Dic-Underhill Joint VentureDownload PDFNational Labor Relations Board - Board DecisionsDec 18, 1973207 N.L.R.B. 1024 (N.L.R.B. 1973) Copy Citation 1024 DECISIONS OF NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD Dic-Underhill Joint Venture , Dic Concrete Corpora. tion and Underhill Construction Co., Inc., Joint Venture and Victor Marrero. Case 29-CA-3166 December 18, 1973 DECISION AND ORDER BY CHAIRMAN MILLER AND MEMBERS JENKINS AND KENNEDY On July 10, 1973, Administrative Law Judge Ralph Winkler issued the attached Decision in this proceed- ing. Thereafter, the General Counsel filed exceptions and a supporting brief. Pursuant to the provisions of Section 3(b) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board has delegated its authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel. The Board has considered the record and the attached Decision in light of the exceptions and brief and has decided to affirm the rulings, findings, and conclusions of the Administrative Law Judge and to adopt his recommended Order. ORDER Pursuant to Section 10(c) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended, the National Labor Relations Board adopts as its Order the recommend- ed Order of the Administrative Law Judge and hereby orders that the complaint herein be, and it hereby is, dismissed in its entirety. DECISION STATEMENT OF THE CASE RALPH WINKLER, Administrative Law Judge: Upon a charge filed by the above-named individual, a complaint issued by the General Counsel on January 31, 1973, and an answer filed by Respondent, a hearing was held on June 4, 1973. Upon the entire record in this case, including my observation of the demeanor of witnesses and considera- tion of briefs, I make the following: FINDINGS OF FACT 1. THE BUSINESS OF RESPONDENT Dic Concrete Corporation, herein called Dic, and Underhill Construction Co., Inc., herein called Underhill, are New York corporations with respective offices and places of business in Elmont, New York, and Queens County, New York, where they are engaged in performing concrete construction subcontracting services and related services. Dic and Underhill are engaged in a joint venture, under the name of Dic Underhill Joint Venture, as a concrete construction contractor on a housing project in Brooklyn, New York. Dic and Underhill are members of the Cement League of the Building Trades Employer's Association of the city of New York, which Association negotiates and administers collective-bargaining agree= ments in behalf of its members with various labor organizations, including the union hereinafter described. Members of the Association make interstate purchases exceeding $50,000, annually. All parties agree, and I find, that Dic, Underhill, and their joint venture are engaged in commerce within Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act. II. THE LABOR ORGANIZATION INVOLVED District Council of Cement and Concrete Workers, International Hod Carriers', Building and Common Laborers' Union of America, AFL-CIO, herein called the Union or District Council, is a labor organization within Section 2(5) of the Act. III. THE UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES Respondent Joint Venture terminated Victor Marrero on or about December 6, 1972, and the issue in this caset is whether, as the General Counsel alleges, this termination was because Marrero sought to become a member of the District Council. As indicated above, Respondent is under contract with the District Council. This contract contains a 7-day, union- shop provision permitted in the building and construction industry, but does not provide for an exclusive hiring hall. There is a local organization named Manpower which was apparently established to promote employment oppor- tunities of minority groups, including Puerto Ricans. In September or October 1972, a Manpower representative requested Respondent's Job Superintendent Donald De- veau, to hire members of minority groups at Respondent's Neptune Avenue project. Respondent did engage about 20 such individuals "off and on," Marrero being one of them. These employees were apparently excused from the union- shop obligations under the contract, and were referred to in the record as "non-union" employees. Marrero applied for employment at the jobsite on or about October 12, 1972.1 He saw general labor foreman Louis Cirillo at the time, and Cirillo told Marrero to return 2 weeks later. Marrero returned on or about October 25 on which occasion he was hired by Cirillo and told to report for laborers work the next day (October 26). The first day of Marrero's employment Union Shop Steward Joseph Sottile spoke to Marrero and other newly hired "minority people." According to Marrero, Sottile told these "minority" individuals that "in two weeks if the company would issue a letter, we would see him and get into the Union." The record establishes that this letter was an employer's 'certification that an individual had a job, and Sottile testified that such a letter was required for admission to the Union. Marrero testified that he had meanwhile heard from other employees that he could be laid off unless he joined the Union, and that he thereupon 1 Although Marrero testified that he was not referred by Manpower, the record establishes that Respondent regarded him as within the "nunonty" group sponsored by that organization. 207 NLRB No. 151 DIC-UNDERHILL JOINT VENTURE 1025 asked Shop Steward Sottile about acquiring union mem- bership. Sottile replied that he would need a "letter" from Respondent to the Union, and Marrero testified that Sottile also indicated at the time that Marrero probably could not get in the Union unless he knew someone "in the business." The morning of December 6 Marrero spoke separately to Foreman Cirillo'and then to Job Superintendent Deveau, about a "letter" in order to get into the Union and each responded to the effect that many union members were out of work because of a work shortage at the time and that in his situation as a "minority" employee Marrero was thus better off without union membership. Later that same day Cirillo notified Marrero that he was being laid off with the explanation, according to Marrero's testimony, that Res- pondent was cutting back, on personnel. Respondent claims, in effect, that it discharged Marrero because of the later's inadequate job performance. Labor Foreman Juan Algarin was Marrero's immediate supervi- sor. Algarin testified that Marrero's performance was not up to standard from the outset and that he so notified Marrero. About a week before Marrero's termination, according to Deveau's testimony, General Labor Foreman Cirillo (who is Algarin's supervisor) told Deveau that he (Cirillo) was considering laying off Marrero for job inadequacies and Deveau further testified that he (Deveau) cautioned Cirillo against such action because of sensitive community feelings respecting "minority" employees. Algarin testified that he ultimately recommended Marre- ro's layoff to Cirillo for poor job performance and that Cirillo went along with the recommendation. Algarin also testified that he had delayed such recommendation in order to give Marrero a "break" for the reason that both were of Puerto Rican ancestry. General Labor Foreman Cirillo had hired Marrero, and Deveau testified that Cirillo also had authority to discharge Marrero despite Deveau's aforementioned caution to Cirillo about community relations, and Deveau further testified that he did not learn of the discharge until such action was taken. The General Counsel contends that Respondent dis- charged Marrero because of Marrero's indicated interest- in 2 In the event no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the Rules and Regulations of the National Labor Relations Board, the findings, conclusions, recommendations, and Recommended Order herein shall, as joining the Union. The General Counsel thus refers to Respondent's (Deveau's and Cirillo's) December 6 sugges- tion to Marrero that Marrero was better off without union membership and its failure to give him a "letter" to the Union; and the General Counsel also adverts to the chronology of December 6; namely, the discharge occur- ring the same day of Marrero's request for the "letter." The General Counsel also adduced the testimony of Marrero that Marrero had received no prior warnings or complaints about his work and that Cirillo had on one occasion even complimented him. (The parties stipulated in this connec- tion that Cirillo, if called, would deny such compliment.) The General Counsel further points out alleged inconsis- tencies in Respondent's" testimony, which I consider it unnecessary to recite in resolving this matter. Conclusions Direct evidence of unlawful motivation for discharges or other discrimination is often unobtainable, and a finding of such motivation may be made appropriately upon a consideration of all attendant circumstances. F. W. Wool- worth Company v. N L.R.B., 121 F.2d 658, 660 (C.A. 2). On the other hand, speculation and surmise will not do. In the present case, we have a union and an employer in contract relations, and I can find no evidentiary basis for inferring that Respondent-either unilaterally or in concert with the Union-had any interest in denying union membership to Marrero. Whether or not Respondent terminated Marrero for the reasons claimed by it, and I need not find that it did, I am thus unable to conclude that this record preponderantly establishes that Respondent took such action because of Marrero's manifested desire to join a union under contract with Respondent and which contract contains a union-shop provision. I accordingly, issue the following recommended: ORDER2 It is hereby ordered that the complaint herein be dismissed. provided in Sec 102.48 of the Rules and Regulations , be adopted by the Board and become its findings, conclusions , and order, and all objections thereto shall be deemed waived for all purposes. Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation