Duane D. Telep, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJul 18, 2003
01A23547 (E.E.O.C. Jul. 18, 2003)

01A23547

07-18-2003

Duane D. Telep, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Duane D. Telep v. United States Postal Service

01A23547

July 18, 2003

.

Duane D. Telep,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A23547

Agency No. 1-D-234-1016-94

Hearing No. 120-A0-3083X

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from the agency's final order

concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaint of unlawful

employment discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil

Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.

and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirm

the agency's final order.

The record reveals that complainant, a Mailhandler, PS-4 at the agency's

Hampton Roads General Mail Facility in Norfolk, Virginia facility, filed

a formal EEO complaint on February 1, 1994, alleging that the agency had

discriminated against him on the bases of race (Caucasian), sex (male),

religion (Catholic), and disability (Degenerative Disc Disease) when

on December 3, 1993, complainant was denied access to handicap parking

spaces in the parking lot closest to the agency's building.<1>

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant received a copy

of the investigative report and requested a hearing before an EEOC

Administrative Judge (AJ). The AJ issued a decision without a hearing,

finding no discrimination.

The AJ concluded that complainant failed to establish his prima

facie cases of discrimination based on sex, race, and religion.

Specifically, the AJ found that complainant failed to demonstrate that

similarly situated employees outside of complainant's protected classes,

i.e. employees who were permitted to park in handicap parking spots in

the east lot, were treated differently under similar circumstances.

As to complainant's claim that managers and supervisors were given

parking spots in the east lot, the AJ noted that they are not similarly

situated to complainant, a craft employee. Further, the AJ determined

that complainant did not proffer any facts or circumstances from which an

inference of discrimination could be drawn. Accordingly, the AJ concluded

that complainant did not show that he was discriminated against based

on his race, sex, or religion.

The AJ then turned to complainant's claim of disability-based

discrimination. Complainant's condition prohibits him from bending,

lifting and carrying over twenty pounds, standing for longer than

two hours, and climbing ladders. The AJ found that complainant did

not show that he was substantially limited in a major life activity.

The AJ noted that complainant did not establish that he had a record

of a disability or that the agency regarded him as an individual with a

disability. Accordingly, the AJ determined that he failed to establish

that he is covered under the Rehabilitation Act.

The AJ continued his analysis and noted that complainant did not

provide any information to show that his limitations necessitated a

closer parking spot as those similarly situated employees who were

assigned to the preferred handicap parking spaces. Therefore, the

AJ determined that complainant did not show that he was subjected to

disparate treatment under the Rehabilitation Act. Further, since the AJ

found that complainant is not covered under the Rehabilitation Act, he

stated that the agency had no affirmative duty under the Rehabilitation

Act to provide complainant with a reasonable accommodation.

The agency's final order implemented the AJ's decision. This appeal

followed. Complainant argues that the agency never provided him with a

reason for the denial of the parking space. Complainant also contends

that the AJ erred procedurally in delaying the hearing and granting an

untimely motion for summary judgment. Therefore, he requests that a

hearing be held in this matter.

The Commission's regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a

hearing when he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material

fact. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.109(g)(3). After a careful review of the

record, the Commission finds that the AJ's issuance of his decision

without a hearing was appropriate as no genuine dispute of material

fact exists. Further, although there was an unexplained delay in the

scheduling of the hearing, we note that there was no need for the hearing

since the case was ripe for summary judgment.

We find that the AJ's decision properly summarized the relevant facts and

referenced the appropriate regulations, policies, and laws. Further,

construing the evidence to be most favorable to complainant, we note

that complainant failed establish that the agency discriminated against

him as alleged.

As to complainant's claim of discrimination on the bases of sex, race,

and religion, we find that complainant failed to present evidence that

any of the agency's actions were motivated by discriminatory animus

toward complainant's protected classes.

As to his claim that the agency denied him a reasonable accommodation in

violation of the Rehabilitation Act, we assume for purposes of analysis

that he is an individual with a disability. The record indicates that

complainant was not given access to handicap parking spaces closest to

the agency's building. Instead, complainant was provided with handicap

parking in another parking lot a block from the building. We note

that there is no indication in the record or on appeal that complainant

had problems walking from the regular handicap parking. The Commission

finds that the action taken by the agency was an effective accommodation.

At issue in this case is complainant's dissatisfaction with the denial

of access to the lot next to the building.

It is the Commission's position that if more than one accommodation is

effective, "the preference of the individual with a disability should

be given primary consideration; however, the employer providing the

accommodation has the ultimate discretion to choose between effective

accommodations." 29 C.F.R. � 1630.9; see also EEOC Enforcement Guidance

on Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship Under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, No. 915.002, Question 9 (revised October 17, 2002);

Polen v. Department of Defense, EEOC Appeal No. 01970984 (January

16, 2001). Thus, while complainant may be entitled to an effective

reasonable accommodation under the Rehabilitation Act, he is not entitled

to the accommodation of his choice. Complainant does not argue that

the parking spot is not effective. Therefore, we find that the agency

provided complainant with a reasonable accommodation even though it was

not the exact accommodation he sought.

Accordingly, we affirm the agency's final order implementing the AJ's

decision without a hearing.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole

discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not

extend your time in which to file a civil action. Both the request and

the civil action must be filed within the time limits as stated in the

paragraph above ("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

July 18, 2003

__________________

Date

1 Complainant sought privileges to park in one of the handicap parking

spaces in the parking lot closest to the agency's building. His request

was denied and complainant had to park in handicap parking spaces in

another lot further from the building.