0720130021
10-30-2015
Ela O.,1 Complainant, v. Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Director, National Security Agency, Agency.
U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013
Ela O.,1
Complainant,
v.
Admiral Michael S. Rogers,
Director,
National Security Agency,
Agency.
Appeal No. 0720130021
Hearing No. 531-2007-00249X
Agency No. 06-033
DECISION
After the issuance of its November 20, 2012, final order, the Agency filed an appeal on December 10, 2012, of an EEOC Administrative Judge's (AJ) decision, which found that it had engaged in retaliatory discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. On December 17, 2012, Complainant filed a cross-appeal from the AJ's determination on attorney's fees. For the following reasons, the Commission DISMISSES the Agency's appeal and MODIFIES the AJ's decision (which became the Agency's final action) on attorney's fees.
ISSUES PRESENTED
The issues presented are: (1) whether the Agency simultaneously filed its final order and appeal in a timely manner pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a); and (2) whether the AJ erred in determining the amount of attorney's fees and costs to which Complainant is entitled.
BACKGROUND
At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant worked as a Deputy Chief at the Agency's Threat Operations Center in Fort Meade, Maryland. On September 26, 2006, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the basis of reprisal for prior protected EEO activity arising under Title VII when:
1. she was not promoted on June 25, 2006; and
2. she was denied recognition at her office's July 20, 2006, awards ceremony.
At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an AJ. Complainant timely requested a hearing, which the AJ held on March 12-13, 2008. Prior to the hearing, Complainant's counsel withdrew from the case, and billed Complainant a total of $50,340.06 in fees and costs. Complainant paid her counsel the invoiced amount in full and represented herself "pro se" during the hearing.
After holding the hearing, the AJ issued a decision on March 16, 2012, in which she found that Complainant had been discriminated against with regard to claim 2, but had not established discrimination with regard to claim 1. Specifically, the AJ found that Complainant established retaliation based on her prior EEO activity when she was denied recognition at her office's July 20, 2006, awards ceremony. In the AJ's March 16, 2012, order, Complainant was ordered to submit a Verified Statement of Attorney's Fees and Costs. Complainant's counsel thereafter submitted their fee petition on April 4, 2012, to the AJ. Therein, Complainant's counsel requested reasonable hourly rates for their work based on the 2011-2012 United States Attorney's Office (USAO) Laffey Matrix. Complainant's counsel requested a total of $59,210.77 in fees and costs. The amount requested consisted of $54,774.50 in attorney's fees for 201.8 hours of work, $2,866.27 in costs for Law Firm 1, and $1,570.00 in attorney's fees for drafting the fee statement for Law Firm 2. Thereafter, on October 5, 2012, the AJ issued an Order Entering Judgment, providing Complainant with appeal rights to the Commission, along with a decision awarding Complainant's counsel fees and costs in the amount of $21,705.70.
AJ's Decision on Attorney's Fees
In awarding $21,705.70, the AJ noted that Complainant's counsel only represented Complainant for about a year from May 25, 2007, through March 7, 2008. The AJ indicated that Complainant's counsel withdrew, so Complainant represented herself at the March 12-13, 2008, hearing. The AJ noted that Complainant's counsel, which consisted of six attorneys, requested compensation at hourly rates based on the prevailing USAO Laffey Matrix rates for 2011-2012. The AJ found, however, that Complainant's counsel's request to be compensated at the current prevailing Laffey Index rates was improper, and instead found that they should be compensated at the historical rates charged at the time the services were rendered in 2007 through 2008. In finding so, the AJ noted that Complainant's counsel did not experience a delay in payment, nor did their billing practices represent non-economic goals. The AJ noted that Complainant's counsel did not have to wait until the end of the litigation before receiving payment and did not continue their representation of Complainant to the end of the case. The AJ further noted that the hourly rate billed by two attorneys and a paralegal were in excess of that which the rate would be according to their years of experience, as determined by the 2007-2008 Laffey Matrix. The AJ therefore found that the prevailing 2011-2012 Laffey rate was not warranted. The AJ instead used the Laffey rate for the 2007-2008 year.
The AJ therefore used as a starting point the fees and costs of $50,340.06 that Complainant was invoiced and had paid in 2007-2008, rather than the $59,210.77 sought by her counsel in 2012. The AJ then reduced the fee amount by 10% to account for irregularities in billing as well as unexplained, duplicative, and unreasonable entries. The AJ then reduced the fee amount by an additional 50% based on partial success, given the fact that Complainant succeeded on only one of her two asserted claims. In sum, the AJ, using the 2007-2008 Laffey Matrix, reduced Complainant's counsel's fees and costs of $50,340.06 by 10% for unreasonable and/or unexplained billing, and an additional 50% for partial success, reflecting a 60% reduction, for a total of $20,135.70 for attorney's fees and costs. The AJ also awarded Complainant $1,570.00 in fees and costs incurred for the preparation of the fee statement, bringing the total to $21,705.70.
Agency's Final Order and Subsequent Appeal
Subsequently, on November 20, 2012, 47 days after the AJ's October 5, 2012, Order Entering Judgment, the Agency issued its final order, declining to implement the AJ's finding of discrimination. The Agency thereafter filed its appeal to the Commission on December 10, 2012. On December 17, 2012, Complainant filed a cross-appeal, asserting that the Agency failed to timely issue its final order and that the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs was inadequate. Complainant, through her counsel, filed her brief in support of her appeal on December 26, 2012, and the Agency filed a brief in opposition on January 29, 2013.
CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL
Complainant's Appeal with regard to Attorney's Fees
On appeal, Complainant, though her counsel, argues that the AJ's 60% reduction of the lodestar was improper. Complainant argues that the AJ failed to consider the fact that her counsel had already properly excluded hours spent on fractionable unsuccessful claims and properly included all other work performed on interrelated claims. Complainant states that she was not awarded compensatory damages and was not successful on her motion for reassignment of the AJ; therefore, her counsel properly excluded this work from their fees. Complainant further indicates that her counsel excluded multiple billings associated with the attendance of attorneys at status meetings. Complainant states that both the successful and unsuccessful retaliation claims were founded upon similar case theories. Complainant states that, with respect to both claims, she had to demonstrate that she engaged in protected EEO activity; that responsible management officials were aware of that activity; and that there was a nexus between the protected activity and the actions the Agency took. Complainant argues that these elements were interrelated with respect to both claims and cannot be separated for the purpose of her attorney's fee award.
Complainant, through her counsel, further argues that the AJ improperly applied the Laffey Matrix at its historical, and not current, rates. Complainant contends that the Commission has repeatedly held that awarding attorney's fees at the current rate, not the historical rate, is appropriate. Complainant argues that the use of current prevailing rates ensures that there is no deprivation in the value of attorney's fees.
Agency's Response to Complainant's Appeal Regarding Attorney's fees
In response, the Agency asserts that the AJ's award of attorney's fees and costs should be upheld. The Agency asserts that the AJ correctly found that Complainant's counsel's billing contained irregularities, duplicative billing by several attorneys, and billing for clerical work and overhead. The Agency further asserts that Complainant's counsel failed to sufficiently explain how they excluded work related to Complainant's unsuccessful promotion claim. The Agency points out that Complainant already paid a total of $50,340.06 in attorney's fees at the time it was due, which was an indication that Complainant's attorneys did not exclude work on unsuccessful claims from their current fee petition. The Agency further indicates that the Commission has long recognized that limited success on the part of a complainant can result in the reduction of the lodestar amount. The Agency additionally asserts that Complainant's two claims were clearly fractionable and involved substantially different facts and theories. The Agency argues that while both claims concerned the same prior EEO activity, the facts and legal theories were different. The Agency contends that the two claims mostly involved different witnesses and evidence, and neither claim was dependent on the other.
The Agency maintains that the AJ correctly found that Complainant's counsel should be compensated at the Laffey Matrix's historical rates charged at the time the services were rendered in 2007 through 2008, rather than at 2011-2012 prevailing rates. The Agency notes that Complainant's counsel never experienced any delay in payment as the fees were paid in full when they withdrew from her case in March 2008. The Agency also notes that at no point did Complainant's counsel's billing represent non-economic goals. Finally, the Agency argues that the AJ's attorney's fee award should be further reduced to $10,595.54, rather than the $21,705.70 awarded by the AJ.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
Pursuant to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405(a), all post-hearing factual findings by an AJ will be upheld if supported by substantial evidence in the record. Substantial evidence is defined as "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 477 (1951) (citation omitted). A finding regarding whether or not discriminatory intent existed is a factual finding. See Pullman-Standard Co. v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 293 (1982). An AJ's conclusions of law are subject to a de novo standard of review, whether or not a hearing was held. An AJ's credibility determination based on the demeanor of a witness or on the tone of voice of a witness will be accepted unless documents or other objective evidence so contradicts the testimony or the testimony so lacks in credibility that a reasonable fact finder would not credit it. See EEOC Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), Chap. 9, at � VI.B. (Aug. 5, 2015).
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Agency's Untimely Appeal
Initially, we note that the Agency's final order did not comply with the Commission's regulations. In accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a), if a final order does not fully implement the AJ's decision, an agency is required to simultaneously issue a final order and file an appeal with the Commission in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.403.
Complainant argues in her cross-appeal that the Agency's appeal was untimely filed with the Commission. In response to Complainant's cross-appeal, the Agency argues that its final order was properly filed within the 40-day limitation period. Even assuming the final order was filed within the 40-day limitation period, the record does not reflect that the Agency simultaneously filed its appeal with the final order in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.110(a). The Agency's November 20, 2012, final order rejected the AJ's finding of reprisal discrimination, but the Agency did not simultaneously file its appeal. A review of the certificate of service dated November 21, 2012, indicates that the Agency served the final order on the EEOC AJ, Complainant, and the Agency's attorney representative. It does not indicate that it was served on the Commission's Office of Federal Operations at that time. On December 10, 2012, the Agency filed its brief in support of its appeal with the Commission.
As a result, the AJ's finding of discrimination is binding on the Agency as the AJ's decision became the Agency's final order by operation of law. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(i). Further, because the Agency's failure to timely file its appeal constituted a failure to take action during the 40-day period, the Agency cannot now challenge any aspect of the AJ's decision. Id. We will not address the Agency's contention that the AJ erred in finding discrimination. As such, the Agency's appeal is DISMISSED. Therefore, we address only Complainant's appeal with respect to the AJ's award of attorney's fees.
Attorney's Fees and Costs
By federal regulation, the agency is required to award attorney's fees and costs for the successful processing of an EEO complaint in accordance with existing case law and regulatory standards. EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(ii). To determine the proper amount of the fee, a lodestar amount is reached by calculating the number of hours reasonably expended by the attorney on the complaint multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate. Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886 (1984); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424 (1983).
There is a strong presumption that the number of hours reasonably expended multiplied by a reasonable hourly rate, the lodestar, represents a reasonable fee, but this amount may be reduced or increased in consideration of the degree of success, quality of representation, and long delay caused by the agency. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(2)(ii)(B). The circumstances under which the lodestar may be adjusted are extremely limited, and are set forth in EEO MD-110, Ch. 11 � VI.F. A fee award may be reduced: in cases of limited success; where the quality of representation was poor; the attorney's conduct resulted in undue delay or obstruction of the process; or where settlement likely could have been reached much earlier, but for the attorney's conduct. Id. The party seeking to adjust the lodestar, either up or down, has the burden of justifying the deviation. Id.
Determination of Reasonable Hourly Rate
The reasonable hourly rate is generally determined by the prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skill, experience and reputation. Blum, 465 U.S. at 895. We note that the Commission and courts generally use the Laffey Matrix to determine the hourly rate for Washington, D.C. area attorneys. The Laffey matrix, which has its origins in the case of Laffey v. Northwest Airlines Inc., 572 F. Supp. 354 (D.D.C. 1983), reversed in part on other grounds, 746 F.2d 4 (D.C. Cir. 1984), is a chart compiled yearly by the United States Attorney's Office in the District of Columbia. It provides a schedule of hourly rates prevailing in the Washington, D.C., area in each year, going back to 1981, for attorneys at various levels of experience. Piper v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 339 F. Supp. 2d 13, 24 n. 8 (D.D.C. 2004).
On appeal, while Complainant, through counsel, agrees with the use of the Laffey Matrix, she disagrees with the AJ's use of the 2007-2008 Laffey Matrix rates. Rather, Complainant believes that the AJ should have used the 2011-2012 Laffey Matrix, the current market hourly rates in effect at the time her counsel submitted their April 4, 2012, fee petition. We note that the Commission has previously found, consistent with federal case law, that delay in payment is properly measured by compensating a complainant's attorney(s) at the current, rather than historical, hourly rates. See Missouri v. Jenkins, 491 U.S. 274, 283-84 (1989); Rowland v. Dep't of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 0120113022 (Feb. 8, 2012); Huyck v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01952015 (Oct. 31, 1997) (current rates are applied "[i]n order to ensure that counsel is not deprived of the value of her fees owing to a delay in the resolution of a case."); Mareno v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01943104 (Feb. 14, 1996) (reaffirming position that proper customary hourly rate is reasonable hourly rate in effect at time of award and not at time services are provided). Here, however, as the AJ and Agency point out, Complainant's counsel experienced no delay in compensation. Complainant's counsel does not dispute that they were paid in full by Complainant when they withdrew from her case in March 2008, before the hearing. As such, it is clear that Complainant's counsel is not entitled to compensation for any delay in payment; therefore the AJ properly calculated Complainant's counsel's hourly rates based on the 2007-2008 Laffey Matrix. Accordingly, we find that the AJ did not err in using Complainant's counsel's previous invoices totaling $50,340.06, instead of the counsel's April 4, 2012, verified statement, requesting $59,210.77 based on the 2011-2012 Laffey Matrix.2
Unsuccessful Claim
Attorney's fees may not be recovered for work on unsuccessful claims. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35. Courts have held that fee applicants should exclude time expended on "truly fractionable" claims or issues on which they did not prevail. See Nat'l Ass'n of Concerned Veterans v. Sec'y of Defense, 675 F.2d 1319, 1327 n.13 (D.C. Cir. 1982). Claims are fractionable or unrelated when they involve distinctly different claims for relief that are based on different facts and legal theories. Hensley, 461 U.S. at 434-35. In cases where a claim for relief involves "a common core of facts or will be based on related legal theories," however, a fee award should not be reduced simply because the plaintiff failed to prevail on every contention raised in the lawsuit. Id. at 435. "The hours spent on unsuccessful claims should be excluded in considering the amount of a reasonable fee only where the unsuccessful claims are distinct in all respects from the successful claims." EEO MD-110, at Ch. 11 � VI.F (citing Hensley, 461 U.S. at 440).
In the instant case, we find that the AJ erred in the reduction of the lodestar amount based on the unsuccessful claim. We find that Complainant's retaliatory unsuccessful promotion claim is not truly fractionable from her retaliatory awards ceremony claim. We note that the facts regarding Complainant's non-promotion claim provided evidence of retaliatory animus that supported Complainant's recognition awards ceremony claim. As the AJ specifically noted:
[The Division Chief's] retaliatory animus was obvious in her altered relationship with Complainant from the moment she learned of Complainant's EEO activity and her treatment of Complainant's promotion package in fiscal year 2006. I am persuaded that [the Division Chief's] assessment of whether Complainant should be recommended for an award in fiscal year 2006 was tainted by the same discriminatory animus that she demonstrated in the 2006 promotion process.
Based on the AJ's finding, it cannot be said that the June 25, 2006, promotion claim on which Complainant did not prevail was "distinct in all respects" from the retaliation claim on which she was successful. In addition, witnesses who testified concerning the unsuccessful claim also gave evidence to support the successful claim. Both claims had common underlying facts and the development of each claim was intertwined with the other. Therefore, we conclude that no reduction in the fee award is warranted here based on the unsuccessful claim.
Reduction for Duplicative and Excessive Billing Entries
All hours reasonably spent in processing the complaint are compensable, but the number of hours should not include excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary hours. EEO MD-110, at Ch. 11 � VI.F. The Commission has ruled that, when reviewing fee petitions which contain many excessive, redundant, unnecessary or inadequately documented expenditures of time, in lieu of engaging in a line-by-line analysis of each charge claimed, the Commission may calculate the number of hours compensable by applying an across-the-board reduction to the number of hours requested. See Bernard v. Dep't of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 01966861 (July 17, 1998).
Although we find that the AJ improperly reduced the fee award for the unsuccessful claim, we find that the AJ's 10% across-the-board reduction for duplicative and excessive billings was reasonable here. Like the AJ, we find that a number of billable hours which were claimed appear to have been excessive and/or duplicative for attorneys with the expertise possessed by Complainant's counsel. We note that Complainant was represented and billed by multiple attorneys who attended the same meetings. The core issues in this case were not overly complex or novel and Complainant's counsel withdrew their representation before the hearing. Also, some billing entries reflect that Complainant was invoiced for services that were clerical in nature. Therefore, we see no reason to disturb the AJ's 10% across-the-board reduction for duplicative and excessive billings entries here. See Jacobsen and Taft v. Dep't of the Navy, EEOC Appeal Nos. 0720100046, 0720100047 (Sep. 7, 2012) (finding that the AJ's 10% across-the-board reduction, instead of conducting a line-by-line analysis, was not an abuse of discretion for duplicative excessive billing); Mohar v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 0720100019 (Aug. 29, 2011), req. for recon. den'd, EEOC Request No. 0520120027 (Mar. 29, 2012) (finding that a 15% across-the-board reduction of attorney's fees was warranted when complainant's fee petition simply reflected too much time spent by too many people); Hyde v. Dep't of Justice, EEOC Appeal No. 0120073964 (Nov. 24, 2009) (finding that a 10% across-the-board reduction was appropriate when a number of billing entries were not sufficiently detailed and/or appeared inappropriate).
CONCLUSION
After a careful review of the record in its entirety, including consideration of all statements submitted on appeal, it is the decision of the Commission to DISMISS the Agency's appeal as untimely filed; and to MODIFY the AJ's decision addressing the amount of attorney's fees to be awarded. We conclude that Complainant is entitled to attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $45,306.05 ($50,340.06 reduced by 10%) and $1,570.00 for fees and costs incurred for the preparation of the fee statement, for a total award of $46,876.05.
ORDER
The Agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial actions within sixty (60) days of this decision becoming final:
1. tender to Complainant payment in the amount of $46,876.05 in attorney's fees and costs;
2. pay Complainant a cash award in the amount of $4,500.00 as recognition for her work in 2005; and
3. post a notice of the finding of discrimination in accordance with the paragraph below.
4.
The Agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying that the corrective action has been implemented.
POSTING ORDER (G0914)
The Agency is ordered to post at its Fort Meade, Maryland facility copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice, after being signed by the Agency's duly authorized representative, shall be posted both in hard copy and electronic format by the Agency within 30 calendar days of the date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for 60 consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places where notices to employees are customarily posted. The Agency shall take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision," within 10 calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H0610)
If Complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), she is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid by the Agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees to the Agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this decision becoming final. The Agency shall then process the claim for attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0610)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory. The Agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30) calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. The Agency's report must contain supporting documentation, and the Agency must send a copy of all submissions to the Complainant. If the Agency does not comply with the Commission's order, the Complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The Complainant also has the right to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408, and 29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(g). Alternatively, the Complainant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File a Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407 and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. 2000e-16(c) (1994 & Supp. IV 1999). If the Complainant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0815)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at Chap. 9 � VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0610)
This is a decision requiring the Agency to continue its administrative processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United States District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a civil action after one hundred and eighty (180) calendar days of the date you filed your complaint with the Agency, or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action, you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant's Right to File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden
Office of Federal Operations
Oct. 30, 2015
__________________
Date
1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant's name when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission's website.
2 Complainant, through her counsel, on appeal, does not dispute that she was billed a total $50,340.06 in 2007-2008.
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
---------------
------------------------------------------------------------
2
0720130021
2
0720130021