Dynabil Industries, Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Dec 23, 1999

330 N.L.R.B. 360 (N.L.R.B. 1999)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 360
Dynabil Industries, Inc. and International Association
of Machinists and Aerospace Workers, District
Lodge 725, AFL–CIO. Case 21–CA–32501
December 23, 1999
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS FOX, HURTGEN, AND BRAME
On February 24, 1999, Administrative Law Judge Jay
R. Pollack issued the attached decision. The Respondent
filed exceptions and a supporting brief and the General
Counsel filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings, findings,1 and conclusions
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondent, Dynabil Industries, Inc., El
Cajon, California, its officers, agents, successors, and
assigns, shall take the action set forth in the Order.

David Mori, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Michael Curran, Esq. (Curran & Associates), of Carlsbad,
California, for the Respondent.
Rod Weigand, of Ontario, California, for the Union.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
JAY R. POLLACK, Administrative Law Judge. I heard this
case in trial at San Diego, California, on November 19, 1998.
On January 26, 1998, International Association of Machinists
and Aerospace Workers, District Lodge 725, AFL–CIO (the
Union) filed the charge alleging that Dynabil Industries, Inc.
(Respondent) committed certain violations of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the National Labor Relations Act (the Act). On May
6, 1998, the Regional Director for Region 21 of the National
Labor Relations Board issued a complaint and notice of hearing
against Respondent, alleging that Respondent violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by discharging employee Roger
Varien because of his support for the Union or because of his
other protected concerted activities. Respondent filed a timely
answer to the complaint, denying all wrongdoing.

1 The Respondent has excepted to some of the judge’s credibility
findings. The Board's established policy is not to overrule an adminis-
trative law judge's credibility resolutions unless the clear preponderance
of all the relevant evidence convinces us that they are incorrect. Stan-
dard Dry Wall Products, 91 NLRB 544 (1950), enfd. 188 F.2d 362 (3d
Cir. 1951). We have carefully examined the record and find no basis
for reversing the findings.
In adopting the judge’s finding that the Respondent violated Sec.
8(a)(3) by the discharge of Roger Varien, Member Hurtgen relies on
the judge’s observation that the Respondent terminated Varien less than
3 hours after giving him a written warning and without evidence of
further wrongdoing. Member Hurtgen does not find that the written
warning violated the Act. However, the only intervening event be-
tween the warning and the discharge was a meeting of managers to
discuss the Union’s organizing drive.

The parties have been afforded full opportunity to appear, to
introduce relevant evidence, to examine and cross-examine
witnesses, and to file briefs. On the entire record, from my
observation of the demeanor of the witnesses,1 and having con-
sidered the briefs submitted by the parties, I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
Respondent is a New York corporation with a principal of-
fice located in Coxsackie, New York, and a branch office and
facility in El Cajon, California, where it is engaged in the
manufacture of aviation parts. During the 12-month period
ending March 31, 1998, Respondent purchased and received at
its El Cajon, California facility goods valued in excess of
$50,000 directly from points outside the State of California.
Accordingly, Respondent admits and I find that it is an em-
ployer engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section
2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
Respondent admits and I find that at all times material the
Union has been a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
II. THE ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Facts
Roger Varien began working for Respondent in June 1997.
Varien worked as a fabricator in Respondent’s trim shop.
Varien normally worked a 4-day/10-hour workweek. Varien
had formerly been a member of the Union and in November of
1997, he contacted the Union with the intention of organizing
the employees at Respondent’s El Cajon facility.
In late November 1997, Varien spoke to employees at the fa-
cility in an effort to obtain names and addresses of interested
employees for the Union. During November and December,
Varien obtained the names and addresses for approximately 80
employees which he gave to the Union.
During the fall and winter of 1997, Varien expressed his
concerns about working conditions to Respondent’s supervisors
and managers. In weekly employee group meetings conducted
by the Company, called “scrap reviews,” it is undisputed that
Varien was outspoken in questioning management about safety
and working conditions. Respondent’s supervisors admitted
that they considered Varien’s questions and comments as dis-
paraging and antimanagement.
On January 15, 1998, Varien was scheduled to begin work at
6 a.m. Varien punched the timeclock at 5:40 a.m. and then
approached a group of employees who also were scheduled to
begin work at 6 a.m. These employees had prepared for work,
punched the timeclock and had taken a break before starting
work at 6 a.m. Varien asked the employees to sign a petition
entitled “Authorization of Union Representation” on behalf of
the Union. Varien obtained the signatures of six employees.
1 The credibility resolutions herein have been derived from a review
of the entire testimonial record and exhibits, with due regard for the
logic of probability, the demeanor of the witnesses, and the teachings
of NLRB v. Walton Manufacturing Co., 369 U.S. 404, 408 (1962). As
to those witnesses testifying in contradiction to the findings here, their
testimony has been discredited, either as having been in conflict with
credited documentary or testimonial evidence or because it was in and
of itself incredible and unworthy of belief.
330 NLRB No. 47
DYNABIL INDUSTRIES 361
Anabol (Al) Quinones, a supervisor in the logistics department,
approached Varien and three or four other employees.
Quinones asked if Varien wanted him to sign the paper. Qui-
nones said that what Varien was doing was “illegal.” Varien
answered that he was on his own time and Quinones replied
that Varien was on company property. Varien repeated that he
was on his own time and Quinones stated, “[W]e will see about
that” and walked away. Varien credibly testified that when
Quinones walked away it was still only 5:55 a.m. Varien put
the union petition away and went to work before 6 a.m.
Quinones testified that it was after 6 a.m. when he noticed
Varien keeping a group of employees from working. He testi-
fied that he asked whether Varien was going to ask him to sign
the paper. Quinones denied knowing that the paper was a peti-
tion for the Union. Quinones told Varien that what he was
doing was “illegal.” Quinones said Varien was wasting com-
pany time and other employees’ time. Varien answered that he
was not “on the clock.” According to Quinones it was 6:03
a.m. and that he then checked Varien’s timecard. The card
showed that Varien had clocked in at 5:40 a.m. The company
rules state that an employee should not clock in more than 10
minutes prior to the start of the shift. Quinones did not look at
the timecard for any of the other employees involved in this
incident. Quinones reported Varien’s actions to Robert Barry,
Respondent’s work center manager. However, Quinones did
not report the names of the other employees.
I credit Varien’s version of these events over that offered by
Quinones. First, Varien’s testimony that these events took
place prior to 6 a.m. was corroborated by two other credible
witnesses. Further, Quinones denied knowing that the paper
involved the Union but offered no credible explanation for
using the word “illegal.” Third, Quinones did not check the
timecards of the other employees who by his own testimony
were wasting company time.
As mentioned above, after speaking with Varien, Quinones
walked to the timeclock and pulled Varien’s timecard. He did
not pull the timecard of any of the other employees allegedly
wasting company time. Quinones reported to Barry that Varien
was “getting people to sign something.” Quinones told Barry
that there were other employees with Varien but Quinones ap-
parently did not mention the name of any other employee and
Barry did not ask who else was involved. Barry did not check
the timecards of any other employee.
On January 16, at approximately noon, Varien was called
into Barry’s office and given a written warning. In the pres-
ence of Michelle Parada from Respondent’s human resources
department, Barry handed Varien a written warning for :

wasting company time and disrupting the workforce in the
trim shop. In addition, employee punched in on his clock
card earlier than he was directed. This policy is also in the
Employee Handbook Section II.

The warning stated, “[N]ext disciplinary step proposed sus-
pension and disciplinary action up to and including termina-
tion.” Barry did not explain the warning but did give Varien a
copy of his timecard showing that the employee had clocked in
more than 10 minutes prior to the beginning of his shift and an
excerpt from the employee handbook setting forth the rule.
Varien contended that he was being singled out because other
employees also punched in for work at the same time he did.
He further offered to show Parada the timecards of other em-
ployees to prove his point but Parada declined to look at other
timecards. After Parada refused to look at the timecards,
Varien returned to work.
At approximately 3:30 p.m., Varien was called into the of-
fice of Manager Allen Ellsworth. Present were Ellsworth,
Barry, Parada, and another employee from human resources.
Ellsworth told Varien that “under Section 1089 of the Insurance
Code,” Varien was discharged and that Respondent did not
have to give Varien any reason for the discharge. Ellsworth
then handed Varien a termination notice. The termination no-
tice contained the notation “refusal to accept available work
effective 1/16/98” and what appear to be initials. Ellsworth
could not explain this notation on the termination slip and no
other representative of Respondent testified as to the meaning
of this remark. There is no evidence or contention that Varien
refused any work assignment. Further, there is no evidence that
Varien engaged in any misconduct in the 2-1/2 hours between
his warning and his discharge. Varien refused to sign the ter-
mination notice.
After receiving his termination notice, Varien left the build-
ing. However, he returned within 30 minutes to retrieve his
jacket. While Varien was getting his jacket he received a copy
of a memorandum issued that date to all employees regarding
the Union. The memorandum stated, inter alia, “[I]t has come
to our attention that possible attempts at union organizing may
be occurring within our industry and certain union individuals
may attempt to contact or recruit you.” Respondent admits
that this memorandum was distributed to employees on January
16, after Varien’s discharge. Prior to the issuance of this
memorandum, Respondent’s manager, Lloyd Clark, had issued
a memorandum to all managers and supervisors informing them
that there was a “union blitz” aimed at the Company. At a
meeting held prior to the issuance of the memorandum to all
employees, Clark discussed union organizing with the manag-
ers and supervisors including those that terminated Varien.
Although Respondent argues that this meeting took place after
Varien was discharged, I find, based on the timing that Varien
received the second memorandum only 30 minutes after his
discharge, that the managers’ meeting took place prior to
Varien’s discharge.
B. Respondent’s Defenses
Respondent contends that “Varien was a below average em-
ployee who had a history of prior discipline for a variety of
reason, primarily wasting time, talking when he should have
been working, poor attitude and cheating the company’s payroll
system and was finally terminated as a result of habitually fail-
ing to follow [Respondent’s] policies.”
On October 1, 1997, Varien received his new employee
evaluation from Barry. The overall rating indicated that Varien
needed improvement. In the area of “attendance & punctual-
ity,” Barry rated Varien as exceeding job requirements. Re-
garding quality and quantity of work Barry graded Varien as
meeting job requirements. As a result of the evaluation, Barry
recommended that Varien be retained as an employee but that
Varien not be given a pay increase.
Varien received a written warning from Barry on November
15, 1997. However, the warning itself indicates that it was
Varien’s first verbal warning. The reason listed for the warning
was “waste of company time. Talking for extended periods of
time on non related items on different occasions.” Varien was
advised to “pay attention to job duties.” Varien disagreed with
the warning and refused to sign it. On November 26, Varien
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 362
made comments during a scrap review meeting in which he
mentioned safety concerns of employees in the facility. Qui-
nones was offended by these comments and wrote a verbal
warning for Varien’s file. Quinones wrote as the reason for this
warning, “Comments made during scrap review to lower mo-
rale. Putting down Dynabil and management.” I do not credit
Quinones testimony that Varien refused to sign the warning.
Rather, I find in accordance with Varien’s testimony that the
warning was not shown to Varien. Quinones did, however,
express his dissatisfaction with Varien’s comments at the scrap
review meeting with Varien.
As indicated above, on January 15, Quinones found Varien
soliciting signatures on a union petition prior to starting work.
Quinones, approached Varien and three or four other employ-
ees. Quinones asked if Varien wanted him to sign the petition.
Quinones said that what Varien was doing was “illegal.”
Varien answered that he was on his own time and Quinones
replied that Varien was on company property. Varien repeated
that he was on his own time and Quinones stated, “[W]e will
see about that,” and walked away. Quinones pulled Varien’s
timecard but not the cards of the other employees. On January
16, Respondent gave Varien a written warning and then later
discharged him that date. Although the warning stated that
Varien was being disciplined for wasting company time, dis-
rupting the workforce, and punching in early, Respondent
would not give Varien any reason for the discharge. None of
the other employees were disciplined.
Respondent had a rule directing employees not to clock in
earlier than 10 minutes before their starting time or punch out
later than 10 minutes after the end of their shift. The rule was
contained in the employee handbook and was posted by Re-
spondent after Varien’s discharge. The purpose of the rule was
to avoid the payment of overtime based simply on manipulation
of the timeclock. Respondent contended that Varien received
some overtime by virtue of clocking in early but no records
were offered to support this argument.2 Varien denied receiv-
ing such overtime payments.
Respondent argues that Ellsworth, Barry, and Quinones de-
cided to terminate Varien prior to any knowledge of union ac-
tivities. I give no credit to this argument. First, circumstantial
evidence shows that Quinones found Varien passing out a peti-
tion for the Union on January 15. Second, Lloyd Clark, general
manager, admitted that he was aware of union activities on
January 15. On January 16, between Varien’s warning and
discharge, Respondent’s management held a meeting to discuss
the Union’s organization and solicitation.
Finally, Respondent argues that this case is simply based on
the Union’s attempt to obtain reinstatement and backpay for
Varien as an organizing tool. I find no merit in such an argu-
ment. The Union’s leading adherent was given a written warn-
ing and terminated 1 day after being observed obtaining signa-
tures for a union petition. The reasons given for the warning
were suspicious and no reason was given for the discharge.
Upon receiving such information from Varien, the Union filed
the instant charge only 5 days after the discharge. No inference
of an improper motive can be drawn from such circumstances.
The case rises or falls on the facts of this case and the applica-
ble law. The Union’s motives in filing the charge for Varien

2 Respondent also argued that other employees had been disciplined
for violating this rule but no such evidence was offered.
are irrelevant.3 Varien, as any other alleged discriminatee,
stands to gain if the case is decided in his favor. That signifi-
cant fact has been considered in making credibility determina-
tions.4 However, as managers of Respondent, Quinones, Ells-
worth, and Barry also had pecuniary and other self-interests in
denying any unfair labor practices. Based on demeanor and
corroboration by other credible witnesses, I found Varien to be
a credible witness and believe him to be a more reliable witness
than Quinones, Ellsworth, and Barry.
C. Conclusions
In Wright Line, 251 NLRB 1083 (1980), enfd. 662 F.2d 899
(1st Cir. 1981), cert. denied 455 U.S. 989 (1982), the Board
announced the following causation test in all cases alleging
violations of Section 8(a)(3) or violations of Section 8(a)(1)
turning on employer motivation. First, the General Counsel
must make a prima facie showing sufficient to support the in-
ference that protected conduct was a “motivating factor” in the
employer’s decision. Upon such a showing, the burden shifts
to the employer to demonstrate that the same action would have
taken place even in the absence of the protected conduct. The
United States Supreme Court approved and adopted the
Board’s Wright Line test in NLRB v. Transportation Corp., 462
U.S. 393, 399–403 (1983). In Manno Electric, 321 NLRB 278,
280 at fn. 12 (1996), the Board restated the test as follows: The
General Counsel has the burden to persuade that antiunion sen-
timent was a substantial or motivating factor in the challenged
employer decision. The burden of persuasion then shifts to the
employer to prove its affirmative defense that it would have
taken the same action even if the employees had not engaged in
protected activity.
Respondent argues that it had no knowledge of Varien’s un-
ion activities but a strong circumstantial case proves otherwise.
Knowledge need not be established directly, but may rest upon
circumstantial evidence from which a reasonable inference of
knowledge may be drawn. Montgomery Ward & Co., 316
NLRB 1248, 1254 (1995); Greco & Haines, Inc., 306 NLRB
634 (1992). Upon discovering Varien soliciting signatures,
Quinones sarcastically asked whether Varien was going to re-
quest Quinones to sign. Quinones told Varien that such activity
was “illegal.” The use of that term only makes sense in the
context that Quinones believed that Varien could not solicit for
the Union on company property. Quinones then checked the
timecard of Varien but not the other employees involved. If all
were wasting time, Quinones would have acted against all of
the employees. This selective action indicates that Quinones
believed Varien was the only one doing something illegal; en-
gaging in union activities on company time and property.
Clark, Respondent’s manager, admitted that he learned of gen-
eral union activity during the morning of January 15.
For the following reasons, I find that General Counsel has
made a strong prima facie showing that Respondent was moti-
vated by unlawful considerations in discharging Varien. First,
the timing of the warning and discharge, shortly after Quinones
found Varien soliciting signatures for the union petition, sug-
3 Respondent argues that the union representative was not a credible
witness. However, except for Respondent’s attempt to show an im-
proper motive for filing the charge, the union representative did not
testify to any relevant facts. The findings of fact in this decision are not
based on any testimony of the union representative.
4 See, e.g., Hi-Craft Clothing Co., 251 NLRB 1310, 1320 (1980),
enf. denied on other grounds 660 F.2d 910 (3d Cir. 1981).
DYNABIL INDUSTRIES 363
gests union animus as a motivating factor in Respondent’s deci-
sion. The abruptness of the discharge and its timing are persua-
sive evidence as to Respondent’s motive.
Second, Respondent took disciplinary action against Varien
but did not investigate or take disciplinary action against the
other employees. Blatant disparity is sufficient to support a
prima facie case of discrimination. Fluor Daniel, Inc., 304
NLRB 970, 970–971 (1991). According to Quinones’ version
of these events, all the employees were wasting company time.
However, Quinones only checked Varien’s timecard and did
not report the name of any other employee to Barry. The rule
prohibiting clocking in early wasn’t posted by Respondent until
after Varien’s discharge. Third, after giving Varien a written
warning, Respondent terminated Varien less than 3 hours later
without any further wrongdoing. The only intervening event
was a meeting of managers to discuss the union organizing
drive. Respondent offered no credible reason for its haste in
discharging Varien after just giving him a written warning.
Fourth, Respondent refused to give Varien a reason for the
discharge. The refusal to give a reason for the discharge under
these circumstances raises an inference that Respondent had an
unlawful motivation for the discharge. Bentley Hedges Travel
Service, 263 NLRB 1408 (1982). Finally, Respondent wrote on
the discharge slip that Varien had refused an assignment. This
false reason also buttress the conclusion that Respondent was
attempting to conceal its unlawful reasons for the discharge.
The burden shifts to Respondent to establish that the same
action would have taken place in the absence of Varien’s union
activities. Respondent has not met its burden under Wright
Line. Its assertion that Varien was an average or below aver-
age employee is not sufficient to overcome the prima facie
case. An employer cannot carry its Wright Line burden simply
by showing that it had a legitimate reason for the action, but
must “persuade” that the action would have taken place even
absent the protected conduct “by a preponderance of the evi-
dence.” Centre Property Management, 277 NLRB 1376
(1985); Roure Betrand Dupont, Inc., 271 NLRB 443 (1984).
Where, as here, the General Counsel makes out a strong prima
facie case under Wright Line, the burden on Respondent is sub-
stantial to overcome a finding of discrimination. Eddyleon
Chocolate Co., 301 NLRB 887, 890 (1991).
Moreover, the evidence that Varien clocked in early and
wasted company time is not persuasive in light of Respondent’s
failure to investigate or discipline the other employees. Re-
spondent contended that other employees had been disciplined
for similar offenses but offered no such evidence.
I find that the strong prima facie case is not rebutted by the
evidence that lawful reasons for lesser discipline may have
existed. Respondent must show that Varien would have been
discharged in the absence of his union and protected concerted
activities. This Respondent has been unable to do. Accord-
ingly, I find that the termination of Varien was motivated by
the employee’s protected union activities and that Respondent
has not established that it would have discharged Varien absent
that protected conduct. Thus, I find that Respondent has failed
to carry its burden under Wright Line and that the discharge of
Roger Varien violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. See
Bronco Wine Co., 253 NLRB 53 (1981); and Hunter Douglas,
Inc., 277 NLRB 1179 (1985).
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. The Respondent is an employer engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. The Union is a labor organization within the meaning of
Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By issuing a warning to and discharging Roger Varien be-
cause of his activities on behalf of the Union, the Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
4. The above-unfair labor practices are unfair labor practices
affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7)
of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that the Respondent engaged in unfair labor
practices, I shall recommend that it be ordered to cease and
desist therefrom and that it take certain affirmative action to
effectuate the policies of the Act.
I shall recommend that Respondent offer Roger Varien full
and immediate reinstatement to the position he would have
held, but for his unlawful discharge. Further, Respondent shall
be directed to make Varien whole for any and all loss of earn-
ings and other rights, benefits, and privileges of employment he
may have suffered by reason of Respondent’s discrimination
against him, with interest. Backpay shall be computed in the
manner set forth in F. W. Woolworth Co., 90 NLRB 289
(1950), with interest as provided in New Horizons for the Re-
tarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987); See also Florida Steel Corp.,
231 NLRB 651 (1977), and Isis Plumbing Co., 139 NLRB 716
(1962).
Respondent shall also be required to remove any and all ref-
erences to its unlawful warning and discharge of Varien from
its files and notify Varien in writing that this has been done and
that the unlawful discipline will not be the basis for any adverse
action against him in the future. Sterling Sugars, Inc., 261
NLRB 472 (1982).
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended5
ORDER
The Respondent, Dynabil Industries, Inc., its officers agents,
successors, and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Issuing warnings to and discharging employees in order
to discourage union activities.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restrain-
ing, or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer rein-
statement to Roger Varien to the position he would have held,
but for his unlawful discharge.
(b) Make whole Varien for any and all losses incurred as a
result of Respondent’s unlawful discharge of him, with interest,
as provided in the remedy section of this decision.

5 All motions inconsistent with this recommended Order are hereby
denied. In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46
of the Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and
recommended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 364
(c) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, remove from
its files any and all references to the warning and discharge of
Varien and notify him in writing that this has been done and
that Respondent’s discipline of him will not be used against
him in any future personnel actions.
(d) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make avail-
able to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all
payroll records, timecards, social security payment records,
personnel records and reports, and all other records necessary
to determine the amount of backpay due under the terms of this
Order.
(e) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at its El
Cajon, California facilities copies of the attached notice marked
“Appendix.”6 Copies of the notice, on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 21, after being signed by Re-
spondent’s authorized representative, shall be posted for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places, including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reason-
able steps shall be taken by Respondent to ensure the notices
are not altered, defaced or covered by other material. In the
event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, the Re-
spondent has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, the Respondent shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the attached notice to all
current employees and former employees employed by the
Respondent at any time since January 15, 1998.
(f) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director, a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps Re-
spondent has taken to comply.

6 If this Order is enforced by a judgment of a United States court of
appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a Judg-
ment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of the
National Labor Relations Board.”
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT issue warnings to or discharge employees in
order to discourage union activities.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with, re-
strain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaran-
teed them by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL offer reinstatement to Roger Varien to the position
he would have held, but for his unlawful discharge.
WE WILL make whole Roger Varien for any and all losses in-
curred as a result of our unlawful discharge of him, with inter-
est.
WE WILL expunge from our files any and all references to the
unlawful warning and discharge of Roger Varien and notify
him in writing that this has been done and that the fact of this
unlawful discipline will not be used against him in any future
personnel actions.

DYNABIL INDUSTRIES, INC.