David T. Contreras, Appellant,v.Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionFeb 23, 1999
01974799 (E.E.O.C. Feb. 23, 1999)

01974799

02-23-1999

David T. Contreras, Appellant, v. Togo D. West, Jr., Secretary, Department of Veterans Affairs, Agency.


David T. Contreras v. Department of Veterans Affairs

01974799

February 23, 1999

David T. Contreras, )

Appellant, )

)

v. ) Appeal No. 01974799

) Agency No. 95-1464

Togo D. West, Jr., ) Hearing No. 360-95-8526X

Secretary, )

Department of Veterans Affairs, )

Agency. )

________________________________)

DECISION

On May 28, 1997, David T, Contreras (appellant) timely appealed the final

decision of the Department of Veterans Affairs (agency), dated April

23, 1997, which concluded that he had not been discriminated against in

violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq. In his complaint, appellant had alleged that agency officials

discriminated against him on the bases of his national origin (Hispanic),

sex (male), and/or reprisal for engaging in prior EEO activity, when he

was not selected for the position of GS-303-6 Program Analyst, advertised

under Vacancy Announcement No. MP-94-050-MP. This appeal is accepted

in accordance with the provisions of EEOC Order No. 960.001.

At the time the events at issue arose, appellant, a Hispanic male,

had been employed by the agency since 1975, and was currently working

as a Health Technician, GS-6, in the San Antonio Outpatient Clinic

of the Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Hospital. In this position,

he performed patient care, as well as a variety of administrative tasks.

The record establishes that appellant's performance had been consistently

rated at the "Outstanding" or "Highly Successful" levels. In the early

1990s, the agency computerized a number of operating systems which had

formerly been performed manually. One of these computer systems was

known as "DHCP." Appellant has a bachelor's degree in health care

administration, as well as a number of specialized college computer

courses. As a result of his training, appellant was responsible for

bringing the San Antonio clinic on line into the DHCP computer system.

Later, the computer functions of the clinic became the responsibility

of the hospital's Medical Administration Service (MAS).

In October 1994, the agency issued a vacancy announcement advertising for

the position of Program Analyst, GS-303-6, with MAS. Appellant was among

the candidates who applied for the position. However, a non-Hispanic

female employee of MAS (the "selectee") was chosen for the position.

At the time of her selection, the selectee was a GS-4 Medical Clerk,

who had worked for the agency for about one year. She had formerly been

on active duty in the Air Force, and had some college, but no degree.

In her only performance evaluation with the agency, she had been rated as

"Fully Successful."

Appellant stated that he believed he had been discriminated against

when not selected for the position in question for a number of reasons.

First, he judged his qualifications for the position to be far superior

to those of the selectee, and believed that his qualifications were not

really examined because a preselection had occurred. He also noted that

the original vacancy announcement, under which he applied, was canceled

and replaced with an amended announcement which he believed was rewritten

to be more advantageous to the selectee. Finally, appellant believed

his application was negatively viewed because of a memorandum he had

written expressing his opposition to "nepotism and cronyism" within

the agency. It is undisputed that the agency officials responsible for

this selection were aware of this memorandum. Appellant's second-level

supervisor discussed the memorandum at a staff meeting, and later told

appellant's wife that "...he [appellant] should not be writing that kind

of stuff because all it's going to do is just hurt himself."

Management witnesses stated that the candidates were rated by a committee

against criteria which was judged to be related to the position

in question. All candidates were rated against the same criteria.

Agency witnesses explained that the selectee was chosen because she

attained the highest rating score and, therefore, was considered best

qualified for the position. These witnesses asserted that appellant

lacked sufficient administrative and computer experience. It was

alleged that the selectee, during her military career, had extensive

administrative experience, and, because she already worked in MAS,

had the most relevant agency work experience.

On March 24, 1995, appellant filed a formal EEO complaint with the

agency, alleging that the agency had discriminated against him as

referenced above. The agency accepted the complaint and conducted

an investigation. At the conclusion of the investigation, appellant

requested an administrative hearing before an Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission (EEOC) administrative judge (AJ).

On February 25, 1997, following a hearing at which seven witnesses

testified, the AJ issued a decision which concluded that the evidence

supported a finding of national origin and sex discrimination.<1> The AJ

based this conclusion on a determination that the evidence established

that appellant was, in fact, significantly better qualified for the

position in question than the selectee by virtue of his education,

training and work experience. The AJ found that evidence strongly

suggested that the ratings were unfairly skewed in the selectee's

favor and that she was awarded high ratings on several factors without

adequate justification. For example, even though she had very limited

experience with agency directives regarding eligibility and entitlements

for agency medical, dental and travel benefits, which was essential to

the position, she scored the same as those who had extensive experience

in this area. The AJ also found significant discrepancies between the

documentation of the scoring used to justify appellant's nonselection

and the written and oral testimony of committee members. For example,

one of the committee members, in justifying his nonselection, averred that

appellant "has some experience in DHCP, but he does not have a whole lot."

However, appellant's Appraisal for Promotion, submitted in support of his

application for selection, was authored by this same individual and said:

[Appellant] is highly skilled in the operation of the DHCP computer.

His present menu includes but is not limited to the following: All

MAS options, Fileman, Ward Lab menu, Beneficiary Travel, C&P Tracking,

HINQ users menu, OPC menu, Radiology Order entry, Register menu, Special

Survey and Display--edit user characteristics."

The AJ also noted that one of the reasons offered by the agency for

appellant's lower rating was that he "lacked direct MAS" experience.

However, in their testimony, the committee members were in accord that MAS

experience should have constituted only a difference of one additional

point in the final scoring criteria, yet appellant's score reflected a

difference of more than one point in this category. Moreover, the AJ

found that the committee ignored the fact that appellant had worked in

MAS when needed as a volunteer. Finally, the AJ was troubled by the fact

that the committee found appellant lacking in administrative experience,

despite his college degree in that field and records which evidenced

extensive experience in administration. The AJ concluded that the

combination of all these factors, coupled with a number of procedural

irregularities in the selection process, were sufficient to establish

that the agency's articulated reason for its selection was pretextual,

and that discrimination based on national origin and sex was the real

reason for appellant's nonselection.

On April 23, 1997, the agency issued its final decision in which it

rejected the AJ's finding of discrimination in this matter. It is from

this decision that appellant now appeals.

After a careful review of the record in its entirety, the Commission

finds that the AJ's recommended decision sets forth the relevant facts

and properly analyzes the appropriate regulations, policies and laws.

Based on the evidence of record, the Commission discerns no basis to

disturb the AJ's finding of discrimination. In reaching this decision,

the Commission notes that the credibility determinations of the AJ are

entitled to deference due to the AJ's first-hand knowledge, through

personal observation, of the demeanor and conduct of the witnesses

at the hearing. Esquer v. United States Postal Service, EEOC Request

No. 05960096 (September 6, 1996); Willis v. Department of the Treasury,

EEOC Request No. 05900589 (July 26, 1990). None of the arguments raised

by the agency on appeal differ significantly from those previously raised

with, and considered by, the AJ in rendering his decision.

Accordingly, it is the decision of the Equal Employment Opportunity

Commission to REVERSE the agency's final decision which rejected the

AJ's finding of national origin and sex discrimination. In order to

remedy appellant for its discriminatory actions, the agency shall,

comply with the following Order.

ORDER

The agency is ORDERED to take the following remedial action:

(A) Within thirty (30) calendar days of the date this decision becomes

final, the agency shall place appellant in the position in question,

or a substantially equivalent position with promotion potential to the

GS-7/9 level, retroactive to the date the selectee assumed the position.

The agency shall award appellant any salary and/or benefits he lost as

a result of his nonselection.

(B) The agency shall provide training to the officials responsible

for its actions in this matter in their responsibilities under all the

Federal equal employment opportunity statutes.

(C) The agency shall post at the Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans

Hospital copies of the attached notice. Copies of the notice,

after being signed by the agency's duly authorized representative,

shall be posted by the agency within thirty (30) calendar days of the

date this decision becomes final, and shall remain posted for sixty

(60) consecutive days, in conspicuous places, including all places

where notices to employees are customarily posted. The agency shall

take reasonable steps to ensure that said notices are not altered,

defaced, or covered by any other material. The original signed notice

is to be submitted to the Compliance Officer at the address cited in

the paragraph entitled "Implementation of the Commission's Decision,"

within ten (10) calendar days of the expiration of the posting period.

(D) The agency is further directed to submit a report of compliance, as

provided in the statement entitled "Implementation of the Commission's

Decision." The report shall include supporting documentation of the

agency's calculation of back pay and other benefits due appellant,

including evidence that the corrective action has been implemented.

ATTORNEY'S FEES (H1092)

If appellant has been represented by an attorney (as defined by

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e)(1)(iii)), he/she is entitled to an award of

reasonable attorney's fees incurred in the processing of the complaint.

29 C.F.R. �1614.501 (e). The award of attorney's fees shall be paid

by the agency. The attorney shall submit a verified statement of fees

to the agency -- not to the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission,

Office of Federal Operations -- within thirty (30) calendar days of this

decision becoming final. The agency shall then process the claim for

attorney's fees in accordance with 29 C.F.R. �1614.501.

IMPLEMENTATION OF THE COMMISSION'S DECISION (K0595)

Compliance with the Commission's corrective action is mandatory.

The agency shall submit its compliance report within thirty (30)

calendar days of the completion of all ordered corrective action. The

report shall be submitted to the Compliance Officer, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. The agency's report must contain supporting

documentation, and the agency must send a copy of all submissions to

the appellant. If the agency does not comply with the Commission's

order, the appellant may petition the Commission for enforcement of

the order. 29 C.F.R. �1614.503 (a). The appellant also has the right

to file a civil action to enforce compliance with the Commission's

order prior to or following an administrative petition for enforcement.

See 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408, 1614.409, and 1614.503 (g). Alternatively,

the appellant has the right to file a civil action on the underlying

complaint in accordance with the paragraph below entitled "Right to File

A Civil Action." 29 C.F.R. �� 1614.408 and 1614.409. A civil action for

enforcement or a civil action on the underlying complaint is subject to

the deadline stated in 42 U.S.C. �2000e-16(c) (Supp. V 1993). If the

appellant files a civil action, the administrative processing of the

complaint, including any petition for enforcement, will be terminated.

See 29 C.F.R. �1614.410.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0795)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the appellant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. New and material evidence is available that was not readily available

when the previous decision was issued; or

2. The previous decision involved an erroneous interpretation of law,

regulation or material fact, or misapplication of established policy; or

3. The decision is of such exceptional nature as to have substantial

precedential implications.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting arguments or evidence, MUST

BE FILED WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive this

decision, or WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive

a timely request to reconsider filed by another party. Any argument in

opposition to the request to reconsider or cross request to reconsider

MUST be submitted to the Commission and to the requesting party

WITHIN TWENTY (20) CALENDAR DAYS of the date you receive the request

to reconsider. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.407. All requests and arguments

must bear proof of postmark and be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

19848, Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark,

the request to reconsider shall be deemed filed on the date it is received

by the Commission.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely. If extenuating circumstances

have prevented the timely filing of a request for reconsideration,

a written statement setting forth the circumstances which caused the

delay and any supporting documentation must be submitted with your

request for reconsideration. The Commission will consider requests

for reconsideration filed after the deadline only in very limited

circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � l6l4.604(c).

RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (R0993)

This is a decision requiring the agency to continue its administrative

processing of your complaint. However, if you wish to file a civil

action, you have the right to file such an action in an appropriate

United States District Court. It is the position of the Commission

that you have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United

States District Court WITHIN NINETY (90) CALENDAR DAYS from the date

that you receive this decision. You should be aware, however, that

courts in some jurisdictions have interpreted the Civil Rights Act of

1991 in a manner suggesting that a civil action must be filed WITHIN

THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive this decision.

To ensure that your civil action is considered timely, you are advised to

file it WITHIN THIRTY (30) CALENDAR DAYS from the date that you receive

this decision or to consult an attorney concerning the applicable time

period in the jurisdiction in which your action would be filed. In the

alternative, you may file a civil action AFTER ONE HUNDRED EIGHTY (180)

CALENDARS DAYS of the date you filed your complaint with the agency,

or filed your appeal with the Commission. If you file a civil action,

YOU MUST NAME AS THE DEFENDANT IN THE COMPLAINT THE PERSON WHO IS THE

OFFICIAL AGENCY HEAD OR DEPARTMENT HEAD, IDENTIFYING THAT PERSON BY

HIS OR HER FULL NAME AND OFFICIAL TITLE. Failure to do so may result

in the dismissal of your case in court. "Agency" or "department"

means the national organization, and not the local office, facility or

department in which you work. Filing a civil action will terminate the

administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1092)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. ��791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of the

Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time in

which to file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action

must be filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above

("Right to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

Feb 23, 1999

_________________ _______________________________

DATE Ronnie Blumenthal, Director

Office of Federal Operations

NOTICE TO EMPLOYEES

POSTED BY ORDER OF THE

EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

An Agency of the United States Government

This Notice is posted pursuant to an Order by the United States Equal

Employment Opportunity Commission dated _____________ which found that

a violation of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. �2000e

et seq., has occurred at this facility.

Federal law requires that there be no discrimination against any

employee or applicant for employment because of the person's RACE,

COLOR, RELIGION, SEX, NATIONAL ORIGIN, AGE, or PHYSICAL or MENTAL

DISABILITY with respect to hiring, firing, promotion, compensation,

or other terms, conditions or privileges of employment.

The Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Hospital supports and will comply

with such Federal law and will not take action against individuals

because they have exercised their rights under law.

The Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Hospital has been found to have

discriminated against the individual affected by the Commission's

finding on the bases of his national origin (Hispanic) and sex

(male) when he was not selected for the position of Program Analyst,

GS-303-6. The Commission has ordered the agency to retroactively

place this individual in the position in question with an award of any

appropriate back pay. The Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Hospital

will ensure that officials responsible for personnel decisions and

terms and conditions of employment will abide by the requirements of

all Federal equal employment opportunity laws and will not retaliate

against employees who file EEO complaints.

The Audie L. Murphy Memorial Veterans Hospital will not in any manner

restrain, interfere, coerce, or retaliate against any individual who

exercises his or her right to oppose practices made unlawful by, or

who participates in proceedings pursuant to, Federal equal employment

opportunity law.

____________________

Date Posted: _____________________

Posting Expires: _________________

29 C.F.R. Part 1614

1 However, the AJ found no violation of Title VII's anti-retaliation

protections because the record did not support a finding that appellant

was opposing a discriminatory policy or practice of the agency within the

purview of the EEO process when he wrote his memorandum opposing "nepotism

and cronyism." As appellant has not provided any additional argument or

evidence on this issue on appeal, the Commission concurs with the AJ's

finding.