ELECTROLUX HOME PRODUCTS, INC.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Sep 30, 2020

2019001759 (P.T.A.B. Sep. 30, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/883,192 10/14/2015 James Fisher E63830 1300US.1 (0106.2) 6340
26158 7590 09/30/2020
WOMBLE BOND DICKINSON (US) LLP
ATTN: IP DOCKETING
P.O. BOX 7037
ATLANTA, GA 30357-0037
EXAMINER
DINH, KHANH Q
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2458
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
09/30/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
BostonDocket@wbd-us.com
IPDocketing@wbd-us.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte JAMES FISHER and MATTHEW DAVID MCCLELLAN
Appeal 2019-001759
Application 14/883,192
Technology Center 2400

Before JEAN R. HOMERE, MICHAEL J. STRAUSS, and
JOHN F. HORVATH, Administrative Patent Judges.

STRAUSS, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL1

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant appeals from the
Examiner’s Final decision to reject claims 1–18.2 See Final Act. 1. We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).

1 We refer to the Specification, filed October 14, 2015 (“Spec.”); the Final
Office Action, mailed December 29, 2017 (“Final Act.”); the Appeal Brief,
filed July 2, 2018 (“Appeal Br.”); the Examiner’s Answer, mailed October
22, 2018 (“Ans.”); and the Reply Brief, filed December 20, 2018 (“Reply
Br.”).
2 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies Electrolux Home Products, Inc., as the real
party in interest. Appeal Br. 1.
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We REVERSE. And enter a NEW GROUND OF REJECTION of
claims 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 pursuant to our authority under 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(b)
CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to automatically setting a clock of a network-
connected apparatus. Claim 1, reproduced below with disputed limitations
emphasized (labelling added for clarity), is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter:
1. An apparatus comprising a processor and a memory
storing executable instructions that in response to
execution by the processor cause the apparatus to at least:

[(a)] receive time information over a packet-switched
computer network, the time information including a current
standard time, time-zone offset and timestamps that define a
predetermined timeframe;

[(b)] calculate a current local time from the current
standard time and time-zone offset, and including an adjustment
of the current local time in instances in which the timestamps
indicate that the current standard time is within the
predetermined timeframe; and

[(c)] cause a clock to be set to the current local time.

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REFERENCE
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:

Name Reference Date
Chapman US 2015/0295669 A1 Oct. 15, 2015

REJECTION
Claims 1–18 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being
anticipated by Chapman. Final Act. 2.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review the appealed rejections for error based upon the issues
identified by Appellant, and in light of the arguments and evidence produced
thereon. Ex parte Frye, 94 USPQ2d 1072, 1075 (BPAI 2010) (precedential).
OPINION
Examiner’s Findings and Contentions of Error
The Examiner finds Chapman’s CCAP core includes a processor and
memory as recited in the preamble of claim 1. Final Act. 3. According to
the Examiner, Chapman’s receipt by timing module 26 of IEEE 1588 time
synchronization messages disclose receiving the recited time information
including a (i) current standard time, (ii) time-zone offset and (iii)
timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe. Id. (citing Chapman
¶¶ 33–36). The Examiner finds Chapman’s adjustment of a slave clock to
agree with the time of its master clock teaches calculating a current local
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time from the received time information and setting a clock to the current
local time. Id. (citing Chapman ¶¶ 33–44, 67–69).
Appellant contends Chapman fails to disclose (A) the recited time
information (limitation (a)) and (B) calculating a current time from the time
information (limitation (b)). Appeal Br. 4–6. Appellant argues
In the cited paragraphs, Chapman describes the process of time
synchronization between master and slave clocks according to
the Precision Time Protocol (PTP) specified by IEEE 1588.
The process includes the exchange of PTP messages between
the master and slave clocks. But in contrast to the time
information of the claimed invention, none of the PTP
messages include all of a current standard time, time-zone
offset and timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe.
There are at most two PTP messages from the master to the
slave that have timestamps. A synch or follow-up message
includes timestamp tl, and a delay response message includes
timestamp t4. See Chapman, para. [0034]; and see Wikipedia,
Precision Time Protocol (last modified Sep. 9, 2017)
.
Appeal Br. 4 (emphasis omitted). Thus, according to Appellant, Chapman
fails to disclose the recited time information according to limitation (a). Id.
In connection with the step of calculating a current local time
(limitation (b)), Appellant argues
Chapman describes how its Converged Cable Access Platform
(CCAP) core and R-PHY node manage time offset and
frequency drift. As described, its CCAP core creates clock
domain island(s) to track the [time] difference between the core
and R-PHY node via IEEE 1588. The time difference is then
used to delay or hastened downstream transmissions to delete or
insert time when the core clock is respectively faster and slower
than the R-PHY clock. In other embodiments, the sample rate
at the core may be adjusted by puncturing out or adding
samples when the core clock is respectively faster and slower
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than the R-PHY clock. But nowhere in cited paragraphs does
Chapman disclose calculation of current local time from the
current standard time and time-zone offset, and including an
adjustment of the current local time in instances in which the
timestamps indicate that the current standard time is within the
predetermined timeframe, as per the claimed invention.
Id. at 5.
Addressing the Examiner’s finding that Chapman’s re-stamp module
updates timestamps to make them consistent with a local time, Appellant
argues the process does not result in calculation of a current local time and
adjustment of the current local time in instances in which the timestamps
indicate the current local time is within a predetermined timeframe (e.g.,
during daylight savings time) as claimed. Id. According to Appellant,
although Chapman considers time zones in restamping an event message
with a new timestamp, the restamping is neither the current local time at the
CCAP core nor is a CCAP core clock set to a calculated current local time as
claimed. Id. at 6.
The Examiner responds that Chapman discloses “using the ordinary
clock to communicate with the network via two logical interfaces based on a
single physical port and implementing an event interface to send and receive
time sync messages, which are time-stamped by a timestamp generation
block based on the value of the local clock.” Ans. 3 (citing Chapman ¶¶ 21,
33–36, and 74). Addressing calculation limitation (b), the Examiner
explains
Chapman discloses an event message that [is] received at
CCAP core 12 in Texas at 10:01 AM from R-PHY node 14(1)
with a timestamp of transmission corresponding to 8:00 AM in
California may be re-stamped by time re-stamp module 80 of
clock domain island 74(1) with a timestamp indicating 8:01
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AM to ensure consistency with the local time of master clock at
R-PHY node, see [0036] to [0044] and [0067] to [0069]
Ans. 4 (citing Chapman ¶¶ 36–44, and 67–69).
Appellant replies that even if Chapman’s timestamps were found to
disclose the claimed current standard time, “nowhere does Chapman
expressly or inherently disclose that either [time sync] message 30(1) or
[delay response message] 30(3) [received by Converged Cable Access
Platform (CCAP) core 12] also includes a time-zone offset and timestamps
that define a predetermined timeframe, as required by the claim.” Reply Br.
3. According to Appellant, although Chapman’s system manages a time
offset between the CCAP core and R-PHY node, the messages received by
the CCAP core do not include a time offset as recited by claim 1. Id.
“Instead, Chapman discloses that its CCAP core determines the time
difference.” Id. (citing Chapman ¶ 42). Appellant further emphasizes
Chapman’s discussion of adjusting for time zone differences is only in
connection with restamping event messages transiting between time zones
and not in calculating a local time from time information received from the
R-PHY node. Reply Br. 5.
Analysis
In order to anticipate under 35 U.S.C. § 102, a prior art reference must
not only disclose all elements of the claim within the four corners of the
document (whether expressly or inherently), but must also disclose those
elements “arranged as in the claim.” Connell v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 722
F.2d 1542, 1548 (Fed. Cir. 1983). During examination of a patent
application, pending claims are given their broadest reasonable construction
consistent with the specification. In re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d
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1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Under the broadest reasonable interpretation
standard, claim terms are given their ordinary and customary meaning as
would be understood by one of ordinary skill in the art in the context of the
entire disclosure. In re Translogic Tech., Inc., 504 F.3d 1249, 1257 (Fed.
Cir. 2007). Furthermore, all limitations of a claim must be considered when
making a patentability determination. In re Gulack, 703 F.2d 1381, 1385
(Fed. Cir. 1983); see also Stratoflex, Inc. v. Aeroquip Corp., 713 F.2d 1530
(Fed. Cir. 1983); and Lantech, Inc. v. Keip Mach. Co., 32 F.3d 542, 546
(Fed. Cir. 1994).
Appellant’s argument is persuasive of reversible Examiner error. As
an initial issue, the Examiner’s mapping of Chapman’s disclosure to the
disputed time information elements is insufficient. In the case of the
claimed timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe (i.e. a time
period including a start time and an end time, such as daylight saving time or
some other designated time period), it is not clear how Chapman’s time
synchronization messages disclose this type of information. Furthermore,
even if Chapman’s time re-stamp module uses a time offset to restamp event
messages, we find insufficient evidence that Chapman’s restamping uses, in
addition to time offsets, the claimed plural timestamps that define the
predetermined timeframe.
Although the Examiner finds “[i]t is inherent that the New York
[eastern standard time (EST)] local time also includes daylight saving time,”
none of Chapman’s examples describes daylight saving time (e.g., eastern
daylight time (EDT). Ans. 4. In any case, claim 1 requires more than an
indication of whether particular time information falls within a
predetermined timeframe (e.g., during EST versus during EDT). It requires
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received timestamps (plural) that define a predetermined timeframe (e.g., the
start and end of daylight saving time). In particular, Appellant’s
Specification discloses time information may include “[s]tart and end
timestamps of a predetermined timeframe such as daylight saving time for
the current year.” Spec. ¶¶ 46, 49, and 51–52. Accordingly, consistent with
the Specification, the mere designation of a time standard (e.g., standard
versus daylight saving time) does not disclose the recited timestamps that
define a predetermined timeframe. Thus, we find insufficient evidence to
support a finding that Chapman discloses the claimed time information
including a current standard time, time-zone offset, and timestamps that
define a predetermined timeframe.
Furthermore, we are unpersuaded all recited components of the time
information are used to calculate a current local time and cause a clock to be
set to that time. As argued by Appellant, we agree that Chapman’s
restamping process does not cause a clock to be set to a local time calculated
from all three time information components including, for example,
timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe. See Appeal Br. 6.
Although Chapman discloses that some embodiments use the re-stamp
module to adjust a local time at a slave clock, there is no description of what
information is used to make the adjustment.3 For example, there is no
indication that timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe (e.g., start
and end of daylight saving time) are used to adjust a local clock. Even if any

3 In some embodiments, time re-stamp module 80 of each clock domain
island 74(1) may adjust the respective local logical time at slave clock 75 to
match the master clock time at corresponding R-PHY nodes 14(1)–14(N)
based on the time difference determined from time sync messages 30
between CCAP core 12 and R-PHY nodes 14(1)–14(N). Chapman ¶ 68.
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time adjustment were to take into consideration a time offset relating to
daylight saving time, information about whether a particular time includes
such an offset does not disclose making an adjustment based on whether
“the timestamps indicate that the current standard time is within the
[timestamps defining a] predetermined timeframe” as recited by claim 1.
For the reasons discussed above, and based on a preponderance of the
evidence of record, we agree with Appellant the Examiner has failed to
demonstrate that Chapman discloses the disputed limitations of independent
apparatus claim 1. Independent method claim 7 and independent
Beauregard-type claim 13 include similar corresponding limitations.
Accordingly, we reverse the rejection of independent claims 1, 7, and 13
under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Chapman together with
the rejection of dependent claims 2–6, 8–12, and 14–15 which fall with their
respective base claims.
We note, in an ex parte appeal, the Board “is basically a board of
review—we review . . . rejections made by [P]atent [E]xaminers.” Ex parte
Gambogi, 62 USPQ2d 1209, 1211 (BPAI 2001). “The review authorized by
35 U.S.C. Section 134 is not a process whereby the [E]xaminer . . . invite[s]
the [B]oard to examine the application and resolve patentability in the first
instance.” Ex parte Braeken, 54 USPQ2d 1110, 1112 (BPAI 1999). Because
we are a board of review and not a place of initial examination, we do not
engage in a de novo examination supplementing the Examiner’s findings in
this particular case. Although the Board is authorized to reject claims under
new grounds pursuant to 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), no inference should be drawn
when the Board elects not to do so. See Manual of Patent Examining
Procedure (MPEP) § 1213.02 (9th Ed., Mar. 2014).
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Furthermore, our decision is limited to the findings before us for
review. The Board does not “allow” claims of an application. Rather, the
Board’s primary role is to review adverse decisions of Examiners including
the findings and conclusions made by the Examiner. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(a)(1) (“The Board, in its decision, may affirm or reverse the decision
of the [E]xaminer in whole or in part on the grounds and on the claims
specified by the [E]xaminer.”). Therefore, despite this Decision reversing
the Examiner’s rejection, no inference should be made as to whether other
prior art may exist rendering the claims unpatentable.
NEW GROUND OF REJECTION
35 U.S.C. § 101
Pursuant to our discretionary authority under 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b), we
enter a new ground of rejection for claims 1, 7, and 13 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being directed to a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject
matter (an abstract idea) without reciting significantly more.
Principles of Law
A. SECTION 101:
Inventions for a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter” generally constitute patent-eligible subject matter.
35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the U.S. Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v.
CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
Collaborative Services v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc., 566 U.S. 66
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(2012), and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo, 566 U.S. at 75–
77). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept
the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the
claims before us are drawn to the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e.,
the use of a third party to mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v.
Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’
application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting against
risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise statutory does not
become nonstatutory simply because it uses a mathematical formula.”
Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187, 191 (“We view respondents’ claims as nothing more
than a process for molding rubber products and not as an attempt to patent a
mathematical formula.”). Having said that, the Court also indicated that a
claim “seeking patent protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not
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accorded the protection of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be
circumvented by attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular
technological environment.” Id. at 191 (citing Benson and Flook).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal quotation marks
omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional
features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
B. USPTO SECTION 101 GUIDANCE:
In January 2019, the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)
published revised guidance on the application of 35 U.S.C. § 101. See
2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50
(Jan. 7, 2019) (“2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.”), updated by USPTO,
October 2019 Update: Subject Matter Eligibility (available at
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/default/files/documents/peg_oct_2019_update.p
df) (“October 2019 Guidance Update”); see also October 2019 Patent
Eligibility Guidance Update, 84 Fed. Reg. 55942 (Oct. 18, 2019) (notifying
the public of the availability of the October 2019 Guidance Update). “All
USPTO personnel are, as a matter of internal agency management, expected
to follow the guidance.” 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 51; see also October
2019 Guidance Update 1.
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Under the 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., we first look to whether the
claim recites the following:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing
human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental
processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).

