David Gorodyansky et al.

Patent Trials and Appeals Board

Jun 15, 2020

13846856 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Jun. 15, 2020)

UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE
United States Patent and Trademark Office
Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS
P.O. Box 1450
Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450
www.uspto.gov
APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO.
13/846,856 03/18/2013 DAVID GORODYANSKY 10001.9 2475
41729 7590 06/15/2020
Pavel Pogodin, Esq.
TransPacific Law Group
5245 AV ISLA VERDE APT 302
Carolina, PR 00979
EXAMINER
SCHWARTZ, DARREN B
ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER
2435
NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE
06/15/2020 ELECTRONIC
Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding.
The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication.
Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the
following e-mail address(es):
pavel@transpacificlaw.com
ppogodin@gmail.com
PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07)
UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE
____________

BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD
____________

Ex parte DAVID GORODYANSKY and EUGENE LAPIDOUS
________________

Appeal 2018-008849
Application 13/846,856
Technology Center 2400
____________

Before LINZY T. McCARTNEY, MATTHEW J. McNEILL, and
STEVEN M. AMUNDSON, Administrative Patent Judges.

McNEILL, Administrative Patent Judge.

DECISION ON APPEAL

Appellant1 appeals under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) from the Examiner’s
rejection of claims 1‒20, which are all the claims pending in this application.
We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b).
We affirm.

1 We use the word “Appellant” to refer to “applicant” as defined in
37 C.F.R. § 1.42. Appellant identifies the real party in interest as
Anchorfree, Inc. Appeal Br. 2.
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Introduction
Appellant’s application relates to using challenge-response tests to
distinguish between human users and software applications on the Internet.
Spec. ¶2. Claim 1 is illustrative of the appealed subject matter and reads as
follows:
1. A computer-implemented method performed in a system
comprising a central processing unit, a network adaptor and a
memory, the method comprising:
a. receiving, via the network adaptor, a request to
access an Internet resource, the request being received from a
request originator;
b. providing, via the network adaptor, to the request
originator a response comprising at least one challenge question
and a plurality of answer options responsive to the challenge
question;
c. receiving, via the network adaptor, from the
request originator a choice of one of the plurality of answer
options; and
d. allowing or denying, using the central processing
unit, the access to the Internet resource based on the received
choice of one of the plurality of answer options,
wherein the plurality of answer options comprise at least
one answer of a first type which is a false answer to the at least
one challenge question and at least two answers of a second
type, which are not false answers to the same at least one
challenge question.

The Examiner’s Rejections
Claims 1‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as being directed to
patent-ineligible subject matter. See Final Act. 30‒35.
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Claims 1‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to
comply with the written-description requirement See Final Act. 35‒36.
Claims 1‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) as failing to
comply with the enablement requirement See Final Act. 36‒49.
Claims 1‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite for failing to particularly point out and distinctly claim the subject
matter regarded as the invention. See Final Act. 50‒52.
Claims 1‒5, 7, 11, 13, and 15‒20 stand rejected under 35 U.S.C. § 103
as unpatentable over Kuo (US 2012/0192252 A1; July 26, 2012), King (US
2012/0054834 A1; Mar. 1, 2012), and Shepard (US 2010/0229223 A1; Sept.
9, 2010) or, in the alternative, Fang (US 8,732,089 B1; May 20, 2014). See
Final Act. 52‒57.
To the base combination, the Examiner adds Li (US 2010/0106671
A1; Apr. 29, 2010) to reject claim 6 (see Final Act. 57); Knox (US
2012/0066744 A1; Mar. 15, 2012) to reject claims 8‒10 (see Final Act. 58‒
59); Guthrie (US 6,161,185; Dec. 12, 2000) to reject claim 12 (see Final Act.
59); and Peneder (US 2009/0276839 A1; Nov. 5, 2009) to reject claim 14
(see Final Act. 60).
ANALYSIS
Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter
An invention is patent eligible if it claims a “new and useful process,
machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101.
However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include
implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract
ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208,
216 (2014).
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In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we
are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo
and Alice. Alice, 573 U. S. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that
framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See
Alice, 573 U.S. at 219 (“On their face, the claims before us are drawn to the
concept of intermediated settlement, i.e., the use of a third party to mitigate
settlement risk.”); see also Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 611 (2010)
(“Claims 1 and 4 in petitioners’ application explain the basic concept of
hedging, or protecting against risk.”).
Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent ineligible,
include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental
economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski, 561 U.S. at 611);
mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and
mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Concepts
determined to be patent eligible include physical and chemical processes,
such as “molding rubber products” (Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 191
(1981)); “tanning, dyeing, making water-proof cloth, vulcanizing India
rubber, smelting ores” (id. at 183 n.7 (quoting Corning v. Burden, 56 U.S.
(15 How.) 252, 267–68 (1854))); and manufacturing flour (Benson, 409 U.S.
at 69 (citing Cochrane v. Deener, 94 U.S. 780, 785 (1876))).
In Diehr, the claim at issue recited a mathematical formula, but the
Supreme Court held that “[a] claim drawn to subject matter otherwise
statutory does not become nonstatutory simply because it uses a
mathematical formula.” Diehr, 450 U.S. at 176; see also id. at 191 (“We
view respondents’ claims as nothing more than a process for molding rubber
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products and not as an attempt to patent a mathematical formula.”). Having
said that, the Supreme Court also indicated that a claim “seeking patent
protection for that formula in the abstract . . . is not accorded the protection
of our patent laws, . . . and this principle cannot be circumvented by
attempting to limit the use of the formula to a particular technological
environment.” Id. (citation omitted) (citing Benson and Flook); see, e.g., id.
at 187 (“It is now commonplace that an application of a law of nature or
mathematical formula to a known structure or process may well be deserving
of patent protection.”).
If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second
step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the
elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive
concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-
eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A
claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to
ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to
monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (alterations in original) (quoting Mayo,
566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[]
fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id.
In January 2019, the PTO published revised guidance on the
application of § 101. USPTO’s January 7, 2019 Memorandum, 2019 Revised
Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (“Revised
Guidance”). Under that guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites:
(1) any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings
of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods
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of organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic
practice, or mental processes); and
(2) additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see Manual of Patent
Examining Procedure (“MPEP”) §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
Only if a claim (1) recites a judicial exception and (2) does not
integrate that exception into a practical application, do we then look to
whether the claim:
(3) adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial
exception that is not “well-understood, routine, conventional”
in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or
(4) simply appends well-understood, routine,
conventional activities previously known to the industry,
specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception.
See Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 1
Step 1 of the Revised Guidance asks whether the claimed subject
matter falls within the four statutory categories of patentable subject matter
identified by 35 U.S.C. § 101: process, machine, manufacture, or
composition of matter. See Revised Guidance. Claim 1 recites “[a]
computer-implemented method performed in a system.” Appellant does not
argue the Examiner erred in concluding claim 1 falls within the four
statutory categories of patentable subject matter. We agree with the
Examiner’s conclusion because claim 1 falls within the process category.
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Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 1
Under Step 2A, Prong 1 of the Revised Guidance, we determine
whether the claims recite any judicial exceptions, including certain
groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of
organizing human activity such as a fundamental economic practice, or
mental processes). See Revised Guidance.
The Examiner determines claim 1 is directed to a challenge-response
test to identify human users. See Final Act. 31. The Examiner determines the
claimed steps are no different than a human engaging in a multiple choice
test, a mental process that has long been performed using pencil and paper.
See Ans. 8. The Examiner determines the claims merely automate this
mental process using generic computers. See id.
Claim 1 recites “[a] computer-implemented method performed in a
system comprising a central processing unit, a network adaptor and a
memory.” These components perform the claimed method, including
“receiving . . . a request to access an Internet resource, the request being
received from a request originator”; “providing . . . to the request originator
a response comprising at least one challenge question and a plurality of
answer options responsive to the challenge question”; “receiving . . . from
the request originator a choice of one of the plurality of answer options”; and
“allowing or denying . . . the access to the Internet resource based on the
received choice of one of the plurality of answer options.” The claim
clarifies the nature of the answer options, reciting “wherein the plurality of
answer options comprise at least one answer of a first type which is a false
answer to the at least one challenge question and at least two answers of a
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second type, which are not false answers to the same at least one challenge
question.”
We agree with the Examiner that these limitations, under their
broadest reasonable interpretation, recite a challenge-response test to
distinguish human users from computer software. The steps of the claimed
method, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, recite concepts that
are performed in the human mind, including observations, evaluations, and
judgments. In particular, the “receiving . . . a request,” “providing . . . a
response,” and “receiving . . . a choice” steps comprise a series of
observations of question and answers. The “allowing or denying” step
comprises an evaluation or judgment of whether the provided information
indicates that the user is a human user or computer software. These steps
may be performed in the human mind or using pen and paper. Accordingly,
we conclude claim 1 recites concepts performed in the human mind, which
fall within the mental processes category of abstract ideas identified in the
Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2A, Prong 2
Under Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance, we next determine
whether the claims recite additional elements that integrate the judicial
exception into a practical application (see MPEP §§ 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h)).
The “additional elements” recited in claim 1 include “a central
processing unit,” “a network adaptor,” and “a memory.” None of these
additional elements constitute “additional elements that integrate the
exception into a practical application.”
To integrate the exception into a practical application, the additional
claim elements must, for example, improve the functioning of a computer or
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any other technology or technical field (see MPEP § 2106.05(a)), apply the
judicial exception with a particular machine (see MPEP § 2106.05(b)), affect
a transformation or reduction of a particular article to a different state or
thing (see MPEP § 2106.05(c)), or apply or use the judicial exception in
some other meaningful way beyond generally linking the use of the judicial
exception to a particular technological environment (see MPEP
§ 2106.05(e)). See Revised Guidance.
Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to an improvement to computer
technology, not an abstract idea. See Appeal Br. 7‒12; Reply Br. 2.
Appellant argues the task of determining whether a user is a human or
computer is a critical task to the Internet infrastructure. See Appeal Br. 8.
Appellant argues this task was traditionally performed by humans using
empirical techniques, not by computer systems, and therefore the claimed
invention allows computers to perform a function not previously
performable by computers. See id. (citing McRO, Inc. v. Bandai Namco
Games Am. Inc., 837 F.3d 1299 (Fed. Cir. 2016); Enfish, LLC v. Microsoft
Corp., 822 F.3d 1327 (Fed. Cir. 2016)). Appellant also argues the claims
recite a particular solution to a particular problem, not merely the idea of a
solution or outcome. Id. at 9.
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. Claim 1 recites
providing a challenge question and a plurality of answer options in response
to the challenge question, where the answer options include at least one false
answer and at least two answers that are not false. The claim recites allowing
or denying access to an Internet resource based on the user’s choice
responsive to this challenge question. Thus, claim 1 focuses on an evaluation
of an answer to a multiple-choice question, not on any particular
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improvement to technology. The critical task identified by Appellant—
distinguishing human users from computers—is purportedly improved by
the number of false and not false answers provided to the user, not any
improvement to the underlying technology. Thus, the improvements
identified by Appellant relate not to improved computers or other
technology, but to advantages achieved by the abstract idea itself.
Indeed, Appellant admits that “[t]his task was traditionally performed
by humans using empirical techniques and not by computer systems.”
Appeal Br. 8. Our reviewing court has “made clear that mere automation of
manual processes using generic computers does not constitute a patentable
improvement in computer technology.” Credit Acceptance Corp. v. Westlake
Servs., 859 F.3d 1044, 1055 (Fed. Cir. 2017). Like the claims in Credit
Acceptance, the focus of claim 1 is on the business practice of distinguishing
between human users and software applications, “and the recited generic
computer elements ‘are invoked merely as a tool.’” Id. (citing Enfish,
822 F.3d 1327); see also Versata Dev. Grp., Inc. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d
1306, 1334 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (collecting cases). The claimed additional
elements used to achieve the claimed results and are not focused on “a
specific means or method that improves the relevant technology.” McRO,
837 F.3d at 1314.
Appellant’s argument that the claims recite a particular solution to a
particular problem, and not the outcome, is unpersuasive. Claim 1 is not of
the same nature as the claims in McRO and Enfish. In McRO, the claimed
improvement allowed computers to produce accurate and realistic
animations that previously could only be produced by human animators.
McRO, 837 F.3d at 1313. The claims recited rules with certain
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characteristics that allowed the computer to perform the animations. Id.
Here, claim 1 broadly recites allowing or denying access to an Internet
resource based on a user’s choice responsive to a multiple-choice challenge
question. Appellant has not persuasively identified an improvement to the
underlying technology that arises from the format of the multiple-choice
question.
Similarly, in Enfish, the claims related to organization of data in a
table in computer memory and a system for indexing that data. Enfish, 822
F.3d at 1332. Claim 1, however, is not directed to such a technological
improvement, instead broadly reciting an evaluation of an answer to a
multiple-choice question.
Appellant also argues claim 1 requires the use of a computer and that
the recited method cannot be performed using paper and pencil. See Reply
Br. 2 (citing Synopsys Inc. v. Mentor Graphics Corp., 839 F.3d 1138 (Fed.
Cir. 2016). Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. First,
Appellant admits that the task of distinguishing humans from computers was
traditionally performed by humans using empirical techniques, not by
computers. Appeal Br. 8. Second, automating this task, as in claim 1, “does
not improve the functioning of the computer, make it operate more
efficiently, or solve any technological problem.” Trading Techs. Int’l, Inc. v.
IBG LLC, 921 F.3d 1378, 1384–85 (Fed. Cir. 2019). Rather, the claim
simply “includes instructions to implement an abstract idea on a computer”
and “does no more than generally link the use of a judicial exception to a
particular technological environment or field of use.” 2019 Revised
Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. at 55.
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Thus, Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error with respect
to Step 2A, Prong 2 of the Revised Guidance. We, therefore, conclude the
judicial exception is not integrated into a practical application under the
Revised Guidance.
Revised Guidance Step 2B
Under Step 2B of the Revised Guidance, we next determine whether
the claims recite an “inventive concept” that “must be significantly more
than the abstract idea itself, and cannot simply be an instruction to
implement or apply the abstract idea on a computer.” BASCOM Glob.
Internet Servs., Inc. v. AT&T Mobility LLC, 827 F.3d 1341, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2016). There must be more than “computer functions [that] are ‘well-
understood, routine, conventional activit[ies]’ previously known to the
industry.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 225 (second alteration in original) (quoting
Mayo, 566 U.S. at 73).
As discussed above, Appellant argues claim 1 is directed to an
improvement to computer technology. See Appeal Br. 7‒12; Reply Br. 2.
Appellant argues claim 1 does not simply recite well-known business
practices performed on a conventional computer. See Appeal Br. 11‒12.
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. As explained
above, Appellant’s argument that the claims recite an improvement to
computer technology is unpersuasive. Appellant’s argument that claim 1
does not simply recite well-known business practices is also unpersuasive.
Claim 1 recites a mental process, not an improvement to computer
technology. Appellant has not persuasively identified any “inventive
concept” sufficient to transform the claims from an abstract idea to a patent-
eligible application. For these reasons, we agree with the Examiner (see
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Final Act. 31‒35) that the claims do not recite an “inventive concept”
sufficient to transform the claims from an abstract idea to a patent-eligible
application. We, therefore, sustain the patent-ineligible subject matter
rejection of claim 1. We also sustain the rejection of independent claims 16
and 20, which Appellant argues are patent eligible for the same reasons. See
Appeal Br. 8‒12; Reply Br. 2. We also sustain the rejection of dependent
claims 2‒15 and 17‒19, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments.
See id.

Written Description
The Examiner finds claim 1 lacks written-description support for the
limitations “false answer” and “not false answer.” See Final Act. 35‒36;
Ans. 19‒21. In particular, the Examiner finds the Specification is silent
regarding answers being false or not false, instead describing answers are
“right” or “obviously wrong.” See Ans. 20.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because the Specification
sufficiently describes presenting answers that are right, which equates to not
false, and obviously wrong, which equates to false. See Appeal Br. 13 (citing
Spec. ¶¶ 50‒52). We agree with Appellant.
The fundamental factual inquiry is whether the specification conveys
with reasonable clarity to those skilled in the art that, as of the filing date
sought, applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed. See,
e.g., Vas-Cath, Inc. v. Mahurkar, 935 F.2d 1555, 1564 (Fed. Cir. 1991).
“[T]he written description requirement is satisfied by the patentee’s
disclosure of ‘such descriptive means as words, structures, figures, diagrams,
formulates, etc., that fully set forth the claimed invention.’” Enzo Biochem,
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Inc. v. Gen-Probe Inc., 323 F.3d 956, 969 (Fed. Cir. 2002) (quoting
Lockwood v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 107 F.3d 1565, 1572 (Fed. Cir. 1997)). We
agree with Appellant that an ordinarily skilled artisan would have
understood the applicant was in possession of the invention as now claimed
by disclosing examples including answers that are right, which equates to
“not false,” as claimed, and obviously wrong, which equates to “false,” as
claimed.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s written-description
rejection of claim 1. We also do not sustain the written-description rejection
of independent claims 16 and 20, which recite commensurate subject matter,
or dependent claims 2‒15 and 17‒19.
Enablement
The Examiner rejects claim 1 as failing to satisfy the enablement
requirement because the Specification does not sufficiently describe how an
ordinarily skilled artisan would practice the invention as claimed without
undue experimentation with respect to the “false answer” and “not false
answer” limitations. See Final Act. 36‒49; Ans. 21‒25.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred because an ordinarily skilled
artisan would understand the scope of the limitations “false answer” and
“not false answer.” See Appeal Br. 14. We agree with Appellant for the
same reasons as discussed above with respect to the written-description
rejection. Accordingly, we do not sustain the Examiner’s enablement
rejection of claim 1. We also do not sustain the enablement rejection of
independent claims 16 and 20, which recite commensurate subject matter, or
dependent claims 2‒15 and 17‒19.
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Indefiniteness
Claim 1 recites, in relevant part, “providing . . . to the request
originator a response comprising at least one challenge question and a
plurality of answers options responsive to the challenge question.” The
Examiner rejects claim 1 as indefinite because “a plurality of answer options
responsive to the challenge question” lacks antecedent basis for “the
challenge question.” Appellant does not argue the Examiner has erred in
rejecting claim 1 for this reason. See Appeal Br. 15. Accordingly, we
summarily sustain the indefiniteness rejection of claim 1. We also
summarily sustain the indefiniteness rejection of independent claims 16 and
20 and dependent claims 3, 5‒15, 17, and 18, for which Appellant offers no
separate argument. See id.
The Examiner also rejects claim 1 as indefinite because the limitations
“false answer” and “not false answer” are “unclear as to the metes and
bounds of an answer which is either an ‘incorrect answer’ versus a ‘correct
answer.’ It is unclear as to what answers qualify as either ‘incorrect’ or
‘correct.’” Final Act. 50. The Examiner’s rejection fails to address the
current language of the claims, which recites “false answer” and “not false
answer.” Appellant argues the Examiner’s rejection is in error. See Appeal
Br. 15. We agree. An ordinarily skilled artisan would understand the metes
and bounds of the limitations “false answer” and “not false answer,”
particularly in light of the examples in the Specification. See Spec. ¶¶ 50‒52.
Accordingly, we do not sustain the rejection of claims 1‒20 as indefinite for
reciting “false answer” and “not false answer.”
The Examiner rejected claim 2 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as being
indefinite for the additional reason that the limitation “would normally be
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understood by the human user but not by a computer” is indefinite. See Final
Act. 51. The Examiner rejected claims 4 and 19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b) as
being indefinite for the additional reason that “a past” is indefinite. See id.
Appellant has not argued that these rejections are in error. See Appeal
Br. 15. Accordingly, we summarily sustain the rejection of claims 2, 4, and
19 under 35 U.S.C. § 112(b).
Obviousness
We have reviewed the Examiner’s obviousness rejections in light of
Appellant’s contentions that the Examiner has erred. We disagree with
Appellant’s contentions. Except as noted below, we adopt as our own: (1)
the findings and reasons set forth in the obviousness rejections by the
Examiner in the action from which this appeal is taken and (2) the reasons
set forth by the Examiner in the Examiner’s Answer in response to
Appellant’s Appeal Brief related to the obviousness rejections. We concur
with the conclusions reached by the Examiner related to obviousness. We
highlight the following additional points.
Appellant argues the Examiner erred in rejecting claim 1 as
unpatentable over Kuo, King, and Shepard or Fang. See Appeal Br. 16‒18;
Reply Br. 5‒6. In particular, Appellant argues none of the cited references
teaches or suggests “wherein the plurality of answer options comprise at
least one answer of a first type which is a false answer to the at least one
challenge question and at least two answers of a second type, which are not
false answers to the same at least one challenge question.” See id. Appellant
argues the Examiner’s reliance on Fang for this limitation is misplaced
because although Fang teaches a plurality of answers, Fang is silent
regarding how many false and not false answers are present in its test. See
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Appeal Br. 18 (citing Fang, Figs. 4, 5); Reply Br. 5‒6 (citing Fang,
Figs. 4, 5).
Appellant has not persuaded us of Examiner error. The Examiner
finds Fang teaches a plurality of answer options including at least one
answer which is a false answer and at least two answers which are not false
answers. See Final Act. 55 (citing Fang, Figs. 4, 5, 2:15‒16, 7:55‒8:12, 9:3‒
35, 10:7‒11:59). Fang teaches presenting a user with a plurality of answer
options to a challenge question. See, e.g., Fang 9:3‒35. These answer
options may include at least two correct answers and several incorrect
answers. See id. Thus, contrary to Appellant’s argument, Fang explicitly
teaches how many false and not false answers are present in its test.
Accordingly, we sustain the obviousness rejection of claim 1. We also
sustain the obviousness rejection of independent claims 16 and 20, which
Appellant argues are patentable for the same reasons. See Appeal Br. 16‒22;
Reply Br. 5‒6. We also sustain the obviousness rejection of dependent
claims 2‒15 and 17‒19, for which Appellant relies on the same arguments.
See id.
DECISION SUMMARY
In summary:
Claims
Rejected
35
U.S.C.
§
Reference(s)/Basis Affirmed Reversed
1‒20 101 Eligibility 1‒20
1‒20 112(a) Written Description 1‒20
1‒20 112(a) Enablement 1‒20
1‒20 112(b) Indefiniteness 1‒20
1‒5, 7, 11, 13,
15‒20
103 Kuo, King,
Shepard/Fang
1‒5, 7, 11,
13, 15‒20

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6 103 Kuo, King,
Shepard/Fang, Li
6
8‒10 103 Kuo, King,
Shepard/Fang, Knox
8‒10
12 103 Kuo, King,
Shepard/Fang, Guthrie
12
14 103 Kuo, King,
Shepard/Fang, Peneder
14
Overall
Outcome
1‒20

CONCLUSION
Because we have sustained at least one ground of rejection with
respect to each claim on appeal, we affirm the decision of the Examiner
rejecting claims 1‒20. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.50(a)(1).
TIME PERIOD FOR RESPONSE
No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with
this appeal may be extended under 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a). See 37 C.F.R.
§ 41.50(f).

AFFIRMED