David B. Davies, Complainant,v.John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigations), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionOct 8, 2002
01A14882 (E.E.O.C. Oct. 8, 2002)

01A14882

10-08-2002

David B. Davies, Complainant, v. John Ashcroft, Attorney General, Department of Justice, (Federal Bureau of Investigations), Agency.


David B. Davies v. Department of Justice

01A14882

October 8, 2002

.

David B. Davies,

Complainant,

v.

John Ashcroft,

Attorney General,

Department of Justice,

(Federal Bureau of Investigations),

Agency.

Appeal No. 01A14882

Agency No. F-99-5352

DECISION

Complainant timely initiated an appeal from a final agency decision

(FAD) concerning his complaint of unlawful employment discrimination in

violation of the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967 (ADEA),

as amended, 29 U.S.C. � 621 et seq. The appeal is accepted pursuant to

29 C.F.R. � 1614.405. For the following reasons, the Commission affirms

the agency's final decision.

The record reveals that during the relevant time, complainant was

employed as a Photographic Technologist in the agency's Audio Video

and Image Analysis Unit, Laboratory Division, Investigative Support

Section in Washington, D.C. Complainant sought EEO counseling and

subsequently filed a formal complaint on May 27, 1999, alleging that he

was discriminated against on the bases of age (D.O.B. October 12, 1946)

and reprisal for prior protected activity when:

(1) on or about March 24, 1999, he was not promoted to the GS-14

level; and

on or about April 25, 1999, an employee under his supervision (CW1)

was reassigned to another unit.

At the conclusion of the investigation, complainant was informed of

his right to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge or

alternatively, to receive a final decision by the agency. Complainant

requested that the agency issue a final decision.

In its FAD, the agency concluded that assuming, arguendo, complainant

established a prima facie case of age discrimination, it nonetheless

articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its actions.

Specifically, the FAD found that complainant was not promoted to the

GS-14 level because he failed to meet the requirements necessary for

such promotion. The Unit Chief (S1) stated in her affidavit that she

did not recommend complainant for a promotion because he �did not show

the initiative to learn the job responsibilities of the other units so

that he could adequately supervise...in [her] absence.� (Report of

Investigation, Exhibit 11, page 5). S1 also stated that complainant

had an unprofessional attitude and despite repeatedly being told what

requirements were necessary for a promotion, he failed to accomplish them.

(R.O.I., Ex. 11, page 5).

The FAD also found that as to the issue of the transfer of an

employee formerly under complainant's supervision, S1 stated that

CW1was transferred after human resources determined that the work

CW1 was performing was incompatible with the unit to which he was

assigned. (R.O.I., Ex 11, page 4). The FAD found that the Section Chief

of ISS supported S1's contention that CW1 was transferred because his job

description and responsibilities were more appropriate to the Forensic

Studio Subunit. (R.O.I., Ex. 12, page 4-5). As to the basis of reprisal

discrimination, the FAD found that complainant failed to establish a prima

facie case, in that he had not engaged in any prior protected activity.

On appeal complainant reiterates his contention that S1 changed the

requirements for promotion to the GS-14 level to include supervisory

responsibilities, which had not previously been necessary for the

promotion. Complainant also alleges that the investigation was

incomplete. The agency requests that we affirm its FAD.

Complainant has alleged a claim of disparate treatment which is examined

under the three-part analysis first enunciated in McDonnell Douglas

Corporation v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); Loeb v. Textron, 600 F.2d 1003

(1st Cir. 1979) (requiring a showing that age was a determinative factor,

in the sense that "but for" age, complainant would not have been subject

to the adverse action at issue); and Hochstadt v. Worcester Foundation

for Experimental Biology, Inc., 425 F. Supp. 318, 324 (D. Mass.), aff'd,

545 F.2d 222 (1st Cir. 1976) (applying McDonnell Douglas to reprisal

cases). For complainant to prevail, he must first establish a prima

facie case of discrimination by presenting facts that, if unexplained,

reasonably give rise to an inference of discrimination, i.e., that a

prohibited consideration was a factor in the adverse employment action.

McDonnell Douglas, 411 U.S. at 802; Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters,

438 U.S. 567(1978). The burden then shifts to the agency to articulate a

legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for its actions. Texas Department of

Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248 , 253 (1981). Once the agency

has met its burden, the complainant bears the ultimate responsibility

to persuade the fact finder by a preponderance of the evidence that

the agency acted on the basis of a prohibited reason. St. Mary's Honor

Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502 (1993).

This established order of analysis in discrimination cases, in which the

first step normally consists of determining the existence of a prima

facie case, need not be followed in all cases. Where the agency has

articulated a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the personnel

action at issue, the factual inquiry can proceed directly to the third

step of the McDonnell Douglas analysis, the ultimate issue of whether

complainant has shown by a preponderance of the evidence that the

agency's actions were motivated by discrimination. United States Postal

Service Board of Governors v. Aikens, 460 U.S. 711 , 713-714 (1983);

Hernandez v. Department of Transportation, EEOC Request No. 05900159

(June 28, 1990); Peterson v. Department of Health and Human Services,

EEOC Request No. 05900467 (June 8, 1990).

Here, the Commission finds that, assuming, arguendo, complainant

established a prima facie case of age and reprisal discrimination,

the agency articulated legitimate, nondiscriminatory reasons for its

actions. Initially, we find that with respect to the transfer of CW1

from complainant's supervision, we concur with the agency's finding

that complainant has failed to establish that the agency's legitimate,

nondiscriminatory reasons were pretextual. As to being denied a promotion

to the GS-14 level, while the record reflects that there is some question

as to the exact requirements that needed to be met for promotion to GS-14,

we find that complainant has failed to establish, by a preponderance of

the evidence, that he was not promoted on the bases of unlawful reprisal

or age discrimination. Further, complainant has failed to show that

any changes in the requirements for obtaining a promotion to GS-14 that

occurred were undertaken so as to obstruct him in qualifying for the

GS-14 level. We note that although it is clear that two of complainant's

co-workers, outside of his protected class, were promoted to the GS-14

level before complainant, despite complainant having more seniority, the

record establishes that both employees had fulfilled the requirements

for promotion while complainant had not. Finally, with respect to

complainant's contention on appeal that the agency's investigation was

incomplete, we find that the agency conducted an investigation sufficient

to allow the Commission to make findings on the issues alleged.

Therefore, after a careful review of the record, including complainant's

contentions on appeal, the agency's response, and arguments and evidence

not specifically addressed in this decision, we affirm the FAD.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0701)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the complainant or the agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the policies,

practices, or operations of the agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party's timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. � 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive for

29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), 9-18 (November 9, 1999). All requests

and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of Federal

Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box 19848,

Washington, D.C. 20036. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. � 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT'S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0900)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official agency head

or department head, identifying that person by his or her full name and

official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal of your

case in court. "Agency" or "department" means the national organization,

and not the local office, facility or department in which you work. If you

file a request to reconsider and also file a civil action, filing a civil

action will terminate the administrative processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z1199)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request that the Court appoint

an attorney to represent you and that the Court permit you to file the

action without payment of fees, costs, or other security. See Title VII

of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended, 42 U.S.C. � 2000e et seq.;

the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended, 29 U.S.C. �� 791, 794(c).

The grant or denial of the request is within the sole discretion of

the Court. Filing a request for an attorney does not extend your time

in which to

file a civil action. Both the request and the civil action must be

filed within the time limits as stated in the paragraph above ("Right

to File A Civil Action").

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

October 8, 2002

__________________

Date