DELTA T, LLC

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Dec 22, 2021

2021002005 (P.T.A.B. Dec. 22, 2021)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
15/307,747 10/28/2016 James M. DESMET 1527-574 3163
35161 7590 12/22/2021
DICKINSON WRIGHT PLLC - WASHINGTON, DC
1825 EYE ST., NW
SUITE 900
WASHINGTON, DC 20006
EXAMINER
COMINGS, DANIEL C
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3763
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
12/22/2021 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
dwpatents@dickinsonwright.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte JAMES M. DESMET,
DAVID R. BANKS, ALEX CHRISTOPHER REED,
MARCUS LANDON BORDERS, and JASON BISHOP

Appeal 2021-002005
Application 15/307,747
Technology Center 3700
____________

Before MICHAEL C. ASTORINO, BRUCE T. WIEDER, and
KENNETH G. SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judges.

SCHOPFER, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1–4, 7–13, 15–26, 28, 29, 71–74, 77, 78
and 89–92. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM IN PART.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Delta T, LLC.
Appeal Br. 3.
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BACKGROUND
The Specification “relates generally to the control of one or more
environmental conditions, such as temperature or light, affecting a space
occupied by a person and, more particularly, to a fixed or wall-mountable
control for regulating devices for controlling such environmental conditions
based on sensed conditions or personal preference.” Spec. ¶ 1.
CLAIMS
Claims 1, 15, 71, and 89 are the independent claims on appeal.
Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed claims and recites:
1. An apparatus for controlling environmental conditions in
connection with a space for occupancy by a person, the space
including a partition, a fan for circulating air in the space, and a
light for illuminating the space, comprising:
a control including a switch, the control adapted for
mounting to the partition and controlling the fan and the light
based on one or more sensed conditions.
Appeal Br. 20.
REJECTIONS
1. The Examiner rejects claims 1–4, 7–13, 15–19, 22–26, 29, 71–74, 77, 78,
89, and 90 under 35 U.S.C. § 102(a)(2) as anticipated by Fadell.2
2. The Examiner rejects claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Fadell in view of Mohan.3
3. The Examiner rejects claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Fadell in view of Adams.4

2 Fadell et al., US 2014/0266669 A1, pub. Sept. 18, 2014.
3 Mohan et al., US 2012/0326608 A1, pub. Dec. 27, 2012.
4 Adams et al., US 2012/0261078 A1, pub. Oct. 18, 2012.
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4. The Examiner rejects claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Fadell in view of Yonekura.5
5. The Examiner rejects claims 91 and 92 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Fadell in view of Mehta.6
6. The Examiner rejects claims 71–74, 77, and 78 under 35 U.S.C.
§ 102(a)(1) as anticipated by Luskin.7
7. The Examiner rejects claims 1–3, 7–13, 15, 17–19, 22–26, 29, 89, and 90
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable over Luskin in view of Hopkins.8
8. The Examiner rejects claims 4 and 16 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Luskin in view of Hopkins and Fadell.
9. The Examiner rejects claim 20 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Luskin in view of Hopkins and Mohan.
10. The Examiner rejects claim 21 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Luskin in view of Hopkins and Adams.
11. The Examiner rejects claim 28 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as unpatentable
over Luskin in view of Hopkins and Yonekura.
12. The Examiner rejects claims 91 and 92 under 35 U.S.C. § 103 as
unpatentable over Luskin in view of Hopkins and Mehta.

5 Yonekura, JP 3-156623 A, pub. July 4, 1991.
6 Mehta et al., US 5,189,412, iss. Feb. 23, 1993.
7 Luskin et al., US 2006/0161270 A1, pub. July 20, 2006.
8 Hopkins, US 8,963,466 B2, iss. Feb. 24, 2015.
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DISCUSSION
Anticipation by Fadell
Claims 1–4 and 7–13
We are persuaded of error in the rejection of claim 1 as anticipated by
Fadell because the Examiner has not established that Fadell discloses a
control for controlling a fan based on a sensed condition.
With respect to claim 1, the Examiner finds that Fadell discloses a
control that controls both a fan and a light based on sensed conditions
because the fan and lights are taught to be controlled by smart switches
using sensed conditions and
[Fadell] teaches the smart wall switches to use data acquired by
home occupancy sensors and information regarding past user
control behavior to self-program automation routines to turn off
and on lights according to the user’s preferred schedule, and
further teaches that “it should be appreciated that all network-
connected smart devices can automatically self-program”, thus
teaching equivalent control of the ceiling fans also taught for
control by the same self-automating smart wall switches.
Final Act. 5–6 (citing Fadell ¶¶ 28, 94).9
Appellant argues that “[n]owhere does Fadell disclose that the fan and
the light are controlled based on any particular sensed condition.” Appeal
Br. 10. More particularly, Appellant argues that the cited portions of Fadell
do not “state anything about the control of the fan being based on any sensed
condition.” Id. Appellant argues that, to the extent Fadell teaches that

9 We note that the Examiner finds that Fadell discloses both a ceiling fan
and the fan of an HVAC system. However, with respect to the rejection of
claim 1, the Examiner finds only that Fadell discloses a control for
controlling the ceiling fan. See Non-Final Act. 5–6.
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network-connected smart device can self-program, Fadell does not expressly
disclose that such devices include lights or fan. Id. at 10–11.
We agree with Appellant that the Examiner has not established that
Fadell expressly or inherently discloses a control for controlling a fan based
on one or more sensed conditions. The Examiner relies on paragraph 28 as
teaching a control that controls a fan and a light switch and then relies on
paragraph 94 as disclosing that such control is based on sensed conditions.
Fadell at paragraph 28 does disclose “intelligent, multi-sensing, network
connected wall switches 108” that “may detect ambient lighting conditions
and control a power and/or dim state of one or more lights.” Fadell ¶ 28.
Thus, Fadell discloses controlling a light based on sensed conditions. Fadell
further discloses that “[i]n some instances, smart wall switches 108 may also
control a power state or speed of a fan, such as a ceiling fan.” Id. However,
this disclosure does not state that control of the fan is based on any sensed
condition.
We also do not see anything in paragraph 94 that discloses a fan being
controlled based on any sensed conditions. Here, Fadell discloses that
“smart wall switches 108 are automatically self-programmed to help the user
turn off and on lights according to a preferred schedule, and to mimic the
user’s patterns when the user is away.” Fadell ¶ 94. Fadell further discloses
that “[t]his automatic self-programming can also be applied to . . . all
network-connected smart devices.” Id. The Examiner finds that Fadell
discloses the fan as being “one such ‘network-connected smart device.’”
Ans. 44. We disagree with this finding. Fadell discloses what are
considered to be “network-connected smart devices,” i.e., “the smart
thermostats 102, the smart hazard detectors 104, the smart doorbells 106, the
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smart wall switches 108, the smart wall plugs 110, the smart entry
detectors 112, the smart doorknobs, the keypads, and other devices.” Fadell
¶ 31. Although this includes “other devices,” the Examiner does not explain
how Fadell discloses that the fan is a network-connected smart device, and
we consider a ceiling fan to be similar to a light in that it is disclosed as
being controlled by a smart wall switch and not that it itself is a smart
device.
Thus, we find that Fadell does not necessarily disclose that a ceiling
fan is network-connected smart device or that it is controlled based on any
sensed condition. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of
independent claim 1 or dependent claims 2–4 and 7–13 as anticipated by
Fadell.
Claims 15, 16, 24, 25, and 29
Regarding independent claim 15, the Examiner finds that Fadell
discloses a fan in the form of a ceiling fan or HVAC fan and a control as
claimed. Non-Final Act. 9. More specifically, the Examiner finds that the
control includes Fadell’s system of network connected devices that include
an occupancy sensor as part of a smart wall switch and a temperature sensor
as part of a thermostat and that the thermostat may be considered a controller
as claimed. Id. at 9–10 (citing Fadell ¶¶ 27, 28, 94).
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings with respect to the
anticipation rejection of claim 15. As discussed below, we are not
persuaded of error by Appellant’s argument.
Appellant first notes that the Examiner does not rely on any single
element that “discloses all the requirements of the claimed control, i.e., the
first sensor, the second sensor and the controller.” Appeal Br. 12. However,
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it is not clear whether Appellant is alleging any error in this regard. The
Examiner acknowledges that the rejection maps the control to the plurality
of network connected devices in Fadell’s system. Ans. 48. Appellant does
not adequately explain any error in the Examiner’s reliance on multiple
devices as collectively forming the claimed control. To the extent Appellant
would require the claim to include a single structure for the control, we are
not persuaded. Notably, this does not appear to be consistent with the claims
or the written description portion of the Specification, which not only
includes a wall receptacle for control but also includes a remote control as an
alternative means that issues control signals to the controller. See, e.g.,
Spec. ¶ 47.
Appellant argues that “the Examiner cannot properly rely upon the
thermostat as the claimed control in claim 15 and the same thermostat as the
claimed thermostat in claim 22,” and thus, “the Examiner must rely on the
smart wall switch 108 as the claimed control.” Appeal Br. 13. We disagree.
Appellant appears to interpret claim 15 to preclude the use of a thermostat,
but Appellant does not adequately explain why this must be the case. Even
though claim 22 requires that the system includes “a thermostat for
regulating the operation of the fan,” we fail to see how this precludes the
Examiner from relying on Fadell’s thermostat in rejecting claim 15. At best,
this may signify an issue in the rejection of claim 22, to the extent that claim
must be interpreted to include a separate thermostat from any control relied
upon with respect to claim 15. But we disagree with Appellant’s premise
that the Examiner cannot rely on any thermostat in rejecting claim 15.
Further, to the extent the rejection of claim 15 does rely on Fadell’s
thermostat, the Examiner is relying on the use of the temperature sensor in
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the thermostat for controlling the HVAC fan. Appellant does not persuade
us of any error in this finding. Fadell specifically discloses that the
thermostat detects temperature and controls the HVAC system accordingly.
Fadell ¶ 27. Appellant also does not explain any error in the Examiner’s
finding that Fadell’s control includes an occupancy sensor. See id. ¶ 94.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the
anticipation rejection of claim 15. Appellant does not provide separate
arguments regarding the anticipation rejection of dependent claims 16, 24,
25, and 29. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claims 15, 16, 24, 25,
and 29 as anticipated by Fadell.
Claim 17
Claim 17 depends from claim 15 and further requires that the
apparatus includes “a plurality of fans, each controlled by the control.”
Appeal Br. 22. With respect to this claim, the Examiner relies on the ceiling
fan and the fan of the HVAC system in Fadell. Non-Final Act. 10.
Appellant argues that “both of these fans are not each controlled by the same
control” because the ceiling fan is controlled by a wall switch and the
HVAC fan is controlled by a thermostat. Appeal Br. 11. We are not
persuaded of error. As discussed above, Appellant does not persuade us of
any error in the Examiner’s explanation of how Fadell discloses a control.
Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of claim 17.
Claim 18
Claim 18 depends from claim 15 and further requires “a light control
device for being regulated by the control.” Appeal Br. 23. The Examiner
finds that Fadell teaches such a light control device in the form of “one of
the smart wall switches 108 in communication with the light or lights it
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switches” that is regulated by the control “particularly in the self-
programming operation of ¶ 94 in which ‘the central server or cloud-
computing system’ of the network of devices of Fadell operates through the
switches 108 to control the lights.” Non-Final Act. 10–11. Appellant argues
that “the Examiner cannot properly rely upon the light switches as both the
claimed control and the claimed light control device.” Appeal Br. 14. We
are not persuaded of error. The Examiner explains that the control is the
system of network connected smart devices in Fadell, which includes the
smart wall switch, thermostat, and other devices. The Examiner further
explains that the smart wall switch is itself regulated by the network of
devices at least to the extent that it may be programmed in the manner
described by Fadell in paragraph 94. Appellant’s argument does not
persuade us of any error in these findings. We also note that claim 19
indicates that a light itself may be considered a light control device, which
Fadell clearly discloses. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 18
here.
Claim 19
Claim 19 depends from claim 18 and further recites that “the light
control devices comprises a light connected to the fan.” Appeal Br. 23. The
Examiner finds that Fadell teaches that “the lights are connected to and
controlled by the smart wall switches 108 of the plurality of devices of
Fadell which also controls a ceiling fan, rendering the light directly
connected to the switch and indirectly connected to the fan.” Non-Final
Act. 11. Appellant argues that “[w]hile the light in Fadell may be indirectly
connected to the light switch/control, claim 19 expressly requires that the
light is connected to the fan. Nowhere does Fadell provide that any light is
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connected to the fan and, therefore, this rejection should be reversed.”
Appeal Br. 14.
We are not persuaded of error. Here, Appellant appears to interpret
the claim to require a direct connection between the light and the fan and
discounts the Examiner’s finding that Fadell teaches an indirect connection
between these devices. We do not agree that the claim should be limited in
this manner. The Specification indicates that a connection may be via
common power circuit or by a physical connection. Spec. ¶¶ 11, 14. The
Specification further indicates that devices may be connected to the control
either through a wired or wireless connection. Id. ¶¶ 42, 62. Thus, the
Specification distinguishes between a physical connection and other wired or
wireless connections. Because the claim does not require a physical
connection, we are not persuaded that the Examiner erred in relying on the
indirect connection of Fadell’s light and fan. Accordingly, we also sustain
the rejection of claim 19.
Claims 22 and 23
Claim 22 depends from claim 15 and further recites “a thermostat for
regulating the operation of the fan.” Appeal Br. 23. As discussed above, the
Examiner finds that Fadell discloses a thermostat 102. Non-Final Act. 11.
Appellant argues that the rejection “should be reversed based upon the
Examiner’s reliance on the thermostat 102 in Fadell as both the claimed
thermostat recited in claim 22 and the claimed control recited in claim 15.”
Appeal Br. 14. We are not persuaded of error. As discussed, with respect to
the claim 15, the Examiner relies only on the temperature sensor and use of
the thermostat to control the fan based on a sensed temperature. Fadell
discloses that the thermostat not only can regulate the fan based on
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temperature but can also do so based on humidity. Fadell ¶ 27. Thus, we do
not agree with Appellant that the Examiner cannot rely on the thermostat for
both sensing temperature and controlling the fan as required by claim 15 and
also for further “regulating the operation of the fan,” e.g., based on humidity,
as required by claim 22. Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of
claim 22 and claim 23, which depends from claim 22.
Claim 26
Claim 26 depends from claim 15 and recites “the control comprises a
mechanically adjustable actuator for actuating at least the fan.” Appeal
Br. 24. The Examiner finds that Fadell discloses a mechanically adjustable
actuator in the form of “the switches of the smart wall switches 108” for
actuating the ceiling fan. Non-Final Act. 12 (citing Fadell ¶ 28). Appellant
argues that the Examiner cannot rely on Fadell’s switch as both the control
and the actuator. Appeal Br. 14. We are not persuaded. This claim
specifically requires that the actuator is part of the control, and thus, we fail
to see why the Examiner cannot rely on a portion of the control as the recited
actuator. Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of claim 26.
Claims 71–74
With respect to independent claim 71, the Examiner finds that Fadell
discloses:
first and second devices for regulating the environmental
condition (the first devices being sensor or a device containing a
sensor, such as temperature sensors taught in ¶ 27 or occupancy
sensors taught in ¶ 94, the sensors being taught to be integrated
into other devices and to intercommunicate in at least ¶ 39, and
the second devices are corresponding systems controlled
according to those sensors, such as the HVAC system of ¶ 27 or
the lights of ¶ 94); and
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a controller (one of the smart devices such as the
thermostat 102 or smart wall switch 108) for controlling the first
device based on a control signal (collecting sensor information
based on user provided instructions or programs), the second
device adapted for being automatically controlled based on
control information received from the first device (as taught in
¶ 27 with regard to the HVAC system or ¶ 94 with regard to the
automated control of the lights).
Non-Final Act. 13–14.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings with respect to this
rejection of claim 71.
Appellant argues that “nowhere does the Examiner account for the
controller and automatic control of the second device of claim 71, based on
control information received from the first device.” Appeal Br. 15.
Appellant asserts that Fadell is silent regarding automatic control of any
second device. Id.
We are not persuaded of error. As noted above, the Examiner
identifies that thermostat’s temperature sensor as an example of a first
device and the HVAC system as an example of the second device. As
Appellant admits (Appeal Br. 15), Fadell discloses “the smart thermostat
102 detects ambient climate characteristics (e.g., temperature and/or
humidity) and controls a HVAC system 103 accordingly.” Fadell ¶ 27. We
understand this disclosure to mean that the HVAC system is automatically
controlled based on control information, i.e., a sensed temperature, from the
temperature sensor via the thermostat. Alternatively, the Examiner relies on
Fadell’s disclosure regarding automatic self-programming of smart wall
switches and other network-connected smart devices. With respect to this
automatic self-programming, a switch may be automatically programmed
based on sensed conditions and the switch may then be used for
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automatically controlling turning lights off and on “according to a preferred
schedule, and to mimic the user’s patterns when the user is away.” Fadell
¶ 94. Given Fadell’s disclosure of control of the HVAC system or a light in
the manner described, we disagree with Appellant’s assertion that “Fadell is
completely silent regarding any second device being automatically
controlled based on control information received from any first device.”
Appeal Br. 15.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection
of claim 71 as anticipated by Fadell. Appellant does not raise separate
arguments regarding claims 72–74. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of
claims 71–74 as anticipated by Fadell.
Claims 77 and 78
Claim 77 depends from claim 71 and recites, “the first device is
associated with a sensor for sensing an environmental condition, and the
second device is controlled based on the environmental condition sensed by
the sensor associated with the first device.” Appeal Br. 25. The Examiner
finds that Fadell discloses the use of a temperature or occupancy sensor for
controlling a second device as required by this claim. Non-Final Act. 15.
Appellant argues that “nowhere does Fadell disclose the second device is
(automatically based upon dependency on claim 71) controlled based on any
environmental condition sensed by the sensor associated with the first
device.” Appeal Br. 15. We disagree with Appellant for the same reasons
discussed above with respect to the rejection of claim 71. Accordingly, we
also sustain the rejection of claim 77 and claim 78, which depends from
claim 77.
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Claims 89 and 90
With respect to independent claim 89, the Examiner relies on the same
findings as those discussed above with respect to claim 1. We are persuaded
of error in the rejection of claim 89 for the same reasons discussed above
with respect to claim 1, i.e., the Examiner has not adequately shown here
that Fadell discloses a means adapted for mounting to the partition and for
controlling both the fan and the light based on at least one sensed condition.
Accordingly, we do not sustain this rejection of claim 89 or dependent
claim 90.
Obviousness over Fadell and Mohan
We are persuaded of error in the rejection of claim 20 to the extent the
Examiner has not provided a reason with adequate rational underpinnings to
support the conclusion of obviousness.
With respect to claim 20, the Examiner acknowledges that “Fadell
does not explicitly teach the controlled lights comprising a light fixture.”
Non-Final Act. 18. The Examiner finds that Mohan teaches a light fixture
and determines
It would have been obvious . . . to modify Fadell with the
intelligent controlled light fixtures of Mohan in order to allow for
the intelligent control of Fadell to be applied to fixtures without
requiring the use of compatible light bulbs that are capable of
sending and receiving signals thus reducing the cost and
increasing convenience to end users who can cheaply replace
light bulbs with common off-the-shelf bulbs without concern for
smart features.
Non-Final Act. 18. The problem with the Examiner’s determination is that it
fails to provide a reason why a person of ordinary skill in the art would have
sought to modify Fadell based on Mohan. We agree with Appellant that the
Examiner merely provides an unsupported conclusion that is not tied to the
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evidence of record. Appeal Br. 18. Although it may be true that one would
find it obvious to improve the convenience of Fadell’s system, the Examiner
does not provide sufficient evidence or explanation showing that a
modification based on Mohan would provide those benefits. Accordingly,
on the record before us, we do not sustain this rejection of claim 20.
Obviousness over Fadell and Adams
With respect to claim 21, the Examiner relies on Adams as disclosing
“an intelligent control system including inputs such as occupancy sensors
and light sensors and using these inputs for controlling the position of a
motorized window treatment.” Non-Final Act. 18–19. The Examiner
determines that it would have been obvious to modify Fadell to include
integrated control of a window treatment because Fadell “suggests the
control of a variety of connected home systems and appliances,” and doing
so would provide “additional functionality to Fadell to increase user
convenience and functionality.” Id. at 19.
Appellant argues that the Examiner’s reason lacks adequate rational
underpinning and is conclusive. Appeal Br. 18. Unlike the rejection of
claim 20, we find that the Examiner’s reasoning here is supported on the
record before us. We agree with the Examiner that Fadell suggests or
teaches automated control of a variety of “devices, appliances and systems”
including HVAC systems, lighting, entertainment, and security. See Fadell
¶ 2. And just as Fadell discloses control of devices based on occupancy,
time, temperature, etc., Adams discloses automated window treatments in a
system that includes “occupancy sensors, vacancy sensors, daylight sensors,
temperature sensors, humidity sensors, security sensors,” and more. Adams
¶ 10. Given this disclosure, we agree with the Examiner that one of ordinary
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skill in the art would have found it obvious to incorporate Adams’ teaching
of controlling a window treatment into Fadell’s system to provide further
functionality and to further support Fadell’s stated goal of improving home
security. Fadell ¶ 1.
Based on the foregoing, we sustain the rejection of claim 21 as
obvious over Fadell and Adams.
Obviousness over Fadell and Yonekura
With respect to claim 28, the Examiner acknowledges that Fadell does
not specifically “teach the control and fan being connected through a
common power circuit and transmitting control signals over this power
circuit.” Non-Final Act. 19. The Examiner finds that Yonekura teaches “a
fan motor connected to a control system and by a DC power circuit 20 and
receiving a voltage control signal FSPEED from this power circuit.” Id.
The Examiner determines that it would have been obvious to modify Fadell
based on Yonekura
in order to allow control signals to be transmitted to the fan using
infrastructure already required for powering the fan either in
place of other signal transmission means (reducing the
requirement for specialized equipment and thus reducing the cost
of the system) or in addition to other signal transmission means
(providing redundancy and increasing reliability in the event of
a failure of other means of transmitting control signals to the fan).
Id. at 19–20.
Without further explanation or evidence, we are persuaded by
Appellant’s argument that the Examiner has not set forth an adequate reason
with the requisite rational underpinnings to support the conclusion of
obviousness. Here, the Examiner fails to provide a reason why a person of
ordinary skill in the art would have sought to modify Fadell based on
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Yonekura. We agree with Appellant that the Examiner merely provides an
unsupported conclusion that is not tied to the evidence of record. Appeal
Br. 18. Although one might find it obvious to improve the cost and
reliability of Fadell’s system, the Examiner does not provide sufficient
evidence or explanation showing that one of ordinary skill in the art would
have modified Fadell based on Yonekura to provide those benefits. Thus, on
the record before us, we do not sustain the rejection of claim 28.
Obviousness over Fadell and Mehta
With respect to the obviousness rejection of claims 91 and 92, the
Examiner the does not provide further explanation or citation to evidence
that would cure the deficiency in the rejection of independent claim 89, as
discussed above. Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 91
and 92 as obvious over Fadell and Mehta.
Anticipation by Luskin
Claims 71, 72, and 74
Claim 71 recites:
A system for controlling an environmental condition in a
space, comprising:
first and second devices for regulating the environmental
condition; and
a controller for controlling the first device based on a
control signal, the second device adapted for being automatically
controlled based on control information received from the first
device.
Appeal Br. 24.
The Examiner finds that Luskin teaches a system as claimed including
a first device that is the combination of user and environmental interfaces of
a central controller, a second device that is a light, light switch, or other
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electrical appliance, and a controller that includes the processing
components of the central controller. Ans. 23–24 (citing Luskin Fig. 4;
¶¶ 29, 31–33, 38, 41, 43). More specifically, the Examiner finds that Luskin
teaches that “[t]he interface elements of the central controller (first devices)
regulate environmental conditions by accepting user inputs and transmitting
control instructions to the second devices[, which] modify environmental
conditions directly.” Id. Regarding the controller, the Examiner explains
that Luskin discloses controlling a first device via a control signal because
Luskin discloses “outputting information to the user by the display
screen/touch screen,” and Luskin discloses automatic control of the second
device as claimed because Luskin discloses “the central controller may
communicate wirelessly to allow the user to control remote light switches,
outlets and appliances based in other rooms via a distributed network.” Id.
at 24.
We agree with and adopt the Examiner’s findings with respect to
rejection of claim 71 as anticipated by Luskin, and we are not persuaded of
error in the rejection by Appellant’s arguments.
Appellant argues that the user cannot be the first device. Reply Br. 2.
However, the Examiner does not appear to rely on the user as a device.
Rather, the Examiner finds that the “user and environmental interfaces” are
the first device, i.e., the interface presented in Luskin’s central controller is a
first device as claimed. See Luskin Fig. 4; ¶¶ 31–33.
Regarding the Examiner’s reliance on the interface as the claimed first
device, Appellant argues that these are “plainly elements of the claimed
controller and not separate devices as required by claim 71.” Reply Br. 2.
Yet, Appellant does not explain adequately why Luskin’s central controller
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cannot include both a first device as claimed and a controller as claimed.
The Examiner explains that the first device is the interface and the controller
is the CPU and other processing structures present in Luskin’s central
controller. Thus, to the extent Appellant argues that the claim requires that
the first device and controller are different structures, the rejection identifies
separate structures in Luskin. Appellant does not explain why the claim
would preclude the first device and controller from being collectively
included as part of a larger structure, e.g., the central controller of Luskin.
Appellant also argues that “Luskin fails to disclose automatic control
of the second device based on control information received from the first
device.” Reply Br. 3 (emphasis omitted). Appellant explains that “[w]hile
Appellant acknowledges that a user may input a command into the controller
to activate a light or other appliance, Luskin is completely silent regarding
any second device being automatically controlled based on control
information received from any first device,” and that “Luskin merely allows
a user to control multiple electrical appliances via a central controller, but
none of these appliances are automatically controlled based on control
information received from a separate appliance.” Id.
We are not persuaded. Luskin discloses that the functions of the
central controller include the ability to
monitor video from any video camera or other video signal
source connected directly or indirectly by the wireless protocol
to other system components; access settings and control the
HVAC system in the household; have voice communication via
the phone or inside the household between two or more central
controller’s [sic]; operate electrical devices which support
infrared remote controls via the device which is equipped with
the wireless controller and infrared emitter; access, control,
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query any other electronic devices via wireless protocol or
infrared sequences.
Luskin ¶ 42. And regarding this functionality, Luskin discloses:
All the foregoing functions of the central controller can be
accessed with the touch screen or by voice command, or
automatically (under software control) in response to sensor
inputs, time or other trigger conditions or a combination of
trigger conditions. In a preferred embodiment, any particular
setting or parameter of the system can be used as a part of a saved
profile. Any profile can be selected by user or automatically
(according to schedule, day light, etc.).
Luskin ¶ 43. Thus, Luskin discloses that second device, e.g., an HVAC
system identified by the Examiner, may be automatically controlled in
response to input from a first device, e.g., sensor inputs identified by the
Examiner. Given this disclosure, we fail to see how Luskin fails to disclose
automatic control of a second device as claimed.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection
of claim 71 as anticipated by Luskin. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection
of claim 71. Appellant does not raise separate arguments regarding
dependent claims 72 and 74, and thus, we are not persuaded of error in the
rejection of those claims for the same reasons. Accordingly, we sustain the
rejection of claims 71, 72, and 74
Claim 73
Claim 73 depends from claim 71 and requires that “the controller
comprises a remote controller for receiving an input from a user and
generating the control signal for regulating the environmental condition.”
Appeal Br. 25. The Examiner finds that Luskin teaches a remote controller
in the form of a remote control and that Luskin’s central controller may be
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considered a remote control because it is physically distant from the devices
it controls. Ans. 25 (citing Luskin ¶¶ 41, 42).
Appellant argues that the cited portions of Luskin do not “state
anything about the controller including a remote control or generating a
signal for regulating an environmental condition.” Reply Br. 4. We
disagree. As noted by the Examiner, Luskin discloses that the controller
includes functionality that allows one to “operate electrical devices which
support infrared remote controls via the device.” Luskin ¶ 42. Luskin
further discloses that using a remote control for controlling a light dimmer is
a basic home automation task. Id. ¶ 4. We agree with the Examiner that
Luskin thus discloses the use of a remote control to provide control signals
for regulating an environmental condition. Luskin also discloses remote
control via “‘standalone’ remote sensor units, with the ability to
communicate with a central controller” that may be used to adjust HVAC
dampers. Id. ¶ 40.
Based on the foregoing, we are not persuaded of error in the rejection
of claim 73 here. Accordingly, we sustain the rejection of claim 73 as
anticipated by Luskin.
Claim 77
Claim 77 depends from claim 71 and requires that “the first device is
associated with a sensor for sensing an environmental condition, and the
second device is controlled based on the environmental condition sensed by
the sensor associated with the first device.” Appeal Br. 25. Appellant
argues that “nowhere does Luskin disclose the second device is
automatically (based upon dependency on claim 71) controlled based on any
environmental condition sensed by the sensor associated with the first
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device.” Reply Br. 4 (emphasis omitted). For the reasons discussed above
with respect to claim 71, we are not persuaded that Luskin fails to disclose
such automatic control. Accordingly, we also sustain the rejection of
claim 77.
Obviousness Rejections over Luskin
We are persuaded of error in the rejections of independent claims 1,
15, and 89 as obvious over Luskin in view of Hopkins because we agree
with Appellant the Examiner has not set forth an adequate reason based on
rational underpinning for combining Luskin and Hopkins.
The key to supporting a prima facie conclusion of obviousness
under 35 U.S.C. § 103 is the clear articulation of the reason why the claimed
invention would have been obvious. The Court in KSR International Co. v.
Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 418 (2007) indicated that the analysis supporting
a rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 103 should be made explicit. The Federal
Circuit has stated that “rejections on obviousness grounds cannot be
sustained by mere conclusory statements; instead, there must be some
articulated reasoning with some rational underpinning to support the legal
conclusion of obviousness.” In re Kahn, 441 F.3d 977, 988 (Fed. Cir. 2006),
cited with approval in KSR, 550 U.S. at 418.
Here, the Examiner has not provided an adequate reason with
supporting evidence or explanation to show that it would have been obvious
to modify Luskin to include a multiple fan array as taught by Hopkins. With
respect to claim 1, for example, the Examiner finds that Luskin teaches an
apparatus as claimed except that “Luskin does not explicitly teach the
control operations performed by the central control . . . to include the control
of a fan.” Ans. 28. The Examiner then finds that using a fan array as taught
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by Hopkins was known in the art and that Hopkins teaches a controller for
controlling an array of fans in order to control fan vibration to reduce noise
and damage. Id. Appellant asserts that “Luskin [does] not disclose a
plurality of fans and necessarily would not need the control of Hopkins to
reduce the phase relationship of a plurality of fans.” Reply Br. 7. We agree
and determine that the problem with the Examiner’s reasoning in support of
this rejection is that no explanation is provided for why one of ordinary skill
in the art would have modified Luskin to include a fan array in the first
instance. More is required than the Examiner’s finding that a fan array was
known in the art.
Based on the foregoing, we are persuaded of error in the rejection of
independent claim 1 and independent claims 15 and 89, for which the
Examiner relies on substantially the same reasoning. Further, in rejecting
the dependent claims as obvious, the Examiner does not rely on any further
reasoning or citation to evidence in the art of record that would cure the
deficiency in the rejection of the independent claims. Accordingly, we do
not sustain the rejections of claims 1–4, 7–13, 15–26, 28, 29, and 89–92.
CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 15–19, 22–26, 29, 71–74, 77, and
78 as anticipated by Fadell. We AFFIRM the rejection of claim 21 as
obvious over Fadell and Adams. We AFFIRM the rejection of claims 71–
74, 77, and 78 as anticipated by Luskin.
We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1–4, 7–13, 89, and 90 as
anticipated by Fadell. We REVERSE the rejection of claim 20 as obvious
over Fadell and Mohan. We REVERSE the rejection of claim 28 as obvious
over Fadell and Yonekura. We REVERSE the rejection of claims 91 and 92
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as obvious over Fadell and Mehta. We REVERSE the rejection of claims 1–
3, 7–13, 15, 17–19, 22–26, 29, 89, and 90 as obvious over Luskin and
Hopkins. We REVERSE the rejection of claims 4 and 16 as obvious over
Luskin, Hopkins, and Fadell. We REVERSE the rejection of claim 20 as
obvious over Luskin, Hopkins, and Mohan. We REVERSE the rejection of
claim 21 as obvious over Luskin, Hopkins, and Adams. We REVERSE the
rejection of claim 28 as obvious over Luskin, Hopkins, and Yonekura. We
REVERSE the rejection of claims 91 and 92 as obvious over Luskin,
Hopkins, and Mehta.
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
1–4, 7–13,
15–19, 22–
26, 29, 71–
74, 77, 78,
89, 90
102(a)(2) Fadell 15–19, 22–
26, 29, 71–
74, 77, 78
1–4, 7–
13, 89,
90
20 103 Fadell, Mohan 20
21 103 Fadell, Adams 21
28 103 Fadell,
Yonekura
28
91, 92 103 Fadell, Mehta 91, 92
71–74, 77, 78 102(a)(1) Luskin 71–74, 77,
78

1–3, 7–13,
15, 17–19,
22–26, 29,
89, 90
103 Luskin,
Hopkins
1–3, 7–
13, 15,
17–19,
22–26,
29, 89,
90
4, 16 103 Luskin,
Hopkins, Fadell
4, 16
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Claims
Rejected
35 U.S.C. § Basis Affirmed Reversed
20 103 Luskin,
Hopkins,
Mohan
20
21 103 Luskin,
Hopkins,
Adams
21
28 103 Luskin,
Hopkins,
Yonekura
28
91, 92 103 Luskin,
Hopkins, Mehta
91, 92
Overall
Outcome
15–19, 21–
26, 29, 71–
74, 77, 78
1–4, 7–
13, 20,
28, 89–
92

No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136 (a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136 (a)(l)(iv).
AFFIRMED IN PART