01993035_r
09-22-1999
Dorothy M. Williams, Appellant, v. Daniel R. Glickman, Secretary, Department of Agriculture, Agency.
Dorothy M. Williams, )
Appellant, )
)
v. ) Appeal No. 01993035
) Agency No. 970139
Daniel R. Glickman, )
Secretary, )
Department of Agriculture, )
Agency. )
______________________________)
DECISION
On May 2, 1999, appellant filed a timely appeal with this Commission from
a final decision (FAD) by the agency dated January 24, 1999, finding that
it was in compliance with the terms of the December 3, 1996 settlement
agreement into which the parties entered. See 29 C.F.R. ��1614.402,
.504(b); EEOC Order No. 960, as amended.
By a letters to the agency dated January 27, 1997, and May 27, 1997,
appellant alleged that she was coerced into signing the settlement
agreement and that it should therefore be disregarded and her prior
complaint reinstated at the point processing ceased. Specifically,
appellant made the following allegations:
(1) Appellant was told to backdate the settlement agreement.
(2) The settlement agreement did not reflect appellant's input regarding
the work schedule and associated expenses.
The agency informed her that if she did not sign the settlement
agreement, she would be terminated effective April 27, 1997.
In its January 24, 1999 FAD, the agency concluded that it had complied
with the terms of the settlement agreement. The agency acknowledged
that appellant was asked to backdate her signature on the agreement,
but determined that this caused no harm. Additionally, the agency
concluded that the presence of a mediator and appellant's consultation
with an attorney prior to signing the agreement indicated that the
provisions therein reflected the input of both parties. Finally, the
agency concluded that �to their knowledge, no one communicated to the
complainant that her failure to sign or comply with the agreement could
or would result in her being terminated.�
On appeal, appellant submitted a letter from the attorney whose advice
she sought when entering the agreement. The attorney's letter states
in pertinent part:
[Appellant] first came in to see me back in December, 1996. She was
being pressured to sign the settlement agreement. She was told she
should backdate the settlement agreement, and that it had to be done
that way. She was being pressured into signing something she did not
want to sign. I understand she signed it in fear of losing her job.
She would not have signed it because she did not agree with its terms.
However, she was told that she would lose her job of 29 years if she
did not sign the agreement on that date.
EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. �1614.504(a) provides that any settlement
agreement knowingly and voluntarily agreed to by the parties, reached at
any stage of the complaint process, shall be binding on both parties.
The Commission has held that a settlement agreement constitutes a
contract between the employee and the agency, to which ordinary rules
of contract construction apply. See Herrington v. Department of Defense,
EEOC Request No. 05960032 (December 9, 1996).
Because the Commission favors the voluntary resolution of discrimination
complaints, settlement agreements are not lightly set aside. See e.g.,
Rogers v. General Electric Co., 781 F.2d 452 (5th Cir. 1986). However, if
coercion, misrepresentation, misinterpretation, or mistake occur during
the formation of the contract, assent to the agreement is impossible,
and the Commission will find the contract void. See Shuman v. Department
of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05900744 (July 20, 1990).
This Commission examines coercion claims with much scrutiny. The party
rasing the defense of coercion must show that there was an improper
threat of sufficient gravity to induce assent to the agreement and that
the assent was in fact induced by the threat. Such a threat may be
expressed, implied or inferred from words or conduct, and must convey
an intention to cause harm or loss. An appellant's bare assertions will
not justify a finding of coercion. See Raphel v. Department of the Army,
EEOC Request No. 05921042 (May 6, 1993).
In the instant case, the Commission finds that appellant failed to
present sufficient evidence showing that the settlement agreement
should be overturned. The agency acknowledges that the signatures on
the agreement were backdated to December 3, 1996. Although the parties
disagree as to why this was done, we find that appellant failed to show
how she was harmed by this practice. Accordingly, we are unwilling to
set aside the agreement merely because it was backdated.
We also find that appellant's other allegations of improprieties are
unsupported by the record. We acknowledge that the statement provided
by appellant's attorney corroborates appellant's claim that she was
coerced into entering into the agreement; however it merely mimics
what appellant told him, rather than providing independent evidence
of coercion. Moreover, the fact that appellant obtained advice from
an attorney prior to signing the agreement lends more credence to the
agency's position that it was entered into without undue influence. If,
as her attorney suggests on appeal, appellant was reluctant to sign the
agreement as it then existed, she should have been advised not to do so.
We find that appellant failed to show that she was coerced into entering
the subject agreement.
Accordingly, the agency's final decision is AFFIRMED for the reasons
set forth herein.
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0795)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available
when the previous decision was issued; or
2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,
regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or
3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial
precedential implications.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST
BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this
decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive
a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in
opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider
MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party
WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request
to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.407. All requests and arguments
must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of
Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box
19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,
the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received
by the Commission.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances
have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,
a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the
delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your
request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests
for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited
circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.604(c).
RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0993)
It is the position of the Commission that you have the right to file
a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court WITHIN
NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.
You should be aware, however, that courts in some jurisdictions have
interpreted the Civil Rights Act of 1991 in a manner suggesting that
a civil action must be filed WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the
date that you receive this decision. To ensure that your civil action
is considered timely, you are advised to file it WITHIN THIRTY (30)
CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision or to consult
an attorney concerning the applicable time period in the jurisdiction
in which your action would be filed. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT
IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
September 22, 1999
____________________________
DATE Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations