Detroit Newspapers II

National Labor Relations Board - Board Decisions

Aug 27, 1998

326 N.L.R.B. 782 (N.L.R.B. 1998)

DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 782
Detroit Newspaper Agency d/b/a Detroit Newspa-
pers;1 The Detroit News, Inc. and The Detroit
Free Press, Inc. and Detroit Mailers Union No.
2040, International Brotherhood of Teamsters,
AFL–CIO; Detroit Typographical Union No. 18,
Communications Workers of America, AFL–
CIO; GCIU Local Union No. 13N, Graphic
Communications International Union, AFL–
CIO; GCIU, Local Union No. 289, Graphic
Communications International Union, AFL–
CIO; Newspaper Guild of Detroit Local 22 and
The Newspaper Guild, AFL–CIO; Teamsters
Local No. 372, International Brotherhood of
Teamsters, AFL–CIO and International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers, Local Union No.
58, AFL–CIO. Cases 7–CA–39522 and 7–CA–
39595
August 27, 1998
DECISION AND ORDER
BY CHAIRMAN GOULD AND MEMBERS LIEBMAN
AND HURTGEN
On November 7, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Wil-
liam G. Kocol issued the attached decision. The Re-
spondents filed exceptions, a supporting brief, and a re-
ply and cross-answering brief; the General Counsel filed
a cross-exception and an answering brief; and the Charg-
ing Parties in each case filed an answering brief.
The National Labor Relations Board has delegated its
authority in this proceeding to a three-member panel.
The Board has considered the decision and the record
in light of the exceptions and briefs and has decided to
affirm the judge’s rulings,2 findings,3 and conclusions
and to adopt the recommended Order.
ORDER
The National Labor Relations Board adopts the rec-
ommended Order of the administrative law judge and
orders that the Respondents, Detroit Newspapers, f/k/a
Detroit Newspaper Agency, The Detroit News, Inc. and
The Detroit Free Press, Inc., Detroit, Michigan; their
officers, agents, successors, and assigns, shall take the
action set forth in the Order.

1 We change the caption from “Detroit Newspapers, f/k/a Detroit
Newspapers Agency,” pursuant to the posthearing contentions of the
Respondents and General Counsel.
2 The judge noted that, in deciding this case, he considered his “ob-
servation of the demeanor of the witnesses.” Because no witnesses
testified at this proceeding, we do not rely on this statement.
3 In finding that the striking employees here were either unfair labor
practice strikers or in sympathy with such strikers, the judge relied
upon the decision of Administrative Law Judge Thomas R. Wilks, in a
case then pending before us, for the finding that the strike at issue was
an unfair labor practice strike. The judge here recognized that the
Board’s review of Judge Wilks’ decision would be the final administra-
tive determination of this issue, and that a decision in the present case
would be contingent on the Board’s decision in the earlier case. See
Columbia Portland Cement Co., 303 NLRB 880, 882 (1991), enfd. 979
F.2d 460 (6th Cir. 1992) (Board relied on its prior determination that
strike was an unfair labor practice strike). Since then, for the reasons
set forth in Detroit Newspapers, 326 NLRB No. 64 (1998), we have
affirmed Judge Wilks’ finding that the strike in question was an unfair
labor strike. Consequently, we review the judge’s findings here in light
of that action.

Linda Rabin Hammell, Esq., for the General Counsel.
Robert A. Vercruysse, Esq. (Vercruysse, Metz & Murray), of
Birmingham Farms, Michigan, for Respondents DNA and
Detroit News.
Jeremy P. Sherman and Kristin Michaels, Esqs. (Seyfarth,
Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson), of Chicago, Illinois, for
Respondent Free Press.
Samuel McKnight, Esq. (Klimist, Mcknight, Sale, McClow &
(Canzano, P.C.), of Southfield, Michigan, for the Charging
Party Unions.
John G. Adam, Esq. (Martens, Ice, Geary, Klass, Legghio, Is-
rael & Gorchow, P.C.), of Southfield, Michigan, for the
Charging Party Local 58.
DECISION
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
WILLIAM G. KOCOL Administrative Law Judge. This case
was tried in Detroit, Michigan, on September 8, 1997. The
charges in Cases 7–CA–39522 and 7–CA–39595 were filed
February 24 and March 12, 1997, respectively, complaints is-
sued on April 3 and 18, 1997, respectively, and amended com-
plaints (the complaints) issued on July 2 and May 2, 1997, re-
spectively. The complaints allege that Detroit Newspapers
f/k/a Detroit Newspaper Agency (Respondent Detroit Newspa-
pers),1 The Detroit News, Inc. (Respondent News), and The
Detroit Free Press, Incorporated (Respondent Free Press) (col-
lectively Respondents) violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the
Act by failing to reinstate striking employees represented by the
Unions identified in the caption of this case to their former
positions with Respondents. Respondents filed timely answers
which denied the substantive allegations of the complaints and
raised a number of affirmative defenses.
On the entire record, including my observation of the de-
meanor of the witnesses, and after considering the briefs filed
by the General Counsel,2 Respondents, Local Union No. 58,
International Brotherhood of Electrical Workers, AFL–CIO,
(Local 58), and the remaining Unions listed in the caption of
this case (the Unions), I make the following
FINDINGS OF FACT
I. JURISDICTION
The Respondent, Detroit Newspapers, is organized as a joint
operating agreement partnership pursuant to the Federal News-
paper Preservation Act and under Michigan law. Respondent
News, a subsidiary of Gannett Newspapers, Inc., and Respon-
dent Free Press, a subsidiary of Knight-Ridder Newspaper, Inc.,
are, and have been at all times material copartners doing busi-
ness for the purposes described below under the trade name and
1 Respondents assert that Respondent Detroit Newspapers is mis-
named and that it is correctly named “Detroit Newspaper Agency d/b/a
Detroit Newspapers.” However, no evidence was submitted to estab-
lish this assertion, and the General Counsel has not moved to amend the
pleadings to accept this representation.
2 The General Counsel’s unopposed motion to correct transcript is
granted; that motion is received in evidence as ALJ Exh. 1.
326 NLRB No. 65
DETROIT NEWSPAPERS 783
style of Detroit Newspapers. At all material times Respondent
Detroit Newspapers has an office and place of business at 615
West Lafayette, Detroit, Michigan, and had been engaged in the
publishing and circulation operations of all nonnews and none-
ditorial departments of Respondent News and Respondent Free
Press as a unified business enterprise, as agents for and for the
benefit of both newspapers, and is responsible for selling ad-
vertising, printing, and distribution of the two newspapers.
Respondent Detroit Newspapers, in the course and conduct of
its business operations described above, annually derives gross
revenues in excess of $500,000, and purchases and receives at
its facilities in the State of Michigan newsprint and other goods
and materials valued in excess of $50,000 directly from points
outside the State of Michigan.
Respondent News, a corporation, has been engaged in the
operation of the news and editorial departments of a daily
newspaper at its facility located at 615 Lafayette, Detroit,
Michigan, where it annually derives gross revenues in excess of
$200,000 and held membership in and/or subscribed to various
interstate news services and published various nationally syndi-
cated features and advertised various nationally sold products.
Respondent Free Press, a corporation, has been engaged in
the operation of the news and editorial departments of a daily
newspaper at its facility located at 321 Lafayette, Detroit,
Michigan, where it annually derives gross revenues in excess of
$200,000 and held membership in and/or subscribed to various
interstate news services and published various nationally syndi-
cated features and advertised various nationally sold products.
It is admitted, and I find, that Respondents are each employ-
ers engaged in commerce within the meaning of Section 2(2),
(6), and (7) of the Act.
It is admitted, and I find, that Local 58 and each of the Un-
ions are labor organizations within the meaning of Section 2(5)
of the Act.
II. ALLEGED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
A. The Strike
On July 13, 1995, employees of Respondents represented by
the Unions engaged in a strike after Respondents and the Un-
ions were unable to reach agreement on successor collective-
bargaining agreements; over 2000 employees participated in the
strike. On November 6, 1995, certain employees represented
by Local 58 joined the strike in sympathy.3

3 Those employees are John Gutzman, Phillip Oliver, David Ander-
son, Robert Sossi, Michael Moran, Andre Viger, Girard Goodreau, and
Lorna Whitfield. At the time these employees joined the strike they
were covered by a collective-bargaining agreement containing a no-
strike clause as follows: “There shall be no stoppage of work, either by
strike or lockouts, because of any proposed change in this Agreement,
or dispute over matters relating to this Agreement. All such matters
must be handled as stated herein.” This language clearly does not
waive the employees’ right to engage in sympathy strikes, since by
definition such strikes would not relate to matters covered by the that
agreement. This interpretation is strengthened by the fact that in nego-
tiations for this contract, Respondent Detroit Newspaper proposed a
specific waiver of the right to engage in sympathy strikes, but it was
unsuccessful in obtaining that langauge. See Indianapolis Power Co.,
291 NLRB 1039 (1988), enfd. 898 F.2d 524 (7th Cir. 1990). In any
event no one contends that there has been a waiver of the right to en-
gage in a sympathy strike by Local 58 on behalf of the employees it
represents.
On June 19, 1997, Administrative Law Judge Thomas R.
Wilks issued a decision w he found that Respondents had
committed certain unfair labor practices. Important to this case,
Judge Wilks concluded that the strike that commenced on July
13, 1995, was an unfair labor practice strike. Judge Wilks or-
dered Respondents to reinstate all unfair labor practice strikers
to their former positions, upon their unconditional offer to re-
turn to work, displacing, if necessary, any replacements em-
ployees hired during the strike. Respondents filed exceptions
to that decision, and the matter is now pending before the
Board.4
This case deals with the issues of whether there has been an
unconditional offer by the striking employees to return to work,
and if so, whether Respondents have offered reinstatement to
those employees in a manner consistent with their status as
unfair labor practice strikers.
B. The Offers to Return to Work and Respondents’ Response
By letters dated February 13 through 17, 1997,5 the Unions
individually advised Respondents that the striking employees
that they represented were making an unconditional offer to
return to work.6 In their answer, Respondent Detroit Newspa-
pers and Respondent News admitted that the offers described
above were unconditional; Respondent Free Press contended in
its answer that these offers were not unconditional. However,
at the hearing Respondent Free Press withdrew that contention
and was no longer seeking to show that the offers were not
unconditional.
By letter dated February 21, Local 58 advised Respondent
Detroit Newspapers of the names of seven employees who
wished to return to work;7 6 days later Local 58 revised that
list.8 On March 10, Local 58 again revised the list of employ-
ees who had joined the strike but desired to return to work.9
Respondent Detroit Newspapers thereafter acknowledged in
letters to the Local 58 that it understood that these offers were
unconditional.
Respondents responded to the offers to return to work by
treating the returning strikers as economic strikers; they devel-
oped a preferential hiring list for returning the strikers to work.
Respondents did not discharge employees who were hired as
replacements during the strike. None of the striking employees
who had offered to return to work were offered reinstatement
by Respondents within 5 days.10
4 As the General Counsel concedes, a finding of a violation in this
case is contingent on the Board’s affirmation of Judge Wilks’ finding
that the strike commencing July 13, 1995, was an unfair labor practice
strike. If the Board reverses that finding, then this case should be dis-
missed, and I so find. However, in the event that the Board affirms that
critical finding, I shall procede to resolve the issues in this case.
5 All dates hereinafter refer to 1997 unless specifically indicated oth-
erwise.
6 Specifically, Local 2040 and Local 372’s letters are dated February
13; Local 289 and Local 18’s letters are dated February 14; Local
13N’s letter is dated February 15; and Local 22’s letter is dated Febru-
ary 17.
7 Those employees are William Bilot, Girard Goodreau, David Mig-
dal, Michael Moran, Phillip Oliver, Robert Sossi, and Andre Viger.
8 Local 58 added the name of employee David Anderson and deleted
the name of David Migdal.
9 The employees on this revised list are the same as those identified
in fn. 3.
10 There is evidence that certain employees were made allegedly
valid offers of reinstatement at times thereafter, but I conclude that
these alleged offers of reinstatement were made pursuant to a preferen-
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 784
C. Analysis
Well-established standards apply to the resolution of this
case. A continuation of the strike does not negate an otherwise
unconditional offer to return to work, where the strike contin-
ues by virtue of the employer’s failure to properly reinstate the
striking employees. Hawaii Meat Co., 139 NLRB 966, 971
(1962). Unfair labor practice strikers are entitled to reinstate-
ment upon their unconditional offer to return to work, displac-
ing, if necessary, any replacements hired during the strike.
Mastro Plastics Corp. v. NLRB, 350 U.S. 270 (1956). An em-
ployer violates Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by failing to
offer reinstatement to unfair labor practice strikers who have
made an unconditional offer to return to work. Cal Spas, 322
NLRB 41 (1996). In order to permit an orderly return to work,
the Board affords an employer a 5-day period in which to return
the former strikers to work without incurring a backpay obliga-
tion. However, where that 5-day period is ignored, then back-
pay obligations begin from the date of the unconditional offer
to return to work. La Corte ECM, Inc., 322 NLRB 137 (1996).
Employees who strike in sympathy with unfair labor practice
strikers assume the same status as the unfair labor practice
strikers. Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc., 224 NLRB 341, 342
(1976).
Applying these principles, I conclude that there was a un-
conditional offer made on behalf of these employees to return
to work. Inasmuch as Judge Wilks has determined that the
strike was an unfair labor practice strike, and if the Board af-
firms that finding, then Respondents were obligated to reinstate
the strikers to their former positions, displacing, if necessary,
replacement employees. Respondents failed to do so. By fail-
ing to reinstate the strikers, Respondents violated Section
8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act.
D. Compliance Matters
At the hearing I ruled that I would not receive evidence on
what I consider to be compliance-related matters. Although I
have concluded that Respondents violated the Act by failing to
offer reinstatement to strikers as unfair labor practice strikers, I
determined to leave for future proceedings, if necessary, the
resolution of issues such as whether lawful changes in Respon-
dents’ operations preclude immediate reinstatement of all strik-
ers, whether individual strikers engaged in conduct which
would deprive them of their right to reinstatement, whether
certain strikers have already returned to work or otherwise have
been reinstated, and whether employees waived reinstatement
by failing to respond to a proper offer of reinstatement made by
Respondents. My reasons for doing so are as follows. Ordinar-
ily, compliance matters are left for resolution after there has
been court enforcement of a Board Order or an indication that a
respondent will not appeal the Board’s Order. I recognize that
under certain circumstances compliance-related matters may be
appropriately resolved along with the determination of whether
an unfair labor practice has occurred. Pease Co., 251 NLRB
540, 544 (1980). I have determined that such a course would
not be appropriate in this case. First, no party seeks to com-
pletely litigate all compliance issues. Indeed, that would im-
practical, if not impossible, to do so at this point, since Respon-
dents have not begun the process of displacing the replacement
employees.

tial hiring list consistent with Respondents’ position that the returning
strikers were economic strikers and not unfair labor practice strikers.
Nonetheless, the parties urge that I resolve certain compli-
ance-related issues. For example, as noted above, offers of
employment were sent to certain employees represented by
Local 58. The General Counsel and Local 58 argue that the
offers were inadequate in that they did not allow the employees
sufficient time to respond; they make related arguments con-
cerning the alleged response of the strikers to Respondent De-
troit Newspapers failure to reinstate them as unfair labor prac-
tice strikers. Respondents argue in turn that their conduct was
appropriate and that this affects the employees right to rein-
statement and backpay. Under the circumstances of this case, I
believe that all compliance-related issues should be left for
resolution at the compliance stage of these proceedings. As
noted above, the Board has not yet issued a final decision in
Judge Wilks’ case; thus, these compliance matters may be en-
tirely unnecessary. Moreover, there is almost certain to be an
overlap between compliance issues raised concerning the em-
ployees represented by Local 58 and the other returning strik-
ers; under these circumstances it is more appropriate to view
the totality of circumstances. Finally, I consider the delay that
litigation of these matters would have on the disposition of the
more central issues of this case. Accordingly, I once again
decline the invitation to resolve those issues; they can be pre-
sented and resolved in a future proceeding, if necessary.
E. Respondents’ Defenses
Respondents assert a number of defenses to the allegations in
the complaint. They argue that because Judge Wilks’ decision
has not yet been ruled upon by the Board, it was inappropriate
to proceed with this case. Respondents also make a related
argument that under these circumstances the General Counsel
failed to prove his case by failing to show that the July 13, 1995
strike was an unfair labor practice strike. They also argue that
they were deprived of due process when I ruled at the hearing
that no party would be permitted to relitigate that issue in this
case. First, I shall discuss the effect Judge Wilks’ decision has
in this case, and then I shall discuss the propriety of the General
Counsel’s decision to litigate this case at this time.
To be sure, Respondents are correct that Judge Wilks’ deci-
sion is not final until it is adopted by the Board. However, it
does not follow that this case may not be litigated until the
Board issues its decision in that case. Respondents’ arguments
boil down to the fact that since Judge Wilks’ decision is not yet
final, it is not yet appropriate to apply res judicata and collateral
estoppel. This argument misses the point, because I recognize
in this decision that Judge Wilks’ decision is not binding on
me; and it is the Board’s decision in that case that will be bind-
ing. Indeed, I have explicitly indicated above that if the Board
reverses Judge Wilks on the critical finding concerning the
nature of the strike, then this case should be dismissed. In the
alternative, if that finding is upheld by the Board, then my other
findings become operative. Thus, it is clear that it is the
Board’s decision, which will be a final administrative decision,
that will decide the nature of the strike in this case. Thus, the
notions of res judicata and collateral estoppel will fully apply
and the Board’s finding concerning the nature of the strike will
be binding on Respondents (and the General Counsel) and they
will be precluded from relitigating it.11 Thus, contrary to Re-
spondents’ assertions, I am not independently deciding in this
11 The other necessary elements—common issues and common par-
ties—are obviously present in this case. Phoenix Newspapers, Inc., 294
NLRB 47, 78 (1989).

DETROIT NEWSPAPERS 785
case the nature of the July, 13, 1995 strike; I am only deciding
that the Board will decide that issue in the prior case and that
finding will be binding and will serve as a predicate for decid-
ing the issues raised in this case.
The cases show that in similar circumstances on occasion
administrative law judges have chosen to operate under the
assumption that a pending decision may be upheld by the
Board. Markle Mfg. Co., 239 NLRB 1142, 1147 (1979), mod.
on other grounds 623 F.2d 1122 (5th Cir. 1980); Iron Workers
Local 103, 195 NLRB 980, 983–984 (1972), enfd. 81 LRRM
2705 (7th Cir. 1972). On other occasions the administrative
law judge has determined that such an assumption would be
improper. Superior Container, Inc., 276 NLRB 532, 533
(1985); Associated Milk Producers, 259 NLRB 1033,1038 fn. 3
(1982); Hospitality Motor Inn, Inc., 250 NLRB 1189, 1193
(1980). Interestingly, under either approach, the result is the
same; the Board decides the issue in the original case and de-
termines what impact it has in the subsequent case. Kings Ter-
race Nursing Home, 229 NLRB 1180, 1180 fn. 1 (1977);
American Thread Co., 270 NLRB 526, 526 fn .2 (1982). The
Board does the same thing in any number of circumstances.
Columbia Portland Cement Co., 303 NLRB 880, 882 (1991),
enfd. 979 F.2d 460 (6th Cir. 1992); State Bank of India, 273
NLRB 267 (1984), enfd. 808 F.2d 526 (7th Cir. 1986).
What the Board has not said is that it inappropriate for the
General Counsel to proceed in litigating cases in this fashion.
This brings us to the issue of whether it was appropriate for the
General Counsel to prosecute this case before the Board had
finally decided the issue of the nature of the strike. The Gen-
eral Counsel points out that to await the final determination of
Judge Wilks’ case would unduly delay the final resolution of
the issues raised in this case. Prompt final resolution of labor
disputes, especially cases such as this one which have signifi-
cant consequences, is an important policy consideration.
Moreover, the Board has recognized that the General Counsel
has been entrusted by Congress with broad discretion in exer-
cising his duties under the Act. Of course, that exercise of
discretion may not be arbitrary or prejudicial to a litigant.
Here, however, Respondents are unable to point to specific
harm that they have suffered by the litigation of this case; the
repeated invocation of “denial of due process” is insufficient.
In sum, I conclude that Respondents’ arguments on this matter
are without merit.
Respondents also argue that it is inappropriate to proceed to
litigate this case because it is merely duplicative of matters
covered by Judge Wilks’ decision. However, this case differs
from the earlier case in several significant respects. First, in
this case the General Counsel alleges that Respondents’ failure
to reinstate returning strikers constitutes an independent viola-
tion of the Act which warrants remedial relief; this issue was
not before Judge Wilks. Also, contrary to Respondents’ asser-
tion in their brief, Judge Wilks did not order backpay for strik-
ers who were not reinstated; this is a specific remedy sought by
the General Counsel in this case. Finally, the General Counsel
argues that in light of the additional unfair labor practices
committed by Respondents in this case, a broad cease-and-
desist order is necessary. These differences clearly distinguish
this case from the earlier case and compel the rejection of Re-
spondents’ arguments.
Respondents also argue that Rule 201 of the Federal Rules of
Evidence prohibits me from taking notice of the nature of the
July, 13, 1995 strike. I agree; use of Rule 201 to do that in this
case would be inappropriate. However, this argument again
misses the point; as described above, I have not relied on Rule
201 in any respect.
Finally, Respondents argue that these case were improperly
consolidated and that I erred when I denied a motion to sever.
However, in light of the obvious commonality of issues and
parties stemming from the history of this case, consolidation is
clearly proper. Respondents’ references to the General Coun-
sel’s internal casehandling manual do not dictate a different
result. First, that manual is not binding on the Board in deter-
mining when consolidation is appropriate. In any event, that
manual does not prohibit consolidation under these circum-
stances, it merely fails to list these circumstances as one where
consolidation may be required.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Respondents are each employers engaged in commerce
within the meaning of Section 2(2), (6), and (7) of the Act.
2. Local 58 and the Unions are each labor organizations
within the meaning of Section 2(5) of the Act.
3. By failing to offer immediate reinstatement to employees
who joined in the strike that commenced July 13, 1995, and
who thereafter made an unconditional offer to return to work,
the Respondents have engaged in unfair labor practices affect-
ing commerce within the meaning of Section 8(a)(3) and (1)
and Section 2(6) and (7) of the Act.
REMEDY
Having found that the Respondents have engaged in certain
unfair labor practices, I find that they must be ordered to cease
and desist and to take certain affirmative action designed to
effectuate the policies of the Act. As to all employees who
joined in the strike that commenced July 13, 1995, and for
whom an unconditional offer to return to work was made, I
shall order Respondents to offer them immediate and full rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist,
to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed,
discharging, if necessary, any replacements, and make them
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits, computed on
a quarterly basis from the date of their unconditional offer to
return to work to the date of proper offers of reinstatement, less
any net interim earnings, as prescribed in F. W. Woolworth Co.,
90 NLRB 289 (1950), plus interest as computed in New Hori-
zons for the Retarded, 283 NLRB 1173 (1987).
The General Counsel, in the complaints, requests that a
broad cease-and-desist order issue in this case; that argument is
not repeated in his brief. A broad order is appropriate when an
employer or union has shown a proclivity to violate the Act or
where it is shown that they have engaged in pattern of conduct
demonstrating a widespread and general disregard for employ-
ees’ Section 7 rights. Hickmott Foods, 242 NLRB 1357 (1979).
Here, the record shows that the core of Judge Wilks’ decision
was that Respondents violated Section 8(a)(5) and (1) of the
Act by failing to bargain in good faith; he concluded that the
unfair labor practices caused the strike. I have concluded that
Respondents violated Section 8(a)(3) and (1) of the Act by
failing to properly reinstate unfair labor practice strikers. Al-
though these unfair labor practices are serious and have serious
consequences, they stem from a single course of conduct taken
by Respondents and do not show either a proclivity to violate
the Act or a widespread and general disregard for Section 7
DECISIONS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD 786
rights. Accordingly, a narrow cease-and-desist order is appro-
priate in this case.
On these findings of fact and conclusions of law and on the
entire record, I issue the following recommended12
ORDER
The Respondents, Detroit Newspapers, f/k/a Detroit News-
paper Agency, The Detroit News, Inc. and The Detroit Free
Press, Inc., Detroit, Michigan; their officers, agents, successors,
and assigns, shall
1. Cease and desist from
(a) Failing to offer to those employees who joined the strike
that commenced July 13, 1995, and for whom unconditional
offers to return to work were made, immediate and full rein-
statement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer exist,
to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to their
seniority or any other rights or privileges previously enjoyed,
discharging, if necessary, any replacements.
(b) In any like or related manner interfering with, restraining,
or coercing employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
them by Section 7 of the Act.
2. Take the following affirmative action necessary to effec-
tuate the policies of the Act.
(a) Within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer to those
employees who joined the strike that commenced July 13,
1995, and for whom unconditional offers to return to work were
made, immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or,
if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed, discharging, if necessary, any
replacements.
(b) Make the employees described above in paragraph 2(a)
whole for any loss of earnings and other benefits suffered as a
result of the discrimination against them, in the manner set
forth in the remedy section of the decision.
(c) Preserve and, within 14 days of a request, make available
to the Board or its agents for examination and copying, all pay-
roll records, social security payment records, timecards, per-
sonnel records and reports, and all other records necessary to
analyze the amount of backpay due under the terms of this Or-
der.
(d) Within 14 days after service by the Region, post at their
facilities in Detroit, Michigan, copies of the attached notice
marked “Appendix.”13 Copies of the notice, on forms provided
by the Regional Director for Region 7, after being signed by the
Respondents’ authorized representative, shall be posted by
Respondents immediately upon receipt and maintained for 60
consecutive days in conspicuous places including all places
where notices to employees are customarily posted. Reasonable
steps shall be taken by Respondents to ensure that the notices
are not altered, defaced, or covered by any other material. In
the event that, during the pendency of these proceedings, Re-
spondents has gone out of business or closed the facility in-
volved in these proceedings, Respondents shall duplicate and
mail, at its own expense, a copy of the notice to all current em-
ployees and former employees employed by Respondents at
any time since February 24, 1997.

12 If no exceptions are filed as provided by Sec. 102.46 of the
Board’s Rules and Regulations, the findings, conclusions, and recom-
mended Order shall, as provided in Sec. 102.48 of the Rules, be
adopted by the Board and all objections to them shall be deemed
waived for all purposes.
13 If this Order is enforced by a Judgment of the United States Court
of Appeals, the words in the notice reading “Posted by Order of the
National Labor Relations Board” shall read “Posted Pursuant to a
Judgment of the United States Court of Appeals Enforcing an Order of
the National Labor Relations Board.”
(e) Within 21 days after service by the Region, file with the
Regional Director a sworn certification of a responsible official
on a form provided by the Region attesting to the steps that
Respondents has taken to comply.
APPENDIX
NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES
POSTED BY ORDER OF THE
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
An Agency of the United States Government

The National Labor Relations Board has found that we violated the
National Labor Relations Act and has ordered us to post and abide
by this notice.

Section 7 of the Act gives employees these rights.
To organize
To form, join, or assist any union
To bargain collectively through representatives of their
own choice
To act together for other mutual aid or protection
To choose not to engage in any of these protected con-
certed activities.

WE WILL NOT fail to offer to those employees who joined the
strike that commenced July 13, 1995, and for whom uncondi-
tional offers to return to work were made, immediate and full
reinstatement to their former jobs or, if those jobs no longer
exist, to substantially equivalent positions, without prejudice to
their seniority or any other rights or privileges previously en-
joyed, discharging, if necessary, any replacements.
WE WILL NOT in any like or related manner interfere with,
restrain, or coerce you in the exercise of the rights guaranteed
you by Section 7 of the Act.
WE WILL within 14 days from the date of this Order, offer to
those employees who joined the strike that commenced July 13,
1995, and for whom unconditional offers to return to work were
made, immediate and full reinstatement to their former jobs or,
if those jobs no longer exist, to substantially equivalent posi-
tions, without prejudice to their seniority or any other rights or
privileges previously enjoyed, discharging, if necessary, any
replacements.
WE WILL make those employees whole for any loss of earn-
ings and other benefits suffered as a result of the discrimination
against them, in the manner set forth in the remedy section of
the decision.
DETROIT NEWSPAPERS, F/K/A DETROIT NEWSPAPER
AGENCY, THE DETROIT NEWS, INC. AND THE
DETROIT FREE PRESS, INC.