01994256
03-08-2001
Eddie L. Chase, Complainant, v. William J. Henderson, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.
Eddie L. Chase v. United States Postal Service
01994256
March 8, 2001
.
Eddie L. Chase,
Complainant,
v.
William J. Henderson,
Postmaster General,
United States Postal Service,
Agency.
Appeal No. 01994256
Agency No. 4-H-390-1020-96
DECISION
Complainant timely initiated an appeal from an agency final decision
pertaining to his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in
violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as
amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq. The Commission accepts the appeal
in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405.
The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was
employed as a Part-time Flexible City Carrier at the agency's Jackson,
Mississippi facility. On October 4, 1995, complainant received a Notice
of Termination. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently
filed a formal complaint on December 29, 1995. At the conclusion of the
investigation, complainant was informed of his right to request a hearing
before an EEOC Administrative Judge or alternatively, to receive a final
decision by the agency. Complainant initially requested a hearing,
but later withdrew the request and asked that the agency issue a final
decision.
On April 2, 1999, the agency issued a decision concluding that
complainant failed to show he was discriminated against based on race
or sex. Specifically, the agency determined that complainant failed
to establish a prima facie case of discrimination because he did not
identify a similarly situated employee of another race and sex who was
treated more favorably. According to the agency, the individual named
by complainant, Person A, was not similarly situated. The agency stated
that although complainant and Person A received unsatisfactory ratings
for work quality and work quantity on their 30-day evaluations, Person
A received satisfactory ratings in later evaluations while complainant
did not. Complainant asserted that he did not receive adequate training
and Person A was given sufficient training. However, the agency
determined that complainant received two days and Person A received
three days of training. The agency noted that Person A was given the
additional day because she was having problems with delivery and worked
routes that differed from complainant's routes. The agency determined
that complainant was terminated because he failed to show satisfactory
improvement during his probationary period. Further, the agency noted
that Person A is the same race as complainant, which �negates [his]
claim of race discrimination.� The agency concluded that there was
no evidence of racial or sexual discrimination, because complainant
was unable to show that the agency's reasons for terminating him were
a pretext for discrimination.
A claim of disparate treatment is examined under the three-part analysis
first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima
facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,
reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that
a prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment
action. See McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction
Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567 (1978). The burden then shifts to
the agency to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for
its actions. See Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine,
450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). Once the agency has met its burden, the
complainant bears the ultimate responsibility to persuade the fact finder
by a preponderance of the evidence that the agency acted on the basis of
a prohibited reason. See St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502
(1993).
This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the
first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima
facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has
articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel
action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third
step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether
complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the
agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. See U.S. Postal
Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 713-714 (1983);
Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159
(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,
EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990); Washington v. Department of
the Navy, EEOC Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990).
The Commission determines that the agency has articulated a legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for its action. The record reflects that
complainant was terminated as a result of his evaluations. Complainant
received unsatisfactory ratings for work quantity and quality, and
failed to show satisfactory improvement during his probationary period.
In attempting to show that the agency's articulated reasons for his
termination were pretextual, complainant stated that he was told that he
would receive a week of training but only received one day of training.
Further, he stated that he was given five different routes which affected
his proficiency in casing and delivering mail. Agency officials testified
that the standard length of training is between two and three days,
according to performance and the trainer's recommendation. Complainant
received two days of training, and Person A received three days.
Regarding complainant's assignment to five different routes, the agency
asserted that a PTF carrier has to work a number of routes efficiently,
and it noted that Person A was also required to work several routes.
The agency indicated that each factor in the evaluations was discussed
with complainant at 30 and 60 days and that he was told that quantity
and quality were unsatisfactory. Therefore, we find that complainant
has failed to present evidence that more likely than not, the agency's
articulated reasons were a pretext for discrimination.
Accordingly, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's
contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence
not specifically addressed in this decision, we AFFIRM the agency's
decision.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0900)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed
with the office of federal operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar
days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of
receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29
C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for
29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests
and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the
request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by
mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.
See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include
proof of service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States
District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you
receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as
the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head
or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and
official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your
case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,
and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to
file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be
filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right
to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
______________________________
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations
March 8, 2001
__________________
Date