Donald J. Hejna

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 2, 2019

14877465 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 2, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/877,465 10/07/2015 Donald J. Hejna JR. lifcip-con4 5092
27087 7590 12/02/2019
MICHAEL B. EINSCHLAG, ESQ.
25680 FERNHILL DRIVE
LOS ALTOS HILLS, CA 94024
EXAMINER
VO, HUYEN X
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2659
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/02/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
mb1schlag@gmail.com
mbeinschlag@comcast.net
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DONALD J. HEJNA JR.
Appeal 2018-006307
Application 14/877,465
Technology Center 2600
Before ERIC B. CHEN, JOHN R. KENNY, and PHILLIP A. BENNETT,
Administrative Patent Judges.
BENNETT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–6. We have jurisdiction under
35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We reverse.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “Applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42(a). Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Virentem
Ventures, LLC. Appeal Br. 1.
Appeal 2018-006307
Application 14/877,465

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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to a methods of adjusting playback rate of
digital audio content based on conceptual information contained in the
digital audio content. Spec. ¶ 123. Claims 1 and 5, reproduced below, are
illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A method of presenting an audio or audio-visual work
which comprises:
detecting media work concept information in an audio
portion of the audio or audio-visual work using a media work
concept information detection apparatus;
associating a presentation rate of the audio of the audio
portion of the audio or audio-visual work with the detected media
work concept information; and
presenting the portion of the audio or audio-visual work
using a presentation apparatus so that the audio is presented at
the presentation rate;
wherein the media work concept information comprise
one or more indicia of words of interest; and
wherein the audio or audio-visual work includes
conversations.

5. A method of presenting an audio or audio-visual work
which comprises:
detecting media work concept information in an audio
portion of the audio or audio-visual work using a media work
concept information detection apparatus;
associating a presentation rate and volume of the audio of
the audio portion of the audio or audio-visual work with the
detected media work concept information; and
presenting the portion of the audio or audio-visual work
using a presentation apparatus so that the audio is presented at
the presentation rate and the volume;
wherein the media work content properties comprise
indicia of words of interest.
App. Br. (Claims Appendix A1–A2).
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Application 14/877,465

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REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner in rejecting the claims on
appeal is:
Kraay
Goldwasser
US 6,202,068 B1
US 6,324,337 B1
Mar. 13, 2001
Nov. 27, 2001
REJECTIONS
Claim 5 is rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 102(b) as being
anticipated by Goldwasser. Final Act. 5–6.
Claims 1–4 and 6 are rejected under pre-AIA 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as
being unpatentable over Goldwasser and Kraay. Final Act. 6–9.
ISSUE
The issue before us is one of claim interpretation. More specifically,
the issue is whether the broadest reasonable interpretation of the phrase
“detecting media work concept information,” as recited in independent
claims 1 and 5, encompasses measuring the energy level of an audio signal,
as disclosed in Goldwasser.
ANALYSIS
The Examiner rejects claim 5 as anticipated by Goldwasser. Final
Act. 5–6. The Examiner also rejects claim 1 as obvious over Goldwasser
and Kraay. Final Act. 6–9. In each rejection, the Examiner relies on
Goldwasser for the limitation as disclosing “detecting media work concept
information.” Final Act. 6 (claim 5 rejection), 7 (claim 1) (citing
Goldwasser col. 3, ll. 14–54). In each instance, the Examiner explains that
“it is not clear in the claim what “concept information” is intended to refer
to. Therefore, it is reasonable to interpret the term as energy level of
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Application 14/877,465

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individual word[s] in the audio signal.” Id. The Examiner further explains
that although the Specification purports to define “media work concept
information,” the purported definition merely provides examples of what
“media work concept information” may include, and because it is open-
ended, it does not exclude Goldwasser’s energy level as being within its
scope. Ans. 2–3.
Appellant argues the Examiner’s interpretation of “media work
concept information” is unreasonably broad. App. Br. 3. Appellant asserts
that the Specification includes a lexicographic definition for “media work
concept information” which the Examiner failed to consider. Specifically,
Appellant argues the Specification includes a section entitled “Definitions”
which sets forth definitions for various terms and phrases, and that “media
work concept information” is defined therein. App. Br. 4–5 (quoting
Spec. ¶ 60). Appellant further argues other portions of the Specification
provide additional description that provides context for “media work concept
information,” and that the additional description is consistent with the
definition set forth in the “Definitions” section. Id. Appellant asserts that
the Examiner’s approach is contrary to Federal Circuit precedent because it
“was based on the assumption that the specification did not proscribe or
preclude the broad reading adopted by the Examiner.” Reply Br. 3
(emphasis omitted).
We are persuaded the Examiner has erred. In interpreting claims, we
give claims their broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the
Specification. In re ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 496 F.3d 1374, 1379
(Fed. Cir. 2007). As noted above, starting at paragraph 40, Appellant’s
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Specification includes a section entitled “Definitions” which includes the
following:
Media Work Concept Information: Media Work Concept
Information (“MWConcI”) may comprise one or more of: (a)
concept information, for example, in the form of keywords; (b)
abstract information; (c) summary information; (d) paraphrase
information; (e) scene information; (f) scene change information;
(g) speaker information (for example, and without limitation,
dialogue, speaker identity, and so forth); (h) hyperlink or other
demarcation or indexing labels conveying information; and (i)
the like which relates to all, or a portion, of the MW. In a
particular example, MWConcI includes any type of information
which reflects upon one or more aspects of the content of the
foregoing such as, without limitation, conceptual tags and the
like. For example, MWConcI may comprise a keyword, a string
of words, or a phrase that expresses a concept such as “stock
market,” “wall street,” and “financial.” It should be understood
that MWConcI may include an algorithm that, when executed,
provides the MWConcI or an identifier of the MWConcI, which
identifier may be used to obtain the MWConcI in accordance
with any one of a number of methods that are well known to those
of ordinary skill in the art including, without limitation, from
local or distributed data bases, where distribution includes
distribution over webs. In addition, MWConcI may include
codes which are processed using look-up tables, rules,
algorithms or the like.
Spec. ¶ 60. Although we agree with the Examiner that this passage is not an
explicit definition, we disagree that it is sufficiently broad and open-ended to
encompass Goldwasser’s “energy level.” Each of the provided examples
adheres to a common theme—the meaning conveyed by the content.
Elsewhere in the Specification the phrase “media work concept information”
is consistently described in the context of information which expresses
concepts, ideas, or meaning to the listener. See, e.g., Spec. ¶ 123 (“The
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MWConcI comprises concept information such as Concept identifiers. For
example, a Concept identifier comprises a keyword, a string of words, or a
phrase that expresses a concept such as ‘stock market,’ ‘wall street,’ and
‘financial.’”) (emphasis added), Spec. ¶ 124 (“Embodiments of the third
aspect of the present invention may utilize detection apparatus that detects
conceptual information in a particular portion of an MW ( an audio or
audio-visual work), and retrieval apparatus that uses the conceptual
information to retrieve PRs (TSM rate or playback rate information) from
the CPRA data structure.”) (emphasis added); Spec. ¶ 190 (“MWCD (a
stream of data which represents conceptual information)”).
Nothing in the specification indicates that media work concept
information includes physical characteristics of the digital audio file such as
energy level. The Examiner determines that because the Specification does
not foreclose such an interpretation, it is reasonable to interpret it as
encompassing energy level. We agree with Appellant that such an approach
contravenes Federal Circuit precedent. See In re Power Integrations, Inc.,
884 F.3d 1370, 1377 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (“The correct inquiry in giving a claim
term its broadest reasonable interpretation in light of the specification is not
whether the specification proscribes or precludes some broad reading of the
claim term adopted by the examiner.”) (citation omitted).
Here, the Examiner’s analysis does not consider the Specification as a
whole, and instead merely considers whether the single passage in paragraph
60 of the Specification excludes the proffered interpretation. However,
according to Power Integrations, “a proper claim construction analysis
endeavors to assign a meaning to a disputed claim term that corresponds
with . . . how the inventor describes his invention in the specification.” Id. at
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1383 (internal citations and quotations omitted). Although the Specification
does not expressly exclude energy level from the scope of “media work
concept information,” such an interpretation is inconsistent with the use of
the phrase throughout the Specification. Accordingly, we agree with
Appellant that, under the proper interpretation of “media work concept
information,” Goldwasser’s energy level does not disclose “detecting media
work concept information” as recited in claims 1 and 5. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the rejections of the independent claims, nor of the remaining
claims which depend therefrom.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejections are reversed.

DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
5 102(b) Goldwasser 5
1–4, 6 103(a) Goldwasser, Kraay 1–4, 6
Overall
Outcome
1–6

REVERSED