Eleven IP Holdings, LLCv.K11 Group Limited

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board

Oct 30, 2020

91230956 (T.T.A.B. Oct. 30, 2020)

This Opinion is Not a
Precedent of the TTAB

Oral Hearing: July 23, 2020 Mailed: October 30, 2020

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
_____

Trademark Trial and Appeal Board
_____

Eleven IP Holdings, LLC
v.
K11 Group Limited
_____

Opposition No. 91230955
Opposition No. 91230956
Opposition No. 91236465
(Consolidated)
_____

Chris C. Polychron and Nicole S. Blakely of Coast Law Group LLP,
for Eleven IP Holdings, LLC.

Kevin Viau and Otto O. Lee of Intellectual Property Law Group LLP,
for K11 Group Limited.
_____

Before Taylor, Wellington and Pologeorgis,
Administrative Trademark Judges.

Opinion by Taylor, Administrative Trademark Judge:
This is a consolidated proceeding1 involving three oppositions brought by Eleven
IP Holdings, LLC (“Opposer”) against marks sought to be registered by K11 Group

1 Opposition No. 91230955 and Opposition No. 91230956 were consolidated by Board order
on July 14, 2017, and Opposition No. 91236465 was added to that consolidated proceeding by
Board order on December 21, 2017. The record in these consolidated proceedings is
maintained in Opposition No. 91230955 and all citations are to that proceeding unless
otherwise noted. Citations in this opinion are to the TTABVUE docket entry number and,
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 2 -
Limited (“Applicant”). Opposer opposes Applicant’s applications to register the
stylized mark 2 (Opposition No. 91230955); the stylized mark
3 (Opposition No. 91230956); and the stylized mark 4
(Opposition No. 91236465), all three for the following services:
Leasing and rental of real estate, real estate agency
services, real estate management services, real estate
valuation services, real estate appraisal, real estate
brokerage, real estate investment services, rental of offices
and apartments; financial advisory, analysis, consultancy,
and information services; capital investment services;
financial valuation services; advisory and consultancy
services relating to finance, investments, and real estate
in International Class 36.

where applicable, the electronic page number where the document or testimony appears.
Because the Board primarily uses TTABVUE in reviewing evidence, it prefers that citations
to non-confidential parts of the record include the TTABVUE docket entry number and the
TTABVUE page number. See RxD Media, LLC v. IP Application Dev. LLC, 125 USPQ2d
1801, 1804 (TTAB 2018); TRADEMARK TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD MANUAL OF
PROCEDURE (“TBMP”) §§ 801.01, 801.03 (2020).
2 Application Serial No. 87023754 was filed May 3, 2016 under Section 44(e) of the Trademark
Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on Hong Kong Registration No. 301285209, registered
February 11, 2009. The application includes the following description of the mark: “The mark
consists of the stylized wording ‘K11.’” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
3 Application Serial No. 87103079 was filed on July 13, 2016, based on a bona fide intent to
use the mark in commerce under Section 1(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1051(b). The
application includes the following description of the mark: “The mark consists of the stylized
wording ‘ATELIER K11.’” Color is not claimed as a feature of the mark.
4 Application Serial No. 87142291 was filed August 17, 2016 under Section 44(e) of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1126(e), based on Hong Kong Registration No. 303879321,
registered August 23, 2016. The application includes the following description of the mark:
“The mark consists of the stylized wording ‘K11.’” Color is not claimed as a feature of the
mark.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 3 -
In each of the three proceedings, Opposer has pleaded a claim of likelihood of
confusion.5 Opposer alleges in each that Applicant’s mark is likely to be confused with
its famous and inherently distinctive trademarks “ELEVEN” and “ ,” that are the
subject of numerous valid and subsisting registrations and applications, listed in
Exhibit A to the Notice of Opposition.6 Those referenced in Opposer’s brief are
detailed, in relevant part, below:7
Registration No. Mark Registration
Date/Status
Relevant Services
4265159 ELEVEN July 24, 2012

Sections 8 affidavit
received; Section 15
affidavit
acknowledged
resort lodging
services; providing
temporary lodging
services in the
nature of a tourist
home, all excluding
restaurant services
(Class 43)
4269487 ELEVEN January 1, 2013

Sections 8 affidavit
received; Section 15
affidavit
acknowledged
travel agency
services, namely,
making reservations
and booking for
temporary lodging;
providing travel
lodging information
services for
travelers (Class 43)
4384681

The registration
includes the
August 13, 2013

Sections 8 affidavit
received; Section 15
affidavit
acknowledged
rental of homes
(Class 39)

5 Opposer also pleaded a dilution claim (1 TTABVUE 10-11, ¶¶ 21-28), but indicated in its
brief (and at oral hearing) that it had elected not to pursue that claim. Accordingly, Opposer’s
dilution claim will not be further considered.
6 1 TTABVUE.
7 1 TTABVUE. Opposer also alleged ownership of Registration Nos. 4180401, 4269438,
4610113, and 4932240, and Registration No. 4269487 was listed twice in Exhibit A.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 4 -
Registration No. Mark Registration
Date/Status
Relevant Services
description reads:
“The mark consists
of a stylized number
‘11’ within a
diamond shape.”
Color is not claimed
a feature of the
mark

4610119

The registration
includes the
description reads:
“The mark consists
of a stylized number
‘11’ within a
diamond shape.”
Color is not claimed
a feature of the
mark
September 23, 2014 travel agency
services, namely,
making reservations
and booking for
temporary lodging;
providing travel
lodging information
services for
travelers
(Class 43)
4621491

The registration
includes the
description reads:
“The mark consists
of a stylized number
‘11’ within a
diamond shape.”
Color is not claimed
a feature of the
mark.
October 14, 2014 hotels; hotel
services, namely,
providing luxury
hotel
accommodations;
resort lodging
services; providing
temporary lodging
services in the
nature of a home;
pubs; bar services;
restaurant services
(Class 43)
87005886
(Now Registration
No. 5868718)

ELEVEN September 24, 2019 Banking and
financing services;
Financial services,
namely, wealth
management
services; Investment
banking services
(Class 36)
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
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Registration No. Mark Registration
Date/Status
Relevant Services
87005887
(Now Registration
No. 5885688)

The registration
includes the
description reads:
“The mark consists
of a stylized number
‘11’ within a
diamond shape.”
Color is not claimed
a feature of the
mark
October 15, 2019 Banking and
financing services;
Financial services,
namely, wealth
management
services; Investment
banking services
(Class 36)

In each answer, Applicant denies the salient allegations in the Notices of
Opposition and, under the heading “Affirmative Defenses,” pleads: (1) laches;
estoppel, and acquiescence; (2) unclean hands; (3) failure to state at claim; and (4)
that there is no likelihood of confusion between the parties’ marks as they and the
services are sufficiently dissimilar.8 Applicant did not pursue the affirmative defenses
of estoppel, acquiescence and waiver so we deem these defenses waived. See Harry
Winston, Inc. v. Bruce Winston Gem Corp., 111 USPQ2d 1419, 1422-23 n.7 (TTAB
2014); Alcatraz Media Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc., 107 USPQ2d 1750, 1752
n.6 (TTAB 2013), aff’d mem., 565 F. App’x 900 (Fed. Cir. 2014). Failure to state a

8 Applicant, in ¶ 34 of its Answer, also gave notice that “it intends to rely upon additional
defenses that become available or apparent …, and thus reserves the right to amend the
Answer to assert such additional defenses.” 10 TTABVUE 5. Such a statement is not an
affirmative defense but merely an advisory statement that Applicant may amend its pleading
at some future date. A defendant cannot reserve unidentified defenses since it does not
provide a plaintiff fair notice of such defenses. We accordingly give no further consideration
to ¶ 34.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 6 -
claim is not an affirmative defense. Notwithstanding, insofar as Applicant neither
filed a formal motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim during the interlocutory
phase of this consolidated proceeding, nor argued this asserted affirmative defense in
its brief, it is hereby waived. Alcatraz Media, Inc. v. Chesapeake Marine Tours Inc.,
107 USPQ2d at 1753 n.6. We consider Applicant’s allegations of no likelihood of
confusion in item 4 as an amplification of Applicant’s denial that its marks are likely
to cause confusion with Opposer’s marks.
Last, although Applicant, at oral hearing, essentially explained that its pleaded
laches defense in item 1 was intended to put Opposer on notice of its assertion of the
Morehouse defense, see Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland and Co., 407 F.2d 881,
160 USPQ 715, 717 (CCPA 1969), it was not plead with sufficient particularity to
convey such notice. Applicant may not rely on an unpleaded defense. We therefore
consider below whether the “prior registration” or Morehouse defense was tried by
implied consent under Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2).
I. Preliminary Matters
A. The Morehouse Defense
Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b)(2), made applicable to Board proceedings by Trademark Rule
2.116(a), 37 C.F.R. § 2.116(a), provides in part that when claims or issues not raised
by the pleadings are tried by express or implied consent of the parties, an amendment
of the pleadings may be made to cause them to conform to the evidence. “Implied
consent to the trial of an unpleaded issue can be found only where the non-offering
party (1) raised no objection to the introduction of evidence on the issue, and (2) was
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 7 -
fairly apprised that the evidence was being offered in support of the issue.” TBMP
§ 507.03(b). See also Morgan Creek Prods. Inc. v. Foria Int’l Inc., 91 USPQ2d 1134,
1138 (TTAB 2009); H.D. Lee Co. v. Maidenform Inc., 87 USPQ2d 1715, 1720-1721
(TTAB 2008); Boise Cascade Corp. v. Cascade Coach Co., 168 USPQ 795, 797 (TTAB
1970) (“Generally speaking, there is an implied consent to contest an issue if there is
no objection to the introduction of evidence on the unpleaded issue, as long as the
adverse party was fairly informed that the evidence went to the unpleaded issue.”).
“The question of whether an issue was tried by consent is basically one of fairness.
The non-moving party must be aware that the issue is being tried, and therefore there
should be no doubt on this matter.” Morgan Creek, 91 USPQ2d at 1139; see also TBMP
§ 507.03(b).
Upon review of the record, Applicant, during trial, made reference to “prior
registrations” in its notice of reliance when it stated with regard to all of the attached
exhibits that:
[the exhibits] are relevant to show lack of likelihood of
confusion between the parties’ marks, or dilution of
Opposer’s marks, as well as defenses related to
Opposer allowing prior registration of the same or
similar marks of Applicant, delaying or failing to act to
challenge Applicant’s marks, and weakness and dilution of
Opposer’s marks due to third party registration and use.
Applicant’s NOR at ¶ 11 (emphasis added).9 We find this reference and appended
evidence fairly apprised Opposer that Applicant intended this evidence to support a
Morehouse defense. Moreover, although Opposer affirmatively asserts in its reply

9 30 TTABVUE 4.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 8 -
brief that “the [Morehouse] defense was never alleged … and accordingly cannot be
pursued,” Opposer’s Reply Br. p. 1010, Opposer devoted a significant portion of it its
brief addressing the merits of that defense. Based on the evidentiary record and the
briefs in this case, we find that the Morehouse defense was tried by the consent of the
parties. Accordingly, we deem the pleadings so amended and address the defense
below.
The “prior registration” or Morehouse defense is an equitable defense in the nature
of laches or acquiescence. Morehouse Mfg. Corp. v. J. Strickland 160 USPQ at 717.
The defense is raised when a defendant claims that it already owns a substantially
similar registered mark for substantially similar goods and/or services such that the
second (or more) registrations sought cause no added injury to the plaintiff. See id.
See also TBMP § 311.02(b)(1), and the authorities cited therein. In addition, the
Morehouse defense will not be applied where a defendant’s prior registration did not
issue until after the commencement of the proceeding in which it is asserted as a
basis for the defense. See Hornblower & Weeks Inc. v. Hornblower & Weeks Inc., 60
USPQ2d 1733, 1737 (TTAB 2001).
Applicant’s asserted Morehouse defense is not applicable in this case for two
reasons. First, all of Applicant’s asserted prior registrations issued after this
proceeding had commenced, id., and second, the marks at issue here are not
“substantially similar” to the marks in the asserted prior registrations. See, e.g., Mag
Instrument, Inc. v. The Brinkman Corp., 96 USPQ2d 1701, 1711-12 (TTAB 2010) (The

10 38 TTABVUE 11.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 9 -
marks MAGNUM MAX and MAGNUM FIRE were found not sufficiently identical for
purposes of asserting the Morehouse defense.).
In view of the foregoing, Applicant may not rely on the Morehouse defense.
B. Evidentiary Rulings
Applicant objects to Exhibit 20 of the declaration of Kyra Martin, arguing that it
“should be excluded from consideration to show that Opposer’s services appeared in,
were covered by, or were mentioned in the listed publications,” because Opposer “has
essentially merely included a list of titles or links without the material actually
attached” and such a list is not sufficient to introduce the listed publications into the
record. Applicant’s Br. p. 11-12.11 Opposer’s listing of publications is properly of
record, having been introduced by the Martin declaration and not seasonably objected
to by Applicant. Cf. Beech Aircraft Corp. v. Lightning Aircraft Co., 1 USPQ2d 1290,
1291 (TTAB 1986) (Opposer’s notice of reliance was received without appended copy
of printed publication, but was not objected to until briefing. The Board considered
the materials furnished with the notice of reliance.). Applicant’s objection therefore
is overruled.
We note, however, that a mere listing of publications does not make the
publication themselves of record. As such, the mere listing has no probative value to
show what services were mentioned in the listed publications.

11 35 TTABVUE 12-13.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 10 -
Similarly, the Martin declaration at ¶ 2 includes a statement that the services
provided by Opposer’s licensees under the ELEVEN Marks have been featured in
hundreds of articles in nationally and internationally distributed publication, and
provides a website link to the “press” page of Opposer’s website, “where many have
been compiled.” This is insufficient to make the webpages themselves of record. In re
Powermat Inc., 105 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 (TTAB 2013) (providing hyperlinks
insufficient to make evidence of record). Therefore, we consider only the example
webpages made of record as exhibits to the declaration.
II. The Record
The record includes the pleadings and, by operation of Trademark Rule 2.122, 37
C.F.R. § 2.122, the files of the subject applications. In conformance with the
evidentiary rulings, the record also includes the following:
A. Opposer’s Evidence
1. Opposer’s notice of reliance on:
a. Hard copies of pleaded registration Nos. 4265159, 4269487,
4384681, 4610119 and 4621491 together with printouts from
the Trademark Status & Document Retrieval (TSDR) database
showing current title and status; and
b. Copies of printouts for pleaded application Serial Nos.
86939564, 87005886 and 87005887, taken from the TSDR data
base.12
2. The Testimony declaration of Kyra Martin, Director of
Administration for Grassy Creek, LLC (Grassy Creek) and Irwin
Backcountry Guides, LLC (IBG), with Grassy Creek providing
management services for IBG and other licensees of Opposer, with

12 26 TTABVUE.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 11 -
Exhibits 9-19 (consisting of articles from various publications
discussing the services provided by Opposer’s licensees),.13
C. Applicant’s Evidence
1. Applicant’s Notice of Reliance on:
a. Printouts of Applicant’s Registration Nos. 5258786, 5299107 and
5239406 taken from the TSDR database;
b. Printouts of five applications, i.e., Serial Nos. 87255991,
87313493, 87771182, 87771198, and 87771219 filed by Applicant
taken from the TSDR database; and
c. Printouts of third-party registrations of ELEVEN- and 11-
formative marks taken from the TSDR data base; and
d. An article entitled “K11 Musea Is the Culmination of Billionaire
Collector Adrian Cheng’s Vision for a Hybrid Art-and-Luxury
Empire. But He’s Not Done Yet.”14
2. The testimony declaration, with Exhibits A-D, of Sze Wan Lisa, Head
of Legal of K11 Group Limited.15
III. Entitlement to Bring a Statutory Cause of Action16
To establish entitlement to bring a statutory cause of action under Section 13 of
the Trademark Act, a plaintiff must demonstrate a real interest in the proceeding

13 27 TTABVUE.
14 30 TTABVUE.
15 31-32 TTABVUE. Although the declaration references Exhibits A-E, it was accompanied
only by Exhibits A-D. However, Exhibit E, identified as an article entitled “K11 Musea Is the
Culmination of Billionaire Collector Adrian Cheng’s Vision for a Hybrid Art-and-Luxury
Empire. But He’s Not Done Yet,” although not included in the submission, was previously
made of record via Applicant’s notice of reliance.
16 Our decisions have previously analyzed the requirements of Section 13 and 14 of the
Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1063-64, under the rubric of “standing.” We now refer to this
inquiry as entitlement to bring a statutory cause of action. Lexmark Int’l, Inc. v. Static
Control Components, Inc., 572 U.S. 118, 125-26 (2014). Despite the change in nomenclature,
our prior decisions and those of the Federal Circuit interpreting Sections 13 and 14 remain
equally applicable.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 12 -
and a reasonable belief of damage. Australian Therapeutic Supplies Pty. Ltd. v.
Naked TM, LLC, 965 F.3d 1370, 2020 USPQ2d 10837 at *3 (Fed. Cir. 2020); see also
Empresa Cubana Del Tabaco v. Gen. Cigar Co., 753 F.3d 1270, 111 USPQ2d 1058
(Fed. Cir. 2014); Coach Servs., Inc. v. Triumph Learning LLC, 668 F.3d 1356, 101
USPQ2d 1713, 1727 (Fed. Cir. 2012); Ritchie v. Simpson, 170 F.3d 1092, 50 USPQ2d
1023, 1025 (Fed. Cir. 1999). Opposer’s entitlement to oppose registration of
Applicant’s marks is established by its pleaded registrations that were properly made
of record, as noted above, which the record shows to be valid and subsisting, and
owned by Opposer. See, e.g., Cunningham v. Laser Golf Corp., 222 F.3d 943, 55
USPQ2d 1842, 1844 (Fed. Cir. 2000); N.Y. Yankees P’ship v. IET Prods. & Servs.,
Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1497, 1501 (TTAB 2015).
IV. Priority
Because Opposer’s pleaded registrations are properly of record, priority is not in
issue in the oppositions with respect to those marks for the services listed therein.
See King Candy Co. v. Eunice King’s Kitchen, Inc., 496 F.2d 1400, 182 USPQ 108
(CCPA 1974). In addition, Opposer made its pleaded applications, Serial No.
87005886 for the mark ELEVEN and Serial No. 87005887 for the design mark ,
of record, both filed on April 22, 2016 and both for “Banking and financing services;
Financial services, namely, wealth management services; Investment banking
services.” An opposer may rely on the filing date of its application to establish
constructive use of its mark on that date. However, any judgment entered in favor of
an opposer relying on such constructive use is contingent upon the ultimate issuance
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 13 -
of a registration. See Spirits Int’l, B.V. v. S.S. Taris Zeytin Ve Zeytinyagi Tarim Satis
Kooperatifleri Birligi, 99USPQ2d 1545, 1549 (TTAB 2011) (citing Compagnie Gervais
Danone v. Precision Formulations LLC, 89 USPQ2d 1251 (TTAB 2009). Because the
April 22, 2016 filing date of Opposer’s applications is prior to the filing dates of
Applicant’s involved applications, May 3, 2016, July 13, 2016 and August 17, 2017,
respectively, Opposer has contingent priority with respect to the services identified
in its pleaded applications.
IV. Likelihood of Confusion
We focus our analysis on whether there is a likelihood of confusion between
Applicant’s marks and identified services and the marks in Opposer’s pleaded
Registration No. 4265159, ELEVEN (in standard characters), for, in relevant part,
“resort lodging services; providing temporary lodging services in the nature of a
tourist home, all excluding restaurant services,” the composite mark in Registration
No. 4384681, , for “rental of homes,” and on pleaded application Serial Nos.
87005886 (’886 App.) and 87005887 (’887 App.) respectively, for the same two marks
noted above and both for “banking and financing services; financial services, namely,
wealth management services; investment banking services,” because if there is no
likelihood of confusion between these marks and services then Applicant’s marks and
services are not likely to be confused with Opposer’s other pleaded marks, which
include additional or different services. See Max Capital Grp. Ltd., 93 USPQ2d 1243,
1245 (TTAB 2010).
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 14 -
Our determination under Section 2(d) is based on an analysis of all of the
probative evidence of record bearing on a likelihood of confusion. In re E. I. du Pont
de Nemours & Co., 476 F.2d 1357, 177 USPQ 563, 567 (CCPA 1973) (“DuPont”); see
also In re Majestic Distilling Co., 315 F.3d 1311, 65 USPQ2d 1201, 1203 (Fed. Cir.
2003). We consider each DuPont factor for which there is evidence and argument. See,
e.g., In re Guild Mortg. Co., 912 F.3d 1376, 129 USPQ2d 1160, 1162-63 (Fed. Cir.
2019); M2 Software, Inc. v. M2 Commc’ns., Inc., 450 F.3d 1378, 78 USPQ2d 1944,
1947 (Fed. Cir. 2006); ProMark Brands Inc. v. GFA Brands, Inc., 114 USPQ2d 1232,
1242 (TTAB 2015) (“While we have considered each factor for which we have
evidence, we focus our analysis on those factors we find to be relevant.”).
Typically, two key considerations in any likelihood of confusion analysis are the
similarities between the marks and the similarities between the goods. See In re
Chatam Int’l Inc., 380 F.3d 1340, 71 USPQ2d 1944, 1945-46 (Fed. Cir. 2004);
Federated Foods, Inc. v. Fort Howard Paper Co., 544 F.2d 1098, 192 USPQ 24, 29
(CCPA 1976). In certain cases, however, the Board may find that a single DuPont
factor is dispositive of likelihood of confusion. Citigroup Inc. v. Capital City Bank Grp.
Inc., 637 F.3d 1344, 98 USPQ2d 1253, 1260 (Fed. Cir. 2011); Kellogg Co. v. Pack’Em
Enters. Inc., 14 USPQ2d 1545, 1550 (TTAB 1990), aff’d, 951 F.2d 330, 21 USPQ2d
1142 (Fed. Cir. 1991). We discuss the relevant DuPont factors below.
A. The Services
We first consider the DuPont factor regarding the similarity or dissimilarity
between the parties’ respective services as identified in the applications and pleaded
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 15 -
registrations. See Octocom Sys., Inc. v. Houston Computers Servs. Inc., 918 F.2d 937,
16 USPQ2d 1783, 1787 (Fed. Cir. 1990) (“The authority is legion that the question of
registrability of an applicant’s mark must be decided on the basis of the identification
of goods [or services] set forth in the application regardless of what the record may
reveal as to the particular nature of an applicant ’s goods [or services], the particular
channels of trade or the class of purchasers to which the sales of goods [or services]
are directed.”). See also Paula Payne Prods. v. Johnson Publ’g Co., 473 F.2d 901, 177
USPQ 76, 77 (CCPA 1973) (“Trademark cases involving the issue of likelihood of
confusion must be decided on the basis of the respective descriptions of goods [or
services].”).
For convenience, we repeat the involved services below. Applicant’s services are
“leasing and rental of real estate, real estate agency services, real estate management
services, real estate valuation services, real estate appraisal, real estate brokerage,
real estate investment services, rental of offices and apartments; financial advisory,
analysis, consultancy, and information services; capital investment services;
financial valuation services; advisory and consultancy services relating to finance,
investments, and real estate.” Opposer’s identified services include, in relevant part,
“providing temporary lodging services in the nature of a tourist home ” (’159 Reg.);
“rental of homes” (’681 Reg.); and “banking and financing services” (’886 and ’887
Apps.).
Opposer maintains that the services identified in each of Applicant’s three
involved applications are broadly described to include items that encompass and are
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 16 -
closely related to services for which it has priority. We agree. As pointed out by
Opposer, Applicant’s broadly worded “rental of real estate” encompasses the more
narrowly defined “rental of homes” recited in the ’159 Reg. Similarly, Applicant’s
“rental of real estate” encompasses the recited “providing temporary lodging services
in the nature of a tourist home”17 in the ’681 Reg., “rental” being defined as “an act
renting”18 and “lodging being defined as: (1) “a place that you pay to live in
temporarily”19; and (2) “a room or rooms rented in a private home.”20 In addition,
Opposer’s broadly worded “banking and financing services,” as recited in the ’886 and
’887 applications, encompass Applicant’s more specifically identified financial
advisory, analysis, consultancy, and information services. Where services are broadly
identified in an application or registration, “we must presume that [those] services
encompass all services of the type identified.” Sw. Mgmt., Inc. v. Ocinomled, Ltd., 115
USPQ2d 1007, 1025 (TTAB 2015); see also In re Solid State Design Inc., 125 USPQ2d
1409, 1412-15 (TTAB 2018) (where the goods in an application or registration are
broadly described, they are deemed to encompass all the goods of the nature and type
described therein).

17 lexico.com/en/definition/lodging, retrieved October 9, 2020.
18 www.merriam-webstercom, retrieved October 9, 2020. The Board may take judicial notice
of dictionary definitions, including online dictionaries which exist in printed format. See In
re Cordua Rests. LP, 110 USPQ2d 1227, 1229 n.4 (TTAB 2014); In re CyberFinancial.Net Inc.,
65 USPQ2d 1789, 1791 n.3 (TTAB 2002).
19 macmillandictionary.com, retrieved October 9, 2020.
20 yourdictionary.com/lodging, retrieved October 9, 2020.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 17 -
We thus find the services are in-part legally identical. Opposer need not prove,
and we need not find, similarity as to each and every activity listed in the description
of services. It is sufficient for finding likelihood of confusion that relatedness is
established for any activity listed in the identification of services in a particular class
in the application. Tuxedo Monopoly, Inc. v. General Mills Fun Group, 648 F.2d 1335,
209 USPQ 986, 988 (CCPA 1981); Inter IKEA Sys. B.V. v. Akea, LLC, 110 USPQ2d
1734, 1745 (TTAB 2014).
We find unavailing Applicant’s argument that the evidence of record must show
“something more” than “that similar marks are used for adjacent products or
services.” Applicant’s Br. p. 20.21 To the extent that Applicant is relying on In re Coors
Brewing Co., 343 F.3d 1340, 68 USPQ2d 1059 (Fed. Cir. 2003) for this assertion, such
reliance is misplaced. In that case, the analysis under the second DuPont factor
focused on the relationship between goods, i.e., beer, on the one hand and services,
i.e., restaurant services, on the other. Cf. In re St. Helena Hosp., 774 F.3d 747, 113
USPQ2d 1082, 1087 (Fed. Cir. 2014) (“Something more” is only required in the
context of comparing goods versus services, not goods versus goods, and where the
relationship between the goods and services is obscure or less evident). Such is not
the case here where we are comparing two or more distinct and unambiguous services
and not goods versus services. As stated, we are convinced, as specified above, that
Applicant’s services are in-part legally identical or, as categorized by Applicant,
overlap with those of Opposer.

21 35 TTABVUE 20.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 18 -
This DuPont factor thus favors a finding of likelihood of confusion.
B. Channels of Trade/Classes of Purchasers
In addition, to the extent that Applicant’s identified services encompass or are
encompassed by Opposer’s services, we may presume that the channels of trade and
classes of purchasers are the same. See In re Viterra Inc., 671 F.3d 1358, 101 USPQ2d
1905, 1908 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (identical goods [or services] are presumed to travel in
same channels of trade to same class of purchasers) (cited in Zheng Cai v. Diamond
Hong, Inc., 901 F.3d 1367, 127 USPQ2d 1797, 1801 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“With respect to
similarity of the established trade channels through which the goods [or services]
reach customers, the TTAB properly followed our case law and ‘presume[d] that the
identical goods move in the same channels of trade and are available to the same
classes of customers for such goods... .’”); In re Yawata Iron & Steel Co., 403 F.2d 752,
159 USPQ 721, 723 (CCPA 1968) (where there are legally identical goods [or services],
the channels of trade and classes of purchasers are considered to be the same. We
accordingly find the presumed channels of trade and classes of consumers at a
minimum to overlap.
This DuPont factor concerning trade channels thus favors a finding of likelihood
of confusion.
C. Conditions of Purchase

The fourth DuPont factor assesses the “conditions under which and buyers to
whom sales are made, i.e., ‘impulse’ vs. careful, sophisticated purchasing.” DuPont,
177 USPQ at 567. Opposer maintains that the respective services are not restricted
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 19 -
to high-dollar investors or sophisticated consumers, and therefore could be offered to
and used by anyone seeking to rent a home or apartment or tourist home, or to anyone
who has money to invest or manage. Relying on the decision in Stone Lion Capital
Partners, LP v. Lion Capital LLP, 746 F.3d 1317, 110 USPQ2d 1157, 1163 (Fed. Cir.
2014) (affirming that the Board properly considered all potential purchasers for the
recited services, including both sophisticated and unsophisticated investors, since
precedent requires consumer care for likelihood of confusion decisions be based “on
the least sophisticated potential purchasers”), Opposer then argues that under the
circumstances noted above, “given the required focus on the parties’ ‘least
sophisticated potential purchasers,’ [the fourth DuPont] factor supports a likelihood
of confusion.” Opposer’s Br. p. 19.22 While that may be so, given the nature of the
respective services, we find that even the least sophisticated consumer of both
Opposer’s and Applicant’s recited services will exercise some degree of care in
selecting rental property and rental accommodations, at least with regard to location
and occupancy. Similarly, consumers of the parties’ respective financial services will
use a certain degree of care in their purchasing decisions. In making this finding, we
recognize that even knowledgeable and careful purchasers can be confused as to
source. See In re Research Trading Corp., 793 F.2d 1276, 230 USPQ 49, 50 (Fed. Cir.
1986).
We thus find this factor to slightly favor Applicant.

22 34 TTABVUE 20.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 20 -
D. Strength of Opposer’s ELEVEN Mark
Opposer maintains that its ELEVEN marks are arbitrary in relation to the
services described in its pleaded applications and registrations and are thus
conceptually strong. Opposer’s Br. p. 20.23 Opposer also points to “evidence of
extensive media coverage of services offered under the ELEVEN Marks.” Id.24
The strength of a mark rests on the extent to which “a significant portion of the
relevant consuming public . . . recognizes the mark as a source indicator.” Joseph
Phelps Vineyards, LLC v. Fairmont Holdings, LLC, 857 F.3d 1323, 122 USPQ2d 1733,
1734 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (citing Palm Bay Imps. v. Veuve Clicquot Ponsardin Maison
Fondee En 1772, 396 F.3d 1369, 73 USPQ2d 1689, 1694 (Fed. Cir. 2005)). In
determining the strength of a mark, we consider both inherent strength, based on the
nature of the mark itself, and commercial strength or recognition. Couch/Braunsdorf
Affinity, Inc. v. 12 Interactive, LLC, 110 USPQ2d 1458, 1476 (TTAB 2014); see also In
re Chippendales USA Inc., 622 F.3d 1346, 96 USPQ2d 1681, 1686 (Fed. Cir. 2010) (“A
mark’s strength is measured both by its conceptual strength (distinctiveness) and its
marketplace strength (secondary meaning).”).
1. Conceptual Strength
Opposer has made of record its pleaded registrations which are not subject to
counterclaims. They are registered on the Principal Register without any disclaimers
or claims of acquired distinctiveness (in whole or in part) and, as such, are entitled to

23 34 TTABVUE 21.
24 Id.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 21 -
all presumptions under Section 7(b) of the Trademark Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1057(b),
including the presumption that the marks are inherently distinctive. Tea Bd. of India
v. Republic of Tea, Inc., 80 USPQ2d 1881, 1899 (TTAB 2006). Nonetheless, we may
acknowledge the weakness of a registered mark in the course of a DuPont analysis.
In re Fat Boys Water Sports LLC, 118 USPQ2d 1511, 1517-18 (TTAB 2016).
Applicant argues that:
extensive registration and use of 11 or ELEVEN indicate
that Applicant’s mark25 is weak, entitled to only a narrow
scope of protection which does not encompass Applicant’s
marks, and further that Opposer has routinely allowed
registration of 11 or ELEVEN marks and cannot now
complain of Applicant’s marks.
Applicant’s br. p. 22.26 Here, Applicant introduced no evidence of third-party use.
Instead, Applicant solely supported its position that the pleaded marks are entitled
to a narrow scope of protection with copies of eleven third-party registrations for 11-
and ELEVEN-formative marks.27 These registrations, except as excluded in footnote
29, issued to different entities and identify various real estate and financial services
and are listed in the table below,:
Marks Reg. No. Relevant Services
11 MIRRORS 5499995 Rental of real estate; real
estate rental of
apartments, offices,
areas, rooms, houses,

25 We presume Applicant meant “Opposer’s mark.”
26 35 TTABVUE 23.
27 30 TTABVUE 47-131, Applicant’s NOR, Exhibit I. All of the registrations issued on the
Principal Register, and some include additional goods and/or services. We have not
considered Registration Nos. 5184180 and 5225642 because they registered pursuant to
Section 44 of the Trademark Act and the registrants have not filed Section 8 affidavits. We
also acknowledge that Registration Nos. 5595685 and 5232035 are owned by the same entity.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 22 -
Marks Reg. No. Relevant Services
land plots; and financial
analysis
SIX11 5729063 Real estate management
services
RENEW ONE ELEVEN 5842785 Leasing of apartments;
Leasing of real estate;
Management of
apartments;
Arranging of leases and
rental agreements for
real estate
N-11 5814804 Financial services,
namely, investment
services

5595685 Venture capital services,
namely, providing
financing to emerging
and start-up companies
TENELEVEN 5232035 Venture capital services,
namely, providing
financing to emerging
and start-up companies

4809737 Providing grants for
charitable purposes in the
fields of climate and
energy and the boating
and marine industries
11 on the 11th 4941114 Charitable fundraising
services
BONUS 11
(BONUS disclaimed)
4465173 Administration of
annuities

Because registrations are not evidence that the subject marks are in use in
commerce, see In re Morinaga Nyugyo Kabushiki Kaisha, 120 USPQ2d 1738, 1745
(TTAB 2016), they do not show that consumers have become so used to seeing these
registered marks in the market place that they have learned to distinguish among
them by minor differences. Id.; see also Sock It To Me, Inc., 202 USPQ2d 10611 at *9.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 23 -
However, registrations may show that a term carries a descriptive or suggestive
meaning. That is, similar to dictionary definitions, “third party registrations are
relevant to prove that some segment of the composite marks which both contesting
parties use has a normally understood and well-recognized descriptive or suggestive
meaning, leading to the conclusion that that segment is relatively weak.” Juice
Generation, Inc. v. GS Enters. LLC, 794 F.3d 1334, 115 USPQ2d 1671, 1675 (Fed. Cir.
2015) (quoting 2 McCarthy on Trademarks and Unfair Competition § 11:90 (4th ed.
2015)).
Initially, we do not find the identified venture capital services, charitable
fundraising and grant services and the administration of annuities services,
identified in Registration Nos. 5595685, 5232035, 4809737, 4941114, and 4465173, to
be included in Opposer’s broadly recited “banking and financing services” and
Applicant introduced no evidence to show that they are a subset of or related to
general banking and financing services. As such, they have little probative value in
our analysis. See In re i.am.symbolic, llc, 866 F.3d 1315, 123 USPQ2d 1744, 1751
(Fed. Cir. 2017) (disregarding third-party registrations for other types of goods where
the proffering party had neither proven nor explained that they were related to the
goods in the cited registration); In re Thor Tech Inc., 90 USPQ2d 1634, 1639 (TTAB
2009) (the third-party registrations are of limited probative value because the goods
identified in the registrations appear to be in fields which are removed from the goods
at issue).
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 24 -
The remaining four registrations, three covering services in the real estate field
and one in the financial services field, are far too few to narrow the scope of protection
of the pleaded registrations. Cf. Juice Generation, 115 USPQ2d at 1675, (involved
approximately a dozen third-party registrations of the same phrase for restaurant
services); Jack Wolfskin Ausrustung Fur Draussen GmbH v. New Millennium Sports,
S.L.U., 797 F.3d 1363, 116 USPQ2d 1129, 1136 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (court stated the
third-party evidence was “voluminous”). In view thereof, Applicant has not
established any conceptual weakness in the word ELEVEN or its numerical
equivalent, and therefore, we accord Opposer’s pleaded ELEVEN marks an ordinary
scope of protection.
2. Commercial Strength
We next analyze the commercial strength of Opposer’s marks. In the context of
likelihood of confusion, such strength varies along a spectrum from very strong to
very weak. Joseph Phelps v. Fairmont Holdings, 122 USPQ2d at 1734 (quoting Palm
Bay v. Veuve Clicquot, 73 USPQ2d at 1694). It “may be measured indirectly by the
volume of sales and advertising expenditures in connection with the [goods or
services] sold under the mark, and other factors such as length of time of use of the
mark; widespread critical assessments; notice by independent sources of the [goods
or services] identified by the mark []; and the general reputation of the [goods or
services].” Tao Licensing, LLC v. Bender Consulting Ltd., 125 USPQ2d 1043, 1056
(TTAB 2017); see also Bose Corp. v. QSC Audio Prods. Inc., 293 F.3d 1367, 63 USPQ2d
1303, 1305-06 (Fed. Cir. 2002).
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 25 -
To demonstrate the commercial strength of its ELEVEN marks, Opposer
primarily relies on magazine articles in which it purports “[t]he services provided by
Licensees under the Eleven Marks have been featured.”28 The articles were published
in Inside Hook, Robb Report, Maxim, Forbes, Men’s Journal, Modern Luxury,
Bloomberg Pursuits, The Wall St. Journal, Outside Magazine, Active Junky, and The
Los Angeles Times. In reviewing the articles, we observe that most also reference the
two-word term “Eleven Experience.” In addition, Opposer did not provide circulation
figures for any of the publications or numbers of impressions or unique hits for the
web sites in which the presumably unsolicited media appeared. We are therefore at
a disadvantage to ascertain the degree of exposure of Opposer’s mark, though we
appreciate the wide-reaching circulation of, for example, The Wall Street Journal,
Forbes and The Los Angeles Times.
Under these circumstances, and because we find no conceptual weakness, we
accord Opposer’s pleaded ELEVEN marks the normal degree of protection to which
an inherently distinctive mark is entitled. Bell’s Brewery, Inc. v. Innovation Brewing
Co., 125 USPQ2d 1340, 1347 (TTAB 2017).
E. Similarity or Dissimilarity of the Marks
We next consider the DuPont likelihood of confusion factor of the similarity or
dissimilarity of the marks in their entireties as to appearance, sound, connotation
and commercial impression. Palm Bay v. Veuve Clicquot, 73 USPQ2d at 1692 (citing
DuPont, 177 USPQ at 567). In comparing the marks, we are mindful that where, as

28 27 TTABVUE 3, 7-20; Martin Decl. ¶ 2, Exhs. 9-19.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 26 -
here, the services are legally identical in part, the degree of similarity necessary to
find likelihood of confusion need not be as great as where there is a recognizable
disparity between the services. Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721; Century 21 Real
Estate Corp. v. Century Life of America, 970 F.2d 874, 23 USPQ2d 1698, 1700 (Fed.
Cir. 1992).
“The proper test is not a side-by-side comparison of the marks, but instead
‘whether the marks are sufficiently similar in terms of their commercial impression’
such that persons who encounter the marks would be likely to assume a connection
between the parties.” Coach Servs., 101 USPQ2d at 1721. See also San Fernando
Electric Mfg. Co. v. JFD Elecs. Components Corp., 565 F.2d 683, 196 USPQ 1, 3 (CCPA
1977); Spoons Rests. Inc. v. Morrison Inc., 23 USPQ2d 1735, 1741 (TTAB 1991), aff’d
mem., 972 F.2d 1353 (Fed. Cir. June 5, 1992). The proper focus is on the recollection
of the average customer, who retains a general rather than specific impression of the
marks. L’Oreal S.A. v. Marcon, 102 USPQ2d 1434, 1438 (TTAB 2012); Winnebago
Indus., Inc. v. Oliver & Winston, Inc., 207 USPQ 335, 344 (TTAB 1980); Sealed Air
Corp. v. Scott Paper Co., 190 USPQ 106, 108 (TTAB 1975).
We first compare Applicant’s stylized , , and marks with
Opposer’s mark, described as “consist[ing] of a stylized number 11 within a
diamond shape.” Opposer maintains that “the literal element ‘11’ of Applicant’s
marks is identical to the literal element ‘11’ of Opposer’s stylized mark,” Opposer’s
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 27 -
Opening Br. p. 16,29 and therefore the parties’ marks are similar. Although it is
confirmed by the description of Opposer’s mark that Opposer intends that its design
mark include the number 11, we do not readily discern that number and find it
unlikely that Opposer’s prospective consumers would. Cf. In re Change Wind Corp.,
123 USPQ2d 1453, 1459 n.6 (TTAB 2017) (“the drawing of the mark, not the words
an application [or registration] uses to describe it, controls what the mark is”).
Instead, it is likely that prospective consumers would perceive Opposer’s mark as
comprising various geometric shapes. We accordingly find no similarity in
appearance, sound, connotation and commercial impression between the Applicant’s
marks and Opposer’s mark.
We turn now to a comparison of Applicant’s marks with Opposer’s pleaded
standard character ELEVEN mark. Opposer maintains that the differences between
the parties’ marks are insufficient to avoid a likelihood of confusion, particularly
arguing that:
the literal element “11” of Applicant’s Marks, on one hand,
and Opposer’s ELEVEN word marks, on the other, are
identical in terms of sound, connotation and commercial
impression, and their visual differences are illusory (and
should indeed be deemed similarities) given that English-
speaking consumers will correctly identify and equate the
number “11” with the word “eleven.”
Opposer’s Opening Br. p. 16.30 Applicant conversely argues that the parties’ marks
are not confusingly similar when viewed in their entireties.

29 34 TTABVUE 17.
30 Id.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 28 -
In considering Applicant’s marks, we do not find, as Opposer suggests, that they
are dominated by the number “11.” Rather, on comparison of the marks in their
entireties, we find them markedly different in appearance. All three of Applicant’s
marks contain or consists of the three character term K11, comprising the single
letter “K” and the numeral “11.” Although Opposer’s ELEVEN mark is the literal
equivalent of the numerical part of Applicant’s mark, when the marks are compared
in their entireties, they are obviously different in appearance. Unlike the marks
Applicant seeks to register, Opposer’s mark does not begin with letter “K” or the word
ATELIER. Instead, Opposer’s ELEVEN mark consists of a six-letter word beginning
with the letter “E” and ending with the letter “N.” In addition, all three of Applicant’s
marks include some stylization. While the stylization is slight and, in itself, does not
distinguish Applicant’s marks from Opposer’s mark, it provides a point of difference
between the marks, as least with regard to the numerical component of Applicant’s
marks. That Opposer’s ELEVEN mark is in standard characters does not alter this
finding. While Opposer is correct that it is entitled to display its mark in the same
font, size and color, see Viterra, 101 USPQ2d at 1909-10, as acknowledged by Opposer,
the stylization is not so extreme or unique as to be distinguishing, and Opposer is not
entitled to display its ELEVEN mark as its numerical equivalent, as the difference
in form is not a font, size or color. See id. (The court also recognized that a standard
character mark may not encompass all possible design elements.). The addition of the
visually prominent word ATELIER to Applicant’s mark further distinguishes
that mark in appearance from Opposer’s ELEVEN mark. We note, too, that the
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 29 -
differing elements in Applicant’s marks are positioned as the first parts of those
marks. Consumers in general are inclined to focus on the first word or portion in a
trademark. Presto Products, Inc. v. Nice-Pak Prodts., Inc., 9 USPQ2d 1895, 1897
(TTAB 1988) (“it is often the first part of a mark which is likely to be impressed upon
the mind of a purchaser and remembered”); see also Palm Bay v. Veuve Clicquot, 73
USPQ2d at 1692.
Similarly, the marks are obviously different in sound. Applicant’s marks contain
additional distinctive elements that are not present in Opposer’s mark.
In terms of meaning or connotation, Applicant maintains that the parties’ marks
“differ vastly in meaning,” because, unlike Opposer’s ELEVEN mark, its marks
“feature the dominant K11 element, which … evokes Applicant’s mission of an art
mall” as conceived by its founder. Applicant’s Br. p. 19.31 While that may be
Applicant’s intended meaning, the record does not establish that such a meaning is
appreciated by Applicant’s prospective or current consumers. Indeed, there is no
evidence that K11 has any recognized meaning in connection with Applicant’s
identified services. In addition, even if, as Opposer argues, the word ATELIER
imparts the meaning of “an artist studio” to Applicant’s mark,32 that
meaning, like the word, is absent from Opposer’s mark. The record is also devoid of
evidence that Opposer’s ELEVEN mark has any particular meaning in connection
with Opposer’s recited services. Thus, given the differences in the marks, consumers

31 35 TTABVUE 20.
32 34 TTABVUE 19; Opposer’s Opening br. p. 18.
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 30 -
are likely to attribute different, primarily arbitrary meanings to the parties’
respective marks notwithstanding the in-part identical services.
For the reasons discussed, when the parties’ respective marks are viewed in their
entireties, we find the differences in appearance, sound and connotation between
them to result in marks that engender distinctly different commercial impressions.
The DuPont factor of dissimilarity of the marks thus favors a finding of no
likelihood of confusion.
Lastly, both Opposer and Applicant rely on a number of prior decisions to bolster
their positions with regard to a finding, or not, of likelihood of confusion in this case.
While our decision is made within the confines of established statutes, rules and case
precedent, it is axiomatic that each case must be decided on its own facts. See In re
Nett Designs Inc., 236 F.3d 1339, 57 USPQ2d 1564, 1566 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (“Even if
some prior registrations had some characteristics similar to [Applicant’s] application,
the PTO’s allowance of such prior registrations does not bind the Board or this
court.”); and In re Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith Inc., 828 F.2d 1567, 4
USPQ2d 1141, 1142 (Fed. Cir. 1987). We are therefore obligated to and have assessed
the registrability of Applicant’s marks on their own merits and have carefully
considered the arguments and evidence of record in this case.
F. Analyzing the Factors
After considering all of the arguments and evidence of record, and all relevant
DuPont factors pertaining to the issue of likelihood of confusion, we conclude that
confusion is not likely between Applicant’s , , and marks and
Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465
- 31 -
Opposer’s ELEVEN and marks. Despite our finding that Applicant’s and
Opposer’s services are in-part legally identical and that those legally identical
services are presumed to move in identical trade channels and would be offered to the
same classes of purchasers, we further find that consumers of both Applicant’s and
Registrant’s recited services will exercise an elevated degree of care in their
purchasing decisions, and the marks at issue are too dissimilar overall to warrant a
finding of likelihood of confusion. Indeed, the first DuPont factor is dispositive in this
case. See Kellogg Co. v. Pack’em Enters., Inc., 951 F.2d. 330, 21 USPQ2d 1142, 1145
(Fed. Cir. 1991) (“We know of no reason why, in a particular case, a single du Pont
factor may not be dispositive. ... ‘each [of the thirteen factors] may from case to case
play a dominant role.’”). Because the marks are sufficiently different in appearance
and sound, and there is no reliable evidence showing that they have the same
meaning or connotation, we find that the relevant consumers are not likely to assume
that a source connection exists between the services provided under Applicant’s and
Opposer’s respective marks.
Decision: Opposition Nos. 91230955, 91230956 and 91236465 are dismissed.