Dropbox, Inc.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 1, 2020

2020000247 (P.T.A.B. Jul. 1, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/632,289 02/26/2015 Viraj Mody P535US1 (60332-0061) 2086
120600 7590 07/01/2020
Hickman Palermo Becker Bingham / Dropbox
1 Almaden Boulevard
Floor 12
San Jose, CA 95113
EXAMINER
MPAMUGO, CHINYERE
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3621
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/01/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
usdocket@h35g.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte VIRAJ MODY, ROBERT KAJIC, PRANAV PIYUSH, and
LILIAN WENG
____________

Appeal 2020-000247
Application 14/632,289
Technology Center 3600
____________

Before ERIC S. FRAHM, JOHNNY A. KUMAR, and
CATHERINE SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judges.

SHIANG, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–16, 18, 19, and 22–24, which are all the
claims pending and rejected in the application. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies Dropbox, Inc. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 1.

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
The present invention relates to “[t]echniques for efficiently selecting
upsell content to serve to users of an online service based on complex user
archetypes.” Spec. ¶ 1. In particular,
a computer-implemented method for efficiently serving upsell
content to a user of an online service based on complex user
archetypes executes at one or more server computers of the
online service . . . . The method determines, for each of a
plurality of predefined complex user archetypes, whether a user
is or is not the predefined complex user archetype, based on
user events reflecting the user’s interaction with primary
application content of the online service over a period of time.
The method stores a set of a plurality of user upsell attributes
for the user in a database. Each of the plurality of user upsell
attributes corresponds to one of the plurality of predefined
complex user archetypes and has a value that indicates whether
the user is or is not the corresponding predefined complex user
archetype.

Spec. ¶ 6. Claim 1 is exemplary:
1. A method for efficiently serving upsell content to a
user of an online service based on complex user archetypes, the
online service comprising one or more server computers with
memory and one or more processors, the method comprising:
based on a set of user events reflecting a user’s
interaction with primary application content of the online
service over a period of time, for each of a plurality of
predefined complex user archetypes, determining, by at least
one of the processors, whether a user is or is not the predefined
complex user archetype;
wherein for each predefined complex user archetype, of
the plurality of predefined complex user archetypes, the each
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predefined complex user archetype represents a respective
pattern of user interaction with the online service over time;
based on the determining, storing, by at least one of the
processors, a set of a plurality of user upsell attributes for the
user in a database;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes corresponds to one respective predefined
complex user archetype of the plurality of predefined complex
user archetypes;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes has a Boolean value that indicates whether the
user is or is not the respective predefined complex user
archetype to which the each user upsell attribute corresponds;
in response to receiving a request from a computing
device used by the user, the request for particular primary
application content of the online service:
identifying, by at least one of the processors, a plurality
of upsell campaigns associated with the particular primary
application content of the online service, each of the plurality of
upsell campaigns associated with a respective upsell content
and associated with a respective user archetype rule, the
respective user archetype rule having a respective Boolean
express;
determining, by at least one of the processors, whether
the respective user archetype rule associated with a particular
upsell campaign of the plurality of upsell campaigns is satisfied
by the set of the plurality of user upsell attributes for the user
including evaluating the respective Boolean expression of the
respective user archetype rule against one or more Boolean
values of the set of the plurality of user upsell attributes for the
user to determine whether the respective user archetype rule
associated with the particular upsell campaign is satisfied by the
set of the plurality of user upsell attributes;
based on the respective user archetype rule associated
with the particular upsell campaign being satisfied by the set of
the plurality of user upsell attributes, serving, by at least one of
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the processors, the respective upsell content associated with the
particular upsell campaign to the computing device used by the
user; and
wherein the serving the respective upsell content
associated with the particular upsell campaign to the computing
device used by the user causes the respective upsell content to
be displayed in a graphical user interface to the user at the
computing device concurrently with display of the particular
primary application content.

References and Rejections2
The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–16, 18, 19, and 22– 24
under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Final Act. 3–7.
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 4, 6, 7, 11–14, 16, 18, 19, 23, and
24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being obvious over the collective teachings of
Jones (US 2006/0136344 A1; June 22, 2006), Dupret (US 2010/0082605
A1; Apr. 1, 2010), and Fontoura (US 2011/0225038 A1; Sept. 15, 2011).
Final Act. 8–17.
The Examiner rejects claims 3 and 15 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
obvious over the collective teachings of Jones, Dupret, Fontoura, and Chen
(US 2011/0029377 A1; Feb. 3, 2011). Final Act. 17–18.
The Examiner rejects claims 10 and 22 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
being obvious over the collective teachings of Jones, Dupret, Fontoura, and
Wright (US 2003/0200135 A1; Oct. 23, 2003). Final Act. 18–19.

2 Throughout this opinion, we refer to the (1) Final Office Action dated
September 21, 2018 (“Final Act.”); (2) Appeal Brief dated April 8, 2019
(“Appeal Br.”); (3) Examiner’s Answer dated August 8, 2019 (“Ans.”); and
(4) Reply Brief dated October 7, 2019 (“Reply Br.”).
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ANALYSIS
We have reviewed and considered Appellant’s arguments, but such
arguments are unpersuasive. To the extent consistent with our analysis
below, we adopt the Examiner’s findings and conclusions in (i) the action
from which this appeal is taken and (ii) the Answer.
In reaching the decision, we only considered the arguments that
Appellant actually raised in the briefs. Arguments that Appellant could have
made, but did not make, are deemed to be waived. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Further, to the extent Appellant advances new arguments
in the Reply Brief without showing good cause, Appellant has waived such
arguments. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.41(b)(2).

35 U.S.C. § 101
Section 101 of the Patent Act provides “[w]hoever invents or
discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may
obtain a patent therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this
title.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted
35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural
phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS
Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014) (internal quotation marks and citation
omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
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Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to
the concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to
mitigate settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611
(2010) (“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept
of hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 182 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
252, 267–68 (1853))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S. at 69
(citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “a claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 187; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
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of our patent laws, and this principle cannot be circumvented by attempting
to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological environment.”
Id. (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id. at 187 (“It is now commonplace
that an application of a law of nature or mathematical formula to a known
structure or process may well be deserving of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a
patent-eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77).
“[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform
that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the application of
§ 101. USPTO, 2019 REVISED PATENT SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY
GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7, 2019) (“Guidance”).3 Under the
guidance set forth in the Guidance, we first look to whether the claim
recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of
abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes) (Step 2A, Prong 1); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into
a practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING

3 The Guidance was updated in October 2019.
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PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)) (9th Ed., Rev.
08.2017, 2018) (Step 2A, Prong 2).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not integrate that
exception into a practical application, do we then look to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that
is not “well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see
MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional
activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high
level of generality, to the judicial exception. (Step 2B.)
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 54–56.
The Guidance “extracts and synthesizes key concepts identified by the
courts as abstract ideas to explain that the abstract idea exception includes
the following” three groupings:
(a) Mathematical concepts—mathematical relationships,
mathematical formulas or equations, mathematical
calculations;
(b) Certain methods of organizing human activity—fundamental
economic principles or practices (including hedging,
insurance, mitigating risk); commercial or legal interactions
(including agreements in the form of contracts; legal
obligations; advertising, marketing or sales activities or
behaviors; business relations); managing personal behavior
or relationships or interactions between people (including
social activities, teaching, and following rules or
instructions); and
(c) Mental processes—concepts performed in the human mind
(including an observation, evaluation, judgment, opinion).

See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 52.
According to the Guidance, “[c]laims that do not recite matter that
falls within these enumerated groupings of abstract ideas should not be
treated as reciting abstract ideas,” except in rare circumstances. Guidance,
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84 Fed. Reg. at 53. If a claim recites any of the three groupings of abstract
ideas, but “the claim as a whole integrates the recited judicial exception into
a practical application of that exception,” the claim is not “directed to” a
judicial exception (abstract idea), and thus is patent eligible. Guidance, 84
Fed. Reg. at 53.
For example, additional limitations that indicate integration into a
practical application include:
1. An improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an
improvement to any other technology or technical field
(MPEP § 2106.05(a));
2. Implementing a judicial exception with, or using a judicial
exception in conjunction with a particular machine or
manufacture that is integral to the claims (MPEP
§ 2106.05(b));
3. Effecting a transformation or reduction of a particular article
to a different state or thing (MPEP § 2106.05(c)); and
4. Applying or using the judicial exception in some other
meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the
judicial exception to a particular technological environment,
such that the claim as a whole is more than a drafting effort
designed to monopolize the exception (MPEP § 2106.05(e)).
In contrast, additional limitations that do not indicate integration into
a practical application include:
1. Reciting the words “apply it” (or an equivalent) with the
judicial exception, or merely including instructions to
implement an abstract idea on a computer, or merely uses a
computer as a tool to perform an abstract idea (MPEP
§ 2106.05(f));
2. Adding insignificant extra-solution activity to the judicial
exception (MPEP § 2106.05(g)); and
3. Generally linking the use of the judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use (MPEP
§ 2106.05(h)).
See Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
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Step 2A, Prong 1
We select claim 1 as the representative claim, and group the
remaining claims accordingly under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv) (“[T]he
failure of appellant to separately argue claims which appellant has grouped
together shall constitute a waiver of any argument that the Board must
consider the patentability of any grouped claim separately.”).
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Guidance (Alice step one), claim 1
(with emphases added) recites:
1. A method for efficiently serving upsell content to a
user of an online service based on complex user archetypes, the
online service comprising one or more server computers with
memory and one or more processors, the method comprising:
based on a set of user events reflecting a user’s
interaction with primary application content of the online
service over a period of time, for each of a plurality of
predefined complex user archetypes, determining, by at least
one of the processors, whether a user is or is not the predefined
complex user archetype;
wherein for each predefined complex user archetype, of
the plurality of predefined complex user archetypes, the each
predefined complex user archetype represents a respective
pattern of user interaction with the online service over time;
based on the determining, storing, by at least one of the
processors, a set of a plurality of user upsell attributes for the
user in a database;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes corresponds to one respective predefined
complex user archetype of the plurality of predefined complex
user archetypes;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes has a Boolean value that indicates whether the
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user is or is not the respective predefined complex user
archetype to which the each user upsell attribute corresponds;
in response to receiving a request from a computing
device used by the user, the request for particular primary
application content of the online service:
identifying, by at least one of the processors, a plurality
of upsell campaigns associated with the particular primary
application content of the online service, each of the plurality of
upsell campaigns associated with a respective upsell content
and associated with a respective user archetype rule, the
respective user archetype rule having a respective Boolean
express;
determining, by at least one of the processors, whether
the respective user archetype rule associated with a particular
upsell campaign of the plurality of upsell campaigns is satisfied
by the set of the plurality of user upsell attributes for the user
including evaluating the respective Boolean expression of the
respective user archetype rule against one or more Boolean
values of the set of the plurality of user upsell attributes for the
user to determine whether the respective user archetype rule
associated with the particular upsell campaign is satisfied by
the set of the plurality of user upsell attributes;
based on the respective user archetype rule associated
with the particular upsell campaign being satisfied by the set of
the plurality of user upsell attributes, serving, by at least one of
the processors, the respective upsell content associated with the
particular upsell campaign to the computing device used by the
user; and
wherein the serving the respective upsell content
associated with the particular upsell campaign to the
computing device used by the user causes the respective upsell
content to be displayed in a graphical user interface to the user
at the computing device concurrently with display of the
particular primary application content.

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All of the italicized limitations are associated with marketing. For
example,
based on a set of user events reflecting a user’s
interaction with primary . . . content of the . . . service over a
period of time, for each of a plurality of predefined complex
user archetypes, determining, . . . whether a user is or is not the
predefined complex user archetype;
wherein for each predefined complex user archetype, of
the plurality of predefined complex user archetypes, the each
predefined complex user archetype represents a respective
pattern of user interaction with the . . . service over time;

facilitate marketing by determining whether a user is a predefined complex
user archetype based on user events. Further,
based on the determining, storing, . . . a set of a plurality
of user upsell attributes for the user in . . . ;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes corresponds to one respective predefined
complex user archetype of the plurality of predefined complex
user archetypes;
wherein each user upsell attribute of the plurality of user
upsell attributes has a Boolean value that indicates whether the
user is or is not the respective predefined complex user
archetype to which the each user upsell attribute corresponds

facilitate marketing by storing user upsell attributes that correspond to
predefined complex user archetypes and indicate whether the user is the
respective predefined complex user archetype. In addition,
in response to receiving a request from . . . the user, the
request for particular primary . . . content of the . . . service:
identifying, . . . a plurality of upsell campaigns associated
with the particular primary . . . content of the . . . service, each
of the plurality of upsell campaigns associated with a respective
upsell content and associated with a respective user archetype
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rule, the respective user archetype rule having a respective
Boolean express;
determining, . . . whether the respective user archetype
rule associated with a particular upsell campaign of the plurality
of upsell campaigns is satisfied by the set of the plurality of
user upsell attributes for the user including evaluating the
respective Boolean expression of the respective user archetype
rule against one or more Boolean values of the set of the
plurality of user upsell attributes for the user to determine
whether the respective user archetype rule associated with the
particular upsell campaign is satisfied by the set of the plurality
of user upsell attributes;
based on the respective user archetype rule associated
with the particular upsell campaign being satisfied by the set of
the plurality of user upsell attributes, serving, . . . the respective
upsell content associated with the particular upsell campaign to
. . . the user; and
wherein the serving the respective upsell content
associated with the particular upsell campaign to . . . the user
causes the respective upsell content to be displayed in a
graphical . . . to the user . . . concurrently with display of the
particular primary . . . content

facilitate marketing by displaying upsell content along with content
requested by the user.
Our determination is supported by the Specification, which describes
the existing idea of upsell content, and the need to provide more efficient
techniques for “selecting up sell content to serve to users . . . and that
facilitates targeting the users with upsell content in very specific ways”
(Spec ¶ 4):
Many online service providers (e.g., web site operators)
wish to promote to a user a feature of their service other than the
feature the user is currently using. For example, an online service
provider may want to promote a new feature of the service while
the user is using a regularly used feature. Such promotions, when
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presented to a user in a computer graphical user interface, may
be referred to as “upsell content” as the promotions typically
have the goal of persuading the user to use the service in a way
that increases the user’s level of engagement with the service.
Upsell content is often presented in the graphical user interface
with primary application content provided by the service. . . . .
When a user requests primary application content from an
online service (e.g., by using a web browser application), the
online service may select upsell content to serve to the user in
addition to serving the requested primary application content.
One way for the online service to select the upsell content to
serve is to simply serve the same upsell content to all users.
However, online service providers may wish to target different
users with different upsell content in very specific ways that are
designed to maximize the probability that the users will increase
their level of engagement with the online service.
Overall, online service providers would appreciate
techniques that enable them to efficiently select up sell content to
serve to users of the online service and that facilitates targeting
the users with upsell content in very specific ways.
Spec. ¶¶ 2–4 (emphases added).
Because marketing is a type of commercial interaction, we conclude
claim 1 recites commercial interactions, which is one of certain methods of
organizing human activity identified in the Guidance, and thus an abstract
idea. See Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 1 (Groupings of Abstract Ideas).

