Donald Remboski et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Aug 26, 2020

2020000754 (P.T.A.B. Aug. 26, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/404,304 01/12/2017 Donald Remboski 8869-US 2050
69054 7590 08/26/2020
RECHES PATENTS
HaArba''a Towers
North Tower
TEL AVIV, 6473925
ISRAEL
EXAMINER
TRIVEDI, ATUL
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3661
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
08/26/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
MAIL@I-P.CO.IL
OREN@I-P.CO.IL
eofficeaction@appcoll.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DONALD REMBOSKI, JACQUI DEDO,
ASSI BITTON, and YOAV MEGGED
Appeal 2020-000754
Application 15/404,304
Technology Center 3600
Before JEREMY M. PLENZLER, LISA M. GUIJT, and
LEE L. STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judges.
STEPINA, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–17, 24, 25, 49, and 50.2 We have
jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies Traffilog Ltd. as the real party in interest.
Appeal Br. 3.
2 Claims 18–23 and 26–48 have been cancelled. Appeal Br. 36–38 (Claims
App.).
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
Appellant’s disclosure is directed to methods and systems for
evaluating vehicle performance and selecting vehicle configurations.
Claim 1, reproduced below, is illustrative of the claimed subject
matter.
1. A method for evaluating a performance of a vehicle when
the vehicle is operated according to a given application, the
method comprises:
sensing sensed vehicle parameters by multiple vehicle
sensors that comprise multiple types of sensors;
determining, by a vehicle monitor, based on the sensed
vehicle parameters, duty related parameters of multiple vehicle
components; wherein the vehicle monitor is mechanically
coupled to the vehicle or installed in the vehicle; and
calculating the performance of the vehicle when operating
according to the given vehicle configuration;
wherein the calculating is based on, at least, (i) the duty
related parameters of the multiple vehicle components and (ii)
relationships between the duty related parameters of the multiple
vehicle components and the performance of the vehicle.
Appeal Br. 34 (Claims App.).
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Duncan US 2015/0161893 A1 June 11, 2015
Cox US 2015/0228129 A1 Aug. 13, 2015

REJECTIONS
I. Claims 1–17, 24, 25, 49, and 50 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 101 as being patent-ineligible.
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II. Claims 1–17, 24, 25, 49, and 50 are rejected under 35 U.S.C.
§ 103(a) as unpatentable over Cox and Duncan.
OPINION
Rejection I—Eligible Subject Matter
Claims 1–17, 49, and 50
The Examiner determines that claim 1 is “directed to the comparison
of information regarding a sample or test subject to a control or target data.”
Final Act. 3. The Examiner concludes that claim 1 is similar to the claim at
issue in Electric Power Group, LLC v. Alstom S.A., 830 F.3d 1350 (Fed. Cir.
2016). Id. at 4–5.
Appellant’s argument begins with reciting legal principles applicable
to the patent eligibility analysis, referring to the 2019 REVISED PATENT
SUBJECT MATTER ELIGIBILITY GUIDANCE, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (Jan. 7,
2019) (hereinafter “Revised Guidance”).3 Appeal Br. 29–30. Appellant
reproduces a portion of the Revised Guidance listing the three major
groupings of concepts identified by the courts as abstract ideas, namely, (i)
mathematical concepts, (ii) certain methods of organizing human activity,
and (iii) mental processes. Id. at 30. After these opening remarks, Appellant

3 Appellant states, “[a]ll the arguments related to the 35 USC 101 rejections
(especially the reference to the Berkheimer memo) are incorporated
herein.” Appeal Br. 29. We understand Appellant to be referring to an April
19, 2018, Memorandum from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for
Patent Examination Policy to the Patent Examining Corps, entitled “Changes
in Examination Procedure Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent
Subject Matter Eligibility Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” and to our
reviewing court’s decision in Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed.
Cir. 2018). However, Appellant makes no arguments regarding Berkheimer.
See Appeal Br.
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concludes “[t]he claims of the current application do not fall on any of these
groupings and thus the 35 USC [§] 101 [ground] should be rejected.” Id.
Appellant next quotes portions of the Revised Guidance relating to
Step 2A, Prong Two, reproduces claims 1 and 24 in their entirety with
certain limitations underlined, and states “[c]laim 1 of the current application
discusses a highly efficient method for evaluating a performance of a vehicle
- which is a practical application,” and “[c]laim 24 of the current application
claims a highly efficient method for selecting a selected vehicle
configuration - which is a practical application.” Id. at 30–32.
Appellant’s arguments do not apprise us of Examiner error. An
invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the
Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit
exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not
patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216
(2014) (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. See Alice, 573 U.S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs.
v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with
that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.”
Id. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the concept of
intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate settlement
risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010) (“Claims 1 and 4
in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of hedging, or protecting
against risk.”).
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Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and, thus, patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 67 (1972)).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (internal citation omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alteration in the original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer
implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.” Id.
Under Step 2A of the Revised Guidance, we first look to whether the
claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract
ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human
activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a
practical application (see MANUAL OF PATENT EXAMINING
PROCEDURE (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h) (9th Ed., Rev. 08.2017,
2018)).
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Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look, in Step
2B, to whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not
“well-understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities
previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to
the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance.
Step 1 – Statutory Category
Claim 1 recites “[a] method for evaluating a performance of a vehicle
when the vehicle is operated according to a given application” (Appeal Br.
34 (Claims App.)), and, therefore, falls into the process category of subject
matter.
Step 2A, Prong 1 – Recitation of Judicial Exception
Claim 1 sets forth a method involving two kinds of parameters,
namely, “sensed vehicle” parameters and “duty related” parameters. See id.
Claim 1 recites, in part, “determining, by a vehicle monitor, based on the
sensed vehicle parameters, duty related parameters of multiple vehicle
components.” Id. Once the step of sensing the sensed vehicle parameters is
performed, claim 1 does not place any specific limits on the manner of
determining the duty related parameters. Appellant’s Specification states,
“[t]he duty related parameters may reflect S-N curves of components that are
subjected to cyclic fatigue failure or may be any compressed representation
of the sensed vehicle parameters. For example- a single duty related
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parameter may represent the values of sensed vehicle parameters over a
period of time.” Spec. ¶ 58. The Specification further explains, “[t]he
monitoring and/or calculation of the duty related parameters of the multiple
vehicle components provides a real estimate of the actual application (the
actual manner in which the vehicle is used by a client) and may be used for
selecting the vehicle configuration that may fit that given application.”
Spec. ¶ 62 (emphasis added). Paragraph 178 of the Specification states,
“[a]dditionally or alternatively, duty related parameters may be deducted
based on information provided by the OEM, by clients of the OEM, [] and
the like.” Thus, the broadly recited step of “determining” is a step that can
be performed mentally (monitoring).
Claim 1 further recites, “calculating the performance of the vehicle
when operating according to the given vehicle configuration.” Appeal Br.
34 (Claims App.). The plain and ordinary meaning of this recitation is the
performance of a mathematical calculation or mental process. The
Specification does not alter this meaning.
Finally, claim 1 includes a “wherein” clause that further defines the
calculation step by reciting “the calculating is based on, at least, (i) the duty
related parameters of the multiple vehicle components and (ii) relationships
between the duty related parameters of the multiple vehicle components and
the performance of the vehicle.” Id. Thus, the last paragraph of claim 1 is
merely an extension of the step of “calculating” recited in the prior
paragraph.
As both the “determining” and “calculating” steps are mathematical
concepts or are mental processes that can be performed in the human mind,
claim 1 recites an abstract idea, one of the judicial exceptions. See Alice,
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573 U.S. at 216. Accordingly, the outcome of our analysis under Step 2A,
Prong 1, requires us to proceed to Step 2A, Prong 2. See Revised Guidance,
84 Fed. Reg. at 54.
Step 2A, Prong 2 – Integrated Into a Practical Application
In Step 2A, Prong 2, we determine whether the recited judicial
exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a)
identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim
beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional
elements individually and in combination to determine whether they
integrate the exception into a practical application. See Revised Guidance.
This evaluation requires an additional element or a combination of
additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial
exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial
exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the exception. See id.
Appellant’s contention that “[c]laim 1 of the current application
discusses a highly efficient method for evaluating a performance of a vehicle
- which is a practical application” (Appeal Br. 31) is merely conclusory and
provides no explanation supporting a finding that claim 1 integrates the
above-noted exceptions into a practical application. Claim 1 recites three
steps, specifically, “sensing,” “determining,” and “calculating.” As
discussed above, the steps of determining and calculating are abstract ideas.
The remaining step, sensing, is broadly recited and requires no specific
technical process. We see no improvement to other technology or technical
field, no implementation via a particular machine, and no transformation of
an article from one form to another. The requirement in claim 1 that the
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vehicle monitor that performs the “determining” step is “mechanically
coupled to the vehicle or installed in the vehicle” does not indicate that the
recited method is performed on a particular machine, nor does Appellant
contend it does. See Appeal Br. Rather, this recitation of a mechanical
coupling is generically recited, and, in light of Appellant’s Specification,
does not appear to require anything more than existing electronic
components, much less require claim 1 to be performed on a particular
machine as this term relates to the machine-or-transformation test. See Spec.
¶¶ 33, 93, 113, 475–478; see also Bilski, 561 U.S. at 604.
In summary, claim 1 does not integrate the recited judicial exception
into a practical application. Thus, we proceed to step 2B.
Step 2B – Well-Understood, Routine, Conventional Activity
With respect to Step 2B, Appellant states, “[a]ll the arguments related
to the 35 USC [§] 101 rejections (especially the reference to the
Berkheimer memo) are incorporated herein.” Appeal Br. 29. We
understand Appellant to be referring to an April 19, 2018, Memorandum
from Robert W. Bahr, Deputy Commissioner for Patent Examination Policy
to the Patent Examining Corps, entitled “Changes in Examination Procedure
Pertaining to Subject Matter Eligibility, Recent Subject Matter Eligibility
Decision (Berkheimer v. HP, Inc.)” and to our reviewing court’s decision in
Berkheimer v. HP Inc., 881 F.3d 1360 (Fed. Cir. 2018). However, Appellant
makes no arguments regarding Berkheimer. See Appeal Br. Rather,
Appellant’s entire discussion of Berkheimer is the statement reproduced
above. Appellant’s mere reference to the existence of the Berkheimer case
does not apprise us of Examiner error.
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Of the three steps recited in claim 1 (“sensing,” “determining,” and
“calculating”) only the step of “sensing sensed vehicle parameters by
multiple vehicle sensors that comprise multiple types of sensors” is not a
recitation of a calculation or a mental process. Claim 1 recites this step at a
high level of generality, failing to limit the parameters sensed, the structure
used to perform the sensing function, or even that structure is required to
perform this data gathering function. We see no reason such generic data
gathering, taken as an individual step or in combination with the remaining
calculation and determination steps in claim 1, amounts to significantly more
than the above-noted judicial exception itself.
We have considered all of Appellant’s arguments in support of the
patent eligibility of claim 1, but find them unpersuasive. Appellant makes
no additional arguments in support of any claims depending from claim 1.
See Appeal Br. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 1–17, 49,
and 50 as being directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claim 24
Independent claim 24 recites substantially similar steps to those
discussed above regarding claim 1, but requires the step of calculating to be
“for each vehicle configuration out of a group of vehicle configurations a
performance of a vehicle when operated according to a given application and
configured according to the vehicle configuration.” Appeal Br. 36 (Claims
App.). Claim 24 also recites a step not recited in claim 1, specifically,
“selecting the selected configuration out of the group of vehicle
configuration[s].” Claim 24 requires that the “vehicle configurations of the
group of vehicle configurations differ from each other by one or more major
components” and “a major component of the one or more major component
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is selected out of an engine, a transmission, a driveline, a brake and an axle.”
Id.
Appellant’s argument in support of the patent eligibility of claim 24 is
to state that claim 24 “claims a highly efficient method for selecting a
selected vehicle configuration - which is a practical application,” followed
by copy of claim 24 with certain limitations underlined. Appeal Br. 32.
As discussed above, the plain and ordinary meaning of the step of
“calculating” is the performance of a mathematical calculation or mental
process. We do not view the additional limitations relating to the step of
calculating a performance of a vehicle under the particular conditions recited
in claim 24 to integrate this judicial exception into a practical application in
any sense relevant to patent eligibility.
Regarding the step of “selecting the selected configuration out of the
group of vehicle configuration[s],” this step can be performed entirely in the
human mind, i.e., it amounts to a mental process, which is one of the
groupings of abstract ideas that qualify as a judicial exception to patent
eligibility. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 24 as being
directed to patent-ineligible subject matter.
Claim 25
With respect to claim 25, Appellant states, “the same arguments
applicable to claim 24 should be applied.” Appeal Br. 32. Claim 25 recites
a computer program product storing instructions that perform a method
similar to the method recited in claim 1. Appeal Br. 37 (Claims App.). For
the same reasons discussed above regarding the rejection of claim 1 as being
directed to patent ineligible subject matter, we sustain the rejection of claim
25.
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Rejection II—Unpatentability over Cox and Duncan
Appellant makes no arguments contesting the rejection of claims 1–
10, 14, 15, 17, 25, and 49. See Appeal Br. Accordingly, any argument that
these claims patentably distinguish over the Examiner’s proposed
combination of the teachings of Cox and Duncan is waived.
Claims 11 and 12
Claim 11 depends from claim 1 and recites “an aggregate size of the
duty related parameters of the multiple vehicle components is less than one
thousandth of an aggregate size of the sensed vehicle parameters.” Appeal
Br. 35 (Claims App.). Similarly, claim 12 recites “an aggregate size of the
duty related parameters of the multiple vehicle components is less than one
millionth of an aggregate size of the sensed vehicle parameters.” Id. The
Examiner identifies paragraph 65 of Cox as teaching these claim limitations.
Final Act. 9–10.
Appellant argues that paragraph 65 of Cox merely indicates the fuel
efficiency as a percentage of a hypothetical optimal fuel efficiency, and this
is not a teaching of an aggregate size of duty related parameters as being less
than one thousandth of an aggregate size of a sensed vehicle parameter.
In reply, the Examiner states:
Cox teaches that a vehicle control system compares sensed
vehicle data (¶ 65; from vehicle monitor device 20 of Figure 1)
and compares these data to “stored or recorded information,”
including but not limited to efficiency percentages (¶ 65). Cox
does not impose any limits on the results of these comparisons,
or teach that the controller stops taking measurements once the
comparison ratios reach a threshold level. The controller of Cox
draws from a number of “hypothetical routes” in order to compile
the historical data (¶ 65). These historical data are then compared
with sensor measurements (¶ 65). Given the range of historical
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data that Cox contemplates compiling (¶¶ 62-65; “alternative
routes” and “alternative variations”), it would fall within the
range of normal comparison results to see duty related
parameters that are less than one thousandth, or one millions, of
sensed values.
Ans. 4.
During examination of a patent application, pending claims are “given
their broadest reasonable construction consistent with the specification.” In
re Am. Acad. of Sci. Tech Ctr., 367 F.3d 1359, 1364 (Fed. Cir. 2004).
Appellant sets forth no explicit interpretation of the term “size” in claims 11
and 12. See Appeal Br. 23–26. However, Appellant’s Specification
discusses the ratios of the aggregate size of the duty related parameters to the
aggregate size of the sensed vehicle parameters recited in claims 11 and 12
and then states “[d]ue to the size difference[,] the transmission of the duty
related parameters of the multiple vehicle components is cost effective and
does not impose unreasonable limits of the bandwidth.” Spec. ¶ 59.
Paragraphs 88–91 of the Specification discuss the reduction of “data size”
and the resultant reduction in the need for transmission bandwidth.
Consistent with the Specification, the broadest reasonable interpretation of
the term “aggregate size” in claims 11 and 12 is “data size,” i.e., the size of
memory required to store (or the amount of bandwidth required to transmit)
the duty related parameter or sensed vehicle parameter. A preponderance of
the evidence does not support a finding that paragraphs 62–65 disclose the
ratios of data size recited in claims 11 and 12. Accordingly, we do not
sustain the rejection of these claims as unpatentable over Cox and Duncan.
Claim 13
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Claim 13 depends indirectly from claim 1 and recites “a duty related
parameter of vehicle component of the multiple vehicle components is a
stress cycle histogram of the vehicle component.” Appeal Br. 35 (Claims
App.). The Examiner finds paragraph 126 of Cox discloses this limitation.
Final Act. 10. Appellant contends that paragraph 125 and 126 of Cox both
fail to support the Examiner’s finding. Appeal Br. 26–28.
In reply, the Examiner states,
Cox teaches that “the vehicle profiler 430 can analyze the vehicle
information” (¶ 126; vehicle profiler 430 of Figure 4) to
determine vehicle component longevity. Cox also teaches that
the vehicle controller collects information on braking frequency
(¶ 120) in addition to other vehicle properties. Given [the]
repeated references to compilation of historical data (¶¶ 70, 109,
111, 113), and the repeated references to data analysis (¶¶ 25,
55–56, 72–73, 125–126) and braking frequency (¶ 120), a person
of skill in the art might well resort to using a histogram, such as
a stress cycle histogram, to draw meaning from these data.
Ans. 4–5 (emphasis added). Regardless of whether a person of ordinary
skill in the art might have resorted to the use of a histogram at the time the
invention was made, the Examiner’s finding that Cox actually discloses the
use of a histogram as recited in claim 13 is not supported by a
preponderance of the evidence. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection
of claim 13 as unpatentable over Cox and Duncan.
Claim 16
Claim 16 depends from claim 1 and recites, “the determining of the
duty related parameters of multiple vehicle components comprises
measuring a distribution of engine power over time.” Appeal Br. 36 (Claims
App.). The Examiner finds Duncan discloses this process in paragraph 30.
Final Act. 10.
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Appellant quotes paragraph 30 of Cox, with certain portions
underlined, and asserts “paragraph [0030] fails to teach or suggest the
determining of the duty related parameters of multiple vehicle components
comprises measuring a distribution of engine power over time[.]
Accordingly – Cox fails to teach or suggest the subject matter of claim 16.
Duncan fails to cure this deficiency.” Appeal Br. 29.
As the Examiner relies on paragraph 30 of Duncan, not Cox, to teach
the above-noted limitation in claim 16, Appellant’s argument does not
address the Examiner’s rejection. Specifically, Appellant’s argument that
paragraph 30 of Cox fails to disclose the pertinent process does not apprise
us of Examiner error. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 16 as
unpatentable over Cox and Duncan.
Claims 24 and 50
Claim 24 recites “selecting the selected configuration out of the group
of vehicle configuration.” Appeal Br. 36 (Claims App.). Claim 24 limits
what the vehicle configurations may be, reciting “[the] vehicle
configurations of the group of vehicle configurations differ from each other
by one or more major components . . . a major component of the one or more
major component is selected out of an engine, a transmission, a driveline, a
brake and an axle.” Id. Claim 50 depends from claim 1 and recites
substantially similar limitations to those discussed above regarding claim 24.
Id. at 38. Appellant argues for the patentability of these claims together.
Appeal Br. 23.
The Examiner finds that paragraphs 28–32 and 73 of Cox disclose the
above-noted “selecting” step. Final Act. 11. Appellant contends Cox
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merely discloses planning a route, selected from various routes, but the route
is selected for only one vehicle (or vehicle configuration). Appeal Br. 22.
In response, the Examiner finds
Cox teaches a route analysis system “can be directed to a user
account or device in a manner that is asynchronous with the use
of the vehicle” (¶ 32). Based on this teaching, as well as a route
analysis system (¶ 31) that “includes processes data provided
from the vehicle monitor device” (¶ 30), a person of skill in the
art might well conclude that the Cox reference considers the
general settings and configurations of the vehicle in calculating
a performance level, and trying to improve that performance
level by choosing a preferable route (¶¶ 31–32).
Ans. 3.
We do not understand paragraphs 30–32 of Cox to disclose selection
from among various vehicle configurations as recited in claim 24 because
the cited portion of Cox teaches that a route may be optimized based on the
characteristics (metrics) of a particular vehicle, not that various
configurations of a vehicle are selected for a given route. See Cox ¶¶ 30–32.
Next, the Examiner finds that, based on Cox’s disclosure in
paragraphs 64 and 89, “a person having ordinary skill in the art would
conclude that Cox teaches that claimed configuration calculation and
selection steps of Claim 24.” Ans. 4.
As is the case with paragraphs 30–32 of Cox, paragraphs 64 and 89
appear to relate to the determination of different characteristics of a single
vehicle, not configurations of that vehicle. Accordingly, the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 24 and 50 is based on an unsupported finding of fact, and
we do not sustain the rejection of these claims as unpatentable over Cox and
Duncan.
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CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are affirmed.
DECISION SUMMARY

Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–17, 24,
25, 49, 50
101 Eligibility 1–17, 24,
25, 49, 50

1–17, 24,
25, 49, 50
103 Cox, Duncan 1–10, 14–
17, 25, 49
11, 12, 13,
24, 50
Overall
Outcome
1–17, 24,
25, 49, 50

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a).
AFFIRMED