Dylan J. Tyson

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jan 22, 2020

13875956 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jan. 22, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/875,956 05/02/2013 Dylan J. Tyson 002328.0872 2449
5073 7590 01/22/2020
BAKER BOTTS L.L.P.
2001 Ross Avenue, Suite 900
Dallas, TX 75201
EXAMINER
CHAKRAVARTI, ARUNAVA
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3693
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
01/22/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
PTOmail1@bakerbotts.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
SUNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DYLAN J. TYSON
Appeal 2018-007307
Application 13/875,956
Technology Center 3600
Before DEBRA K. STEPHENS, ADAM J. PYONIN, and
PHILLIP A. BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as The
Prudential Insurance Company of America. Appeal Br. 2.
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims relate to calculating premium amounts for the generation
of an annuity based on a pension plan. Spec., Title. Claim 1, reproduced
below, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A system, comprising:
a memory;
one or more processors communicatively coupled to the
memory and operable to:
receive data indicative of a plurality of participants
in a pension plan;
prior to any of the plurality of participants electing
to receive a liability payout, wherein the liability payout is
an amount of money that satisfies a portion of a benefit of
the pension plan, and wherein electing to receive the
liability payout terminates the benefit of the pension plan
of the participant of the plurality of participants who
elected to receive the liability payout:
for each participant of the plurality of participants:
determine data indicative of a first premium
amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy a benefit
of the pension plan that the participant is not eligible
to elect to receive as the liability payout; and
determine data indicative of a second
premium amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy
a benefit of the pension plan that the participant is
eligible to elect to receive as the liability payout;
determine a first total premium amount for an
annuity sufficient to satisfy, for each participant of
the plurality of participants, both the benefit of the
pension that the participant is not eligible to elect
and the benefit of the pension that the participant is
eligible to elect, the first total premium amount
being based, at least in part, on the first premium
amount for each participant of the plurality of
participants and the second premium amount for
each participant of the plurality of participants; and
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communicate the first total premium amount
for display;
receive data indicative of a determination that a subset of
the plurality of participants elected to not receive the liability
payout;
in response to the determination that a subset of the
plurality of participants elected to not receive the liability payout,
determine a second total premium amount for a second annuity,
the second annuity sufficient to satisfy, for each participant of
the plurality of participants, the benefit of the pension plan that
the participant was not eligible to elect and, for each participant
of the subset, the benefit of the pension plan that the participant
was eligible to elect, the second total premium amount being
based, at least in part, on the first premium amount for each
participant of the plurality of participants and the second
premium amount for each participant of the subset of the
plurality of participants; and
communicate the second total premium amount for
display.
Appeal Br. 20–21 (Claims Appendix).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Fay
Lyons
US 2002/0188540 A1
US 2013/0117047 A1
Dec. 12, 2002
May 9, 2013

REJECTIONS
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. Final Act. 3–4, 10–13.
Claims 1–20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Lyons and Fay. Final Act. 5–10, 14–15.
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REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101
Standard for Patent Eligibility
In issues involving subject matter eligibility, our inquiry focuses on
whether the claims satisfy the two-step test set forth by the Supreme Court in
Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank International, 573 U.S. 208 (2014). The Court
instructs us to “first determine whether the claims at issue are directed to a
patent-ineligible concept,” Id. at 217–18, and, in this case, the inquiry
centers on whether the claims are directed to an abstract idea. If the initial
threshold is met, we then move to the second step, in which we “consider the
elements of each claim both individually and ‘as an ordered combination’ to
determine whether the additional elements ‘transform the nature of the
claim’ into a patent-eligible application.” Id. (quoting Mayo Collaborative
Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 79, 78 (2012)). The Court
describes the second step as a search for “an ‘“inventive concept”’—i.e., an
element or combination of elements that is ‘sufficient to ensure that the
patent in practice amounts to significantly more than a patent upon the
[ineligible concept] itself.’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 72–73).
The USPTO has published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101 consistent with Alice and subsequent Federal Circuit decisions.
USPTO, 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”). Under the Guidance, we first look to
whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (referred to Step 2A, prong 1 in
the Guidance); and
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(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h))
(referred to Step 2A, prong 2 in the Guidance).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then move to Step
2B of the Guidance. There, we look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
Examiner’s Findings and Conclusion
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being directed to a judicial exception
without significantly more under Alice. Final Act. 2–4. Under the first step
of the Alice inquiry, the Examiner determines:
[T]he claims describe concepts that the courts have deemed
abstract. For example, administration of financial accounts
(Intellectual Ventures), budgeting (Int. Ventures), managing a
stable value protected investment plan (Bancorp), mitigating
settlement risk (Alice), hedging (Bilski), advanced payments
based on future retirement benefits (Retirement Benefits v.
Bancorp), creating a contractual relationship (BuySAFE),
implementing rules based tasks for processing insurance claims
(Accenture), processing loan information (Dealertrack),
collecting information, analyzing it, and displaying certain
results of the collection and analysis (Electric Power Group),
collecting and analyzing information to detect misuse and
notifying a user when misuse is detected (FairWarning),
receiving, screening, and distributing e-mail (Int. Ventures).
Calculating premiums for pension annuity is a fundamental
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economic practice. Hence, the claims are directed to an abstract
idea. The dependent claims merely list premium risk factors, age,
gender, etc., which are also abstract.
Final Act. 3–4. The Examiner further explains:
The Specification (Para [0001] - [0005]) discloses that the
invention relates to the calculation of premium amounts for the
generation of an annuity based on a pension plan. Hence, the
invention deals with fundamental economic practice.
Final Act. 11.
Under Alice step 2, the Examiner determines that the claim does not
include additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly
more than the judicial exception because:
Here, Examiner finds that the technological environment recited
in the claims invokes or contains no more than purely functional,
routine and generic components for receiving, data, calculating
amounts and communicating for display, without any
meaningful limitations. Viewed as a whole, the claims simply
recite the concept of calculating premium for different types
participants in a pension plan based on their eligibility. The
claims do not purport to improve the functioning of a computer
or effect an improvement in any other technology or technical
field. Instead, the claims at issue do not amount to any
significantly more than an instruction to apply the abstract idea
of calculating premium for pension plan on generic computers.
Stating an abstract idea while adding the words "apply it on a
computer" is not sufficient for patent eligibility. Thus, the claims
also fail the second part of the two part Alice analysis.
Final Act. 12.
Appellant’s Contentions
Appellant argues that there are several deficiencies in the rejection.
Appeal Br. 12–18. Appellant first argues the Examiner’s characterization of
the claims is flawed:
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The claims are not directed to “calculating premiums for
pension annuities” as alleged by the Examiner, see Final Office
Action, p. 4, but are instead directed to unique and
unconventional systems and methods of reducing or preventing
burdens on an annuity issuer and/or a pension plan, which . . . are
not abstract. Additionally, the pending claims are not directed to
any of the abstract ideas identified by the Examiner.
Appeal Br. 12–13. Appellant further argues the claims are not directed to an
abstract idea because:
The unconventional method claimed in Claim 14 recites a
particular manner of reducing or preventing the imposition of
burdens on annuity issuers and/or pension plans. As recited in
Claim 14, this outcome is achieved by determining a first total
premium amount (corresponding to a preliminary premium
amount) and a second total premium amount (corresponding to a
final premium amount). Accordingly, Claim 14 does not attempt
to cover every possible way of reducing or preventing the
imposition of burdens on annuity issuers and/or pension plans
and instead covers a specific and limited way of doing so.
Appeal Br. 14.
Appellant also challenges the Examiner’s determination under the
second step of the Alice inquiry. Specifically, Appellant argues the claims
provide a technological improvement “by performing the series of steps in
the claimed manner, computing resource (e.g., processor, memory, and
network resources) waste is reduced and/or prevented over prior, more
conventional ways of generating an annuity.” Appeal Br. 15. Appellant
further argues the claims recite an inventive concept because:
The claims here recite a unique method and system of
reducing or preventing the imposition of burdens on annuity
issuers and/or pension plans. As explained in the Specification,
conventional systems and methods of generating an annuity do
not generally clarify how the cost of the generation of the annuity
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will be determined. This can be problematic during annuity
negotiations as the goals of the pension plan and the annuity
issuer may differ.
App. Br. 16.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong One 2
The Judicial Exception
Applying the Guidance, we are not persuaded the Examiner has erred
in rejecting claim 1 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter. The
Guidance instructs us first to determine whether any judicial exception to
patent eligibility is recited in the claim. The Guidance identifies three
judicially-excepted groupings: (1) mathematical concepts, (2) certain
methods of organizing human activity such as fundamental economic
practices and commercial interactions, and (3) mental processes. We focus
our analysis on the second grouping—certain methods of organizing human
activity such as fundamental economic practices and commercial
interactions.3
Claim 1 recites the following limitations: (1) “prior to any of the
plurality of participants electing to receive a liability payout, wherein the

2 Throughout this opinion, we give the claim limitations the broadest
reasonable interpretation consistent with the Specification. See In re Morris,
127 F.3d 1048, 1054 (Fed. Cir. 1997).
3 Appellant’s arguments are made to claim 14. However, Appellant
indicates that the independent claims 1 and 8 are substantially similar.
Appeal Br. 14 (“The implementation details of Claim 14 are also
incorporated in independent Claims 1 and 8.”). Therefore, we select claim 1
as representative. 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(iv) (“When multiple claims subject
to the same ground of rejection are argued as a group or subgroup by
Appellant, the Board may select a single claim from the group or subgroup
and may decide the appeal as to the ground of rejection with respect to the
group or subgroup on the basis of the selected claim alone.”).
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liability payout is an amount of money that satisfies a portion of a benefit of
the pension plan, and wherein electing to receive the liability payout
terminates the benefit of the pension plan of the participant of the plurality
of participants who elected to receive the liability payout,” (2) “for each
participant of the plurality of participants,” (3) “determine data indicative of
a first premium amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy a benefit of the
pension plan that the participant is not eligible to elect to receive as the
liability payout,” (4) “determine data indicative of a second premium
amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy a benefit of the pension plan that
the participant is eligible to elect to receive as the liability payout,”
(5) “determine a first total premium amount for an annuity sufficient to
satisfy, for each participant of the plurality of participants, both the benefit
of the pension that the participant is not eligible to elect and the benefit of
the pension that the participant is eligible to elect, the first total premium
amount being based, at least in part, on the first premium amount for each
participant of the plurality of participants and the second premium amount
for each participant of the plurality of participants,” and (6) “in response to
the determination that a subset of the plurality of participants elected to not
receive the liability payout, determine a second total premium amount for a
second annuity, the second annuity sufficient to satisfy, for each participant
of the plurality of participants, the benefit of the pension plan that the
participant was not eligible to elect and, for each participant of the subset,
the benefit of the pension plan that the participant was eligible to elect, the
second total premium amount being based, at least in part, on the first
premium amount for each participant of the plurality of participants and the
second premium amount for each participant of the subset of the plurality of
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participants.” Appeal Br. 27 (Claims Appendix). These limitations, under
their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite a fundamental economic
practice and commercial interaction of calculating annuity premium amounts
to satisfy pension obligations.
For example, limitation (1) recites information about the legal
framework of a pension plan, including how liability payouts are offered
within the plan, which would be typical of most pension plans, and
necessary information for calculating an annuity premium based on the plan.
Limitations (2)–(5) which recite the calculations needed for determining an
initial annuity premium based on initial assumptions, are also operations that
are used in connection with a commercial activity. Limitation (6), which
recites updating the premium amount in response to real world deviations
from the initial assumptions, is similarly abstract, as it is another commercial
activity. Like the concept of intermediated settlement in Alice, and the
concept of hedging in Bilski (which like the instant claims involve
evaluating and managing risk in a financial transaction), Appellant’s claimed
concept of calculating annuity premium amounts to satisfy pension
obligations “is a fundamental economic practice long prevalent in our
system of commerce.” Alice, 134 S. Ct. at 2356 (internal quotation marks
omitted); see also Bancorp Servs., L.L.C. v. Sun Life Assurance Co. of
Canada, 687 F.3d 1266 (Fed. Cir. 2012) (finding patents tracking value of
insurance policies and calculating amounts that underwriters must guarantee
and pay should the policy be paid out prematurely were ineligible abstract
ideas). Accordingly, we conclude the location-based, targeted advertising
method set forth in claim 1 recites a judicial exception of a fundamental
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economic practice and commercial interaction, which is a certain method of
organizing human activity under the Guidance.
Revised Guidance, Step 2A, Prong Two
Integration of the Judicial Exception into a Practical Application
Having determined claim 1 recites a judicial exception, our analysis
under the Memorandum turns now to determining whether there are
“additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical
application.” See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (citing MPEP
§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Under the Guidance, limitations that are indicative of “integration into
a practical application” include:
1. Improvements to the functioning of a computer, or to any other
technology or technical field — see MPEP § 2106.05(a);
2. Applying the judicial exception with, or by use of, a particular
machine — see MPEP § 2106.05(b);
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article to
a different state or thing — see MPEP § 2106.05(c); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment, such that
the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(e).
In contrast, limitations that are not indicative of “integration into a
practical application” include:
1. Adding the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the judicial
exception, or merely include instructions to implement an
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abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a computer as a tool
to perform an abstract idea – see MPEP § 2106.05(f);
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception — see MPEP § 2106.05(g); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use — see
MPEP 2106.05(h).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–55 (“Prong Two”).
Appellant’s claim 1 recites elements additional to those identified
above. These limitations include computer hardware components such as
(a) “a memory,” and (b) “one or more processors communicatively coupled
to the memory.” Appeal Br. 20 (Claims Appendix). We conclude that these
generic hardware limitations are insufficient to integrate the recited judicial
exception into a practical application because they amount only to
“instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely use[] a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea.” MPEP § 2106.05(f).
Claim 1 additionally recites (c) “receive data indicative of a plurality
of participants in a pension plan,” (d) “communicate the first total premium
amount for display,” (e) “receive data indicative of a determination that a
subset of the plurality of participants elected not to receive the liability
payout,” and (f) “communicate the second total premium amount for
display.” Like the computer-based limitations above, we conclude these
limitations (c)–(f) also are insufficient to integrate the abstract idea into a
practical application because they constitute data gathering and data output
operations which are well-established as the types of computer operations
fairly characterized as insignificant extra-solution activity. MPEP
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§ 2106.05(g) (“Extra-solution activity includes both pre-solution and post-
solution activity. An example of pre-solution activity is a step of gathering
data for use in a claimed process.”) Viewed as an ordered combination, the
analysis stays the same. These additional limitations merely describe the use
of generic computers and standard data gathering and output operations
which use computers as a tool to carry out the abstract concept.
As noted above, Appellant argues claim 1 provides a technical
improvement in that processor, memory, and network resources are
conserved. Appeal Br. 15–16; Reply Br. 5. We disagree. Appellant does
not identify any evidence that practicing the claimed invention conserves
resources over prior art annuity administration processes. The improvement
asserted by Appellant is merely an improvement to the annuity generation
process—an improvement to the abstract idea itself.
Accordingly, we conclude claim 1 is directed to a judicial exception.

The Inventive Concept – Step 2B
Having determined the claim is directed to a judicial exception, we
proceed to evaluating whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond
the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in
the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)) or simply appends well-understood,
routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified
at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See Guidance, 84 Fed.
Reg. at 56.
Our review of the Examiner’s rejection under Step 2B is guided by the
revised examination procedure published online by the USPTO on April 19,
2018, entitled “Changes in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject
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Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v.
HP, Inc.)” (“Berkheimer Memorandum”), which imposed a new fact finding
requirement for Examiners, as applicable to rejections under § 101. Based
on the record before us, we agree with the Examiner that the claim does not
add specific limitations beyond what is well-understood, routine, and
conventional.
Even if it could be shown that the claim provides Appellant’s asserted
benefit that “the annuity generation process may continue to completion
rather than terminating at some point during the process,” it would not
provide the technological improvement Step 2B demands. See Appeal Br.
16. Step 2B requires that an improvement be beyond the mere automation
benefits provided by computers in general. The claim limitations Appellant
asserts as not well-understood, routine, and conventional are themselves
abstract. Appeal Br. 11 (asserting all elements of claim 1 are not well-
understood, routine, and conventional). In Step 2B, however, our analysis
focuses on the additional elements—those beyond what is abstract. Pursuant
to the Guidance, we agree with the Examiner that the additional elements,
individually and as an ordered combination, do not provide significantly
more than the identified abstract concept. See Ans. 11–12.
Appellant also challenges the evidentiary basis of the Examiner’s
finding in Step 2B of the Guidance (Alice step 2). Reply Br. 3–4. We are
not persuaded of Examiner error. Appellant again asserts that evidence is
required which demonstrates that all claim limitations are well-understood,
routine, and conventional. As we noted above, this analysis applies to the
additional claim elements, and not to those that form the abstract idea itself.
SAP Am. Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1168 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
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(“What is needed is an inventive concept in the non-abstract application
realm.”).
To the extent Appellant challenges the Examiner’s findings with
respect to the additional elements, we find the Examiner’s determination that
the additional limitations in claim 1 are well-understood, routine, and
conventional sufficiently supported in this record. The Berkheimer
Memorandum provides that the Examiner may support a finding that an
additional element or combination of elements may be supported by “[a]
citation to one or more of the court decisions discussed in MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II) as noting the well-understood, routine, conventional nature
of the additional element(s).” Berkheimer Memorandum at 4, § III(A)(2).
Here, the Examiner cites the recognized computer functions in MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)(II), and notes that the limitations of claim 1 are similar types of
computer operations. Ans. 11–12. Appellant does not provide any
argument or explanation as to how or why this evidence is insufficient.
Accordingly, we are not persuaded the Examiner erred in the Step 2B
analysis. See Spec. 17:6–21:19; Alice, 573 U.S. at 226 (“Nearly every
computer will include a ‘communications controller’ and ‘data storage unit’
capable of performing the basic calculation, storage, and transmission
functions required by the method claims”).
Accordingly, we do not discern in claim 1 any specific limitation
beyond the judicial exception that is not “well-understood, routine,
conventional,” and instead agree with the Examiner that the claims do not
provide an inventive concept sufficient to transform the judicial exception
into patent-eligible subject matter.
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Because the Examiner correctly concluded claim 1 is directed to a
judicial exception, and because Appellant does not identify any error in the
Examiner’s determination under step 2B of the Guidance, we sustain the
rejection of representative claim 1 under 35 U.S.C. § 101, as well as of
claims 2–20 which fall therewith.
REJECTION UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 103
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as being obvious over Lyons and Fay.
Final Act. 5–10, 14–15. The Examiner finds the limitation “determine data
indicative of a first premium amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy a
benefit of the pension plan that the participant is not eligible to elect to
receive as the liability payout,” is taught by Lyons. Final Act. 5 (citing
Lyons ¶¶ 15, 19, 38, 39, and 42–46).
Appellant argues that the cited portions of Lyons are deficient because
“cited portions of Lyons do not disclose determining data indicative of a
premium amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy a benefit of a pension
plan that a participant is, or is not, eligible to elect to receive as a liability
payout as required by Claim 1.” Appeal Br. 10. Appellant further asserts
that the Examiner’s analysis does not account for the distinction between
election choice (which reflects a choice made by an eligible participant to
elect a liability payout) and election eligibility (which goes to whether the
participant is permitted to make such a choice). Reply Br. 3–4. Appellant
argues “at most, the relied-upon portions of Lyons disclose election choice
but not election eligibility.” Reply Br. 4. We agree with Appellant.
The cited portions of Lyons describe scenarios in which a premium
for a buy-out of selected pension scheme benefits is calculated. See, e.g.,
Lyons ¶ 18–19. However, Lyons does not contemplate any evaluation of a
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premium that considers whether a particular plan participant is eligible to
elect a liability payout. As such, Lyons does not teach or suggest “determine
data indicative of a first premium amount for an annuity sufficient to satisfy
a benefit of the pension plan that the participant is not eligible to elect to
receive as the liability payout,” as recited in claim 1.
Accordingly, we are persuaded Lyons fails to teach the disputed
limitation, and, therefore, we reverse the rejection of claim 1 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) and its dependent claims. For the same reasons, we also
reverse the rejections of independent claims 8 and 14 which recite similar
limitations, as well as of the remaining claims which depend therefrom.
CONCLUSION
Because we have affirmed at least one ground of rejection for each
claim on appeal, we affirm the Examiner's decision to reject the claims.
37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
More specifically,
We affirm the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 101.
We reverse the Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–20 under
35 U.S.C. § 103.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–20 101 patent eligibility 1–20
1–20 103 Lyons, Fay 1–20
Overall
Outcome
1–20
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TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED