Dianne Waugh, Complainant,v.John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionJan 10, 2005
01a50038 (E.E.O.C. Jan. 10, 2005)

01a50038

01-10-2005

Dianne Waugh, Complainant, v. John E. Potter, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, Agency.


Dianne Waugh v. United States Postal Service

01A50038

January 10, 2005

.

Dianne Waugh,

Complainant,

v.

John E. Potter,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A50038

Agency No. 1-J-631-0052-03

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning her complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation

Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 791 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant

to 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission

affirms the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a casual clerk at the agency's St. Louis, MO Processing and

Distribution Center. Complainant sought EEO counseling and subsequently

filed a formal complaint on September 4, 2003, claiming that she was

discriminated against on the basis of disability when:

(1) on July 29, 2003, complainant was sent home and told not to return

to work without a doctor's note; and

on August 9, 2003, complainant was terminated during her probationary

period for attendance deficiencies.<1>

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

her right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that complainant had not been

discriminated against as alleged. Specifically, the agency concluded

that complainant was not an individual with a disability as defined

by the Rehabilitation Act, because her injury did not affect a major

life activity. The agency concluded further that even if complainant was

entitled to protection under the Rehabilitation Act as an individual with

a disability, the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for its actions.<2> Specifically, the agency determined that complainant

was sent home on July 29, 2003, for not having acceptable medical

documentation to support requested job restrictions; that complainant was

absent from work until August 9, 2003, without information to justify

the absences, and that complainant was terminated from employment at

that time. The agency concluded that complainant failed to prove that

its actions were a pretext for discrimination. This appeal followed.

The record in this case contains a copy of an email dated July 29,

2003, from an agency official to complainant's supervisor. Therein,

the agency official stated that complainant was on limited duty, and

was subsequently released to full duty by her physician, �per injury

comp.� The agency official indicated that complainant returned with a

new medical statement from a different physician and that �Inj Comp.�

said to honor the statement as limited duty until �Inj. Comp.� heard from

a claims examiner. The agency official stated that the claims examiner

did not authorize complainant to change physicians; that complainant

should therefore be considered �light duty;� and that because there is

no light duty for casual employees, she should be sent home.

The record also contains a copy of an affidavit from complainant's

supervisor, dated May 28, 2004. Therein, complainant's supervisor

stated that complainant was sent home on July 29, 2003, due to not

having acceptable medical documentation to support the job restrictions

that she was requesting. The supervisor stated further that from July

29, 2003 until August 9, 2003, he received no information to justify

complainant's absences from work. The supervisor stated that complainant

was spoken to on previous occasions; was made ware of the agency policy

on attendance; and what action could be taken regarding non-compliance.

The supervisor concluded by stating that at no time was he made aware

of any impairment that substantially limited complainant's ability to

perform one or more major life activities.

In the absence of direct evidence of discrimination, the allocation of

burdens and order of presentation of proof in a disability case alleging

discrimination is a three-step process. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,

411 U.S. 792, 802-803 (1973); and Heyman v. Queens Village Comm. for

Mental Health for Jamaica Cmty. Adolescent Program, 198 F. 3d 68 (2d

Cir. 1999)(applying McDonnell Douglas, to disability cases). First,

complainant must establish a prima facie case of discrimination by

presenting facts that, if unexplained, reasonably give rise to an

inference of discrimination; i.e., that a prohibited consideration was a

factor in the adverse employment action. McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at

802. Next, the agency must articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reason(s) for its actions. Texas Department of Community Affairs

v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981). If the agency is successful,

then the complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence,

that the legitimate reason(s) proffered by the agency was a pretext

for discrimination. Id. at 256.

Although the initial inquiry in a discrimination case usually focuses on

whether the complainant has established a prima facie case, following

this order of analysis is unnecessary when the agency has articulated

a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. See Washington

v. Department of the Navy, Petition No. 03900056 (May 31, 1990). In such

cases, the inquiry shifts from whether the complainant has established

a prima facie case to whether s/he has demonstrated by preponderance

of the evidence that the agency's reasons for its actions were merely a

pretext for discrimination. Id.; see also United States Postal Service

Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711, 714-717 (1983).

Here, we find that the agency has stated legitimate, nondiscriminatory

reasons for its actions. Specifically, the agency stated that

complainant was sent home on July 29, 2003, because she did not have

medical documentation to support the job restrictions she requested.

Regarding complainant's termination, the agency states that complainant

was absent from work from July 29 through August 9, 2003 without

sufficient documentation to justify or excuse her absence. The agency

indicates further that complainant along with three other employees were

terminated at this time due to attendance problems.

Because the agency has proffered legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons

for the alleged discriminatory event, complainant now bears the burden

of establishing that the agency's stated reasons are merely a pretext

for discrimination. Shapiro v. Social Security Administration, EEOC

Request No. 05960403 (December 6, 1996). Complainant can do this

by showing that the agency was motivated by a discriminatory reason.

Id. (citing St. Mary's Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993)).

Here, complainant has failed to establish that the agency's reasons

were a mask to hide unlawful discrimination. We find that complainant

has failed to prove that the agency's actions were the result of any

discriminatory animus toward complainant's disability as alleged.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, we AFFIRM the final

agency decision.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national

organization, and not the local office, facility or department in

which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

January 10, 2005

__________________

Date

1In its FAD, the agency identified the

disability as �not specified.� However, the investigative report

indicates that the disability relates to complainant's left shoulder.

The record further reflects that on April 22, 2003, complainant reported

an injury to her left shoulder when a �case gait� fell on her.

2The Commission will presume, for purposes of analysis only and without

so finding, that complainant is an individual with a disability.