01971629
02-28-2000
David Wilson, Complainant, v. Kenneth S. Apfel, Commissioner, Social Security Administration, Agency.
David Wilson v. Social Security Administration
01971629
February 28, 2000
David Wilson, )
Complainant, )
) Appeal No. 01971629
v. ) Agency Nos. SSA-183-93
)
Kenneth S. Apfel, )
Commissioner, )
Social Security Administration, )
Agency. )
)
DECISION
INTRODUCTION
Complainant filed a timely appeal with this Commission challenging
the final decision of the Social Security Administration (agency)
on compensatory damages concerning his complaint of discrimination in
violation of �501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29
U.S.C. �791 et seq.<1> The appeal is accepted in accordance with EEOC
Order No. 960.001.
ISSUE PRESENTED
The issue on appeal is whether the agency's final decision properly
determined that complainant was entitled to an award of compensatory
damages in the amount of $4,612.50 for the agency's previous finding of
race discrimination.
BACKGROUND
In a formal complaint, complainant alleged that he was discriminated
against on the basis of his physical disability (Carpal Tunnel Syndrome)
when by memorandum dated August 17, 1992, the agency's management denied
his request for reasonable accommodation. Following a hearing, an EEOC
administrative judge issued a recommended decision on July 5, 1994,
finding no discrimination. The agency subsequently adopted the AJ's
finding of no discrimination in a final agency decision dated August 4,
1994. Thereafter, complainant appealed to the Commission's Office of
Federal Operation (OFO). On March 7, 1996, OFO issued a decision (EEOC
Appeal No. 01945850) reversing the agency's finding of no discrimination.
OFO found that complainant had been discriminated against as a result of
the agency's failure to accommodate complainant's Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.
As a remedy, OFO ordered the agency to award complainant back pay and
benefits from the period of September 24, 1992 (the date complainant
began working part-time) until the OFO's decision became final (March 7,
1996). In addition, OFO ordered the agency to conduct a supplemental
investigation into complainant's claim for compensatory damages.
On August 6, 1996, complainant submitted a claim for compensatory damages
totaling $200,400.00 as follows:
Pecuniary Losses
Aspirin $ 100.00
Mileage $ 300.00
Non-Pecuniary Losses
Aggravation and Exacerbation of $160,000.00
Carpal Tunnel Syndrome; Emotional
Distress
Loss of Earnings, employment benefits, $ 40,000.00
& future earnings. (1992-1995) $10,000 per year.
Following complainant's submission of supplemental information and the
agency's expert's review of complainant's medical evidence, the agency
concluded that complainant was entitled to an award of $4,612.50 for
compensatory damages in a final decision dated November 14, 1996.
In its final decision, the agency essentially determined that
complainant's request for compensatory damages in the amount of
$200,400.00 was unsubstantiated by the evidence submitted by complainant.
Based on the evidence submitted by complainant, the agency concluded
that complainant was entitled to pecuniary damages in the amount of
$112.50 for reimbursement for mileage complainant incurred for five
round trip medical visits during the period of September 2, 1992 to
October 28, 1992. In addition, the agency awarded complainant the sum of
$3,500.00 for the aggravation of his Carpal Tunnel Syndrome condition,
and $1,000.00 for emotional distress suffered as a direct cause of the
discriminatory action. The agency denied complainant's request for
out-of-pocket medical expenses in the amount of $300.00 for aspirin and
also denied complainant's claim for past and future pecuniary losses
described as loss of earnings, employment benefits and future earning.
On appeal, complainant disagrees with the agency's award and contends that
his compensatory damages claim was more than substantiated by his medical
documentation and testimonial evidence. In support of his compensatory
damages claim, complainant submitted his affidavit dated May 6, 1996,
and affidavits from his mother and wife. Complainant also provided
several letters from physicians who have treated him for his Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome.
ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS
Section 102(a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (CRA 1991), 105 Stat. 1071,
Pub. L. No. 102-166, codified as 42 U.S.C. � 1981A, authorizes an award
of compensatory damages as part of make-whole relief for intentional
discrimination in violation of Title VII, of the Civil Rights act of
1964 as amended. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002 at 8 (July 14, 1992); See
West v. Gibson, 119 S.Ct. 1906 (1999).
"[C]ompensatory damage awards must be limited to the sums necessary
to compensate [a complainant] for actual harm, even if the harm is
intangible." Id. at 13 (citing Carter v. Duncan-Higgins, Ltd., 727 F. 2d
1225 (D.C. Cir. 1984)). Thus, a compensatory damages award should
reimburse a complainant for proven pecuniary losses, future pecuniary
losses, and nonpecuniary losses.
The seminal Commission decision regarding the proof of entitlement
to compensatory damages is Carle v. Department of Navy, EEOC Appeal
No. 01922369 (January 5, 1993). In Carle, the Commission described the
type of objective evidence that an agency may obtain when assessing the
merits of a complainant's request for emotional distress damages.
In the instant case, complainant's claim for compensatory damages
involves both pecuniary and non-pecuniary losses. Pecuniary losses
are out-of pocket losses that occurred prior to the date of resolution
of the damage claim and those out-of pocket losses that are likely to
occur after conciliation of the claim. Non-pecuniary losses are losses
that are not subject to precise quantification, i.e. emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
injury to professional standing, injury to character and reputation,
injury to credit standing, and loss of health. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002
at 10 (July 14, 1992).
Medical Expenses
Complainant asserts that he is entitled to $100.00 for out-of-pocket
medical expenses. In support of his claim he asserts that his medical
documentation shows that he experienced a history of headaches for which
he took aspirin and Tylenol for relief. We find complainant's testimony
and medical evidence do not provide the requisite proof for objective
evidence which would establish a connection between the agency's
action and complainant's medical expense. In support of our finding,
we note that complainant admits that he did not maintain records or
receipts regarding his out-of-pocket medical expenses. Additionally,
we find that complainant's medical documentation does not provide any
evidence that the submitted expense records were related to a medical
condition that resulted from the agency's failure to provide complainant
with a reasonable accommodation during the period of August 1992 until
the date he resigned (February 2, 1995). Also, we find no evidence in
the record which would support complainant's assessment that he paid
$100.00 for aspirin.
Mileage Expenses
The Commission agrees with the agency's calculation of its award of
$112.50 to complainant for additional mileage expenses (mileage/gas
for medical treatment and examinations) he incurred as a result of the
discriminatory actions which lead to the aggravation and exacerbation
of his carpal tunnel syndrome. Again we note that complainant admits
that he did not maintain records or receipts regarding these expenses.
Therefore, due to the speculative nature of these expenses, we find the
agency's award reasonable.
Non-Pecuniary Damages
Complainant also asserts that he is entitled to $200,000.00 for
non-pecuniary damages. He describes these damages as aggravation and
exacerbation of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome, emotional distress, and loss of
earnings, employment benefits and future earning potential.
Regarding complainant's request for compensation for loss of past
earnings, we note, that Section 1981(b)(2) indicates that compensatory
damages do not include back pay, interest on back pay, or any other
type of equitable relief authorized by Title VII. We find that lost
earnings is an equitable remedy and is not included under "compensatory
damages." See Bever v. USDA, EEOC Appeal No. 01953949 (October 31, 1996).
Also we note that complainant's lost earnings and employment benefits
were addressed in the agency's back pay award. The agency awarded and
paid complainant a gross amount of $31,976.49 for back pay and $2,672.64
for his annual leave (employment benefits) for a total of $34,649.13.
In addition, the agency determined that complainant was entitled to a
net amount of $12,787.39 as compensation for his earnings from Worker's
Compensation.
Complainant contends that as a result of the agency's failure to provide
him with a reasonable accommodation, he was forced to resign and thereby
suffered a significant loss in future income. Complainant additionally
claims that he is no longer marketable in the computer industry and is
unlikely to find comparable employment given his permanent and progressive
medical disability and work restrictions. Moreover, complainant contends
that his inability to use his hands for any relative length of time and the
need for regular breaks makes him less, if not entirely, unmarketable.
First, we note that complainant's contention that he was forced to
resign by the agency is in essence a constructive discharge claim.
We find that this claim is not like or related to any matter that is
before us or that was decided by OFO in its March 7, 1996, decision
finding discrimination. See 29 C.F.R. �1614.107(b) Therefore, we will
not address this matter in this decision, but advise complainant that
if he wishes to pursue this matter he should contact an EEO counselor.
Second, we find that what opportunities complainant may have in the
future or how his career continues to unfold are dependent on too many
variables, many (if not most) of which are unrelated to the agency's
failure to provide him with a reasonable accommodation. For instance,
complainant has been diagnosed with permanent Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.
He developed this condition absent any wrongdoing by the agency.
In the instant action, and based on our review of OFO's decision,
we find that complainant is entitled to only those damages resulting
from the agency's failure to accommodate his condition during the time
period of August 1992 until the date complainant resigned, February 6,
1995, and is not responsible for any and all damages resulting from the
condition in general. See Rountree v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC
Appeal No. 01941906 (July 7, 1995), affirmed, EEOC Request No. 05950919
(February 15, 1996). Also, we find that complainant provided no objective
evidence to support his contention that he is no longer marketable for
computer jobs. For example, complainant did not specifically identify
any computer positions that he was not selected for as a result of
the agency's failure to provide a reasonable accommodation. Finally,
we find no evidence that complainant could not have continued working
with the agency once it supplied him with the reasonable accommodations
ordered by OFO. Based on these findings, we conclude that complainant
has not proven his entitlement to future earnings.
Aggravation and Exacerbation of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
We find that complainant's medical documentation provided the requisite
connection to support his entitlement to nonpecuniary damages for the
aggravation and exacerbation of his Carpal Tunnel Syndrome which occurred
as a direct result of the agency's failure to provide complainant with a
reasonable accommodation on August 18, 1992. However, we find that the
agency's award of $3,500 is an appropriate award for relief. We base
our finding on the evidence that follows.
According to the record, during the time period of February 2, 1992,
until August 17, 1992, complainant worked a modified work schedule that
allowed him 30 minutes on and 90 minutes off CRT and telephone duty.
Under this modified work schedule, complainant's Carpal Tunnel symptoms
abated. On August 18, 1992, complainant returned to his full-time
duties as a Teleservice Center Representative without restrictions
in his modified work station the agency provided as an attempt to
accommodate complainant's condition. Complainant's full-time regular
duties consisted of answering telephone inquiries from the public, which
entailed a combination of hand writing, consulting, reference binders,
and typing information into the computer. Normally, complainant fielded
approximately 80 inquiries per day. Upon returning to his full-time
regular duties under the agency's less than perfect accommodations,
complainant's symptoms, which had abated, returned. Commencing September
24, 1992, complainant began working only four hours per day. In December
1992, the agency reassigned complainant to work as a union steward;
complainant worked only four hours per day. The Office of Workers'
Compensation Programs (OWCP) accepted complainant's Carpal Tunnel
Syndrome as work-related, and paid complainant wage-loss benefits for
the periods of time he was unable to work eight hours per day. We note
that this evidence shows that more than one variable may have played
a role in exacerbating complainant's condition. While we acknowledge
the agency's failure to provide adequate accommodations by providing a
modified work station that met the prescribed arrangement complainant's
physician suggested, we cannot ignore the fact that complainant also
returned to his normal duties without any restrictions. We find that
complainant's return to his full-time regular duties are a relevant
factor that must be considered in assessing the amount of damages that
resulted from the agency's actions. Furthermore, we find that OWCP's
Orthopedic Surgeon who examined complainant on September 23, 1992,
noted that complainant's condition was attributable to his usual and
customary occupation and fell short of apportioning any exacerbation of
complainant's condition to the agency's failure to provide the adequate
modifications for his work station. Finally, contrary to complainant's
contentions, we find that the Orthopedic Surgeon's October 28, 1992,
evaluation of complainant does not clearly support a finding that his
nerve conduction studies which revealed a "probable mild bilateral
carpal tunnel syndrome" constitute evidence of an exacerbation of
complainant's Carpal Tunnel Syndrome. Once again the Surgeon, though
finding complainant's condition permanent and stationary as of October 28,
1992, does not clearly attribute complainant's condition to the agency's
failure to provide him with a adequate reasonable accommodation.
At most we find that complainant's medical documentation supports
a finding that complainant's condition worsened when he resumed his
full-time regular duties. Whenever complainant ceased these duties,
his symptoms appeared to have abated. We note that complainant's
condition is generally referred to as mild, and we note that the
surgeon's comments in both of his evaluations reveal that he found "few
physical findings that correlate to complainant's subjective complaints."
The surgeon further comments, that complainant's complaints "appear to
be activity related, and once that specific activity has ceased, his
symptoms resolve." Considering this evidence, we agree with the agency's
assessment that aggravation of complainant's injury was temporary in
duration and mild in severity.
Emotional Distress
Finally, we conclude that complainant's affidavit, and the affidavit
from his wife are sufficient to support complainant's claim that he
suffered emotional distress as direct cause of the agency's failure to
provide adequate reasonable accommodations for his Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.
However, we find that complainant's mothers' affidavit and the affidavit
from a physician that treated complainant in 1991, provides no relevant
information in support of the time period in question (August 18,
1992 until September 2, 1992) during which the agency failed to provide
complainant with an adequate reasonable accommodation. Their testimony
essentially deals with complainant's development of Carpal Tunnel Syndrome
in 1991. As we stated before, complainant developed this condition as
a result of the repetitive duties of his regular work as a Teleservice
Center Representative and not because of any wrongdoing by the agency.
Moreover, in determining damages, the agency is only responsible for those
damages that are clearly shown to be caused by the alleged discriminatory
conduct, not for any damages in general. See Bever v. Department of
Agriculture, EEOC Request No. 01953949 (October 31, 1996).
We note that complainant's wife testified that complainant is no longer
able to perform simple tasks such as tightening screws, bringing in
groceries, carrying their children, carrying infant carriers, diapers,
clothes, etc. In addition, complainant's wife states that complainant
is not able to perform virtually any other tasks that requires strain
on his wrists, or strength from his fore arms and arms. She further
states that she can no longer rely on complainant to perform the everyday
tasks that he performed prior to his injury. Regarding, complainant's
emotional state, his wife testified that he is very frustrated and that
his relationship with their children have been impacted by complainant's
condition.
In support of his emotional distress claim, complainant testified that
he experienced six months of withdrawal and despondency (including
feeling "very depressed") with increased fatigue and feeling of a lack
of self worth as a result of the agency's failure to accommodate him.
The agency awarded complainant a sum of $1,000 based on their assessment
that complainant's complaint of aggravation of his medical condition
failed to provide any credible evidence to prove that his emotional
distress was caused by discrimination rather than distress over his Carpal
Tunnel Syndrome, other health issues such as his inability to exercise
due to limitations related to his condition, medication side effects,
or family issues including his physical inability to hold his children.
In determining the amount of a compensatory damages award, we are guided
by the principle that a compensatory damages award is limited to the sums
necessary to compensate complainant for the actual harm caused by the
agency's discriminatory action and attempt to affix a reasonable dollar
value to compensate him for that portion of his emotional distress that
was caused by the agency's discrimination. EEOC Notice No. N 915.002
at 13.
We further note that damage awards for emotional harm are difficult to
determine and that there are no definitive rules governing the amount
to be awarded in given cases. In this regard, the Commission finds
that a proper award must meet two goals: that it not be "monstrously
excessive" standing alone, and that it be consistent with awards made
in similar cases. See Cygnar v. City of Chicago, 865 F.2d 827, 848 (7th
Cir. 1989); EEOC v. AIC Security Investigations, Ltd., 823 F. Supp. 571,
574 (N.D. Ill. 1993).
There have been recent Commission decisions awarding nonpecuniary
damages for emotional harm similar to that experienced by complainant.
In Lawrence v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal No. 01952288
(April 18, 1996), the Commission authorized an award of $3,000 in
compensatory damages for emotional harm where complainant averred that
she suffered from weight loss, nausea, stomach problems and headaches
as a result of sexual harassment and the agency's failure to respond
promptly to her allegations. In White v. Department of Veterans Affairs,
EEOC Appeal No. 01950342 (June 13, 1997), the Commission ordered an award
of $5,000 in nonpecuniary damages where the complainant's testimony and
his psychologist's report indicated that the harassment that complainant
endured, which took both sexual and nonsexual forms, led complainant to
suffer from anxiety, depression, emotional fatigue, occasional nightmares,
and insomnia.
Also, in Rountree v. Department of Agriculture, EEOC Appeal No. 01941906
(July 7, 1995), affirmed, EEOC Request No. 05950919 (February 15, 1996),
the Commission ordered an award of $8,000 in nonpecuniary damages where
the complainant's statement and psychologist's report indicated that some
of the complainant's emotional distress, including feelings of inadequacy,
failure, and depression, were the result of a discriminatory performance
appraisal and the denial of bonus pay based on that appraisal.
Finally, in Demeuse v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Appeal
No. 01950324 (May 22, 1997), the Commission ordered an award of $1,500.00
for emotional distress after concluding that complainant suffered
embarrassment and humiliation as the result of discriminatory harassment
or hostile environment based on complainant's mental disability, when
his supervisor "frisked" him for weapons while he was walking to his
work area.
Having carefully considered the facts of this case, the Commission
finds that an award of $2,000.00 in compensatory damages is a proper
award for the emotional harm complainant suffered as a result of
the discriminatory action in this case. In reaching this amount,
the Commission has considered a number of factors. For example, we
considered the nature and severity of the discrimination, as well as
the nature and severity of complainant's emotional pain and suffering.
We considered the evidence concerning complainant's emotional distress
received from complainant's affidavit, his wife's affidavit, and the
lack of objective evidence supporting his emotional harm. Additionally,
we considered the amounts awarded in similar cases.
Accordingly, based on the foregoing, the agency's decision awarding
complainant compensatory damages is affirmed regarding damages assessed
for complainant's medical expenses, mileage, past and future earnings and
benefits and non-pecuniary damages for the aggravation and exacerbation
of complainant's Carpal Tunnel Syndrome.
The agency's decision awarding damages in the amount of $1,000.00 for
complainant's emotional distress is vacated. In accordance with this
decision, the agency is ordered to comply with the following order.
ORDER
The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:
(1) Within thirty (30) days of the date on which this decision becomes
final, the agency shall tender to complainant nonpecuniary compensatory
damages in the amount of $5,612.50.
(2) Complainant is entitled to an award of reasonable attorney's fees
incurred with respect to the compensatory damages issue as provided in
the statement entitled "Attorney's Fees."
(3) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as
provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's
Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation verifying
that the corrective action has been implemented.
ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1199)
If complainant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to
an award of reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the
complaint. 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501(e). The award of attorney's fees shall
be paid by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of
fees to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,
Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this
decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for
attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. � 1614.501.
IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K1199)
Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.
The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)
calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The
report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal
Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,
Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting
documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to the
complainant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's order,
the complainant may petition the Commission for enforcement of the order.
29 C.F.R. � 1614.503(a). The complainant also has the right to file a
civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's order prior
to or following an administrative petition for enforcement. See 64
Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659-60 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407, 1614.408), and 29 C.F.R. �
1614.503(g). Alternatively, the complainant has the right to file a
civil action on the underlying complaint in accordance with the paragraph
below entitled "Right to File A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.407
and 1614.408. A civil action for enforcement or a civil action on the
underlying complaint is subject to the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �
2000e-16(c)(Supp. V 1993). If the complainant files a civil action, the
administrative processing of the complaint, including any petition for
enforcement, will be terminated. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.409).
STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL
RECONSIDERATION (M1199)
The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this
case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing
arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:
1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation
of material fact or law; or
2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,
practices, or operations of the agency.
Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, MUST BE FILED
WITH THE OFFICE OF FEDERAL OPERATIONS (OFO) WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR
DAYS of receipt of this decision or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS
OF RECEIPT OF ANOTHER PARTY'S TIMELY REQUEST FOR RECONSIDERATION. See
64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,659 (1999) (to be codified and hereinafter
referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.405). All requests and arguments must be
submitted to the Director, Office of Federal Operations, Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the
absence of a legible postmark, the request to reconsider shall be deemed
timely filed if it is received by mail within five days of the expiration
of the applicable filing period. See 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644, 37,661 (1999)
(to be codified and hereinafter referred to as 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604).
The request or opposition must also include proof of service on the
other party.
Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your
request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances
prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation
must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission
will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only
in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).
COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R1199)
This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative
processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil
action, you have the right to file such action in an appropriate United
States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date
that you receive this decision. In the alternative, you may file a
civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY (180) CALENDAR DAYS of the date
you filed your complaint with the agency, or filed your appeal with the
Commission. If you file a civil action, YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN
THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT
HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE.
Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your case in court.
"Agency" or "department" means the national organization, and not the
local office, facility or department in which you work. Filing a civil
action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.
RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)
If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot
afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint
an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the
action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;
the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).
The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of
the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time
in which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action
must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above
("Right to File A Civil Action").
FOR THE COMMISSION:
February 28, 2000
Date Carlton M. Hadden, Acting Director
Office of Federal Operations
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
For timeliness purposes, the Commission will presume that this decision
was received within five (5) calendar days after it was mailed. I certify
that this decision was mailed to complainant, complainant's representative
(if applicable), and the agency on:
Date Equal Employment Assistant
1On November 9, 1999, revised regulations governing the EEOC's federal
sector complaint process went into effect. These regulations apply to all
Federal sector EEO complaints pending at any stage in the administrative
process. Consequently, the Commission will apply the revised regulations
found at 64 Fed. Reg. 37,644 (1999), where applicable, in deciding the
present appeal. The regulations, as amended, may also be found at the
Commission's website at WWW.EEOC.GOV.