Delfina Y.,1 Complainant,v.Richard V. Spencer, Secretary, Department of the Navy, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity Commission

Sep 20, 2019

2019004209 (E.E.O.C. Sep. 20, 2019)

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION
Office of Federal Operations
P.O. Box 77960
Washington, DC 20013

Delfina Y.,1
Complainant,

v.

Richard V. Spencer,
Secretary,
Department of the Navy,
Agency.

Appeal Nos. 0120180602, 2019004209

Hearing No. 480-2018-00189X

Agency Nos. DON-17-63394-00192, DON-17-39721-01739

DECISION

Complainant timely2 filed two appeals with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC or Commission), pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(a), from the Agency’s final decisions
concerning her equal employment opportunity (EEO) complaints alleging employment
discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII), as amended,
42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and Section 501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation
Act), as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission may, in its discretion, consolidate
two or more complaints of discrimination filed by the same complainant. See 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.606. Accordingly, the Commission exercises its discretion and consolidates the above-
captioned cases. For the following reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final
decisions.

ISSUES PRESENTED

The issues presented are: (1) whether the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
Administrative Judge (AJ) correctly determined that Complainant unequivocally withdrew her

1 This case has been randomly assigned a pseudonym which will replace Complainant’s name
when the decision is published to non-parties and the Commission’s website.

2 The Commission deems the appeal timely, as discussed infra at n.3.
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hearing request; and (2) whether the preponderance of the evidence in the record establishes that
Complainant was subjected to discrimination based on sex, disability, and/or reprisal.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to these complaints, Complainant worked as a GS-0346-09
Logistics Management Specialist in the Agency’s Naval Surface Warfare Center (NSWC), Port
Hueneme Division (PHD), Modernization and Installation Division, Configuration Management
Branch, in Port Hueneme, California. Beginning in March 2016, the Division Manager (S1)
acted as Complainant’s first- and second-line supervisor after her previous first-line supervisor
retired. In October 2016, the new Branch Manager (S2) became Complainant’s first-line
supervisor.

Complainant was hired in or around February 2015 as a GS-0346-07 Logistics Management
Specialist Intern through the Agency’s Naval Acquisition Development Program (NADP). The
full-performance level of Complainant’s position was a GS-0346-12 Logistics Management
Analyst position. The NSWC PHD Career Field Manager (CM1) managed the career progress of
local NADP Interns assigned to Port Hueneme. A Career Manager (CM2) and the Career
Management Division Head (CM3) administered the national NADP from Mechanicsburg,
Pennsylvania.

Complainant is female, and she stated that she has two service-connected disabilities, Post
Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) and a back condition. According to Complainant, both of her
disabilities are permanent and were diagnosed in May 2007. Complainant alleged that CM1 was
aware of her disabilities because she was hired through the NADP Wounded Warrior Program.
Complainant stated that she requested a sit/stand desk and a specialized chair to alleviate her
back problem as a reasonable accommodation shortly after she began working in the
Configuration Management Branch in March 2016. S1 stated that he learned about
Complainant’s physical impairment in March 2016, but he stated that he was not aware that
Complainant had PTSD until she filed an EEO complaint.

Complainant stated that on March 24, 2016, CM1 disclosed her PTSD to S1 during a meeting.
According to Complainant, she had not previously disclosed her PTSD to S1. CM1 denied
disclosing Complainant’s PTSD. CM1 averred that he was explaining the process for requesting
a flexible schedule that would allow Complainant to avoid using leave for her medical
appointments, but he stated that he did not tell S1 why Complainant needed to attend the medical
appointments. S1 agreed with CM1 that he did not disclose the nature of Complainant’s
disability while they discussed flexible schedule arrangements.

Complainant alleged that in April 2016 CM1 told her that she “speaks in weeds,” that she cannot
retain information due to memory issues, that she was in the wrong field, and that she was not a
leader. CM1 stated that Complainant had a tendency to focus her analysis on small, insignificant
details “in the weeds” rather than demonstrating knowledge of the big picture of logistics. CM1
denied telling Complainant that she could not retain information, but he stated that he told her
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that her knowledge did not reflect the amount of training she had completed. According to CM1,
Complainant often completed training that did not relate to the logistics field and really did not
seem interested in logistics, but he denied telling her that she was in the wrong career field. CM1
averred that he told Complainant that, while she might be a leader in other ways, she was not a
leader in the logistics field. According to Complainant, it seemed as though CM1, who was
supposed to ensure she completed the developmental requirements of the NADP, had a personal
vendetta against her.

On June 21, 2016, Complainant sent S1 an email, stating that she was on her way to a first-aid
training course when she heard her name being called in another room for a logistics course.
According to Complainant, she did not remember signing up for the logistics training. On June
21, 2016, S1 responded that she needed supervisory approval before signing up for further
training, that he would not authorize further training classes that were unrelated to her
assignment in the Configuration Management Branch, and that she should concentrate on
learning her job. S1 stated that he sent this response because Complainant had been enrolling in
courses that were unrelated to her position of record without supervisory approval while
neglecting job-related training. Complainant stated that she needed a great deal of training to
learn the different parts of her developmental position. According to S1, after sending
Complainant the June 21 email, he approved her enrollment in risk-management and
provisioning systems courses but denied her request to attend a technical writing class that was
not relevant to her job. CM1 stated that S1 approved several job-related training courses for
Complainant in fall 2016.

Complainant averred that in July 2016 S1 told her to copy him on all of her outgoing emails.
Complainant stated that she felt that S1 was singling her out for micromanagement and that he
was setting her up to fail. According to S1, he had received multiple complaints that
Complainant was hostile or rude in emails, so he asked her to copy him, hoping that copying him
on messages would eliminate some of the hostility. S1 also stated that Complainant was leaving
the workplace without telling anyone where she was going, so he asked her to check in and out,
so he would know where she was. S1 averred that all Interns were supposed to send emails to
him when they checked in and out of the work area but that he did not ask to be copied on other
emails because there were no complaints about the tone of other Interns’ communications. A GS-
07 Logistics Management Specialist Intern (C1) stated that she was required to send emails to S1
when she left her workspace and when she returned. C1 averred that she would also copy S1 on
some work-related emails.

According to Complainant, in September 2016 CM1 called her at her office three times in the
space of two weeks to ask about her personal plans such as whether she was currently enrolled in
school and whether she still had student loans. Complainant alleged that CM1’s inquiries were
unprofessional. CM1 stated that he acts as a mentor to the Interns and often asks about non-
work-related activities such as higher education. Complainant stated that on or about September
28, 2016, she noticed that CM1 had been looking at her LinkedIn profile. CM1 stated that he is
active on LinkedIn and that he viewed Complainant’s profile but did not ask to connect with her.
Complainant averred that CM1 looking at her social media made her nervous.
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Complainant averred that NADP Interns were supposed to be receive regular rotational
assignments to learn different aspects of their career field. Complainant stated that in September
2016 S1 denied her request for a rotational assignment. According to S1, Complainant asked for
a rotational assignment to China Lake, California, or to the Los Angeles area because she wanted
to be closer to her parents, but she did not have a job-related reason for completing a rotation at
those locations. S1 averred that he denied her request because there was no assignment available
at those locations that related to logistics management. S2 also noted that most NADP Intern
rotational assignments were cancelled in FY 2017 because of budget cuts.

Complainant alleged that in October 2016 S1 told her that her performance was marginal, that
she could not work independently, and that she did not know her job. According to Complainant,
her performance was excellent. S1 stated that he met with Complainant on October 11, 2016, to
discuss her performance and that Complainant was entering the third and final year of the NADP
Intern Program but still had not mastered the knowledge expected at the GS-09 level. According
to S1, he received frequent feedback from various employees in the Branch that Complainant
could not work independently and that her work required extensive revision. S1 stated that he
had counseled Complainant about her performance since she joined the Branch in March 2016.
CM1 averred that he had observed S1 counseling Complainant about her performance.
According to C1, Complainant would ask the same basic work-related questions repeatedly and
did not seem to pay attention to the answers she received.

On November 7, 2016, Complainant emailed CM2 to request a hardship transfer to China Lake
because of her parents’ declining health. CM2 provided Complainant with the transfer policy,
which required identifying an available position in China Lake and documentation of the
hardship. According to Complainant, in mid-November 2016 she requested leave under the
Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) because her father had a serious stroke and her mother
had a heart attack.

On November 30, 2016, S2 issued Complainant a 60-day Performance Improvement Plan (PIP).
Complainant alleged that S2 was her new supervisor and therefore did not know her
performance, so it was unfair for him to sign the PIP. According to S2, S1 had briefed him about
Complainant’s performance, which was well below the level required for promotion to GS-11
despite extensive training. S2 averred that Complainant successfully completed one week of the
PIP before leaving on extended FMLA leave in December 2016 to care for her parents.

On February 8, 2017, Complainant emailed CM2, asking for additional FMLA leave. On
February 22, 2017, CM2 responded, stating that Complainant was only entitled to 12 weeks of
FMLA leave in a 12-month period. On March 9, 2017, Complainant emailed CM3, requesting a
hardship transfer to China Lake and requesting two additional weeks of FMLA leave. On March
10, 2017, CM3 emailed Complainant that her FMLA leave was expiring soon and that it was not
possible to transfer to China Lake because there was not a position available. On March 12,
2017, Complainant responded to CM3, requesting a hardship transfer to Los Angeles. On March
14, 2017, CM3 emailed Complainant, stating that there was no available position in Los Angeles
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but listing other possible locations in California. According to CM3, Complainant never
responded to this email identifying other locations of interest. According to the record,
Complainant exhausted her remaining FMLA leave on March 14, 2017, and she requested two
additional weeks of leave without pay (LWOP). S2 approved Complainant’s LWOP request, and
she was charged LWOP through March 31, 2017.

On April 1, 2017, Complainant resigned, effective immediately. In her letter of resignation,
Complainant alleged that she had been subjected to discrimination and harassment and that she
feared returning to the workplace because it was such a hostile work environment. Complainant
stated that she should have been granted a hardship transfer because she was an only child and
that there was no one else who could take care of her parents.

Agency No. DON-17-63394-00192

Complainant initiated contact with an EEO Counselor on October 25, 2016. On February 11,
2017, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on
the bases of sex (female) and disability (PTSD and back impairment) when:

1. Beginning in March 24, 2016, she was subjected to a hostile work environment that
included offensive comments about her disability and her work performance, being told
that future training classes would not be authorized, being required to copy her supervisor
on all of her outgoing emails, being asked about her personal life, and management
looking at her LinkedIn page;

2. In or around September 2016, S1 denied her request for a rotational assignment;

3. In or around October 2016, S1 informed Complainant that her performance was marginal,
she could not work independently, and she did not know her job; and

4. On December 2, 2016, Complainant was placed on a PIP.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation and notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ. In
accordance with Complainant’s request, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b). The decision concluded that Complainant failed to prove that the Agency
subjected her to discrimination as alleged. Appeal No. 0120180602 followed.

Agency No. DON-17-39721-01739

Complainant contacted an EEO Counselor again on March 28, 2017. On June 27, 2017,
Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that the Agency discriminated against her on the
bases of sex (female), disability (PTSD and back impairment), and reprisal for prior protected
EEO activity under Title VII and the Rehabilitation Act when:
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5. On March 28, 2017, her request for a hardship transfer to China Lake or to the Los
Angeles area was denied.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant with a copy of the
report of investigation, notice of her right to request a hearing before an EEOC AJ, and a form on
which Complainant could elect a hearing, a final decision, or the withdrawal of her complaint.
On November 20, 2017, Complainant submitted an election form, checking the box indicating
that she was requesting a hearing but also writing that she wanted a final decision from the
Agency. On November 22, 2017, Complainant submitted a second election form, checking the
box indicting that she wanted the Agency to issue a final decision.

On January 12, 2018, the Agency issued a final decision pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.110(b)
pursuant to Complainant’s November 22, 2017, request. Therein, the Agency concluded that
Complainant failed to prove that the Agency subjected her to discrimination as alleged.

On January 10, 2018, an AJ in the EEOC Los Angeles District Office acknowledged
Complainant’s November 20, 2017, hearing request. On January 26, 2018, the Agency filed a
motion to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction because Complainant withdrew her hearing request.
Complainant did not respond to the Agency’s motion. On February 4, 2019, the AJ assigned to
the case granted the Agency’s motion to dismiss, finding that Complainant voluntarily and
unambiguously withdrew her hearing request on November 22, 2017. The Agency reissued its
final decision finding no discrimination on February 13, 2019, with an updated section regarding
the procedural history of the case. Appeal No. 2019004209 followed.3

CONTENTIONS ON APPEAL

On appeal, Complainant contends that management was not truthful when responding to the
EEO Investigators. According to Complainant, she was mistreated by the Agency, which has

3 EEOC Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 1614.402 provides that appeals to the Commission must be filed
within 30 calendar days after a complainant receives notice of the Agency's decision. In the
absence of proof to the contrary, a complainant is presumed to have received an agency's final
decision within five days of mailing. Dillard v. U.S. Postal Serv., EEOC Appeal No. 01A61673
(July 21, 2006). According to the Agency’s certificate of service, it sent a copy of the reissued
final decision to Complainant via Federal Express (FedEx) on February 13, 2019. A copy of the
FedEx tracking information indicates that, as of July 30, 2019, the item is “in transit” and the
scheduled delivery is “pending.” Complainant filed Appeal No. 2019004209 on June 12, 2019.
Where, as here, there is an issue of timeliness, an agency always bears the burden of obtaining
sufficient information to support a reasoned determination as to timeliness. See Guy v. Dep't of
Energy, EEOC Request No. 05930703 (Jan. 4, 1994); Williams v. Dep't of Defense, EEOC
Request No. 05920506 (Aug. 25, 1992). We find that the Agency has not established when
Complainant received the February 13, 2019, final decision, and so we deem the appeal timely.
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negatively affected her health. Complainant argues that the AJ should not have dismissed her
case. Complainant requests an honest review of her allegations.

In response to Complainant’s appeals, the Agency contends that Complainant has identified no
basis for reversing its determination that Complainant failed to establish that she was subjected
to discrimination.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

As these are appeals from decisions issued without a hearing, pursuant to 29 C.F.R.
§ 1614.110(b), the Agency's decisions are subject to de novo review by the Commission. 29
C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). See Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R.
Part 1614, at Chap. 9, § VI.A. (Aug. 5, 2015) (explaining that the de novo standard of review
“requires that the Commission examine the record without regard to the factual and legal
determinations of the previous decision maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents,
statements, and testimony of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the
parties, and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment of the record and
its interpretation of the law”).

Withdrawal of Complainant’s Hearing Request

Complainant contends that the AJ should not have dismissed her hearing request. On November
20, 2017, Complainant submitted an ambiguous hearing request that indicated that she wanted a
hearing and a final decision from the Agency. The Commission acknowledged receipt of this
ambiguous hearing request on January 10, 2018. However, to the extent that Complainant’s
ambiguous November 20 request constituted a valid hearing request, we find that Complainant
withdrew her hearing request on November 22, 2017, when she submitted a second election form
that exclusively elected a final decision from the Agency. See Complainant v. Dep’t of Veterans
Affairs, EEOC Appeal No. 0120130040 (Aug. 20, 2015) (complainant withdrew hearing request
when she submitted request for final decision after submission of hearing request). Accordingly,
we proceed to consider the merits of Complainant’s complaints.

Disparate Treatment

To prevail in a disparate treatment claim, Complainant must satisfy the three-part evidentiary
scheme fashioned by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792
(1973). She must generally establish a prima facie case by demonstrating that she was subjected
to an adverse employment action under circumstances that would support an inference of
discrimination. Furnco Constr. Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 576 (1978). The prima facie
inquiry may be dispensed with in this case, however, since the Agency has articulated legitimate
and nondiscriminatory reasons for its conduct. See U.S. Postal Serv. Bd. of Governors v. Aikens,
460 U.S. 711, 713-17 (1983); Holley v. Dep’t of Veterans Affairs, EEOC Request No. 05950842
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(Nov. 13, 1997). To ultimately prevail, Complainant must prove, by a preponderance of the
evidence, that the Agency’s explanation is a pretext for discrimination. Reeves v. Sanderson
Plumbing Products, Inc., 530 U.S. 133 (2000); St. Mary's Honor Ctr. v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 519
(1993); Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 256 (1981); Holley, supra;
Pavelka v. Dep’t of the Navy, EEOC Request No. 05950351 (Dec. 14, 1995). For purposes of
our analysis, we assume, without so finding, that Complainant has established a prima facie case
as to each of her claims.

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination based on sex and disability when
S1 denied her September 2016 request for a rotational assignment in China Lake or the Los
Angeles area. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for denying this request is that
there was no vacancy related to the logistics field at these locations. Although Complainant
emphasized that she found this decision unfair, we find that the preponderance of the evidence in
the record does not establish that the Agency’s proffered reason is a pretext designed to mask
discriminatory animus.

Complainant alleged that she was discriminated against when S1 told her that her performance
was marginal. The Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for critiquing Complainant’s
performance were that Complainant lacked the requisite GS-09 knowledge and that her work
contained many mistakes. As evidence of pretext, Complainant stated that her work was
excellent and that S1 did not counsel her about any deficiencies before October 2016. However,
C1 stated that Complainant asked questions of her coworkers that conveyed a lack of knowledge,
and CM1 averred that he had observed S1 counsel Complainant about her performance,
corroborating S1’s statements about Complainant’s performance. We further find that the
preponderance of the evidence in the record does not establish that the Agency’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reasons are pretextual.

Complainant alleged discrimination with respect to being placed on a PIP. The Agency’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanation for issuing the PIP was that S1 had observed and
documented performance issues since he became Complainant’s supervisor in March 2016.
Although Complainant is correct that S2, her new supervisor, had limited opportunity to observe
her performance directly, we do not find that this establishes the Agency’s legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason is pretextual, and the preponderance of the evidence does not
otherwise establish pretext.

Finally, Complainant alleged that she was subjected to discrimination based on sex, disability,
and reprisal for prior protected activity when her hardship transfer request was not approved in
March 2017. As with the September 2016 request for a rotational assignment, the Agency’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for not providing Complainant with a hardship transfer was
that there were no available positions in her desired locations. Although a transfer would have
helped Complainant take care of her aging parents, the preponderance of the evidence in the
record does not establish that the Agency’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext
for discrimination based on sex, disability, and/or reprisal.

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Hostile Work Environment

Complainant alleged that she was subjected to a hostile work environment. To establish a claim
of harassment a complainant must show that: (1) she belongs to a statutorily protected class; (2)
she was subjected to harassment in the form of unwelcome verbal or physical conduct involving
the protected class; (3) the harassment complained of was based on her statutorily protected
class; (4) the harassment affected a term or condition of employment and/or had the purpose or
effect of unreasonably interfering with the work environment and/or creating an intimidating,
hostile, or offensive work environment; and (5) there is a basis for imputing liability to the
employer. See Henson v. City of Dundee, 682 F.2d 897 (11th Cir. 1982). Further, the incidents
must have been "sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of [Complainant's]
employment and create an abusive working environment." Harris v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510
U.S. 17, 21 (1993). The harasser's conduct should be evaluated from the objective viewpoint of a
reasonable person in the victim's circumstances. Enforcement Guidance on Harris v. Forklift
Systems Inc., EEOC Notice No. 915.002 at 6 (Mar. 8, 1994).

With respect to CM1 allegedly disclosing Complainant’s PTSD to S1, we find that Complainant
has not established by the preponderance of the evidence in the record that CM1 did so. CM1
denied doing so, and S1 stated that he was unaware that she had PTSD until she filed an EEO
complaint. We find that there is no evident connection between the other instances of alleged
harassment and Complainant’s sex or disability. Furthermore, we find that the alleged
harassment, which consists of career advice from CM1 and the exercise of ordinary supervisory
oversight by S1 in addition to the allegations already analyzed as disparate-treatment claims, is
neither severe nor pervasive. Therefore, Complainant has not established by the preponderance
of the evidence that she was subjected to unlawful harassment.

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on appeal, including those not
specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM the Agency’s final decisions because Complainant
withdrew her hearing request and because the preponderance of the evidence in the record does
not establish that discrimination occurred.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M0617)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this case if the Complainant or
the Agency submits a written request containing arguments or evidence which tend to establish
that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation of material fact
or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies, practices, or
operations of the Agency.
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Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed with the Office of
Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar days of receipt of this decision. A party
shall have twenty (20) calendar days of receipt of another party’s timely request for
reconsideration in which to submit a brief or statement in opposition. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405;
Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110),
at Chap. 9 § VII.B (Aug. 5, 2015). All requests and arguments must be submitted to the
Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission.
Complainant’s request may be submitted via regular mail to P.O. Box 77960, Washington, DC
20013, or by certified mail to 131 M Street, NE, Washington, DC 20507. In the absence of a
legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by mail
within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The
agency’s request must be submitted in digital format via the EEOC’s Federal Sector EEO Portal
(FedSEP). See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.403(g). The request or opposition must also include proof of
service on the other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your request for reconsideration
as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances prevented the timely filing of the request. Any
supporting documentation must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The
Commission will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very
limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)
You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States District Court within
ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you receive this decision. If you file a civil action,
you must name as the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency head or
department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and official title. Failure to do
so may result in the dismissal of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the
national organization, and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you
file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the
administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0815)
If you want to file a civil action but cannot pay the fees, costs, or security to do so, you may
request permission from the court to proceed with the civil action without paying these fees or
costs. Similarly, if you cannot afford an attorney to represent you in the civil action, you may
request the court to appoint an attorney for you. You must submit the requests for waiver of
court costs or appointment of an attorney directly to the court, not the Commission. The

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court has the sole discretion to grant or deny these types of requests. Such requests do not alter
the time limits for filing a civil action (please read the paragraph titled Complainant’s Right to
File a Civil Action for the specific time limits).
FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________ Carlton M. Hadden’s signature
Carlton M. Hadden, Director
Office of Federal Operations

September 20, 2019
Date