2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55.
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is
not “well-understood, routine, [and] conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of
generality, to the judicial exception.

2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 56.

Analysis
STEP 2A, PRONG 1:
Under step 2A, prong 1, of the 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., we first
look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
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organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52–54.
Limitation (a) recites, in part,
receive time information . . . , the time information including a
current standard time, time-zone offset and timestamps that
define a predetermined timeframe.
Appeal Br. 9.
Appellant’s Specification discloses acquiring “a time standard such as
Coordinated Universal Time (UTC), Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) or the
like.” Spec. ¶ 44. Thus, a reasonable interpretation of a current standard
time is an agreed upon universal or standard time of day. The Specification
describes a time-zone offset as “a standard time offset (e.g., UTC offset).”
According to one source “[t]he UTC offset is the difference in hours and
minutes from Coordinated Universal Time (UTC) for a particular place and
date. It is generally shown in the format ±[hh]:[mm], ±[hh][mm], or ±[hh].”
UTC offset Wikipedia, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/UTC_offset (last
visited Sept. 22, 2020). Thus, a reasonable interpretation of a time-zone
offset is a time difference between the universal or standard time and a local
time at a given location. Finally, the Specification describes an example of
timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe as “[s]tart and end
timestamps of a predetermined timeframe such as daylight saving time for
the current year.” Spec. ¶ 46. Daylight saving time is defined as “time usu.
one hour ahead of standard time.” WEBSTER’S COLLEGIATE
DICTIONARY, Merriam-Webster, 10th Ed., 294 (1997). Thus, a reasonable
interpretation of timestamps includes dates and/or times during which an
additional or alternative time adjustment is to be made to determine a local
time based on a universal or standard time and a time offset. Thus, the
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components of the recited time information used to calculate a local time
include times, differences in times, and beginning and end dates or times.
Gathering or receiving information, such as the recited standard time, time-
zone offset, and timestamps that define a predetermined timeframe,
constitutes a mental process, e.g., a mental observation. The 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg., recognizes mental processes, including observations, as
constituting a patent-ineligible abstract idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
52. Accordingly, limitation (a) recites an abstract idea.
Limitation (b) recites
calculate a current local time from the current standard time and
time-zone offset, and including an adjustment of the current
local time in instances in which the timestamps indicate that the
current standard time is within the predetermined timeframe.
Appeal Br. 9. The Specification discloses
In some examples, the current local time may be calculated in
accordance with the following:

l. Local Time = Standard Time + Time-Zone Offset; and
2. If Daylight Savings Start< Standard Time < Daylight Savings
End, then Local Time = Local Time + l hour
Spec. ¶ 47. Based on the example calculations provided in Appellant’s
Specification and the definitions above, the current local time calculations
recited by limitation (b) constitute evaluations that can be performed in the
human mind or with the aid of pencil and paper. The “mental processes”
judicial exception includes concepts that can be performed by a human with
a pen and paper as well as those that can be performed entirely in the mind.
See October 2019 Guidance Update 9 (“A claim that encompasses a human
performing the step(s) mentally with the aid of a pen and paper recites a
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mental process.”) (emphasis omitted). Thus, current local time calculating
step (b) constitutes a mental process. The 2019 Guidance recognizes mental
processes, including evaluations, as constituting a patent-ineligible abstract
idea. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52.
Furthermore, calculating a current time, as recited by limitation (b),
also constitutes performing mathematical calculations. This fact is
evidenced by Appellant’s description of adding or subtracting the time-zone
offset to/from the current standard time and, as appropriate, adding an hour
if the local time is within a predetermined timeframe (e.g., daylight saving
time is in effect). The 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., expressly recognizes
mathematical relationships and calculations as constituting patent-ineligible
abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, on this
additional basis, we further determine that limitation (b) recites an abstract
idea.
Limitation (c) recites “cause a clock to be set to the current local
time.” Appeal Br. 9. Appellant’s Specification does not provide a detailed
description of what actions are required according to limitation (c).
Therefore, under a broad but reasonable interpretation, causing a clock to be
set to a current local time reasonably includes informing a person needing to
reset a clock or watch of the current local time. For example, it is a common
experience that, upon landing, a member of an airliner’s flight crew will
inform passengers of the current local time. We note in passing that,
because aircraft operations typically are controlled using UTC, it would be
expected that the flight crew would mentally perform the necessary time
adjustment recited by limitation (b) in arriving at the local time. In any case,
telling time so that a clock can be set to the current local time reasonably is
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considered a type of social activity and/or a form of teaching included within
the category of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions
between people and, accordingly, a certain method of organizing human
activity. The 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., expressly recognizes a certain
methods of organizing human activity as constituting patent-ineligible
abstract ideas. 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 52. Accordingly, limitation (c)
recites an abstract idea.
For these reasons, we determine all limitations (a) through (c) of claim
1 recite a judicial exception to patent-eligible subject matter under step 2A,
prong 1, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.
Step 2A, Prong 2
Under step 2A, Prong 2, of the 2019 Revised Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg.,
we determine whether any of the additional elements beyond the abstract
idea integrate the abstract ideas into a practical application. 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 54. The 2019 Guidance provides exemplary considerations
that are indicative of an additional element or combination of elements
integrating the judicial exception into a practical application, such as an
additional element reflecting an improvement in the functioning of a
computer or an improvement to other technology or technical field. Id. at
55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a).
In addition to the actions required by claim limitations (a) though (c)
which we determine recite concepts identified as abstract ideas, certain
elements of claim 1 also constitute insignificant extra-solution activity to the
judicial exception. In particular, claim element (a) recites “receive time
information over a packet-switched computer network, the time information
including a current standard time, time-zone offset and timestamps that
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define a predetermined timeframe.” This limitation reasonably can be
characterized as merely constituting the insignificant pre-solution activity of
data gathering.
An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering data
for use in a claimed process, e.g., a step of obtaining
information about credit card transactions, which is recited as
part of a claimed process of analyzing and manipulating the
gathered information by a series of steps in order to detect
whether the transactions were fraudulent.

MPEP § 2106.05(g). The Federal Circuit has held that data gathering steps
“cannot make an otherwise nonstatutory claim statutory.” CyberSource
Corp. v. Retail Decisions, Inc., 654 F.3d 1366, 1370 (Fed. Cir. 2011)
(quoting In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 840 (Fed. Cir. 1989)).
Limitation (c) recites “cause a clock to be set to the current local
time.” As discussed above, under a broad but reasonable interpretation,
limitation (c) includes providing the current local time such that, for
example, a person can set a clock or watch to the current local time.
Accordingly, limitation (c) does not add any meaningful limitations to the
noted abstract idea because it reasonably may be characterized as merely
being directed to the insignificant post-solution activity of transmitting data.
E.g., Apple, Inc. v. Ameranth, Inc., 842 F.3d 1229, 1241–42 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(holding that printing or downloading generated menus constituted
insignificant extra-solution activity).
Thus, limitations (a) and (c) recite the type of extra-solution activity
(i.e., activities in addition to the judicial exception) the courts have
determined insufficient to transform judicially excepted subject matter into a
patent-eligible application. See MPEP § 2106.05(g); see also 2019
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Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 55, n.31; Bancorp Servs, L.L.C. v. Sun Life
Assurance Co. of Can., 771 F.Supp.2d 1054, 1066 (E.D. Mo. 2011) aff’d,
687 F.3d at 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (Explaining that “storing, retrieving, and
providing data . . . are inconsequential data gathering and insignificant post
solution activity.”); Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 612 (2010) (holding the
use of well-known techniques to establish inputs to the abstract idea as
extra-solution activity that fails to make the underlying concept patent
eligible); and Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350,
1355 (Fed. Cir. 2016 (Explaining that “selecting information, by content or
source, for collection, analysis, and display does nothing significant to
differentiate a process from ordinary mental processes.”).
In addition to the claim elements identified above as constituting
mental processes, mathematical concepts, and certain method of organizing
human activity, claim 1 requires a processor and a memory storing
executable instructions. Appellant discloses the use of conventional
processor and memory components. Spec. ¶¶ 56–57.
Consistent with the 2019 Guidance, these additional elements are not
practical applications of a judicial exception as they are included among an
additional element that merely recites “apply it” or similar language, or that
merely includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or
that merely uses a computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.
2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 54. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (“[M]erely
requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that
abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.”); see also MPEP
§ 2106.05(f)(2) (“Use of a computer or other machinery in its ordinary
capacity for economic or other tasks (e.g., to receive, store, or transmit data)
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or simply adding a general purpose computer or computer components after
the fact to an abstract idea (e.g., a fundamental economic practice or
mathematical equation) does not provide significantly more.”).
Limitation (a) requiring the time information be received over a
packet-switched computer network is likewise insufficient to integrate an
abstract idea into a practical application. MPEP § 2106.05(f) (identifying
“[s]electing a particular data source or type of data” as an example of extra-
solution activity).
Finally, we do not ascertain any technical improvement implemented
by the apparatus of claim 1. Instead, if there is any improvement, it is to the
underlying abstract idea of calculating a current local time from the current
standard time and time-zone offset including an adjustment of the current
local time in instances in which the current standard time is within a
predetermined timeframe, not to the performance or operation of the
processor or memory or some other technology.
For the reasons discussed, the claims do not include additional
elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the judicial
exception because the additional elements do not effect an improvement to
another technology, technical field, or to the functioning of a computer
itself. See MPEP § 2106.05(a). We further determine claim 1 does not
recite:
(i) an application of the abstract idea with, or by use of, a
particular machine;
(ii) a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a
different state or thing; or
(iii) other meaningful limitations beyond generally linking the
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use of the abstract idea to a particular technological
environment.
See id. §§ 2106.05(b), (c), (e)–(h). Thus, claim 1 does not integrate the
judicial exception into a practical application.
Step 2B
Under step 2B of the 2019 Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg., we next analyze
whether claim 1 adds any specific limitations beyond the judicial exception
that, either alone or as an ordered combination, amount to more than “well-
understood, routine, conventional” activity in the field. 2019 Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. 56; see also MPEP § 2106.05(d).
In the present case, all claim elements, with the exception of the
processor and memory, correspond to concepts determined to be abstract
ideas for the reasons discussed above in connection with prong 1 of our
analysis and/or merely constitute extra-solution activity under prong 2.
Appellant’s lack of disclosure of computer hardware or functional
requirements and the lack of details describing implementation of the recited
functions (such as might have been indicated by inclusion of a detailed flow
chart depicting unconventional computer operations and/or routines for
performing each of the claimed steps), persuades us that the omitted details
are well-understood, routine, and conventional. See, e.g., MPEP
§ 2106.07(a)(III)(A).4

