Dixon Distributing Co., Inc.

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Jun 10, 1974

211 N.L.R.B. 241 (N.L.R.B. 1974)

DIXON DISTRIBUTING CO. 241
Dixon Distributing Company , Inc. and Local Union
No. 406, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
Chauffeurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of Ameri-
ca, Ind . Cases 7-CA-10176 and 7-CA-10622
June 10, 1974
DECISION AND ORDER
BY MEMBERS JENKINS, KENNEDY, AND
PENELLO
On November 30, 1973, Administrative Law Judge
Melvin J. Welles issued the attached Decision in this
proceeding. Thereafter, the Charging Party filed
exceptions and the Respondent filed exceptions and
a supporting brief. The Respondent also filed an
answering brief to the Charging Party's exceptions.
Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the
National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the
National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the record and the
attached Decision in light of the exceptions and
briefs' and has decided to affirm the rulings,
findings ,2 and conclusions of the Administrative Law
Judge and to adopt his recommended Order.
In the absence of exceptions thereto, we adopt pro
forma the Administrative Law Judge's 8(a)(3) and (1)
findings with respect to Robert Green.
Member Jenkins, as set forth in his separate
opinion attached hereto, and Member Penello adopt
the Administrative Law Judge's conclusion that
Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by refusing to bargain with the Union on and
after July 23, 1973, the date on which the Union was
certified. Member Kennedy would not find any
8(aX5) violation in accordance with his dissent in the
representation case on which the Charging Party's
certification is predicated.3
Members Kennedy and Penello adopt the Admin-
istrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent did
not violate Section 8(aX5) and (1) of the Act by
putting in effect on February 15, 1973, certain
changes in the employees' delivery routes. Member
Kennedy finds no violation again in accordance with
his dissent in the representation case on which the
Charging Party's certification is predicated. Member
Penello finds no violation since he is in agreement
with the conclusion of the Administrative Law Judge
I The Respondent moved that the Board reconsider its decision in the
underlying representation case, Dixon Distributing Co.,IInc, 204 NLRB
'1155', in which the Charging Party herein was certified as the collective-
bargaining representative of Respondent 's driver-salesmen and helpers. In
the alternative , Respondent moved that the representation case be reopened
for the purpose of holding a hearing to adduce further testimony. For the
reasons previously stated in the poor decision , Respondent's motion is
hereby denied . Member Kennedy , for the reasons set forth in his dissenting
that Respondent satisfied its duty to bargain on the
issue at the February 15 meeting with the two union
business agents. Member Penello finds that Laney &
Duke Storage Warehouse Co., Inc., 151 NLRB 248,
enfd. 369 F.2d 859 (C.A. 5, 1966), and King Radio
Corporation, Inc., 166 NLRB 649, relied upon by
Member Jenkins, are distinguishable, since the
unilateral changes after the election and before
certification in those cases occurred without notice to
or consultation with the Union. It is immaterial that
the discussion herein occurred at the request of the
Union rather than having been initiated by the
Respondent.
Member Jenkins disagrees and would find the
8(a)(5) violation for the reasons set forth in his
separate opinion herein.
ORDER
Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor
Relations Act, as amended , the National Labor
Relations Board adopts as its order the recommend-
ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and
hereby orders that Respondent, Dixon Distributing
Company, Inc., Traverse City , Michigan, its officers,
agents , successors , and assigns , shall take the action
set forth in the said recommended Order.
MEMBER JENKINS, concurring in part and dissenting
in part:
I join in my colleagues ' pro forma adoption of the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
changing the method of payment of employee
Robert Green, and his dismissal of an independent
8(a)(1) allegation.
I also join with Member Penello in adopting the
Administrative Law Judge's finding that Respondent
violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) by refusing to
bargain with the Union on and after July 27, 1973,
the date on which the Union was certified.
However, I am unable to join with my colleagues in
adopting the finding of the Administrative Law
Judge that Respondent did not violate Section
8(a)(5) of the Act by putting in effect on February
19, 1973, certain changes in the employees' delivery
routes. As the Administrative Law Judge stated, the
changes occurred about 10 days after the Union's 5
to 2 victory in the election, but before the Union was
certified on July 27, 1973.
opinion in the prior decision, would grant Respondent 's motion.
2 The Administrative Law Judge incorrectly referred to the Board's
certification of representative in the underlying representation case as
having issued on "July 27, 1973" instead of "July 23, 1973" in the following
places : subsection A, the first paragraph of subsection D, and Conclusion of
Law 2.
3 204 NLRB No. 159.
211 NLRB No. 2
242 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
My colleagues do not dispute that the route
changes herein involve changing terms and condi-
tions of employment which are mandatory subjects
of bargaining . It is also clear that Respondent had a
duty to bargain with the Union with respect to such
changes during the period between the time of the
election and the issuance of a certification by the
Board.4 The Administrative Law Judge concluded
that Respondent satisfied what duty to bargain it had
at a meeting held February 15, 1973, with two union
business agents . I disagree.
The record reveals that Respondent did not give
the Union notice of the route changes, but rather it
appears that Union Business Agent Wilder requested
a meeting with Respondent President Dixon after
Wilder was told by employee Taylor that Respon-
dent planned to institute the change.
On February 15, 1973, Wilder and another union
business agent , Anderson, called on Dixon and
brought up the matter of the route changes. Wilder
stated that Dixon should negotiate with the Union
about these changes. Dixon replied that he was going
to make the changes, and explained his reasons for
doing so. Wilder repeated that Dixon should negoti-
ate with the Union about the changes. Anderson
testified that the meeting ended after Anderson said
that they were going to file unfair labor practice
charges if Dixon instituted the changes. Although
Dixon denied that he was told at the meeting that the
Union was going to file charges, it is uncontroverted
that Wilder telephoned Dixon the next day and again
requested negotiations on the route changes. Wilder
told Dixon that if he wouldn't negotiate on the route
changes or set a meeting to negotiate on the route
changes, then Wilder would file unfair labor practice
charges. Dixon replied that he was going to make the
changes.
From the above, I conclude that Respondent did
not bargain in good faith with the Union on
February 15, 1973, concerning the route changes. It
is undenied that the Union brought the issue up and
requested negotiations. Dixon's statement that he
was going to make the changes, and his repeated
rejection of the Union's request to negotiate the
matter, is not bargaining within the meaning of
Section 8(d) of the Act merely because Dixon
explained his reasons for the action. Thus, Respon-
dent did not present the Union with a proposal, but
rather the Union was faced with a fait accompli.
Accordingly, I would reverse the finding of the
Administrative Law Judge and find an additional
violation of Section 8(a)(5) for Respondent's unilat-
eral changes in the employees' delivery routes.
4 Laney & Duke Storage Warehouse Co., Inc., 151 NLRB 248 , enfd. 369
F.2d 859 (C.A. 5, 1966); King Radio Corporation Inc., 166 NLRB 649.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
MELVIN J. WELLES , Administrative Law Judge: This case
was heard at Traverse City, Michigan, on October 9, 1973,
based on charges filed on February 28 and September 20,
1973, and a consolidated complaint issued September 26,
1973, alleging that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(1)(3)
and (5) of the Act. Respondent denied that it engaged in
any unfair labor practices , except that it admits that it has
refused to bargain with the Union in order to obtain
judicial review of the Board's Decision and Certification of
Representatives . The General Counsel and Respondent
have filed briefs, which have been carefully considered.
Upon the entire record in the case , including my
observation of the witnesses , I make the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. THE BUSINESS OF THE EMPLOYER AND THE LABOR
ORGANIZATION INVOLVED
Respondent, a Michigan corporation , is engaged in the
sale and distribution of beer and other beverages at its
place of business in Traverse City, Michigan . During the
year ending December 31, 1972, it had a gross revenue of
more than $500,000, and received goods and materials
valued in excess of $50,000 from points outside the State of
Michigan . I find that it is engaged in commerce within the
meaning of Section 2 (6) and (7) of the Act. The Union is a
labor organization within the meaning of Section 2(5) of
the Act.
II. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. Introduction-The Issues
On February 9, 1973, the Union "won" a Board-
conducted election among the employees (driver-salesmen
and helpers) by a vote of 5 to 2. Respondent thereafter
filed objections to the election, which were ultimately, on
July 27, 1973, overruled by the Board, and the Union was
thereupon certified. The unfair labor practices alleged in
this case include (1) a threat to the employees, prior to the
election, of a loss of benefits if the Union won the election,
(2) a discriminatory reduction in the pay of employee
Green, immediately after the election, (3) a unilateral
change in the drivers' routes, effected shortly after the
election, and (4) a refusal to bargain , following the Board's
certification.
B. The Alleged 8(a)(1)
The General Counsel alleges that Respondent, in
violation of Section 8(a)(1), threatened employees with loss
of benefits if the Union won the election. To support this
allegation, the General Counsel adduced testimony from
two witnesses , Allen Taylor and Robert Green, with
respect to statements made by Robert Dixon, Respon-
dent's president, at a sales meeting of the employees prior
to the February 9, 1973, election . According to Taylor,
Dixon responded to an employee inquiry about the existing
DIXON DISTRIBUTING CO.
profit-sharing plan by stating that "he would try to
encourage the Union to .bring in the retirement plan and
try to get out [sic,] the profit sharing plan and if the Union
came in, that he felt that he would do anything in his
power to make sure of this and if the Union went in he
would try his damdest not to let anybody get anymore of
the profit sharing than possible." Taylor added that Dixon
said "normally anybody that was in the union would take
the retirement and it wouldn't be feasible to have two
retirements ," and that "he would be inclined to accept it
[the union retirement plan]." Green testified that "the way
I understood it he [Dixon] said if the union came in that he
had his option which he was referring to Teamster 's union
retirement or the profit sharing as far as he was concerned,
we would not have the profit sharing. He would try to get
rid of the profit sharing." Green added that Dixon "didn't
say to the fact that he was going to. He said he was going
to try, so no, it is not a threat to me, no."
Dixon testified that when asked about the profit-sharing
plan, he said that he""knew of several wholesalers who had
contracts . I had seen several contracts and that I had never
seen a contract with a bonus, cash bonus provision and a
profit sharing provision as reports to the contract . . . and
that it was my opinion that the union preferred their own
health and welfare and retirement package."
There is no substantial difference between the two
versions . Accepting fully the testimony of Taylor and
Green, I nevertheless do not find Dixon's remarks, in the
circumstances, to constitute a threat of loss of benefit. At
most, Dixon was telling the employees , in response to a
question from one of them about the profit-sharing plan,
that the particular benefit might be lost , but not as a result
of employer action, rather as a possible result of bargain-
ing. The Board quite recently dismissed an 8(a)(1)
allegation in a closely analogous factual situation in
Appleton Discount, Inc., 205 NLRB No. 58, despite the fact
that there, unlike here, the company was found guilty of
violating Section 8(a)(1) in several other respects. In the
instant case , there is no context of other independent
8(a)(1) violations, and no animus has been shown.
Accordingly, I find no violation of the Act in this respect.
C. The Alleged Unlawful Change in Green's Status
Some time in September 1972, employee Robert Green
gave Dixon notice that he was leaving. He had been a
driver-salesman . Just prior to his last day of employment,
he told Dixon he had decided not to leave, and asked for
his job back . Green was told by Dixon he would have to go
back to work as a helper, because the route Green had
driven had been promised to someone else. Green told
Dixon that he would not be getting a full 40 hours in, and
Dixon told him , according to Green , that when he had to
work Saturdays , Dixon would "pay him the difference to
make forty hours for you," even if he only worked "thirty-
three, thirty five hours." 1 Green did in fact receive a full 40
hours' pay, although working less than that number of
hours , during most, if not all, weeks in January 1973.
Starting right after the election, however, he was paid only
i Dixon testified that he did not "guarantee" Green a 40-hour week He
added that he "possibly did tell him that I would try to take care of him and
243
for actual time worked. This change in his status is alleged
as having been "in retaliation for the election results," and
therefore violative of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
Because there is no evidence to show that Dixon knew or
suspected that Green had been active in union activities, or
even that he had voted for the Union in the election (Green
testified that he never indicated how he voted in the
election; Dixon testified that Green may have told him at
one time that he voted against the Union), and also
because there is no evidence that Dixon was "retaliating"
against any particular individual because of the Union's
victory, I do not find that the "reduction" was motivated
by anything to do with Green personally.
Dixon testified, however, that his "understanding" with
Green changed following the union victory in the election,
because "When I contemplated contract employment, I
didn't think having the precedent of paying a man for not
working was a good thing so I reverted back to paying
people for exactly what they did." Dixon went on to say
"they voted for it and I assumed that we might be
negotiating contract and I didn't want to have some
precedent of paying some guy for staying home .... And
I had only done it for a short time and I thought I would
bail out of this one right now."
This testimony, alleges the General Counsel, establishes
a violation of the Act, for it demonstrates that but for the
union victory in the election, Dixon would have continued,
at least for a while, to pay Green for time not worked, in
accordance with their "understanding." Respondent ar-
gues, however, that "the inference, if any, to be drawn
from this comment should be tempered by the record as a
whole," that is, by the absence of any showing of antiunion
activities or attitude by the Company, and by the fact that
"it is doubtful that a pay practice in existence for one
month, with respect to Saturdays only, constitutes an
established and regular condition of employment."
Although, as I already indicated, I am satisfied that
Dixon's explanation was an honest one, and was not
designed to conceal any antiunion, or retaliatory motiva-
tion, the explanation itself does, as the General Counsel
contends, establish the violation. But for the victory of the
Union in the election, Dixon would, by his own admission,
not even have considered changing Green's payment to an
actual hours worked basis at that time. It is understandable
that an employer, contemplating that he may be negotiat-
ing a contract with a union for the first time, would not
want to start negotiations encumbered by a practice of
paying an employee for time not actually worked, that he
would want, to use Dixon's words, to "bail out of this one
right now." To understand the motivation, however, and
even to characterize it, as I do in this case, as not motivated
by "hostility" toward the Union, is not to say that the
conduct is any the less violative of the Act. From the
employees' standpoint, a benefit previously bestowed has
been taken away as a direct result of the Union's 5 to 2
victory in the election. That this is "discrimination . . . to
discourage membership" in the union is self-evident. That
there may not have been a "guarantee" to Green of
continued 40-hour pay for less than 40 hours worked does
make it worth his while. and in fact in January I am sure that I paid him
forty hours for weeks that he didn 't work anywhere near forty."
244 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
not alter this conclusion. For the question is not whether
the "condition of employment" had become unalterably
fixed, or whether Dixon was legally obligated by any
contract of employment to continue paying Green for time
not worked; it is, rather, why Dixon stopped paying Green
for time not worked. As to that, as already stated, I
perforce must accept Dixon's own reason.
Respondent argues that perhaps by February 19, some
10 days after the change in Green's status, Green would no
longer have received pay for hours not worked because no
more Saturday work was done, and the extra payments
were keyed to Green's performing some work on Saturday.
I do not think the evidence is completely clear to the effect
that never thereafter was Saturday work done. In any
event, this goes to the amount of backpay due Green rather
than to whether the change was as a matter of law a
violation of Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act. For the
foregoing reasons, I conclude that it was.
D. The Alleged Unilateral Change in Delivery
Routes
As noted above, the complaint alleges that certain
changes in the employees' delivery routes, put into effect
about February 19, 1973, were made unilaterally, and
therefore that Respondent violated Section 8(a)(5) of the
Act. The changes occurred about 10 days after the Union's
5 to 2 victory in the election, but long before the Union
was certified, on July 27, 1973. Although the question as to
when a bargaining obligation arises after an election is
"won" but before the union is certified is peripherally
present as an issue here, I need not resolve that question,
for Respondent agrees, as stated in its brief, that "an
employer is not free to take advantage of the hiatus
between election and certification by unilaterally changing
terms and conditions of employment which are mandatory
subjects of bargaining." Respondent argues, however, that
route changes of the type involved here do not constitute a
mandatory subject of bargaining. Although I am inclined
to disagree, this question too needs no resolution by me,
for I agree with Respondent's final argument that it did in
fact satisfy what duty to bargain it had at a meeting held
February 15 with two union business agents.
Bargaining has never meant reaching agreement. Even
with full-fledged bargaining for a contract going on, or
during a contract term, matters arise where the exigencies
and economics of a situation seem to require rather prompt
action. In such circumstances, "bargaining" may well be in
good faith, and lawful, without being protracted, and
without any agreement being reached. At the February 15
meeting, furthermore, there may well have been indications
that the union agents were accepting Dixon's explanation,
and agreeing to the changes, although when charges were
filed the next day it was obvious that either there had been
no agreement or that the Union had a change of heart. But
the changes in routes had been a matter under considera-
tion by the Company for a long time prior to the February
9 election, and the need for relatively early action had
come to a head because of certain new beer accounts the
2 This finding, and the order entered hereinafter, obviates the need to
pass upon the General Counsel's motion for summary judgment on this
Company was to receive. The discussion of February 15 at
the very least represented an airing of the matter, and an
exchange of views. That it did not actually result in
agreement is of no consequence, for an impasse in
bargaining, as long as the bargaining has been in good
faith, permits a company to effect whatever changes it had
proposed to make. This is particularly true during a period
when a resolution of the question concerning representa-
tion is still pending because of unresolved objections. For,
as stated by Dixon on the stand, management does need to
run its business, and changes in operations toward that end
often cannot await the ultimate full-fledged contract
bargaining with a certified incumbent union.
There is plainly no hard and fast rule applicable to all
situations or all "changes." The nature of a particular
change, whether it is reasonably necessary to put it into
effect at the time, its effect upon employees, and a host of
other considerations all bear o:i whether what bargaining
obligation does exist has been satisfied by the bargaining
that took place. In this case, the session between Dixon
and the two union agents, albeit only about 20 minutes in
length, sufficed, in my opinion, to satisfy that obligation.
Union Business Agent Robert Anderson testified, with
respect to the February 15 meeting, that "it was just a
matter of two sides taking a position," and that the subject
of route changes was discussed "in some detail." The other
union business agent present at that meeting, Raymond
Wilder, went into some detail with respect to what Dixon
told them about the route changes, with respect to the new
beer that was going to be available, the need for better
distribution methods, and improved customer service.
Anderson also testified that Dixon mentioned that "some
of his routes were heavy on one side and some were light
on another," confirming Dixon's testimony about the
imbalance of the routes, and his employees having
complained some time earlier about that and about having
to work Saturdays. The meeting, in sum, did represent de
facto bargaining about the single subject matter, a
particular single aspect of the employees' "Working
conditions," with which this allegation is concerned. I find,
in all the circumstances, that Respondent did not violate
Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the Act in this respect.
E. The Refusal To Bargain
Respondent admits that it has refused to bargain in order
to test, in the court of appeals, the validity of the Board's
certification. I find, accordingly, that Respondent violated
Section 8(a)(5) of the Act.2
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. By unlawfully changing the method of payment of
employee Robert Green, Respondent has engaged in
unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3)
and (1) of the Act.
2. By refusing to bargain with the Union, on and after
July 27, 1973, in the umt found appropriate by the Board
in the representation proceeding, Respondent has engaged
aspect of the complaint, on which I reserved ruling at the hearing
DIXON DISTRIBUTING CO.
in unfair labor practices within the meaning of Section
8(a)(5) and ( 1) of the Act.
3. , The aforesaid unfair labor practices affect commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
THE REMEDY
Having found that Respondent has engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I shall recommend that it cease and
desist therefrom, and that it take certain affirmative action
necessary to remedy the unfair labor practices and to
effectuate the policies of the Act. Included in this
affirmative action will be a recommendation that Respon-
dent make whole Robert Green for losses he suffered as a
result of the change in his method of payment in February
1973, with the payment of interest at the rate of 6 percent
per annum. Isis Plumbing & Heating Co., 138 NLRB 716.
Upon the foregoing findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and the entire record, and pursuant to Section 10(c) of the
Act, I hereby issue the following recommended:
ORDERS
Respondent , Dixon Distributing Company, Inc., Trav-
erse City, Michigan , its officers , agents, successors, and
assigns , shall:
1. Cease and desist from:
(a) Changing its employees methods of pay as a result of
a union victory in a Board -conducted election.
(b) Refusing to recognize Local Union No. 406,
International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauffeurs,
Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind., as the
exclusive collective -bargaining representative of its em-
ployees in the following appropriate unit:
All driver salesmen and driver salesmen helpers
employed by the Employer at its Traverse City,
Michigan , facility, but excluding transport drivers,
warehouse employees , office clerical employees , guards
and supervisors as defined in the Act and all other
employees.
(c) In any like or related manner interfering with,
restraining, or coercing its employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action which is
necessary to effectuate the policies of the Act:
(a) Make whole Robert Green , in the manner set forth in
the section entitled "The Remedy ," for any loss of earnings
suffered by reason of the discriminatory change in his
method of pay.
(b) Upon request, recognize and bargain with the Union,
as the exclusive collective -bargaining representative of the
employees in the aforesaid appropriate unit , respecting
rates of pay, wages , hours , or other terms and conditions of
employment , and, if any understanding is reached, embody
such understanding in a signed agreement.
(c) Post at its place of business in Traverse City,
Michigan , copies of the attached notice marked "Appen-
dix."4 Copies of said notice , on forms provided by the
Regional Director for Region 7 of the Board, after being
duly signed by Respondent's authorized representative,
shall be posted by it immediately upon receipt thereof, and
245
be maintained by it for 60 consecutive days thereafter, in
conspicuous places, including all places where notices to
employees are customarily posted. Reasonable steps shall
be taken by Respondent to ensure that said notices are not
altered, defaced, or covered by any other material.
(d) Notify the Regional Director for Region 7, in writing,
within 20 days from the receipt of this Decision, what steps
the Respondent has taken to comply herewith.
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the complaint be, and it
hereby is, dismissed insofar as it alleges unfair labor
practices not specifically found herein.
3 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings,
conclusions , and recommended Order herein shall, as provided in Sec.
102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become
its findings , conclusions , and Order, and all objections thereto shall be
deemed waived for all purposes.
4 In the event that the Board's Order is enforced by a Judgment of a
United States Court of Appeals, the words in the notice reading "Posted by
Order of the National Labor Relations Board" shall read "Posted Pursuant
to a Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board."
APPENDIX
NOTICE To EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government
WE WILL NOT change employees ' methods of pay as
a result of the union winning an election.
WE WILL pay Robert Green for losses he suffered as
a result of our having discriminatorily changed his
method of pay in February 1973.
WE WILL bargain collectively with Local Union No.
406, International Brotherhood of Teamsters , Chauf-
feurs, Warehousemen and Helpers of America, Ind.,
respecting rates of pay , wages , hours, or other terms
and conditions of employment , as the representative of
our employees in the following bargaining unit:
All driver salesmen and driver salesmen helpers
at out Traverse City, Michigan, facility, excluding
transport drivers , warehouse employees , office
clerical employees , guards, and supervisors as
defined in the Act, and all other employees.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere
with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of
their rights guaranteed by the National Labor Relat-
ions Act.
DIXON DISTRIBUTING
COMPANY, INC.
(Employer)
Dated By
(Representative) (Title)
This is an official notice and must not be defaced by
anyone.
This notice must remain posted for 60 consecutive days
246 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
from the date of posting and must not be altered , defaced, its provisions may be directed to the Board's Office, 500
or covered by any other material. Book Buildings 1249 Washington, Detroit, Michigan
Any questions concerning this notice or compliance with 48226, Telephone 313-226-3200.