Dennis George. Thompson

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 27, 2019

14841513 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Dec. 27, 2019)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
14/841,513 08/31/2015 Dennis George Thompson 50596 (CNHA:0370) 6615
71475 7590 12/27/2019
CNH Industrial America LLC
Intellectual Property Law Department
700 STATE STREET
RACINE, WI 53404
EXAMINER
SCOTT, JACOB S
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3659
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/27/2019 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
napatent@cnhind.com
vannette.azarian@cnhind.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
Ex parte DENNIS GEORGE THOMPSON
Appeal 2019-002619
Application 14/841,513
Technology Center 3600
Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, JOHN C. KERINS, and
CHARLES N. GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judges.
GREENHUT, Administrative Patent Judge.
DECISION ON APPEAL
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–10 and 16–25. See Final Act. 1. We
have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word Appellant to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as CNH Industrial
Canada, Ltd. Appeal Br. 2.
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Application 14/841,513
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CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER
The claims are directed to “[a] flow control system for an agricultural
metering system.” Spec. ¶ 1. Claim 1, reproduced below, with emphasis
added, is illustrative of the claimed subject matter:
1. A flow control system for an agricultural metering system,
comprising:
at least one clutch configured to alternately engage and
disengage in response to a respective pulse-width modulation
(PWM) signal, wherein the at least one clutch is configured to
establish a rotatable connection between a respective drive input
and a respective rotatable metering device while engaged and to
interrupt the rotatable connection between the respective drive
input and the respective rotatable metering device while
disengaged; and
a control system communicatively coupled to the at least
one clutch and configured to output the respective PWM signal,
wherein the PWM signal is configured to induce the at least one
clutch to disengage while the PWM signal is at a first magnitude
and to induce the at least one clutch to engage while the PWM
signal is at a second magnitude, different from the first
magnitude, and the control system is configured to control a
rotation rate of the respective rotatable metering device by
adjusting a duty cycle of the respective PWM signal.
REFERENCES
The prior art relied upon by the Examiner is:
Name Reference Date
Brome US 2006/0178177 A1 Aug. 10, 2006
Leising US 2008/0296117 A1 Dec. 4, 2008
Thompson US 2012/0325131 A1 Dec. 27, 2012

REJECTION
Claims 1–10 and 16–25 are rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as being
unpatentable over Thompson, Brome, and Leising. Final Act. 2.
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OPINION
Claims 1–10 and 16–20
These claims are argued as a group for which claim 1 is representative
under 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv).
The Examiner relies on Thompson for the basic system claimed albeit
without a pulse-width modulation (PWM) control of the clutch. Final
Act. 2–4. Appellant and the Examiner disagree as to whether Brome, when
combined with Thompson in the manner proposed by the Examiner, would
satisfy the limitation emphasized above. App. Br. 7–8; Final Act. 4–5; Ans.
19–20. Appellant’s position is that varying the amount of engagement does
not equate to first and second magnitudes of the PWM signal that
respectively engage and disengage the clutch. App. Br. 8; Reply. Br 2.
First, we note that the claim does not preclude variation of the amount
of clutch engagement via the PWM signal. If anything, the last clause of the
claim, “the control system is configured to control a rotation rate of the
respective rotatable metering device by adjusting a duty cycle of the
respective PWM signal” appears to actually require it. Second, as the
Examiner correctly points out:
Brome teaches, to disengage the clutch, the “[c]ontroller 234
releases the clutch by reducing the duty cycle to zero and thereby
interrupting all current to the clutch valve coil of clutch 220”,
paragraph [0090]. Also, Brome teaches, to engage the clutch, the
“controller 234 applies current to the control valve for clutch 220
at a 100% duty cycle. In other words, it completely engages
clutch 220”, paragraph [0075].
Ans. 19–20 (quoting Brome). Thus, the “first magnitude” associated with
clutch disengagement in Brome is zero, exactly like the exemplary first
magnitude discussed in Appellant’s own Specification. Spec. para. 35 (“the
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Application 14/841,513
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PWM signal may alternate between a first magnitude (e.g., zero
magnitude)”). The “second magnitude” is some non-zero magnitude in
Brome associated with the 100% duty cycle. This is also consistent with
Appellant’s Specification. Spec. para. 35 (“a second magnitude (e.g.,
maximum magnitude)”). We are not apprised by Appellant as to why the
express language of claim 1 would require anything more.
Appellant’s reliance on the absence of the aforementioned teachings
of Brome in Thompson and Leising (App. Br. 8–9; Reply. Br. 2–3) is
inapposite. Non-obviousness cannot be shown by attacking references
individually when the rejection is predicated upon the teachings of a
combination of references. See In re Merck & Co. Inc., 800 F.2d 1091, 1097
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (citation omitted).
For the foregoing reasons we sustain the Examiner’s rejection of
claims 1–10 and 16–20.

Claims 21–25
Providing a “plurality of housings” and disposing “each clutch of the
plurality of clutches and a corresponding clutch controller of the plurality of
clutch controllers [] within a respective housing of the plurality of housings”
as recited in claim 21 may seem like a fairly simple concept. Nonetheless,
this does not excuse the Examiner from presenting adequate evidence and/or
analysis to sufficiently account for this particular claim limitation. See Final
Act. 7. All words in a claim must be considered in judging the obviousness
of the claimed subject matter. See In re Wilson, 424 F.2d 1382, 1385.
The Examiner states:
Thompson teaches separate, selectively engaged and
independently controllable metering sections which would all
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Application 14/841,513
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have separate housings for the components so as to contain and
protect the clutches and controllers. See paragraph [0032].
Ans. 15. However, we find nothing in paragraph 32 of Thompson relating to
housings, and no reasoning of record to demonstrate why independent
control of the metering sections necessarily requires separate clutch
housings.
“[T]he precise language of 35 U.S.C. § 102 that ‘(a) person shall be
entitled to a patent unless,’ concerning novelty and unobviousness, clearly
places a burden of proof on the Patent Office which requires it to produce
the factual basis for its rejection of an application under sections 102 and
103.” In re Warner 379 F.2d 1011, 1016 (CCPA 1967). The Patent Trial and
Appeal Board is primarily a tribunal of review. See Ex Parte Frye, 94
USPQ2d 1072, 1075-1077 (BPAI 2010) (precedential). For that review to be
meaningful it must be based on some concrete evidence in the record to
support the Examiner’s factual findings and legal conclusions. In re Zurko,
258 F.3d 1379, 1386 (Fed. Cir. 2001). The key to supporting any prima facie
conclusion of obviousness under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of
the reason(s) why the claimed invention would have been obvious. The
Court in KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) noted that the
analysis supporting a rejection under 35 U.S.C.§ 103 should be made
explicit. The Federal Circuit has stated that “rejections on obviousness
grounds cannot be sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there
must be some articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to
support the legal conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988
(Fed. Cir. 2006), cited with approval in KSR Int’l. v. Teleflex, 550 U.S. at
418.
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Appellant correctly argues the Examiner has not carried this burden
with respect to claim 21. App. Br. 12–13; Reply. Br 3–4.
CONCLUSION
The Examiner’s rejection is affirmed-in-part.
More specifically,
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 1–10 and 16–20 is affirmed.
The Examiner’s rejection of claims 21–25 is reversed.
DECISION SUMMARY
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–10, 16–
25
103 Thompson, Brome,
Leising
1–10, 16–
20
21–25

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED-IN-PART