4 A Specification demonstrates the well-understood, routine, conventional
nature of additional elements when it describes the additional elements as
well-understood or routine or conventional (or an equivalent term), as a
commercially available product, or in a manner that indicates that the
additional elements are sufficiently well-known that the Specification does
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Consistent with the Berkheimer Memorandum, the claims merely
recite generic computer components performing generic computing
functions that are well-understood, routine, and conventional. 5 See Alice,
573 U.S. at 225 (The “use of a computer to obtain data, adjust account
balances, and issue automated instructions; all of these computer functions
are ‘well-understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to
the industry.”) (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 71–73); see also Benson, 409
U.S. at 65 (Noting that a “computer operates then upon both new and
previously stored data. The general-purpose computer is designed to
perform operations under many different programs.”); FairWarning IP, LLC
v. Iatric Sys., Inc., 839 F.3d 1089, 1096 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (noting that using
generic computing components like a microprocessor or user interface does
not transform an otherwise abstract idea into eligible subject matter); Mortg.
Grader, Inc. v. First Choice Loan Servs. Inc., 811 F.3d 1314, 1324–25 (Fed.
Cir. 2016) (indicating components such as an “interface” are generic
computer components that do not satisfy the inventive concept requirement);
and MPEP § 2106.05(d)(II) (citing Alice and Mayo) accord Berkheimer
Memo 3–4.
For these reasons, we determine that claim 1 does not recite additional
elements that, either individually or as an ordered combination, amount to

not need to describe the particulars of such additional elements to satisfy
35 U.S.C. [§] 112(a).
5 Memorandum on Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.) (Apr. 19, 2018) available at:
https://www.uspto.gov/sites/defaultfiles/documents/memo-berkheimer-
20180419.PDF (“Berkheimer Memo”).
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significantly more than the judicial exception within the meaning of the
2019 Revised Guidance. 84 Fed. Reg. 52–55; see also MPEP § 2106.05(d).

DECISION SUMMARY
For the reasons discussed above, we conclude independent apparatus
claim 1 is not patent eligible under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Independent method
claim 7 and independent Beauregard-type claim 13 include similar
corresponding limitations and, accordingly, also are not patent eligible under
35 U.S.C. § 101. We leave to the Examiner to consider whether dependent
claims 2–6, 8–12, and 14–18 are also patent ineligible under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–18 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(2) as being anticipated by Chapman.
We enter a new ground of rejection, rejecting claims 1, 7, and 13
under § 101 as being directed to patent ineligible subject matter.
This decision contains a new ground of rejection pursuant to 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(b). Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) provides “[a] new ground of rejection
pursuant to this paragraph shall not be considered final for judicial review.”
Rule 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b) also provides that the
Appellant, WITHIN TWO MONTHS FROM THE DATE OF
THE DECISION, must exercise one of the following two
options with respect to the new ground of rejection to avoid
termination of the appeal as to the rejected claims:
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(1) Reopen prosecution. Submit an appropriate
amendment of the claims so rejected or new Evidence
relating to the claims so rejected, or both, and have the
matter reconsidered by the examiner, in which event the
prosecution will be remanded to the examiner. . . .
(2) Request rehearing. Request that the
proceeding be reheard under § 41.52 by the Board upon
the same record. . . .

CONCLUSION

In summary:

REVERSED
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(b)

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis/Reference(s) Affirmed Reversed New
Ground
1–18 102(a)(2) Chapman 1–18
1, 7, 13 101 Eligibility 1, 7, 13
Overall
Outcome
1–18 1, 7, 13