
09-03-1999
Ellis E. Williams, Appellant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency,
Ellis E. Williams, )
Appellant, )
) Appeal No. 01976672
v. ) Agency No. 4-C-442-1113-95
)
William J. Henderson, )
Postmaster General, )
United States Postal Service, )
Agency, )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Appellant timely initiated an appeal to the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission (Commission) from the final decision of the agency concerning
his allegation that the agency violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq. The appeal is accepted
by the Commission in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order
No. 960.001.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue presented herein is whether the agency discriminated against
appellant based on race (African American) and color (black) when his
request for a reassignment was allegedly denied.
BACKGROUND
Appellant filed a formal complaint in June 1995 in which he raised the
issue identified above. Although the complaint was initially dismissed
by the agency, that decision was reversed by the Commission and the
agency was ordered to process the complaint. Williams v. U.S. Postal
Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01956330 (December 23, 1996). Following an
investigation, appellant did not request an EEO administrative hearing
and the agency thereafter issued a final decision in August 1997 finding
no discrimination. It is from this decision that appellant now appeals.
During the period in question, appellant was employed as a Distribution
Clerk at the agency's facility (Facility 1) in Steubenville, Ohio.
In January 1995, appellant requested a transfer to the agency's
Youngstown, Ohio facility (Facility 2). Although there were no vacancies,
appellant's request was kept on file by Facility 2's personnel office.
In May 1995, appellant was informed that Facility 2 had vacancies for
the position of LSM Operator, and that, in order to qualify for that
position (the Position), he would be required to take dexterity training
and pass a test. Appellant began this training and received a letter
dated June 2, 1995, stating that, once he completed the training, he
would have to demonstrate the ability to perform machine distribution
and accuracy training. The letter states further:
You will be allowed 47 hours to complete machine application training.
In addition, you may be assigned a scheme requirement, in which you will
be allowed one hour of training for 16 memory items assigned. If you
fail to qualify either on the 47 hour machine application training,
manual scheme training, or machine scheme training, this failure will
result in your separation from the Postal Service (emphasis in original).
Appellant thereafter submitted a letter dated June 6, 1995, declining
the Position.
Appellant contends that, at the time he received the aforementioned
letter, he was on his way to successfully qualifying for the Position.
In this regard, appellant states that the letter was designed to
intimidate him into declining the transfer. He also takes exception
with a statement made to him by his supervisor regarding the transfer.
Specifically, the supervisor told appellant that, because there was a
shortage of clerks at Facility 1, he was going to hold appellant for 90
days in the event appellant was transferred.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of
burdens and order of presentation of proof in a Title VII case alleging
discrimination is a three-step process. Appellant has the initial burden
of establishing a prima facie case of discrimi-nation. If appellant
meets this burden, then the burden shifts to the agency to articulate
some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its challenged action.
Appellant must then prove, by a prepon-derance of the evidence, that
the legitimate reason articulated by the agency was not its true reason,
but was a pretext for discrimination. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,
411 U.S. 792 (1973).
Even assuming that appellant can establish a prima facie case, we
find that the agency has articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory
reason for the action at issue. See Texas Dep't of Community Affairs
v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 254 (1981). Specifically, officials testified
that appellant's request for a transfer was granted and that the reason
he was not reassigned was because he withdrew his request.
At this point, appellant bears the burden of establishing that the
agency's articulated reason is a mere pretext for discrimination.
Appellant can do this either directly, by showing that a discrimi-natory
reason more likely motivated the agency, or indirectly, by showing that
the agency's proffered explanation is unworthy of credence. Id. at 256.
In St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993), the Supreme
Court held that a fact finder is not required, as a matter of law, to
find discrimination whenever it finds that the employer's explanation is
not credible. The Court further made clear that a fact finder may find
discrimination in such circumstances. The critical factor is that a fact
finder must be persuaded by the complainant that it was discrimination
that motivated the employer to act as it did. According to the Court,
it is not sufficient "to disbelieve the employer; the fact finder must
believe the plaintiff's explanation of intentional discrimination."
Id. at 519 (emphasis in original).
The Commission finds appellant has not established pretext. Specifically,
we find that the reason appellant was not reassigned was because he
withdrew his request for the Position. Although appellant asserts that
he was intimidated by officials into withdrawing his request, we find
insufficient evidence to support such a conclusion. In this regard,
although the agency's June 2, 1995, letter states that appellant would
be removed if he did not successfully complete the LSM training, he
has not demonstrated that this condition was either out of the ordinary
or discriminatory. Accordingly, the Commission finds appellant has not
established that he was discriminated against based on race.
CONCLUSION
Based on a review of the record and for the reasons cited above, it is
the decision of the Commission to AFFIRM the FAD and find appellant has
not established that the agency discriminated against him as alleged.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. If you file a civil action,
YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE
OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS
OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result in
the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department
in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a
civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative
processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
09-03-99
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations