Dave Hunter, Jr., Complainant,v.Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.

Equal Employment Opportunity CommissionAug 18, 2011
0120081971 (E.E.O.C. Aug. 18, 2011)

0120081971

08-18-2011

Dave Hunter, Jr., Complainant, v. Patrick R. Donahoe, Postmaster General, United States Postal Service, (Southwest Area), Agency.




Dave Hunter, Jr.,

Complainant,

v.

Patrick R. Donahoe,

Postmaster General,

United States Postal Service,

(Southwest Area),

Agency.

Appeal No. 0120081971

Hearing No. 461-2006-00072X

Agency No. 4G-700-0080-06

DECISION

On March 18, 2008, Complainant filed an appeal from the Agency’s March

11, 2008, final order concerning his equal employment opportunity (EEO)

complaint alleging employment discrimination in violation of Section

501 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (Rehabilitation Act), as amended,

29 U.S.C. § 791 et seq. The Commission deems the appeal timely and

accepts it pursuant to 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a). For the following

reasons, the Commission AFFIRMS the Agency’s final order.

BACKGROUND

At the time of events giving rise to this complaint, Complainant was a

bidder as a T-6 Letter Carrier at the Agency’s Post Office facility

in Gretna, Louisiana. The record indicated that Complainant had been

employed with the Agency. On April 2, 2004, Complainant stopped working

for medical reasons. In November 2004, Complainant was diagnosed with

hypertensive vascular disease and applied for disability retirement with

the Office of Personnel Management. However, it was denied. On March

9, 2006, Complainant bid on the T-6 Letter Carrier position which was

awarded to him on March 13, 2006. The record showed that the position

entailed casing and delivering mail on five different routes when a

regular carrier was not working.

On March 17, 2006, Complainant underwent heart surgery. The Agency

asked Complainant on April 19, 2006, for medical certification that

he could perform the essential functions of the position. The record

indicated that Complainant failed to respond to the Agency’s request.

On April 24, 2006, the Agency disallowed the bid. The matter was raised

in a grievance. As a result, the Agency cancelled the bid rescission

to allow Complainant an opportunity to provide medical certification

that he could perform the duties of his bid position. Complainant again

failed to provide the information to the Agency. As a result, the Agency

disallowed his bid again.

On June 1, 2006, Complainant filed an EEO complaint alleging that

the Agency discriminated against him on the basis of disability

(hypertensive vascular disease) when, in April 2006; the Agency disallowed

Complainant’s bid to the T-6 Letter Carrier position.

At the conclusion of the investigation, the Agency provided Complainant

with a copy of the report of investigation and notice of his right

to request a hearing before an EEOC Administrative Judge (AJ).

Complainant timely requested a hearing. The Agency filed a motion

for summary judgment. The AJ assigned to the case determined that the

complaint did not warrant a hearing and over Complainant's objections,

issued a decision without a hearing on March 6, 2008.

The AJ determined that Complainant failed to establish that he was

subjected to discrimination in violation of the Rehabilitation Act.

The AJ noted that Complainant failed to establish coverage under the

Rehabilitation Act as a “qualified” individual with a disability,

noting that Complainant acknowledged that, based on the duties of the

bid position, he was not able to do the essential functions of the bid

position due to his medical condition. The Agency subsequently issued

a final order adopting the AJ’s finding that Complainant failed to

prove that the Agency subjected him to discrimination as alleged.

ANALYSIS AND FINDINGS

In rendering this appellate decision we must scrutinize the AJ’s legal

and factual conclusions, and the Agency’s final order adopting them,

de novo. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.405(a) (stating that a “decision

on an appeal from an Agency’s final action shall be based on a de

novo review . . .”); see also Equal Employment Opportunity Management

Directive for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614, at Chapter 9, § VI.B. (November 9,

1999) (providing that an administrative judge’s “decision to issue a

decision without a hearing pursuant to [29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)] will

be reviewed de novo”). This essentially means that we should look at

this case with fresh eyes. In other words, we are free to accept (if

accurate) or reject (if erroneous) the AJ’s, and Agency’s, factual

conclusions and legal analysis – including on the ultimate fact of

whether intentional discrimination occurred, and on the legal issue

of whether any federal employment discrimination statute was violated.

See id. at Chapter 9, § VI.A. (explaining that the de novo standard

of review “requires that the Commission examine the record without

regard to the factual and legal determinations of the previous decision

maker,” and that EEOC “review the documents, statements, and testimony

of record, including any timely and relevant submissions of the parties,

and . . . issue its decision based on the Commission’s own assessment

of the record and its interpretation of the law”).

We must determine whether it was appropriate for the AJ to have

issued a decision without a hearing on this record. The Commission's

regulations allow an AJ to issue a decision without a hearing when

he or she finds that there is no genuine issue of material fact.

29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g). This regulation is patterned after the

summary judgment procedure set forth in Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of

Civil Procedure. The U.S. Supreme Court has held that summary judgment

is appropriate where a court determines that, given the substantive legal

and evidentiary standards that apply to the case, there exists no genuine

issue of material fact. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242,

255 (1986). In ruling on a motion for summary judgment, a court’s

function is not to weigh the evidence but rather to determine whether

there are genuine issues for trial. Id. at 249. The evidence of the

non-moving party must be believed at the summary judgment stage and all

justifiable inferences must be drawn in the non-moving party’s favor.

Id. at 255. An issue of fact is "genuine" if the evidence is such that

a reasonable fact finder could find in favor of the non-moving party.

Celotex v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322-23 (1986); Oliver v. Digital

Equip. Corp., 846 F.2d 103, 105 (1st Cir. 1988). A fact is "material"

if it has the potential to affect the outcome of the case.

If a case can only be resolved by weighing conflicting evidence, issuing

a decision without holding a hearing is not appropriate. In the context

of an administrative proceeding, an AJ may properly consider issuing a

decision without holding a hearing only upon a determination that the

record has been adequately developed for summary disposition. See Petty

v. Dep’t of Def., EEOC Appeal No. 01A24206 (July 11, 2003). Finally,

an AJ should not rule in favor of one party without holding a hearing

unless he or she ensures that the party opposing the ruling is given

(1) ample notice of the proposal to issue a decision without a hearing,

(2) a comprehensive statement of the allegedly undisputed material facts,

(3) the opportunity to respond to such a statement, and (4) the chance

to engage in discovery before responding, if necessary. According to

the Supreme Court, Rule 56 itself precludes summary judgment “where the

[party opposing summary judgment] has not had the opportunity to discover

information that is essential to his opposition.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at

250. In the hearing context, this means that the administrative judge

must enable the parties to engage in the amount of discovery necessary

to properly respond to any motion for a decision without a hearing.

Cf. 29 C.F.R. § 1614.109(g)(2) (suggesting that an administrative judge

could order discovery, if necessary, after receiving an opposition to a

motion for a decision without a hearing). Upon review of the record,

we find that the AJ properly determined that there were no material

facts in dispute.

To bring a claim of disability discrimination, Complainant must first

establish that he is disabled within the meaning of the Rehabilitation

Act. For the purposes of analysis, we assume Complainant is an individual

with a disability. 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(g)(1).

However, upon review of this matter, the Commission concludes that

Complainant has failed to prove that the Agency was in violation of the

Rehabilitation Act. The Agency's requests for medical documentation to

ensure that Complainant was qualified for the position were appropriate

under the Rehabilitation Act. The record indicates that Complainant

had not been in working status with the Agency since 2004, due to his

medical condition. Further, Complainant had applied for a disability

retirement from the Agency. Therefore, when he won the T-6 bid position,

the Agency requested that Complainant provide medical documentation

showing that he was able to perform the essential functions of the bid

position. Complainant refused to provide updated medical documentation

and consequently, the Agency withdrew the bid. The Agency was unable

to determine if Complainant could perform the duties of the bid

position without the medical documentation. It should also be noted

that Complainant averred that he could not perform the duties of his

bid position. The Agency noted that it needed the requested medical

documentation to evaluate Complainant's possible need for a reasonable

accommodation that could have allowed him to perform the duties of his

bid position. It is clear that the Agency sought to engage Complainant in

the interactive process, but Complainant failed to participate. Therefore,

the Commission finds that Complainant has not demonstrated that the

Agency violated the Rehabilitation Act. EEOC Enforcement Guidance on

Reasonable Accommodation and Undue Hardship under the Americans with

Disabilities Act, EEOC No. 915.002, Question 6 (as revised Oct. 17, 2002).

CONCLUSION

Based on a thorough review of the record and the contentions on

appeal, including those not specifically addressed herein, we AFFIRM

the Agency’s final action implementing the AJ’s finding of no

discrimination.

STATEMENT OF RIGHTS - ON APPEAL

RECONSIDERATION (M0610)

The Commission may, in its discretion, reconsider the decision in this

case if the Complainant or the Agency submits a written request containing

arguments or evidence which tend to establish that:

1. The appellate decision involved a clearly erroneous interpretation

of material fact or law; or

2. The appellate decision will have a substantial impact on the

policies, practices, or operations of the Agency.

Requests to reconsider, with supporting statement or brief, must be filed

with the Office of Federal Operations (OFO) within thirty (30) calendar

days of receipt of this decision or within twenty (20) calendar days of

receipt of another party’s timely request for reconsideration. See 29

C.F.R. § 1614.405; Equal Employment Opportunity Management Directive

for 29 C.F.R. Part 1614 (EEO MD-110), at 9-18 (November 9, 1999).

All requests and arguments must be submitted to the Director, Office of

Federal Operations, Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, P.O. Box

77960, Washington, DC 20013. In the absence of a legible postmark, the

request to reconsider shall be deemed timely filed if it is received by

mail within five days of the expiration of the applicable filing period.

See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604. The request or opposition must also include

proof of service on the other party.

Failure to file within the time period will result in dismissal of your

request for reconsideration as untimely, unless extenuating circumstances

prevented the timely filing of the request. Any supporting documentation

must be submitted with your request for reconsideration. The Commission

will consider requests for reconsideration filed after the deadline only

in very limited circumstances. See 29 C.F.R. § 1614.604(c).

COMPLAINANT’S RIGHT TO FILE A CIVIL ACTION (S0610)

You have the right to file a civil action in an appropriate United States

District Court within ninety (90) calendar days from the date that you

receive this decision. If you file a civil action, you must name as

the defendant in the complaint the person who is the official Agency

head or department head, identifying that person by his or her full

name and official title. Failure to do so may result in the dismissal

of your case in court. “Agency” or “department” means the

national organization, and not the local office, facility or department

in which you work. If you file a request to reconsider and also file a

civil action, filing a civil action will terminate the administrative

processing of your complaint.

RIGHT TO REQUEST COUNSEL (Z0610)

If you decide to file a civil action, and if you do not have or cannot

afford the services of an attorney, you may request from the Court that

the Court appoint an attorney to represent you and that the Court also

permit you to file the action without payment of fees, costs, or other

security. See Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, as amended,

42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq.; the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, as amended,

29 U.S.C. §§ 791, 794(c). The grant or denial of the request is within

the sole discretion of the Court. Filing a request for an attorney with

the Court does not extend your time in which to file a civil action.

Both the request and the civil action must be filed within the time limits

as stated in the paragraph above (“Right to File A Civil Action”).

FOR THE COMMISSION:

______________________________

Carlton M. Hadden, Director

Office of Federal Operations

August 18, 2011

__________________

Date

2

0120081971

U.S. EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY COMMISSION

Office of Federal Operations

P.O. Box 77960

Washington, DC 20013

2

0120081971