Step 2A, Prong 2
Turning to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Guidance, contrary to Appellant’s
assertions (Appeal Br. 15–19; Reply Br. 4–10), Appellant has not shown
claim 1 recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. In particular, Appellant has not shown the additional
elements (such as “online,” “server computers with memory,” “processors,”
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“application,” and “database”) integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application. Appellant’s attorney argument that
the specific application to complex user archetypes in the
Boolean values and Boolean expression context claimed, in
order to efficiently determine whether a user should be served
particular upsell content in the context of a request for content,
was unknown

(Appeal Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 4) is unpersuasive, as Appellant does not
provide sufficient objective evidence to support the assertion. See In re
Geisler, 116 F.3d 1465, 1470 (Fed. Cir. 1997) (“attorney argument [is] not
the kind of factual evidence that is required to rebut a prima facie case of
obviousness”); Meitzner v. Mindick, 549 F.2d 775, 782 (CCPA 1977)
(“Argument of counsel cannot take the place of evidence lacking in the
record.”).
In any event, regardless of whether
the specific application to complex user archetypes in the
Boolean values and Boolean expression context claimed, in
order to efficiently determine whether a user should be served
particular upsell content in the context of a request for content

(Appeal Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 4) was indeed unknown and Appellant’s
invention indeed qualifies as an “upsell content serving improvement”
(Appeal Br. 15; see also Reply Br. 4), “a claim for a new abstract idea is still
an abstract idea.” Synopsys, Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138,
1151 (Fed. Cir. 2016). “[U]nder the Mayo/Alice framework, a claim
directed to a newly discovered law of nature (or natural phenomenon or
abstract idea) cannot rely on the novelty of that discovery for the inventive
concept necessary for patent eligibility . . . .” Genetic Techs. Ltd. v. Merial
L.L.C., 818 F.3d 1369, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (citations omitted).
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Contrary to Appellant’s arguments of “improv[ing] the computer
functionality” and “technological improvement” (Appeal Br. 15–16; see also
Reply Br. 4–5), claim 1 is “not directed to an improvement in the way
computers operate” and “the focus of the claims is not on . . . an
improvement in computers as tools, but on certain independently abstract
ideas that use computers as tools.” FairWarning IP, LLC v. Iatric Sys., Inc.,
839 F.3d 1089, 1095 (Fed. Cir. 2016).
Further, Appellant’s assertion regarding pre-emption (Appeal Br. 16;
Reply Br. 5) is unpersuasive, because “[w]hile preemption may signal patent
ineligible subject matter, the absence of complete preemption does not
demonstrate patent eligibility. . . . Where a patent’s claims are deemed only
to disclose patent ineligible subject matter under the Mayo framework, as
they are in this case, preemption concerns are fully addressed and made
moot.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2015); see also OIP Techs., Inc. v. Amazon.com, Inc., 788 F.3d
1359, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (“that the claims do not preempt all price
optimization or may be limited to price optimization in the e-commerce
setting do not make them any less abstract”).
Contrary to Appellant’s assertions (Appeal Br. 16–17; Reply Br. 6),
the rejected claims are unlike the claims in Enfish. In Enfish, the court
determined:
The . . . patents are directed to an innovative logical model for a
computer database. . . . A logical model generally results in the
creation of particular tables of data, but it does not describe how
the bits and bytes of those tables are arranged in physical
memory devices. Contrary to conventional logical models, the
patented logical model includes all data entities in a single
table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same
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table. The patents describe this as the “self-referential”
property of the database.
Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft Corp., 822 F.3d 1327, 1330 (Fed. Cir. 2016)
(emphases added).
[T]he plain focus of the claims is on an improvement to
computer functionality itself, not on economic or other tasks for
which a computer is used in its ordinary capacity.
[T]he claims . . . are directed to a specific improvement to the
way computers operate, embodied in the self-referential table.
Id. at 1336.
Unlike the claims of Enfish, claim 1 is not “directed to an innovative
logical model for a computer database [that] . . . includes all data entities in a
single table, with column definitions provided by rows in that same table” or
similar improvements. Id. at 1330. Instead, claim 1 focuses on an abstract
idea that merely uses computers as tools.
Appellant also cites BASCOM Global Internet Services, Inc. v. AT&T
Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Appeal Br. 17; Reply Br. 6–
7), but does not persuasively explain why that case is similar to the present
case. In BASCOM, the court determined that at the pleading stage and
construed in favor of the nonmovant,
The inventive concept described and claimed . . . is the
installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from
the end-users, with customizable filtering features specific to
each end user. This design gives the filtering tool both the
benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a
filter on the ISP server. BASCOM explains that the inventive
concept rests on taking advantage of the ability of at least some
ISPs to identify individual accounts that communicate with the
ISP server, and to associate a request for Internet content with a
specific individual account.
BASCOM Global Internet Services, 827 F.3d at 1350 (emphasis
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added).
Unlike the claims of BASCOM, claim 1 is not directed to an
“installation of a filtering tool at a specific location, remote from the end-
users, with customizable filtering features specific to each end user” or
similar improvements. Id. at 1350. Nor does claim 1 “give[] the filtering
tool both the benefits of a filter on a local computer and the benefits of a
filter on the ISP server” or provide similar benefits. Id. Therefore,
BASCOM is inapplicable here.
In addition, Appellant cites Visual Memory LLC v. NVIDIA
Corporation, 867 F.3d 1253 (Fed. Cir. 2017) (Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 5–
6), but fails to show that case is applicable here. In Visual Memory, the
court determined:
Our review of the ‘740 patent claims demonstrates that they are
directed to an improved computer memory system, not to the
abstract idea of categorical data storage. Claim 1 requires a
memory system “having one or more programmable operational
characteristics, said characteristics being defined through
configuration by said computer based on the type of said
processor,” and “determin[ing] a type of data stored by said
cache.” . . . .
The specification explains that multiple benefits flow from
the ‘740 patent‘s improved memory system. As an initial matter,
the specification discloses that a memory system with
programmable operational characteristics defined by the
processor connected to the memory system permits “different
types of processors to be installed with the subject memory
system without significantly compromising their individual
performance.” Although prior art memory systems possessed the
flexibility to operate with multiple different processors, this one-
size-fits-all approach frequently caused a tradeoff in processor
performance. The ‘740 patent‘s teachings obviate the need to
design a separate memory system for each type of processor,
which proved to be costly and inefficient, and, at the same time,
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avoid the performance problems of prior art memory systems. . .
. . Finally, in addition to enabling interoperability with multiple
different processors, the ‘740 patent specification explains that
the selective definition of the functions of the cache memory
based on processor type results in a memory system that can
outperform a prior art memory system that is armed with “a
cache many times larger than the cumulative size of the subject
caches.”
. . . the claims here are directed to a technological
improvement: an enhanced computer memory system. The ‘740
patent‘s claims focus on a “specific asserted improvement in
computer capabilities”—the use of programmable operational
characteristics that are configurable based on the type of
processor—instead of “on a process that qualifies as an
‘abstract idea’ for which computers are invoked merely as a
tool.”
Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259–61 (emphases added) (citations
omitted).
Unlike the claims of Visual Memory, claim 1 is not directed to “an
improved computer memory system” or any computer improvements. Id. at
1259. Indeed, Appellant acknowledges “the pending claims are not directed
to an enhanced computer memory system like the claims in Visual
Memory.” (Appeal Br. 16; Reply Br. 5). Nor does claim 1 provide
“benefits flow from the . . . improved memory system” or benefits from any
improved computer system. Visual Memory, 867 F.3d at 1259. To the
contrary and as discussed above, to the extent claim 1 is new, it is directed to
a “new” abstract idea. See Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151; Genetic Techs., 818
F.3d at 1376.
As a result, we conclude claim 1 does not recite additional elements
that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See
Guidance, Step 2A, Prong 2. Instead, claim 1 is directed to the abstract idea
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of marketing (effectively marketing upsell content to users by targeting
users), using computers as tools.
Appellant also argues:
The Examiner makes a new ground of rejection in the
Examiner’s Answer by changing the abstract idea to which the
claims are alleged to be directed. The change was not
necessitated by the 2019 PEG as both the 2019 PEG and the
guidance before the 2019 PEG ask whether the claim is directed
to an abstract idea pursuant to Part I of Mayo I Alice. This
change in alleged abstract idea by the Examiner constitutes a
new ground of rejection. Prosecution should be reopened so
that the Applicant has opportunity to respond to the merits of
the new ground of rejection with the possibility of a claim
amendment under 37 C.F.R. § 1.111.

In the Final Office Action, the Examiner states that the
pending claims are “directed to an abstract idea of serving
upsell content to a user of an online service, which falls under
the category of an idea of itself.” (Final Office Action at p. 5)
(emphasis added.) Then, in the Examiner’s Answer, the
Examiner asserts that the pending claims are “fall within the
Certain Methods of Organizing Human Activities groupings
of abstract ideas.” (Examiner’s Answer at p. 6) (emphasis
added.) These are different grouping of abstract ideas that the
Examiner has swapped from the Final Office Action to the
Examiner’s Answer.

Reply Br. 3; see also Reply Br. 1–2, 4.
Appellant’s request is a petitionable—not appealable—matter and is,
therefore, not before us. See MPEP § 1002.02(c) (Petitions and Requests
Decided by the Technology Center Directors) (“Petitions . . . to request
review of the primary examiner’s failure to designate a rejection in the
examiner’s answer as a new ground of rejection”); see also MPEP § 1201
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(“The Board will not ordinarily hear a question that should be decided by the
Director on petition . . . .”).

Step 2B
Turning to Step 2B of the Guidance (Alice step two), Appellant does
not persuasively argue any specific limitation was not well-understood,
routine, or conventional in the field. Nor does Appellant persuasively argue
the Examiner erred in that aspect. In particular, Appellant argues the
inventive concept is “the efficient selection and serving of up sell content to
users of [a] . . . service based on complex user archetypes that represents
patterns of user interaction with the . . . service over time.” Appeal Br. 17;
see also Reply Br. 9–10. That argument is unpersuasive because as
discussed above, the argued concept is a part of the abstract idea. See
Synopsys, 839 F.3d at 1151; Genetic Techs., 818 F.3d at 1376; see also BSG
Tech LLC v. BuySeasons, Inc., 899 F.3d 1281, 1290 (Fed. Cir. 2018)
(explaining the Alice “Court only assessed whether the claim limitations
other than the invention’s use of the ineligible concept to which it was
directed were well-understood, routine and conventional” and “did not
consider whether it was well-understood, routine, and conventional to
execute the claimed intermediated settlement method on a generic
computer”) (emphasis added).
Appellant also argues the Examiner erred by citing paragraph 6 of the
Specification. See Appeal Br. 18–19. Specifically, Appellant argues
because “that paragraph under the section titled ‘Summary of the Invention’
describes the Applicant’s own invention,” “[n]othing about that paragraph,
or the balance of the disclosure of the invention in the Applicant’s
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Specification, admits that the claimed invention is well-understood, routine,
or conventional” and “the Examiner’s citation to paragraph [0006] of the
Applicant’s Specification does not meet the evidentiary burden on the
Examiner to show with supporting evidence that the claimed invention was
well-understood, routine, or conventional.” Appeal Br. 18 (emphasis
added). The arguments are unpersuasive because the Examiner does not
need to show the claimed invention was well-understood, routine, or
conventional. See BSG Tech, 899 F.3d at 1290. As discussed above, all of
the italicized limitations are part of the abstract idea, and the Examiner does
not need to show such limitations were well-understood, routine, or
conventional. See id. In any event, although paragraph 6 of the
Specification describes the invention, it indicates the server computers were
well-understood, routine, and conventional. See Spec. ¶ 6 (“The server
computers collectively have one or more processors and memory. The
memory stores one or more programs for execution by the one or more
processors.”). That description is consistent with Appellant’s own
acknowledgment that “the claimed invention can be implemented using
general-purpose computing components.” Reply Br. 7.
Further, the Examiner cites cases to fulfill the requirements under
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360, 1367 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (Final Act. 8;
Ans. 8–9), and Appellant does not persuasively argue why such citations are
insufficient. In fact, Appellant does not persuasively argue any of the
additional elements was not well-understood, routine, and conventional.
Therefore, claim 1 does not “contain[] an “‘inventive concept’” sufficient to
‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.”
Alice, 573 U.S. at 221. As a result, Appellant has not persuaded us the
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Examiner erred with respect to the Guidance’s Step 2B analysis. See
Guidance, Step 2B.
Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101.
For similar reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s
rejection of dependent claims 2–4, 6–7, 10–16, 18–19, and 22–24 under 35
U.S.C. § 101, as Appellant does not advance separate substantive arguments
about those claims. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

35 U.S.C. § 103
On this record, the Examiner did not err in rejecting claims 1.

I

Appellant argues Jones, Dupret, and Fontoura do not collectively
teach
based on a set of user events reflecting a user’s
interaction with . . . content of the online service over a period
of time, . . . determining . . . whether a user is or is not the
predefined complex user archetype;
wherein . . . the each predefined complex user archetype
represents a respective pattern of user interaction with the
online service over time;

as recited in claim 1. See Appeal Br. 20–23; see also Reply Br. 10–12. In
particular, Appellant argues:
what is determined in Jones based on the customer’s purchase history
is a list of items purchased by the customer and a list of items
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correlated with those items, not whether the customer is or is not a
predefined complex user archetype that represents a pattern of user
interaction with an online service over time.

. . . .

Jones does not describe determining whether a customer’s purchase
history conforms to an archetypal online purchase history pattern.
Furthermore, determining what items a user purchases online during a
period of time, of by the mere fact that a purchase history of a user is
recorded, is not determining any sort of purchasing pattern, in the
same way that determining that a particular shopper purchased milk in
the past month is not determining any sort of reliable purchasing
sample that reflects the traits, tendencies or other characteristics of the
shopper over that time period.

Appeal Br. 20–21 (emphases omitted).
[T]here is no notion in Jones of a complex user archetype as defined
by a respective pattern of user interaction with an online service over
time. To the extent a user’s purchase history in Jones is “complex,”
there is no determination in Jones based on the customer’s purchase
history whether the user’s purchase history conforms to a predefined
customer archetype defined by a respective purchase history pattern
over time.

Appeal Br. 21.
One skilled in the art would not understand determining
correlations between items purchased by a customer and items
purchased by other customers that also purchased the items the
customer purchased to be determining a pattern of user interaction
with an online service over time. For example, Jones does not
describe determining different types of shoppers that reflect different
shopping patterns from users’ purchase history. There is no
description in Jones of examining a user’s purchase history and
determining what type of shopper they are where the type reflects a
shopping pattern over time. As such, Jones does not teach or suggest
to one skilled in the art determining whether a user is or is not a
predefined complex user archetype based on a set of user events
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reflecting the user’s interaction with content of an online service over
a period of time and where the predefined complex user archetype
represents a respective pattern of user interaction with the online
server over time, as recited in Claim 1.

Appeal Br. 21.
Appellant also argues Dupret does not “overcome the deficiencies of
Jones.” Appeal Br. 21. Specifically, Appellant argues:
A user-interaction pattern as described in Dupret is not a
predefined complex user archetype, as claimed. In fact, Dupret does
not appear to expressly define what a “user interaction pattern” is
except to say it is “related to a search engine.” Whatever it is, it
certainly is not in any way “predefined.” Instead, Dupret appears to
describe uncovering a user-interaction pattern from a user’s query
chains using a “tree-based layered Bayesian Network (BN)
framework.” (Dupret at ¶ [0028].) If a pattern is uncovered or
discovered from a user’s query chain using a Bayesian network then
the pattern is probabilistic, not “predefined,” as claimed.

Appeal Br. 21–22; See also Reply Br. 10–11.
Appellant has not persuaded us of error. The Examiner finds Jones
teaches “based on a set of user events reflecting a user’s interaction with . . .
content of the online service over a period of time, . . . determining . . .
whether a user is or is not the predefined complex user archetype.” See
Final Act. 8; Ans. 9–10. According to Jones,
FIG. 3 illustrates generating and providing an upsell
item listing according to a preferred embodiment, and can be
further understood in relation to FIGS. 4 and 5. At step 302, a
sales history is maintained for all customers and items of the
enterprise. This can be over a predetermined data retention
period (e.g., a rolling 2-year calendar) . . . correlation metrics
are computed between items on a customerwise basis. The
correlation metrics can be associated with a predetermined
time period (e.g., the preceding 12-month period), or can be
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based on all available transaction history in the upsell database
204. By customerwise basis, it is meant that correlations are
drawn between two items if they were purchased by the same
customer within the predetermined time period . . . .

In a web-based business application, one particularly
convenient statistical reliability measure comprises, for a
correlation metric AB, a direct count of the number of
customers who actually did buy both A and B in the
predetermined[.]

FIG. 4 illustrates a browser window 402 in which a user
accesses the web-based business application 102, the browser
window 402 including a customer information record 404.
Included among a variety of useful information in the customer
information record 404 is an opportunities tab 406 for causing a
display of an opportunities list, a transactions tab 408 for
causing a display of a transactions list, and an upsell tab 410 for
causing a display of the upsell item list for that customer. Upon
a single click of the upsell tab 410, the customer is shown an
upsell item list for that customer (see FIG. 5, 502), preferably
as a continuation of the same customer information record 404
within the browser window 402.

Jones ¶¶ 41–42, 44 (emphases added). Contrary to Appellant’s arguments
(Appeal Br. 20–23; Reply Br. 10–12), Jones teaches determining whether a
user has purchased two items over the preceding 12-month period, based on
the user’s interaction with the online purchasing services. See Jones ¶¶ 41–
42; 44. Therefore, Jones teaches “based on a set of user events reflecting a
user’s interaction with . . . content of the online service over a period of
time, . . . determining . . . whether a user is or is not the predefined complex
user archetype,” as recited in claim 1. Our findings are supported by the
Specification, which describes the following exemplary “predefined
complex user archetype”:
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Predefined Complex User
Archetype Value

Description

MAU A user who used the online
service in the past 28 days.

Spec. ¶ 51.
Further, because the Examiner relies on the combination of Jones and
Dupret to teach the disputed claim limitations, Appellant cannot establish
nonobviousness by attacking the references individually. See In re Merck &
Co., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097 (Fed. Cir. 1986). As discussed above, Jones
teaches “the predefined complex user archetype.” The Examiner also
finds—and Appellant does not persuasively dispute—Dupret teaches “the
each . . . represents a respective pattern of user interaction with the online
service over time.” See Final Act. 10 (citing Dupret ¶¶ 26–27).
In the method of FIG. 2, a next step, step 126, is
determining user-interaction patterns relating to the search
engine using the at least one smaller chain. Similar to the steps
above, the step may be performed by the processing device 108
in response to the executable instructions 112. As described in
further detail below, the determination of user interaction
patterns is performed by computational analysis of the smaller
chains and the information stored therein. Through the analysis
and subsequent determination for user interaction patterns,
search engine technology can be vastly improved through the
utilization of the feedback relating to these search sessions that
fall within the long tail of search session groups and under
previous analytical systems, would be ignored as deemed too
granular to provide any beneficial feedback.

Query chains are sequences of queries related to a single
query intent or information need (for example, finding
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information about camping sites in Paris), and are different
from more high level goals (like planning holidays in Paris).
The technique starts by grouping simple user actions
(inspecting a new search result list, clicking on a link, etc.)
which are equal string queries issued by a single user within a
determined time span. For each user, the technique then groups
these so-called atomic sessions into query chains using two
thresholds, a time threshold and a query similarity threshold. ).

Dupret ¶¶ 26–27 (emphases added). Because Appellant does not
persuasively dispute the Examiner’s rationale for the proposed
combination, Appellant has not shown the Examiner erred in
determining Jones and Dupret collectively teach “wherein . . . the each
predefined complex user archetype represents a respective pattern of
user interaction with the online service over time,” as recited in claim
1.

II
Appellant argues:
Fontoura describes a technique for efficiently evaluating a
collection of attribute-value pairs against a complex Boolean
expression. For example, an online advertising campaign may target
online user visits represented as attribute-value sets by matching the
sets to a Boolean expression associated with the campaign. (Fontoura
at ¶ [0033].) However, Fontoura does not appear to contemplate a
Boolean expression for matching against the claimed set of “user
upsell attributes” for a user where each such attribute corresponds to a
respective “predefined complex user archetype” that the user is or is
not and has a “Boolean value that indicates whether the user is or is
not the respective predefined complex user archetype.”

In other words, to the extent Fontoura’s technique could be
used to efficiently evaluate the claimed Boolean expression against
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the claimed set of user up sell attributes for a user, Fontoura still does
not teach the claimed set of user upsell attributes for a user.

Appeal Br. 22; see also Reply Br. 11.
Appellant’s arguments are not directed to the Examiner’s specific
findings. The Examiner relies on Jones—not Fontura—for teaching “a set
of a plurality of user upsell attributes for the user.” See Final Act. 8 (citing
Jones ¶ 40). Further, as discussed above, Jones explicitly teaches “the
predefined complex user archetype.” Therefore, Fontoura does not need to
separately teach those limitations.
In addition, the Examiner cites Fontoura’s paragraphs 4 and 27 for
teaching the disputed limitations. See Final Act. 10; Ans. 10. Appellant
does not critique the cited paragraphs, and does not show why the
Examiner’s findings based on such paragraphs are incorrect. See In re
Baxter Travenol Labs., 952 F.2d 388, 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991) (“It is not the
function of this court [or this Board] to examine the claims in greater detail
than argued by an appellant, looking for [patentable] distinctions over the
prior art.”).

III

Appellant argues:
One skilled in the art would not understand a combination of
Jones, Dupret and Fontoura to provide exactly what is claimed
including the claimed solution . . . . The only way one skilled in the
art arrives at that part of the solution is to be informed by the
applicant’s own disclosure which, of course, is impermissible
hindsight in an obviousness analysis.

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Appeal Br. 22–23; See also Reply Br. 11–12.
We disagree. As discussed above, Appellant’s arguments about the
missing elements from the combination are unpersuasive. As a result,
Appellant’s conclusion of “impermissible hindsight” (Appeal Br. 23; Reply
Br. 12)—based on the missing elements argument—is also unpersuasive.
As to the legal analysis of hindsight, our reviewing courts have not
established a bright-line test for hindsight. The U.S. Supreme Court guides
that “[a] factfinder should be aware, of course, of the distortion caused by
hindsight bias and must be cautious of arguments reliant upon ex post
reasoning.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421 (citing Graham v. John Deere Co. of
Kansas City, 383 U.S. 1, 36 (1966)). “Rigid preventative rules that deny
factfinders recourse to common sense, however, are neither necessary under
our case law nor consistent with it.” KSR, 550 U.S. at 421.
Appellant has not demonstrated the Examiner’s proffered combination
of references would have been “uniquely challenging or difficult for one of
ordinary skill in the art.” Leapfrog Enters., 485 F.3d at 1162. Further, after
reviewing the respective teachings and suggestions of Jones, Dupret and
Fontoura, we find the weight of the evidence shows the proffered
combination is merely a predictable use of prior art elements according to
their established functions, because the combination uses prior art elements
of (i) “wherein . . . the each predefined complex user archetype represents a
respective pattern of user interaction with the online service over time”; (ii)
the . . . having a respective Boolean express”; and (iii) “evaluating the
respective Boolean expression of the . . . against one or more Boolean values
of . . . for the user to determine whether the . . . associated with . . . is
satisfied by the . . .” to improve content delivery to users. Therefore, on this
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record, Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner engaged in
impermissible hindsight.
Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, we
sustain the Examiner’s rejection of independent claim 1, and independent
claims 12, 13, and 24 for similar reasons.
We also sustain the Examiner’s rejection of corresponding dependent
claims 2, 4, 6, 7, 10, 11, 14, 16, 18, 19, 22, and 23, as Appellant does not
advance separate substantive arguments about those claims. See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.37(c)(1)(iv).

Dependent Claims 3 and 15
Appellant argues:
Dependent Claim 3 . . . recites . . . “wherein processing, by at
least one of the processors, the user events through a data pipeline to
produce the plurality of user upsell attributes comprises processing, by
at least one of the processors, the user events through a series of a
plurality of MapReduce phases.” . . . .
. . . .
In contrast, in Chen, a MapReduce framework is used to
forecast an inventory of online advertising impressions. This use of
MapReduce includes collecting samples of “visitor profiles,” that
include “visitor attributes,” from “ad logs” and matching collected
samples to a targeting profile. (Chen at ¶ [0030].) A targeting profile
inventory of available advertisement impressions may then be forecast
from the samples matched to the targeting profile. (Id.) As stated in
Chen, the ad logs may include “recorded information of advertisement
impressions served.” The attributes of the visitor profiles of Chen are
attributes of advertisement impressions served, not the claimed “user
upsell attributes” produced by a MapReduce pipeline . . . .

Appeal Br. 24.
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First, Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because they are not
directed to the Examiner’s specific findings. The Examiner finds—and
Appellant does not dispute—“Jones, in view of Dupret and Fontoura,
discloses wherein processing, by at least one of the processors, the set of
user events through a data pipeline to produce the plurality of user upsell
attributes (Paragraph [0040]).” Final Act. 17. Therefore, the combination of
Jones, Dupret, and Fontoura teaches the claimed “user upsell attributes.”
The Examiner further finds——and Appellant does not dispute—
Chen teaches “through a series of a plurality of MapReduce phases.” See
Final Act. 17–18. Because Appellant does not dispute the Examiner’s
rationale for the proposed combination, Appellant has not shown the
Examiner erred in determining Jones, Dupret, Fontoura, and Chen
collectively teach “wherein processing, by at least one of the processors, the
set of user events through a data pipeline to produce the plurality of user
upsell attributes comprises processing, by at least one of the processors, the
set of user events through a series of a plurality of MapReduce phases,” as
required by claim 3. See Final Act. 17.
Second, in response to Appellant’s arguments (Appeal Br. 24), the
Examiner further explains:
The MapReduce system of Chen processes marketing attributes to
target users. Generally, MapReduce is a technique for processing big
data sets. There is no indication from Chen that upsell attributes
would be processed differently than other marketing attributes.

Ans. 11.
Appellant fails to persuasively respond to such explanation and,
therefore, fails to show Examiner error. See Baxter Travenol Labs., 952
F.2d at 391 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
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Because Appellant has not persuaded us the Examiner erred, and for
similar reasons discussed above, we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
dependent claim 3, and dependent claim 15 for similar reasons.

CONCLUSION
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–16,
18, 19, and 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 101.
We affirm the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–4, 6, 7, 10–16,
18, 19, and 22–24 under 35 U.S.C. § 103.

In summary:

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 6–7,
10–16, 18–
19, 22–24
101 Eligibility 1–4, 6–7,
10–16, 18–
19, 22–24

1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
11–14, 16,
18, 19, 23,
24
103 Jones, Dupret,
Fontoura
1, 2, 4, 6, 7,
11–14, 16,
18, 19, 23,
24

3, 15 103 Jones, Dupret,
Fontoura, Chen
3, 15
10, 22 103 Jones, Dupret,
Fontoura, Wright
10, 22
Overall
Outcome
1–4, 6–7,
10–16, 18–
19, 22–24

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No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). See 37
C.F.R. § 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED