David Colvin et al.Download PDFPatent Trials and Appeals BoardAug 2, 201913788065 - (D) (P.T.A.B. Aug. 2, 2019) Copy Citation UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE United States Patent and Trademark Office Address: COMMISSIONER FOR PATENTS P.O. Box 1450 Alexandria, Virginia 22313-1450 www.uspto.gov APPLICATION NO. FILING DATE FIRST NAMED INVENTOR ATTORNEY DOCKET NO. CONFIRMATION NO. 13/788,065 03/07/2013 David Colvin GAMA92PUSP6 8097 144762 7590 08/02/2019 BROOKS KUSHMAN P.C./Gaming Arts, Z4 Poker 1000 TOWN CENTER TWENTY-SECOND FLOOR SOUTHFIELD, MI 48075 EXAMINER SKAARUP, JASON M ART UNIT PAPER NUMBER 3715 NOTIFICATION DATE DELIVERY MODE 08/02/2019 ELECTRONIC Please find below and/or attached an Office communication concerning this application or proceeding. The time period for reply, if any, is set in the attached communication. Notice of the Office communication was sent electronically on above-indicated "Notification Date" to the following e-mail address(es): docketing@brookskushman.com PTOL-90A (Rev. 04/07) UNITED STATES PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE ____________ BEFORE THE PATENT TRIAL AND APPEAL BOARD ____________ Ex parte DAVID COLVIN and ERIC D. COLVIN ____________ Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 Technology Center 3700 ____________ Before JENNIFER D. BAHR, EDWARD A. BROWN, and WILLIAM A. CAPP, Administrative Patent Judges. BROWN, Administrative Patent Judge. DECISION ON APPEAL STATEMENT OF THE CASE Appellant1 seeks review under 35 U.S.C. § 134(a) of the Examiner’s decision rejecting claims 1–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent- ineligible subject matter. We have jurisdiction under 35 U.S.C. § 6(b). We AFFIRM. 1 Gaming Arts, LLC (“Appellant”) is the Applicant and also identified as the real party in interest. 37 C.F.R. § 1.46; Br. 1. Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 2 CLAIMED SUBJECT MATTER Claims 1 and 14 are independent claims. Claim 1 illustrates the claimed subject matter: 1. An electronic gaming machine comprising: a memory device configured to store instructions that are executable by a processor to provide a game of chance in which a plurality of house indicia is selected from a pool of house indicia; an input device configured to receive a physical item associated with a monetary value; a user interface configured to: enable the player to select one or more wagers for the game of chance; and enable the player to initiate a cash out operation; and a processor coupled to said memory device for executing the instructions, wherein, when said processor executes the instructions, said processor is programmed to: add the monetary value to a credit balance for the player; deduct the selected wager from the credit balance; provide a first bingo pattern to be matched upon a determination that a player entered a first wager; provide at least one second bingo pattern to be matched upon a determination that the player entered a second wager; randomly select a plurality of house indicia from the pool of house indicia; determine whether the first bingo pattern is matched by determining whether each player indicia within the first bingo pattern is matched by one of the selected plurality of house indicia; determine whether the at least one second bingo pattern is matched by determining whether each player indicia within the at least one second bingo pattern is matched by at least one of the selected plurality of house indicia; determine that the player wins a first prize upon the determination that the first bingo pattern is matched; Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 3 determine that the player wins at least a second prize upon the determination that the at least one second bingo pattern is matched; and decrease the credit balance in response to the cash out operation. Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1). ANALYSIS Patent-Ineligible Subject Matter An invention is patent-eligible if it claims a “new and useful process, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter.” 35 U.S.C. § 101. However, the Supreme Court has long interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 101 to include implicit exceptions: “[l]aws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas” are not patentable. E.g., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 216 (2014). In determining whether a claim falls within an excluded category, we are guided by the Supreme Court’s two-step framework, described in Mayo and Alice. Id. at 217–18 (citing Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 75–77 (2012)). In accordance with that framework, we first determine what concept the claim is “directed to.” See Alice, 573 U.S. at 219. Concepts determined to be abstract ideas, and thus patent-ineligible, include certain methods of organizing human activity, such as fundamental economic practices (Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20; Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593 (2010)); mathematical formulas (Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 594–95 (1978)); and mental processes (Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 69 (1972)). Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 4 If the claim is “directed to” an abstract idea, we turn to the second step of the Alice and Mayo framework, where “we must examine the elements of the claim to determine whether it contains an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent- eligible application.” Alice, 573 U.S. at 221 (quotation marks omitted). “A claim that recites an abstract idea must include ‘additional features’ to ensure ‘that the [claim] is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the [abstract idea].’” Id. (quoting Mayo, 566 U.S. at 77). “[M]erely requir[ing] generic computer implementation[] fail[s] to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention.” Id. On January 7, 2019, the PTO issued revised guidance on the application of § 101. See 2019 Revised Patent Subject Matter Eligibility Guidance, 84 Fed. Reg. 50 (hereinafter “2019 Guidance”). The 2019 Guidance includes steps 2A and 2B. Under Step 2A, Prong One, of the guidance, we first look to whether the claim recites any judicial exceptions, including certain groupings of abstract ideas (i.e., mathematical concepts, certain methods of organizing human activities such as a fundamental economic practice, or mental processes). See id. at 54. If a claim recites a judicial exception, we proceed to Step 2A, Prong Two, and determine whether the claim recites additional elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application. See id.; see also MPEP § 2106.05(a)–(c), (e)–(h). Only if a claim both recites a judicial exception and fails to integrate the judicial exception into a practical application, do we proceed to Step 2B of the guidance. At this step, we determine whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 5 understood, routine, conventional” in the field (see MPEP § 2106.05(d)); or simply appends well-understood, routine, conventional activities previously known to the industry, specified at a high level of generality, to the judicial exception. See 84 Fed. Reg. 56. Claim Grouping Appellant argues claims 1–26 together (Br. 3–13), and also presents argument for claims 1–13 together (id. at 13–14) and for claims 14–26 together (id. at 14–15) in contesting the rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 101. We select claims 1 and 14 as the representative claims to decide the appeal of this rejection. See 37 C.F.R. § 41.37(c)(1)(iv). Claims 2–13 stand or fall with claim 1 and claims 15–26 stand or fall with claim 14. Step 2A, Prong One – Recitation of Judicial Exception The Examiner determines that claims 1–26 recite an abstract idea; namely, rules for “managing or conducting a game.” Final Act. 6–7. The Examiner determines that managing or conducting a game, as claimed, is similar to the kind of “organizing human activity” and “fundamental economic practice” at issue in Alice. Id. at 7. The Examiner also determines that the abstract idea of managing a game is similar to the abstract ideas of: managing risk (hedging) during consumer transactions (Bilski); mitigating settlement risk in financial transactions (Alice); managing a game of bingo Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 6 (Planet Bingo2); and rules for conducting a wagering game (In re Smith3). Id. Claim 1 We agree with the Examiner that claim 1 recites an abstract idea. In fact, claim 1 recites several. Claim 1 is directed to an electronic gaming machine comprising “a memory device,” “an input device,” “a user interface,” and “a processor” “configured to” or “programmed to” execute instructions to provide a game of chance. Br. (Claims App. 1). With the claimed user interface, “the player . . . select[s] one or more wagers for the game of chance . . . and . . . initiate[s] a cash out operation.” Id. (Claims App. 1). These limitations pertaining to the input device and user interface involve player actions in playing the game of chance, which, as claimed, is a wagering game. Conducting and managing wagering games relates to following rules or instructions, which is an example of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people. This example is one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.13. Claim 1 further recites that the “processor executes the instructions.” Appeal Br. (Claims App. 1). The instructions include, inter alia, “add the monetary value to a credit balance for the player,” “deduct the selected wager from the credit balance,” and “decrease the credit balance in response to the cash out operation.” Id. (emphasis added). Under their broadest reasonable interpretation, these limitations each involve performing a mathematical calculation using simple addition or subtraction to change or 2 Planet Bingo, LLC v. VKGS LLC, 576 F. App’x 1005 (Fed. Cir. 2014). 3 In re Smith, 815 F.3d 816 (Fed. Cir. 2016). Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 7 determine the player’s current credit balance. According to the 2019 Guidance, mathematical relationships, mathematical formulas or equations, and mathematical calculations are mathematical concepts, which is one of the groupings of abstract ideas. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.12. The recited instructions also include “provide a first bingo pattern to be matched upon a determination that a player entered a first wager,” “provide at least one second bingo pattern to be matched upon a determination that the player entered a second wager,” and “randomly select a plurality of house indicia from the pool of house indicia.” Br. (Claims App. 1) (emphasis added). The instructions further include “[(i)] determine whether the first bingo pattern is matched by determining whether each player indicia within the first bingo pattern is matched by one of the selected plurality of house indicia,” “[ii] determine whether the at least one second bingo pattern is matched by determining whether each player indicia within the at least one second bingo pattern is matched by at least one of the selected plurality of house indicia,” “[iii] determine that the player wins a first prize upon the determination that the first bingo pattern is matched,” and “[iv] determine that the player wins at least a second prize upon the determination that the at least one second bingo pattern is matched.” Id. (Claims App. 1) (emphasis added). The “provide,” “randomly select,” and “determine” limitations (i)-(iv) involve conducting and managing a wagering game by following rules or instructions, which, as noted, is an example of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, and one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.13. Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 8 The “determine” limitations (i) and (ii) involve comparing the first and second bingo patterns to the randomly-selected house indicia to determine whether there is matching. Under their broadest reasonable interpretation, these limitations firstly involve concepts performed in the human mind including observation, evaluation, judgment, and opinion, which are mental processes. These limitations secondly involve mathematical concepts; namely, using mathematical relationships in determining whether there is matching (correspondence) between each player indicia within the first and second bingo patterns and one of the house indicia. As noted, mathematical relationships are a mathematical concept, which is one of the groupings of abstract ideas. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.12; see also SAP America, Inc. v. InvestPic, LLC, 898 F.3d 1161, 1163 (Fed. Cir. 2018) (holding that claims to a ‘‘series of mathematical calculations based on selected information’’ are directed to abstract ideas). The “determine” limitations (iii) and (iv) involve providing a first prize and/or a second prize to the player when matching occurs in playing the game of chance. These limitations involve conducting and managing a wagering game by following rules or instructions, and thus fall within one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n. 13. Appellant contends that “each of . . . [the] claims includes a number of features or steps that are not mental steps, and cannot be carried out by a human using pen and paper, or by a general-purpose computer.” Appeal Br. 11. However, Appellant fails to identify with specificity which particular “features or steps” in claim 1 are not mental steps and cannot be carried out by a human using pen and paper, or by a general-purpose computer. In that Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 9 regard, the recitation of computer components does not, by itself, establish that the claim does not recite mental steps. See, e.g., Versata Dev. Grp. v. SAP Am., Inc., 793 F.3d 1306, 1335 (Fed. Cir. 2015) (‘‘Courts have examined claims that required the use of a computer and still found that the underlying, patent-ineligible invention could be performed via pen and paper or in a person’s mind.’’). Also, “performance of a claim limitation using generic computer components does not necessarily preclude the claim limitation from being in the mathematical concepts grouping, Benson, 409 U.S. at 67, or the certain methods of organizing human activity grouping, Alice, 573 U.S. at 219–20.” See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.14. Accordingly, this contention is not persuasive. Claim 14 We also agree with the Examiner that claim 14 recites an abstract idea. In fact, claim 14, like claim 1, recites several abstract ideas. Claim 14 is directed to “a method of providing a game of chance in which a plurality of house indicia is selected from a pool of house indicia.” Br. (Claims App. 3). The method of claim 14 comprises “receiving” steps, which are closely similar to the limitations pertaining to the input device and user interface recited in claim 1, and steps of “adding,” “deducting,” “providing,” “randomly selecting,” determining,” “enabling,” and “decreasing,” which are closely similar to the instructions recited in claim 1. Id. The receiving steps in claim 14 involve wagering actions by the player in playing the game of chance. These steps relate to following rules or instructions, which is an example of managing personal behavior or relationships or interactions between people, one of certain methods of organizing human activity identified in the 2019 Guidance. See 2019 Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 10 Guidance at 52 n.13. Under their broadest reasonable interpretation, the adding, deducting, and decreasing steps involve performing mathematical calculations, a mathematical concept, which is one of the groupings of abstract ideas. See 2019 Guidance at 52 n.12. And, under their broadest reasonable interpretation, the providing, randomly selecting, and determining steps involve both mental processes and mathematical concepts, and thus, abstract ideas under the 2019 Guidance. See id. at 52 nn.12–13. Because we conclude that each of claims 1 and 14 recites an abstract idea, we proceed to Prong Two to determine whether these claims are “directed to” the judicial exception. Step 2A, Prong Two – Practical Application We next determine whether the recited judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of that exception by: (a) identifying whether there are any additional elements recited in the claim beyond the judicial exception(s); and (b) evaluating those additional elements individually and in combination to determine whether they integrate the exception into a practical application. This evaluation requires an additional element or a combination of additional elements in the claim to apply, rely on, or use the judicial exception in a manner that imposes a meaningful limit on the judicial exception, such that the claim is more than a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. When the judicial exception is integrated into a practical application of the exception, the claim is not “directed to” the judicial exception. See 2019 Guidance at 54. Appellant contends that claims 1 and 14 are not directed to a “fundamental economic practice” or “organizing human activity” as claimed Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 11 in Alice, managing a game of bingo as claimed Planet Bingo, or conducting a wagering game as claimed in Smith. Br. 4. Rather, Appellant contends, claim 1 is directed to “an electronic gaming machine that includes hardware specific to electronic gaming machines and not found on a general-purpose computer,” and claim 14 is directed to “a statutory process or method for providing a game of chance on a statutory electronic gaming machine, not a general-purpose computer.” Id. Appellant contends that the claimed electronic gaming machine “is a special purpose machine that includes components such as an input device configured to receive a physical item associated with a monetary value, such as currency or tickets, for example.” Id. (emphasis added). Appellant contends that its position is supported by the absence of any claim rejection under 35 U.S.C. § 102 or § 103. Id. at 5. According to Appellant, the claims “are directed to a new and non-obvious special- purpose electronic gaming machine that includes components that are NOT found on a general-purpose computer to implement a game that is NOT a conventional process or game found in the prior art.” Id. Appellant contends that, in contrast, Smith’s claimed method is directed to purely conventional activity performed by a dealer. Id. at 6. Appellant asserts that Smith states, “‘Abstract ideas, including a set of rules for a game, may be patent-eligible if they contain an ‘inventive concept’ sufficient to ‘transform’ the claimed abstract idea into a patent-eligible application.’” Id. at 6–7. Appellant contends that its claims contain such an inventive concept. Id. at 7. Appellant contends its “claims not merely directed to ‘rules for conducting a wagering game’ and are not performed by a dealer as recited in the rejected claims [in Smith].” Id. at 8–9. According to Appellant, “the Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 12 gaming machine features not found on a general-purpose computer are sufficient to transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible machine and process based on the Court’s decision in [Smith].” Id. at 9. These contentions are not persuasive. Applying the 2019 Guidance, the additional elements in claim 1 beyond the judicial exceptions identified above are the “memory device configured to store instructions that are executable by a processor to provide a game of chance in which a plurality of house indicia is selected from a pool of house indicia”; an input device; a user interface; and a processor coupled to the memory device. These electronic elements are also recited in the method steps in claim 14. Appellant asserts that “an electronic gaming machine having an input device configured to receive a physical item associated with a monetary value” is directed to a statutory machine. Appeal Br. 9. Appellant does not, however, explain persuasively, or provide any evidence that shows, why the claimed input device is a special purpose (or particular) element or machine. The input device limitation is recited at a high level of generality, without any specifics of how the input device receives the physical item of value or even of the item itself. Thus, the limitation amounts to nothing more than a generic and nonspecific means of accepting currency to be used for wagers in the wagering game, that is, a drafting effort designed to monopolize the exception. Regarding the other electronic elements recited in claims 1 and 14, paragraphs 87, 121, and 122, for example, of the Specification describe that the memory device and processor are not limited. Appellant appears to contend that the claimed processor does not perform a generic function, but rather, “adds the monetary value of the physical item to a credit balance, Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 13 deducts the wager from the credit balance, presents the game to the player, and determines an outcome based on indicia randomly selected by the machine.” Id. at 13. Appellant does not, however, explain persuasively, or provide supporting evidence that shows, why these are more than generic operations performed in an electronic gaming machine, such as a slot machine. And, as described in the Specification at paragraph 125, for example, the user interface likewise is not limited. Absent persuasive evidence to the contrary, we determine that claims 1 and 14 merely use a generic memory device, input device, user interface, and processor as tools to perform the abstract idea(s). See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Moreover, even if the memory device, input device, user interface, and/or processor recited in claim 1 may be “novel,” which Appellant does not establish with persuasive evidence, “[t]he ‘novelty’ of . . . the . . . [claim] itself, is of no relevance in determining whether the subject matter of a claim falls within the § 101 categories of possibly patentable subject matter.” See Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 188–189 (1981). Regarding Planet Bingo, Appellant contends that each of the present claims includes features that are significantly more than the generically claimed computer with generic input and output terminals recited in the rejected claims of Planet Bingo.” Br. 11. Appellant mentions “an input device configured to receive a physical item associated with a monetary value, [and] a user interface configured to enable a player to select a wager for at least one of the plurality of games and to initiate a cash out operation, and currency or tickets having a monetary value.” Id. For reasons discussed above, however, Appellant does not establish that the recited input device or user interface is a special purpose or particular element or machine. Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 14 Appellant’s contentions do not persuade us that the claims provide an improvement in the functioning of a computer, or an improvement to other technology or technical field, making them patent-eligible. Appellant asserts that “[t]he recitations of the instant claims solve a domain-specific problem related to electronic gaming machines.” Id. at 12. Appellant does not, however, identify the purported “domain-specific problem,” much less show how the claimed subject matter purportedly solves it. Appellant contends that the claims “do not attempt to preempt every application of the alleged abstract idea,” which weighs in favor of patent eligibility (id. at 11) and “[t]he recitations of the instant claims . . . do not attempt to pre-empt every application of the alleged abstract idea of managing a game . . . [and] the claims do not attempt to pre-empt every system or method of playing bingo, or playing a conventional game of bingo on a general-purpose computer” (id. at 12). Even if this contention is correct, we note “preemption may signal patent ineligible subject matter, [but] the absence of complete preemption does not demonstrate patent eligibility.” Ariosa Diagnostics, Inc. v. Sequenom, Inc., 788 F.3d 1371, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2015). Accordingly, this argument is unpersuasive. In Smith, the court concluded that the claimed “method of conducting a wagering game” was drawn to an abstract idea. Smith, 815 F.3d at 818 (“[a]pplicants’ claims, directed to rules for conducting a wagering game” are abstract). The court likened the claimed method to the method of exchanging financial obligations at issue in Alice. Id. at 819. Additionally, the court found that the method of conducting a wagering game was similar to the subject matter held to be patent-ineligible in Planet Bingo, 576 F. App’x at 1007, in which the court determined that the claims recite methods Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 15 for “managing a game of Bingo” “similar to the kind of ‘organizing human activity’ at issue in Alice.” Id. And, in In re Guldenaar, 911 F.3d 1157, 1160 (Fed. Cir. 2018), the court concluded that the claimed “method of playing a dice game” is directed to a method of conducting a wagering game, which like the patent-ineligible claims in Smith is drawn to an abstract idea. Claims 1 and 14 are, like the claims found to be patent-ineligible in these decisions, directed to conducting a wagering game. Claim 1 involves conducting and managing a game of chance played by a player using an electronic gaming machine. The recited limitations involve the player selecting wagers for the game of chance, managing the player’s credit balance based on the selected wager and cash out operation, matching the first and second bingo patterns provided by the player’s selected wagers, and determining whether the player wins a first or second prize based on the results of the matching. The limitations in claim 14 are similar to those recited in claim 1. Claims 1 and 14 merely use generic components as a tool to perform the abstract idea. See MPEP § 2106.05(f). Thus, apart from the limitations reciting an abstract idea, claims 1 and 14 do not recite additional claim elements that integrate the judicial exception into a practical application of the exception. We proceed to determine whether these claims recite an “inventive concept.” Step 2B – Inventive Concept For Step 2B of the analysis, we determine whether the claim adds a specific limitation beyond the judicial exception that is not “well- understood, routine, conventional” in the field. See 2019 Guidance. Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 16 The Examiner concludes that claim 1 does not include any additional elements that are sufficient to amount to significantly more than the abstract idea itself. Final Act. 7–8. We agree with the Examiner that the electronic gaming machine recited in claim 1 and the method recited in claim 14 merely use generic components as a tool to perform the abstract ideas. However, the application of an abstract idea using generic computer components does not transform the claim into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Alice, 573 U.S. at 212. Appellant references paragraphs 128–130 of the Specification as providing support for the input device in claim 1. Br. 1. We note that paragraph 130 describes that bill acceptor 404 receives paper currency, which is a physical item having a monetary value. However, the Examiner cites evidence (i.e., Parker4, Cannon5, and Walker6) showing that “an electronic gaming machine having a memory device, an input device configured to receive a physical item associated with a monetary value (e.g., acceptor), a user interface, and a processor to be conventional hardware or conventional activity.” Ans. 10–12 (emphasis added). For example, the passage in Cannon quoted by the Examiner states, “[t]he input devices of the present invention include conventional input devices such as . . . currency acceptors.” Id. at 11 (emphasis added). We agree with the Examiner that these additional elements do not transform the abstract idea into a patent-eligible application of the abstract idea. Final Act. 8. 4 US 5,016,879, issued May 21, 1991. 5 US 5,766,074, issued June 16, 1998. 6 US 2004/0147308 A1, published July 29, 2004. Appeal 2019-001231 Application 13/788,065 17 We thus sustain the rejection of claims 1 and 14 under 35 U.S.C. § 101. Claims 2–13 and 15–26 fall with claims 1 and 14, respectively. DECISION The rejection of claims 1–26 under 35 U.S.C. § 101 as directed to patent-ineligible subject matter is affirmed. No time period for taking any subsequent action in connection with this appeal may be extended according to 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(a)(1)(iv). AFFIRMED Copy with citationCopy as parenthetical citation