David Miller

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jul 15, 2020

12848279 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jul. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
12/848,279 08/02/2010 David Dodd Miller 2010P11056 US 5614
28524 7590 07/15/2020
SIEMENS CORPORATION
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY DEPARTMENT
3501 Quadrangle Blvd Ste 230
Orlando, FL 32817
EXAMINER
SHEIKH, ASFAND M
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
3627
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
07/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
ipdadmin.us@siemens.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
________________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
________________

Ex parte DAVID DODD MILLER
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Appeal 2020-002712
Application 12/848,279
Technology Center 3600
________________

Before JASON V. MORGAN, AMBER L. HAGY, and
DAVID J. CUTITTA II, Administrative Patent Judges.

MORGAN, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Pursuant to 35 U.S.C. § 134(a), Appellant1 appeals from the
Examiner’s decision to reject claims 1, 2, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 22, 23, 25, and
27–29. This appeal is related to appeal number 2016-002698 (decided July
5, 2017).2 We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We AFFIRM.
Summary of the disclosure
Appellant’s invention generally relates to a traffic control system.
Spec. ¶ 2. The traffic control system may include a roadside equipment
(RSE) system that can be used for detecting approaching vehicles and
controlling traffic control equipment, such as a traffic signal, based thereon.
Spec. ¶¶ 4, 23, 44.
Representative claim (key limitations emphasized)
1. A method for traffic control, comprising:
wirelessly receiving vehicle data by a roadside equipment
(RSE) system from multiple vehicles, each vehicle comprising

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in 37
C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as Siemens
Mobility, Inc. Appeal Br. 1.
2 Appellant failed to identify the prior appeal as being related. See Appeal
Br. 1. Appellant and Appellant’s counsel are reminded of the duty to identify
all other prior . . . appeals . . . which satisfy all of the following
conditions: involve an application . . . owned by the appellant
or assignee, are known to appellant, the appellant’s legal
representative, or assignee, and may be related to, directly
affect . . . or have a bearing on the Board’s decision in the
pending appeal.
37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(ii) (2018).
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an onboard equipment (OBE) system connected to the vehicle,
the vehicle data including location data and time data;
determining a most recent location of each vehicle by the RSE
system and from the vehicle data;
comparing the most recent location of each vehicle to a
previous location of each vehicle;
determining, by the RSE system, an estimated time of arrival
(ETA) of each vehicle to a base location using the vehicle data
and including determining a vehicle speed and a vehicle travel
time to the base location, ETAs for the multiple vehicles being
determined simultaneously;
producing, by the RSE, a control signal for traffic equipment
including a traffic signal of the base location and controlling a
green time of the traffic signal to accommodate a greatest
number of ETAs of the multiple vehicles,
wherein the control signal is used to control operation of the
traffic equipment,
wherein the control signal is also based on traffic conditions,
wherein during low traffic volume below a predetermined
value, each vehicle is granted a green signal at arrival at the
base location as a first come, first served-control strategy such
that no vehicle stops, and
wherein, when traffic volume increases above the
predetermined value, control strategy switches from the first
come, first served-control strategy to a coordinated control
strategy such that the traffic volume is formed into platoons
that progress through green lights at a speed limit.
The Examiner’s rejections and cited references
The Examiner rejects claims 1, 2, 6, 12, 13, 15, 16, 22, and 23 under
35 U.S.C. § 103(a) as being unpatentable over Sumner (US 2008/0204277
A1; published Aug. 28, 2008), Hall et al. (US 5,539,398; issued July 23,
1996) (“Hall”), Ebner et al. (US 6,985,090 B2; issued Jan. 10, 2006)
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Application 12/848,279

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(“Ebner”), Ueda et al. (US 3,602,880; issued Aug. 31, 1971) (“Ueda”), and
Bryant (US 2010/0283631 A1; published Nov. 11, 2010). Final Act. 4–12.
The Examiner rejects claims 25 and 27–29 under 35 U.S.C. § 103(a)
as being unpatentable over Sumner, Hall, Ebner, Ueda, Bryant, and the
Examiner’s Official Notice. Final Act. 12–15.
ADOPTION OF EXAMINER’S FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS
We agree with and adopt as our own the Examiner’s findings as set
forth in the Answer and in the Action from which this appeal was taken, and
we concur with the Examiner’s conclusions. We have considered
Appellant’s arguments, but do not find them persuasive of error. We provide
the following explanation for emphasis.
ANALYSIS
In rejecting claim 1 as obvious, the Examiner finds Ueda’s controlling
of traffic signals “in accordance with the volume of traffic approaching the
intersection on each of the intersecting streets” (Ueda col. 1, ll. 7–9)—
particularly managing vehicle platoons (see id. at col. 1, l. 41–col. 2, l. 5)—
teaches or suggests when traffic volume increases above a predetermined
value, control strategy switches to a coordinated control strategy such that
the traffic volume is formed into platoons that progress through green lights
at a speed limit (Final Act. 9 (citing Ueda col. 1, ll. 5–30, col. 1, l. 41–col. 2,
l. 5)). The Examiner relies on the strategy of Bryant’s Smart Stop Sign
System, which enables the first driver to approach an intersection to go
through without having to come to a complete stop (Bryant ¶ 2), to teach or
suggest during low traffic volume below a predetermined value, each vehicle
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is granted a green signal at arrival at the base location as a first come, first
served-control strategy such that no vehicle stops (Final Act. 10 (citing
Bryant ¶ 2)). The Examiner concludes the combination of the strategies of
Ueda and Bryant would have been obvious to an artisan of ordinary skill
because it would have represented the combination of familiar prior art
elements according to known methods to yield predictable results. Id.; see
also Leapfrog Enterprises, Inc. v. Fisher-Price, Inc., 485 F.3d 1157, 1161
(Fed. Cir. 2007) (citing KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 416
(2007)).
Appellant contends the Examiner erred because “none of the cited art,
alone or in combination, disclose, teach or suggest that control strategies are
switched based on low traffic volume below a predetermined value and high
traffic volume above the predetermined value.” Appeal Br. 4. Appellant
acknowledges that “Ueda discloses detecting platoons and changing traffic
lights accordingly to accommodate the platoons [and] Bryant discloses
controlling traffic lights at specific intersections.” Id. at 6. But Appellant
argues that the references fail to
teach or suggest a traffic control method utilizing different
control strategies, wherein during low traffic volume a first
come, first served-control strategy is applied, and when traffic
volume increases, a control strategy switches from the first
come, first served-control strategy to a coordinated control
strategy where platoons are formed and progress through green
lights at a speed limit as claimed.
Id. In particular, Appellant argues “Ueda does not teach or suggest acting
without platooning when the traffic value is below the predetermined
number of vehicles.” Reply Br. 3.
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Appellant’s arguments are unpersuasive because “one cannot show
non-obviousness by attacking references individually where, as here, the
rejections are based on combinations of references.” In re Keller, 642 F.2d
413, 426 (CCPA 1981). Here, the Examiner properly relies on Ueda for its
teachings regarding a strategy for how to manage traffic that becomes too
heavy for low-traffic strategies. See Final Act. 9.
The Examiner’s findings are supported by Ueda’s teaching of
managing a platoon that is identified “[w]hen the number of vehicles that
will enter a street intersection during a predetermined relatively short period
of time has exceeded a predetermined number.” Ueda col. 1, ll. 42–44. That
is, Ueda teaches or suggests use of a coordinated control strategy when
traffic volume (e.g., the number of vehicles that will enter a street
intersection during a predetermined relatively short period of time) increases
above a predetermined value. But the cited teachings of Ueda are directed to
coordinated control under high traffic volume on at least one street. See, e.g.,
Ueda col. 1, l. 41–col. 2, l. 1. The cited teachings of Ueda provide minimal
guidance as to what strategy to use when traffic volume is low on all streets
at an intersection. See id. col. 1, ll. 6–18. Therefore, we agree with the
Examiner that an artisan of ordinary skill would have looked to other low
traffic volume strategies, such as the strategy Bryant teaches, to address
traffic conditions outside the focus of Ueda’s teachings. See, e.g., Ans. 5
(“‘volume’ below the ‘predetermined number’ would be the low traffic
volume below a predetermined value” and “acting without platooning of
Ueda [in such conditions] could be substituted with the teachings of Bryant’s
‘green lighting’”).
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Appellant argues Bryant “relates to a smart stop sign system to
promote safety and efficiency at traffic intersections where a standard All-
Way Stop arrangement is not enough to ensure traffic safety and a standard
traffic light system is overkill,” and thus Appellant contends “Bryant teaches
away from standard traffic light systems and proposes instead the Smart
Stop Sign System.” Reply Br. 3; see also Appeal Br. 5. But Appellant does
not identify any teaching in Bryant that criticizes, discredits, or otherwise
discourages using the Bryant low traffic volume strategy—giving preference
to the first driver to reach the intersection—in other traffic control systems.
See In re Fulton, 391 F.3d 1195, 1201 (Fed. Cir. 2004). Rather, Appellant
merely shows that Bryant teaches that the strategy can be applied without
use of a traffic light system in situations where traffic volume is persistently
light enough that standard traffic lights would be unnecessary. But it has
long been known that traffic at many intersections can vary greatly (e.g.,
traffic volume may be low early in the morning, but become heavy during
“rush hour”). Thus, an artisan of ordinary skill would have recognized that
Bryant’s teachings would be applicable in other systems designed to handle
periods of high traffic volume to the extent such systems also must be able
to handle periods of low traffic volume. Therefore, Appellant’s arguments
do not show that Bryant teaches away from being combined in the claimed
manner with Ueda and the other references cited by the Examiner.
Accordingly, we sustain the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejection
of claim 1, and the Examiner’s 35 U.S.C. § 103(a) rejections of claims 2, 6,
12, 13, 15, 16, 22, 23, 25, and 27–29, which Appellant does not argue
separately. See Appeal Br. 6.

Appeal 2020-002712
Application 12/848,279

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CONCLUSION
Claims
Rejected 35 U.S.C. § References Affirmed Reversed
1, 2, 6, 12,
13, 15, 16,
22, 23
103(a) Sumner, Hall,
Ebner, Ueda,
Bryant
1, 2, 6, 12,
13, 15, 16,
22, 23

25, 27–29 103(a) Sumner, Hall,
Ebner, Ueda,
Bryant,
Official Notice
25, 27–29
Overall
Outcome
1, 2, 6, 12,
13, 15, 16,
22, 23, 25,
27–29

TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking subsequent action in connection with this
appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 1.136(a)(1)(iv).
AFFIRMED